Analysis of Key Definitions in 26 U.S.C. under the Canons of Statutory Construction

Background

The following analysis does not purport to know or understand any one of mankind’s individual situation or contractual relationships. It is very possible anyone reading this may be subject to legal taxation based on the definitions below and the voluntary “job” one has undertaken by their own volition. There is a vast swath of mankind who have committed themselves to the statutory system under 26 U.S.C. as a “person” in the commercial jurisdiction of the United States as defined therein. It is the responsibility of each man or woman to determine their obligations accordingly.

The taxing system is not unlawful, but it can be a system of acquiescence and opportunistic presumption. Ignorance of the law is not an excuse. This analysis is not a complaint and is not intended to blame those who created and maintain said taxation system.

I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

This evaluation provides a neutral, and strict legal analysis of the foundational definitions within Title 26 of the United States Code (the Internal Revenue Code, or I.R.C.). The purpose of this analysis is to delineate the intent and meaning of the legislature based solely on the text of the statute and the controlling rules of statutory construction, without reliance on subsequent agency interpretations, administrative presumptions, or judicial gloss that may deviate from the strict text.

The Five Canons of Statutory Construction

The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted strict rules, canons of construction, for interpreting statutory language. When Congress enacts a statute, it is presumed to legislate with these rules in mind. The five primary canons applied in this analysis are:

1. The Whole-Statute Rule: A statute must be read as a whole. A definition or provision must not be read in isolation but in the context of the entire statutory scheme, particularly its jurisdictional and geographic limitations.

2. Noscitur a Sociis (It is known by its associates): When a word is ambiguous or has multiple meanings, its meaning is determined by the words immediately surrounding it. Words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.

3. Ejusdem Generis (Of the same kind): When a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.

4. Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius (The expression of one is the exclusion of others): When a statute includes a list of specific items, any item not listed is presumed to be intentionally excluded by the legislature.

5. The Term of Art Rule: When a statute provides a specific, specialized definition for a common word, that statutory definition completely displaces the ordinary, everyday dictionary meaning of the word for the purposes of that statute.

Conceptual Framework

In accordance with the required conceptual framework for this analysis, the following distinctions are maintained throughout:

• Man or woman: Refers to the living essence, spirit, or soul, distinct from a statutory creation.

• Human: Refers to the physical form or outer shell.

• Individual: Used in its strict statutory sense as an “individual thing” or a separate entity, not presumed to be synonymous with a living man or woman unless the statute explicitly commands such a construction.

• Person / Natural Person: Analyzed strictly as statutory constructs or entities created by or subject to the code, avoiding the presumptive leap that a “natural person” is equivalent to a living man or woman without explicit statutory definition.

II. A CRITICAL DISTINCTION: “INCLUDES” VERSUS “MEANS”

Before analyzing specific terms, it is imperative to establish the statutory and common law rules governing the word “includes,” as this single word directly impacts the often expansive (and often erroneous) application of the I.R.C..

A. The Statutory Definition: 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c)

Statutory Text:

“The terms ‘includes’ and ‘including’ when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.”

Application of Canons: The IRS and federal courts frequently rely on this subsection to argue that “includes” is a term of universal expansion, meaning that if a statute says “employee includes a government officer,” it also captures everyone else in the private sector. This is a fatal misreading of the text.

The statute explicitly states that “includes” does not exclude other things “otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.” This is a codification of the canon of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind). If a term is defined to “include” A, B, and C, it can also include D and E, but only if D and E are of the exact same class and character as A, B, and C. It cannot be expanded to include X, Y, and Z if they are of a fundamentally different class.

B. “Means” vs. “Includes”

The legislature uses “means” and “includes” deliberately and distinctly throughout Title 26:

• “Means” is exhaustive and restrictive. When a statute says “X means Y,” X is Y and nothing else.

• “Includes” is illustrative but bounded by class. When a statute says “X includes Y,” X consists of Y and other unlisted items of the exact same legal class as Y.

In Treasury Treasury Decision 3980, Vol. 29, January-December, 1927, p. 64, the Treasury itself acknowledged: “The word ‘includes’ is a term of limitation, not of enlargement.” When the legislature lists specific government officers after the word “includes,” it is limiting the definition to that class of actors. It is not throwing the door open to the entire private sector. To read “includes” as a term of limitless expansion destroys the purpose of defining the term in the first place.

III. THE CONJUNCTIVE VERSUS THE DISJUNCTIVE: “AND” VERSUS “OR”

A critical layer of statutory construction that must be applied to the Internal Revenue Code is the precise distinction between the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or.” The legislature’s choice of these words dictates whether statutory conditions are cumulative (all must be met) or alternative (any one may be met). In the context of the I.R.C., the misapplication or conflation of these terms by administrative agencies often results in an unlawful expansion of jurisdiction.

A. The General Rule of Construction

The fundamental rule of statutory construction regarding conjunctions is that “and” is conjunctive, and “or” is disjunctive.

• “And” means that all listed conditions, elements, or requirements must be satisfied simultaneously. It joins things together.

• “Or” means that the listed conditions, elements, or requirements are alternatives. It separates things.

Courts have consistently held that these words are not interchangeable unless a strict literal reading would produce an absurdity clearly contrary to legislative intent. As the Supreme Court noted in Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930), courts cannot rewrite a statute to change “and” to “or” simply to aid the government in revenue collection. If the legislature wrote “and,” it meant “and.”

B. Application to Key I.R.C. Definitions

The distinction between “and” and “or” becomes critically important when analyzing the definitional chains in the I.R.C.

1. The Definition of “Person” — § 7701(a)(1)

“The term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”

Here, the legislature used the disjunctive “or.” This means a “person” can be any one of these distinct artificial entities or statutory constructs. It does not need to be all of them. However, because of the Ejusdem Generis canon (discussed above), the “or” connects items of the same class. An “individual” in this list is an alternative to a corporation or a trust, but it remains a member of the same class, an artificial statutory entity, not a living man or woman.

2. The Definition of “Employee” — § 3401(c)

“The term ‘employee’ includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term ‘employee’ also includes an officer of a corporation.”

The repeated use of “or” in this definition establishes alternative categories of government and corporate actors. A statutory employee can be an officer of the United States, or an elected official of a State, or an officer of a corporation. The disjunctive “or” provides multiple paths to statutory employee status, but every single path leads to a government office or a corporate fiduciary position. The “or” never provides a path to the private sector.

3. The FICA Chain: “Wages” and “Employment” — §§ 3121(a) and 3121(b) The interaction of “and” and “or” is most critical when moving between different statutory sections that must be read together.

To be liable for FICA, a party must receive “wages” (remuneration for employment) AND the activity must constitute “employment” (services performed by an employee within the United States).

The IRS often treats these conditions as disjunctive, acting as if receiving remuneration or performing a service is sufficient to trigger liability. But the statutory structure is strictly conjunctive. The definitions are nested. You cannot have “wages” without “employment,” and you cannot have “employment” without an “employee,” and you cannot have an “employee” outside the specifically enumerated government/corporate classes. If any one of these conjunctive requirements fails, the entire chain of liability breaks.

C. The Trap of “And/Or” Conflation

The most common administrative error (or deliberate overreach) is reading a conjunctive “and” as a disjunctive “or” to capture activity that only meets half the statutory requirement.

For example, a living man may receive remuneration for services performed. The IRS observes the remuneration and the service, and presumes FICA liability. But the statute requires remuneration AND statutory “employment” (which requires a statutory “employee” acting within the federal municipal jurisdiction). By ignoring the conjunctive requirement that the service must meet the strict statutory definition of “employment,” the agency unlawfully expands its reach.

When drafting correspondence or analyzing IRS claims, every “and” must be enforced as a hard requirement that the government must prove, and every “or” must be restricted to the specific class of alternatives the legislature actually wrote.

IV. ANALYSIS OF GENERAL PROVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS (26 U.S.C. § 7701)

Chapter 79 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 7701) provides the general definitions that apply throughout the title, “where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof.”

A. “Person” — 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1)

Statutory Text:

“The term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”

Application of Canons:

• Term of Art: The statute redefines “person” from its common meaning (a human being) to a specific list of entities.

• Noscitur a Sociis & Ejusdem Generis: The word “individual” appears in a list where every other item (trust, estate, partnership, association, company, corporation) is an artificial legal entity, a fiction of law created by statute or contract. By the company it keeps, “individual” in this context must be read as an “individual entity” or a single unit of the artificial classes listed, rather than a living man or woman.

• Expressio Unius: The legislature specifically listed artificial entities. It did not list “man,” “woman,” or “human being.” The exclusion of the living essence is presumed intentional.

Legislative Intent: The intent of the legislature was to define “person” as a category of legal fictions and artificial entities subject to the jurisdiction of the code. The term “individual” acts as a catch-all for a single entity of the type listed, not as a bridge to capture the living man or woman.

B. “United States” and “State” — 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(9) and (10)

Statutory Text:

(9) “The term ‘United States’ when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.”
(10) “The term ‘State’ shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.”

Application of Canons:

• Term of Art: The statute specifically defines geographical terms. In Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), the Supreme Court recognized three distinct meanings of “United States”: (1) the sovereign nation in international law, (2) the collective territory of the several sovereign states, and (3) the municipal corporation governing the federal territories and the District of Columbia.

• Expressio Unius: By defining “United States” to include only the “States and the District of Columbia,” and then defining “State” to include the District of Columbia, the legislature is utilizing the third Hooven definition—the federal municipal jurisdiction. The sovereign states of the Union (e.g., Pennsylvania, Texas) are conspicuously absent from the explicit enumerations when read strictly under this canon.

Legislative Intent: The definitions establish a strict territorial and jurisdictional boundary. The “United States” for the purposes of the I.R.C. is the federal municipal jurisdiction (the District of Columbia and federal territories/enclaves), not the sovereign territory of the fifty Union states.

C. “Trade or Business” — 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(26)

Statutory Text:

“The term ‘trade or business’ includes the performance of the functions of a public office.”

Application of Canons:

• Term of Art & Expressio Unius: The statute does not define “trade or business” as any activity engaged in for profit. It specifically defines it as the performance of the functions of a public office. If the legislature intended it to mean all commercial activity, it would have said so. By expressing “public office,” it excludes private, non-governmental commercial activity.

Legislative Intent: The intent is to capture the activities of government officers and those exercising delegated sovereign authority, bringing their compensation within the purview of the code. It does not encompass the private labor or private enterprise of a man or woman.

D. “Taxpayer” — 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(14)

Statutory Text:

“The term ‘taxpayer’ means any person subject to any internal revenue tax.”

Application of Canons:

• Whole-Statute Rule: This definition is circular and dependent. A “taxpayer” is a “person” (an artificial entity under (a)(1)) who is “subject to” a tax. To be “subject to” a tax, another specific section of the code must explicitly impose liability on that specific class of person for a specific activity.

• Term of Art: A “taxpayer” is not merely someone who pays taxes; it is a specific statutory status. A man or woman who is not an artificial entity (a “person”) and who has not engaged in a taxable activity (e.g., a “trade or business” / public office) cannot be a “taxpayer.”

Legislative Intent: The legislature intended “taxpayer” to be a restrictive legal classification, not a universal descriptor of the population. It requires both the correct statutory entity status and a specific statute imposing liability.

V. ANALYSIS OF INCOME TAX AND WITHHOLDING DEFINITIONS

A. “Income” (Gross Income) — 26 U.S.C. § 61

Statutory Text:

“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items; (2) Gross income derived from business...”

Application of Canons:

• Whole-Statute Rule: Section 61 must be read in conjunction with § 7701(a)(26). “Gross income derived from business” means income derived from a “trade or business,” which is defined as the performance of the functions of a public office.

• Term of Art: The Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), defined income strictly as “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.” It is a corporate/investment concept, representing a severable profit, not the direct exchange of a man’s labor for sustenance.

Legislative Intent: The intent is to tax the profit or gain derived from statutorily defined activities (such as holding a public office or operating as a federal corporation), not to tax the private, direct exchange of labor by a living man or woman.

B. “Employee” (Chapter 24 - Withholding) — 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c)

Statutory Text:

“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘employee’ includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term ‘employee’ also includes an officer of a corporation.”

Application of Canons:

• Whole-Statute Rule: The phrase “For purposes of this chapter” strictly limits this definition to Chapter 24 (Collection of Income Tax at Source).

• Noscitur a Sociis & Ejusdem Generis: The list consists entirely of government officials (officers, elected officials of the U.S., States, D.C., agencies) and corporate fiduciaries (officers of a corporation). The general term “employee” must be restricted to this same class, individuals exercising delegated authority for a government or a statutory corporation.

• Expressio Unius: The legislature detailed seven specific categories of government and corporate actors. It completely omitted private workers in the private sector. This omission is legally presumed to be intentional.

Legislative Intent: The legislature intended the withholding provisions of Chapter 24 to apply to the compensation of government officers, federal employees, and corporate officers, those who are engaged in a “trade or business” (public office) or operating under a federal charter. It did not intend to capture the private labor of a man or woman.

C. “Employer” — 26 U.S.C. § 3401(d)

Statutory Text:

“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘employer’ means the person for whom an individual performs or performed any service, of whatever nature, as the employee of such person...”

Application of Canons:

• Whole-Statute Rule: This definition is entirely dependent on the definition of “employee” in § 3401(c) and “person” in § 7701(a)(1).

• Term of Art: An “employer” is only an employer if the individual performing the service is a statutory “employee” (a government or corporate officer). If the worker is a private man or woman, the entity paying them is not a statutory “employer.”

Legislative Intent: The intent is to designate the government agencies and corporations that pay statutory “employees” as the entities responsible for withholding.

VI. ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT TAX (FICA) DEFINITIONS

A. “Wages” — 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)

Statutory Text:

“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘wages’ means all remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash...”

Application of Canons:

• Whole-Statute Rule: “Wages” is entirely dependent on the existence of statutory “employment.” If the activity is not “employment,” the remuneration is not “wages.”

B. “Employment” — 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)

Statutory Text:

“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘employment’ means any service, of whatever nature, performed... by an employee for the person employing him, irrespective of the citizenship or residence of either, (A) within the United States...”

Application of Canons:

• Whole-Statute Rule & Term of Art: This definition restricts “employment” to services performed “within the United States.” Applying the definition from § 7701(a)(9) and the Hooven doctrine, this means services performed within the federal municipal jurisdiction (D.C. and territories), not within the sovereign states of the Union.

Legislative Intent: The legislature intended FICA to apply territorially to the federal jurisdiction and statutorily to those engaged in government/corporate service.

C. “Employee” (FICA) — 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)

Statutory Text:

“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘employee’ means— (1) any officer of a corporation; or (2) any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee; or (3) any individual (other than an individual who is an employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who performs services for remuneration for any person [in specific enumerated categories like agent-drivers, life insurance salesmen, etc.]”

Application of Canons:

• Whole-Statute Rule: While paragraph (2) references “common law rules,” this cannot override the jurisdictional limitation of § 3121(b). The “common law” employee must still be performing services “within the United States” (the federal municipal jurisdiction).

• Ejusdem Generis: The specific enumeration of corporate officers (1) and highly regulated, licensed, or federally connected trades (3) restricts the broad language of (2) to individuals operating in a similar quasi-governmental, corporate, or federally regulated capacity within the federal territory.

Legislative Intent: The intent of the FICA definitions is to create a closed loop: “Wages” requires “employment,” which requires an “employee” performing services “within the United States.” The legislature did not intend to impose FICA taxes on the private exchange of labor by a man or woman occurring within a sovereign state, outside the federal municipal jurisdiction.

VII. CONCLUSION

When the definitions of Title 26 are read strictly according to the text enacted by the legislature and the Supreme Court’s established canons of statutory construction, without the interference of agency presumption or expansive judicial gloss, a clear, internally consistent framework emerges.

The Internal Revenue Code is a highly specific body of law designed to regulate and tax:

1. Artificial entities (”persons” such as corporations, trusts, and estates).

2. Individuals engaged in the performance of the functions of a public office (”trade or business”).

3. Government officers, elected officials, and corporate fiduciaries (”employees”).

4. Activities occurring within the federal municipal jurisdiction (”United States”).

The code does not, by its own text, capture the living man or woman engaged in the private exchange of labor within the sovereign states of the Union. The widespread application of the code to the private sector relies on the administrative presumption that the common, everyday meanings of words (like “employee” and “income”) apply, completely ignoring the fact that the legislature displaced those common meanings with highly restrictive statutory Terms of Art.

This analysis confirms that the jurisdictional and definitional boundaries established by the legislature are strict, narrow, and specifically exclude the private man or woman who has not voluntarily elected to act as a statutory entity or public officer.

If you believe you are a man or a woman who is not subject to the federal taxation system, it may be worth considering any current or past agreements you signed that impact that presumption. Did you sign a W4, 1040, or any other government taxation form? Did you use your SSN for said forms? Did you properly rescind these agreements when you became aware that you may not be one of these statutory entities? Is it on record with the place you work? Did you perform proper notice? If no, then the presumption in law stands. Complaining, getting angry, yelling at people, blaming those who created these forms and who allow you to agree, and stating you are a “man” will not fix the record. It is all about the evidence and agreements.

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Background

This document serves as the third part of an ongoing examination of the modern enforcement apparatus of Palantir and the second part of the examination of Lexipol and the outsourcing of Police policymaking, as well as the addition of the Flock Safety camera infrastructure. This article examines those States, agencies, Counties, and groups utilizing surveillance targeting of Palantir and Flock Safety as well as the policymaking materials of Lexipol and its affiliates.

This article seeks to synthesize these realities into a clear, benevolent understanding of how the system functions, not as a malicious conspiracy of individuals, but as an architecture of presumption. The goal is not to incite anger, but to foster awareness. When a man or woman understands the design of the system, fear is replaced by clarity, and reaction is replaced by informed, lawful action.

I. The Scale of the Apparatus: A Symptom of Design, Not a “Hit List”

The master reference table compiled in previous sections documents thousands of agencies, from the smallest municipal police departments to the highest levels of the federal government, utilizing Lexipol, Palantir, and Flock Safety.

It is vital to understand two things about this data:

1. It is not exhaustive. The documented deployments represent only what is publicly available or has been uncovered through audits and investigations. The true scale is likely much larger.

2. It is not a “hit list.” The officers, administrators, and municipal leaders employing these systems are, in the vast majority of cases, acting under the genuine belief that they are providing “public safety.” They are operating within the boundaries of the training they received (from entities like Police1) and the policies handed down to them (from entities like Lexipol).

The men and women wearing the badge are largely unaware of the constitutional bypass they are participating in. They do not see the MCO conversion, the commercial hook, or the delegation of sovereign authority. They see a tool that catches criminals. The liability lies in the design of the system and the corporate architects who built it, not necessarily the individual officer who was handed a tablet and told to use it. Although, as has been previously shown in other articles, qualified immunity does not exist due to the Scrivener’s Error in the compilation of 42 U.S. Code §1983 and §1985 and 18 U.S. Code §242 and §243.

II. The Driver’s License: An Article of Commerce, Not a Private Right

A central pillar of the surveillance apparatus, specifically the ALPR networks and data broker integrations, relies on the data associated with the driver’s license and vehicle registration.

Many people feel a deep sense of privacy violation when they realize their movements are being tracked via their license plates. However, under the current statutory framework, the Supreme Court has ruled that this information is fundamentally commercial, not private.

In Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and the nature of DMV records. The Court explicitly recognized that the driver’s license and its associated data are articles of commerce:

“The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used for significant commercial purposes... It is therefore clear that the motor vehicle information is an article of commerce and its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation.” — Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. at 148 [1]

The Court’s own language contains a precise limiting phrase that is essential to cite accurately:

“Because drivers’ personal, identifying information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation.” — Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. at 148 (emphasis added).

When a man or woman applies for a driver’s license, they are entering into a commercial contract with the State. They are obtaining a commercial credential. The data generated by that credential, including the license plate number, is an article of commerce. The corporate surveillance state (Palantir, Flock) relies entirely on this commercial classification to buy, sell, and aggregate the data without a Fourth Amendment warrant.

To prevent the regulated information of commerce, that inherently contains your personal information by default, from being considered public and commercial, is to not obtain a driver’s license in the first place. If you decide to operate in interstate commerce by being a chauffer, food delivery driver, company paid driver, or large commercial vehicle driver, a separate and legal address, independent of your home and other private property and associated curtilage, may be worth consideration.

III. The Hurdle of Presumption: Voluntary Submission and Commercial Activity

If the driver’s license is a commercial credential, and the data is an article of commerce, how did it become universally applied to every man and woman traveling on the public ways?

The answer is rebuttable presumption.

The vehicle codes of every state, and the federal funding mechanisms that support them (like the UVC), are designed to regulate actual commercial activity; the transportation of persons or property for hire. This regulation is a valid exercise of the policing powers of the State and Federal governments.

However, the system is designed to presume that anyone operating a conveyance on the highway is engaged in that regulated commercial activity.

• The application for the license is voluntary.

• The surrender of the Manufacturer’s Certificate of Origin (MCO) for a Certificate of Registration and Title is voluntary.

The hurdle the people face is that by voluntarily applying for the commercial credential, they have unknowingly consented to the presumption. The State does not force the man or woman into commerce; the man or woman steps into the commercial jurisdiction by signing the application. The system operates on the ignorance of the applicant. The other hurdle is the training apparatus that expressly communicates to local law enforcement and public servants that the law compels all people to obtain these commercial articles. This is demonstrably false, yet it has been trained into becoming a cultural and enforcement norm.

IV. The Plausible Deniability of Universal Application

The universal application of tracking people and their property, even if they have inadvertently subjected themselves to licensing, plates, and registration, is unconstitutional on its face when applied to the private exercise of the right of locomotion.

The fundamental problem is the lack of clearly defined exemptions within the statutory codes. A man or woman reading the vehicle code will rarely find a clear, plain-language section explaining how to operate a private conveyance outside of commerce.

The State’s Plausible Deniability: The State and Federal governments maintain plausible deniability regarding this omission. If challenged, the State will argue:

1. We only regulate commerce.

2. We do not have the authority to regulate the private right of locomotion only to protect its use.

3. Therefore, we do not write codes or provide exemption forms for rights we do not regulate.

This creates a structural trap. By failing to provide a clear administrative off-ramp, and by allowing the universal presumption of commerce to stand unchallenged, the State contributes to the lack of awareness. The non-discriminatory abuse of liberty is baked into the design. The system does not actively hunt the sovereign man or woman; it simply assumes they do not exist until proven otherwise on the administrative record.

The FMCSA does have the ability to provide a DOT number that explicitly states “non-commercial, non-business, private, intrastate”, and without the need for insurance. However, States and their police contingent do not readily accept or understand this distinction. It is a very challenging procedure to get the proper result in the application process, and often, due to the very limited understanding of this option buried in the FMCSA application process, it is widely ignored. The other catch is that this DOT number is in their registration database and defeats the purpose of truly private locomotion.

V. Additional Factors: The Normalization of Surveillance

Beyond the commercial hook and the rebuttable presumption, several other factors contribute to the current state of affairs:

A. The “Nothing to Hide” Fallacy

The corporate architects of the surveillance state rely heavily on the psychological conditioning of the public. The argument that “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear” is fundamentally incompatible with the natural law axioms of the Republic. The Fourth Amendment was not written to protect criminals; it was written to protect the innocent from the arbitrary exercise of state power.

B. The Erosion of the “Curtilage”

Historically, the law recognized the “curtilage”, the area immediately surrounding a home, as possessing the same Fourth Amendment protections as the home itself. The proliferation of ALPR cameras and drone surveillance has effectively destroyed the curtilage. A man or woman can now be tracked from the moment their conveyance leaves their driveway.

C. The Illusion of Consent

When a man or woman clicks “Accept” on a terms of service agreement for a smartphone app, or signs a DMV application, the system registers “consent.” But consent obtained without full disclosure of the consequences, such as the fact that your location data will be sold to data brokers and ingested by Palantir for law enforcement targeting, is not informed consent. It is the illusion of consent, manufactured to satisfy a legal checklist.

Reference Table: The Corporate Surveillance and Enforcement Apparatus

Lexipol, Palantir, and Flock Safety Client Base and Delegation of Authority Analysis

This section compiles the documented client bases of the three primary corporate actors constructing the modern surveillance and enforcement apparatus: Lexipol (policy and training), Palantir (data integration and targeting), and Flock Safety (mass visual surveillance).

The data below demonstrates the scale of the privatization of sovereign authority, where un-elected corporate entities dictate the rules of engagement, the targets of enforcement, and the surveillance of the people, effectively sidestepping constitutional legislative processes.

I. Delegation of Authority Analysis

Before examining the client lists, it is necessary to establish exactly how the use of these corporate products constitutes an outsourcing or delegation of sovereign authority that sidesteps legislative codes and constitutional protections.

Lexipol (The Policy Manufacturer)

Lexipol drafts the policy manuals that dictate when police may use force, when they may engage in vehicle pursuits, and how they interact with federal immigration enforcement. [2]

• The Sidestep: When a municipal agency adopts a Lexipol manual, that manual becomes the official, legally binding policy of the department. This bypasses the city council, the state legislature, and the public. The rules governing the use of state force are written by a private equity-owned corporation (GTCR LLC) whose stated goal is risk management and liability reduction, not the protection of constitutional rights. [3]

• The Indemnification Trap: Lexipol retains copyright over its policies, preventing agencies from freely sharing or modifying them without permission. Furthermore, Lexipol claims it merely “suggests” content, forcing the municipality to bear all civil liability when the policies result in constitutional violations. [4]

Palantir (The Targeting Engine)

Palantir provides the data integration platforms (Gotham, Foundry, ImmigrationOS) that aggregate disparate databases, including DMV records, Medicaid data, utility bills, and commercial data broker purchases. [5]

• The Sidestep: By purchasing data from commercial brokers (like Thomson Reuters CLEAR), Palantir allows law enforcement to access information that would normally require a Fourth Amendment warrant. This creates a “pay-to-play” bypass of the Constitution. [6] Furthermore, Palantir’s predictive policing algorithms generate suspicion based on opaque, proprietary models, shifting the burden of proof and eliminating the requirement for individualized probable cause. [7]

Flock Safety (The Mass Surveillance Grid)

Flock Safety operates a nationwide network of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and video surveillance cameras, capturing billions of images per month. [8]

• The Sidestep: Flock’s centralized cloud infrastructure allows local police departments to search data collected by cameras in entirely different jurisdictions. A local police chief can search a nationwide database without a warrant, legislative approval, or oversight. Flock also plans to integrate its data with commercial data brokers, explicitly allowing police to “jump from LPR to person,” further eroding Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless mass surveillance. [9]

II. Reference Table: Federal Agencies

The following federal agencies have documented contracts or usage of these corporate systems.

III. Reference Table: State and Local Agencies

Due to the massive scale of deployment (Lexipol: ~8,100 agencies; Flock: 2,700+ agencies), this table highlights key states, major metropolitan areas, and documented instances of widespread adoption.

Note: The EFF Atlas of Surveillance documents 2,707 specific agency deployments of Flock Safety ALPRs nationwide as of 2025. Lexipol claims over 8,100 client agencies. The above table represents a representative cross-section of this total market saturation.

IV. The System of Systems: How They Intersect

These three corporate entities do not operate in isolation; they form an integrated, self-reinforcing apparatus that completely surrounds the man or woman exercising their right of locomotion.

1. The Policy (Lexipol): Lexipol dictates that officers must use ALPR systems to identify unregistered conveyances and mandates the procedures for initiating a traffic stop.

2. The Surveillance (Flock Safety): Flock Safety cameras capture the license plate or any notice on the conveyance, run it against the nationwide database, and alert the officer that the conveyance is unregistered or the driver is flagged.

3. The Intelligence (Palantir): If an arrest or citation occurs, Palantir’s systems aggregate that data, combine it with commercial data broker information, and use it to build a comprehensive profile of the man or woman, potentially flagging them for further enforcement or immigration action.

This is the realization of the “Technological Republic” described by Alex Karp; a system where sovereign authority is exercised not by elected representatives bound by the Constitution, but by corporate algorithms and private policy manuals.

Conclusion: The Path Forward

The corporate-state surveillance apparatus, built by Palantir, guided by Lexipol, and enforced through systems like Flock Safety, is vast, powerful, and deeply entrenched.

However, its power rests entirely on two fragile foundations:

1. The presumption of commerce.

2. The ignorance of the people.

The path forward is not found in anger, violence, or hostility toward the men and women who enforce the codes. The path forward is found in awareness and administrative clarity.

When a man or woman understands the difference between the right of locomotion and the commercial driving privilege, when they understand the MCO conversion, and when they understand that the system operates on rebuttable presumptions, they regain their footing. The system can only regulate what is in commerce. It can only track what is registered.

By educating the people on the true nature of the system, we replace the fear of the surveillance state with the quiet confidence of the sovereign man and woman. Knowledge is power. The lack of knowledge: anyone reading this should be aware of the consequences.

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In addition to these facts, the normalization of this control grid has been engrained into the subconscious through movies and television which actively promote and standardize the acceptance of this system. It is almost always in the form of catching the “bad guys”. On occasion, the framing is to have the little guy win over the machine of control.

References

[1] Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000).

[2] Mother Jones. “The Private Company That Dictates Police Policy for Thousands of Departments.” August 2020.

[3] Texas Law Review. “The Privatization of Police Policymaking.” 2021.

[4] American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Washington. “Faulty Lexipol Policies Expose Police Departments to Costly Lawsuits.”

[5] Wikipedia. “Palantir Technologies - Customers.” Accessed May 6, 2026

[6] Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).

[7] The Intercept. “How the LAPD and Palantir Use Data to Justify Racist Policing.” January 2021.

[8] Flock Safety. Official Company Website and Marketing Materials. 2026.

[9] American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). “Flock’s Aggressive Expansions Go Far Beyond Simple Driver Surveillance.” August 2025.

[10] USASpending.gov. Palantir Technologies Inc. Federal Award Recipient Profile.

[11] Campaign Zero. “The Private Companies Quietly Building a Police State.” October 2025.

[12] National Public Radio (NPR). “Why some cities are ditching their Flock license plate readers.” February 2026.

[13] Reuters. “Palantir CEO defends surveillance tech as US government contracts boost sales.” February 2026.

[14] The Intercept. “Palantir Is Helping Trump’s IRS Conduct ‘Massive-Scale’ Data Mining.” April 2026.

[15] SEC.gov. Palantir Technologies Inc. Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024.

[16] BuzzFeed News. “This Is What Palantir And The LAPD Know About You.” September 2020.

[17] Lexipol. “Lexipol Expands Law Enforcement Accreditation Services to Eight States.” April 2023.

[18] The Verge. “Minority Report: Why We Should Question Predictive Policing.” March 2018.

[19] ACLU Washington. Settlement records regarding Spokane Police Department and Lexipol immigration policies.

[20] Ohio Collaborative Community-Police Advisory Board records.

[21] The Verge. Investigation into New Orleans predictive policing program.

[22] DDoSecrets. “Release: LexipolLeaks (68GB).” February 2025.

Background

The question has been asked where the three jurisdictions come from in our American jurisprudence. People would like clear proof, in actual writing, that these are real classifications. It is too easy to disregard jurisdictional commentary as fringe “sovereign” ideas if you do not know where to look, or, if you do not understand original meanings and texts about a topic. Examples in previous articles are words like “locomotion”, “resident” or “residence”, “person”, and many more terms we do not understand the original meanings.

The legal and philosophical tradition of the Western world has long recognized that different forms of authority govern different domains of human existence. This recognition is not merely academic; it has profound practical consequences for the rights of the people, the powers of governments, and the nature of the courts that adjudicate disputes. The three-part framework of Land, Sea, and Air - corresponding, respectively, to the jurisdictions of the Common Law, Admiralty/Maritime Law, and Ecclesiastical Law, represents one of the most foundational, yet least publicly understood, organizing principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence.

This analysis undertakes a comprehensive examination of that framework, drawing upon the most authoritative legal writings in the Western tradition, including the Commentaries on the Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone, the Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States by Justice Joseph Story, the writings and judicial opinions of Sir Edward Coke, and the Law of Nations by Emer de Vattel. It also examines the theological and juridical claims of the Papal Bull Unam Sanctam of 1302, which provides the historical foundation for the theoretical “Air” jurisdiction. Against this backdrop, the analysis then turns to the design of the original American court system under the Constitution of 1787, demonstrating how the Founders deliberately mapped these jurisdictional principles onto the new federal structure, assigning the Sea jurisdiction to the federal courts while leaving the Land jurisdiction, the common law, to the people and their state courts.

The final and most consequential portion of this analysis traces the systematic erosion of this original design. Through the expansion of the Commerce Clause, the rise of the administrative state, the initial abolition of federal general common law in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) (this will be explored further in a future companion article with examples that demonstrate the re-institution of federal common law and the incorporation doctrine), and the development of the doctrine of presumed agency, the federal government has extended its jurisdictional reach far beyond its original, limited domain. The result is what may aptly be called a jurisdictional trap: a legal environment in which the people, the creators of the government, find themselves presumed to be subjects of a regulatory apparatus that the original Constitution was specifically designed to prevent.

I. The Three-Part Jurisdictional Framework: Historical and Philosophical Foundations

A. The Jurisdiction of the Land: Common Law and the Rights of the People

The jurisdiction of the Land is the oldest and most fundamental of the three domains. It is the domain of the common law; that body of law derived not from the decrees of a sovereign (king, country, or government in this context) or the statutes of a legislature, but from the immemorial customs and traditions of the people themselves, as declared and refined through the decisions of the courts over centuries. Blackstone, in the opening pages of his Commentaries, describes the common law as the birthright of every Englishman, a set of rights and principles so deeply embedded in the fabric of society that no act of Parliament could legitimately abrogate them without the consent of the people. [1]

The common law is, at its core, the law of the land, the law that governs the relations between men and women in their private, non-commercial capacity. It protects the right to life, liberty, and property. It provides remedies for wrongs committed by one man against another. It recognizes the sovereignty of the individual man over his or her own body, labor, and estate. Blackstone identifies the common law courts, the Court of King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer, as the principal guardians of these rights, and he is at pains throughout the Commentaries to distinguish their jurisdiction from that of the admiralty and ecclesiastical courts, which he treats as inferior and exceptional tribunals. [1]

The great champion of the common law against the encroachments of other jurisdictions was Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and later of the King’s Bench in the early 17th century. Coke’s battles with King James I and with the admiralty and ecclesiastical courts were not mere professional rivalries; they were principled defenses of the proposition that the common law was the supreme law of the land, and that no other jurisdiction, not the prerogative courts of the King, not the admiralty courts, and not the ecclesiastical courts, could lawfully encroach upon it. [2] His instrument for this defense was the writ of prohibition, a common law writ by which the courts of common law could order inferior or rival courts to cease proceedings that fell within the common law’s exclusive jurisdiction.

Coke’s most famous confrontation with the admiralty jurisdiction arose from his insistence that the admiralty courts could only exercise jurisdiction over matters occurring on the high seas, whereas infra corpus comitatus (within the body of a county) was the exclusive province of the common law. [2] This distinction between the territorial jurisdiction of the common law and the maritime jurisdiction of the admiralty is one of the most important and enduring principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence, and it forms the bedrock of the three-part framework.

Vattel, in his Law of Nations, provides the philosophical underpinning for the land jurisdiction in the context of international law. He argues that the territorial sovereignty of a nation, its jurisdiction over the land within its borders, is the foundation of all political authority. The nation’s law governs all persons and things within its territory, and no foreign power can lawfully exercise jurisdiction within that territory without the nation’s consent. [15] This principle of territorial sovereignty, applied at the domestic level, supports the idea that the people of a state, living on the land within its borders, are governed by the laws of that state, the common law, and not by the laws of a distant or foreign authority. An example in our current system of a foreign authority exercising its power over a state is the federal uniform codes being applied to State legislatures statutes through federal funding mechanisms.

B. The Jurisdiction of the Sea: Admiralty, Maritime Law, and the Law of Nations

The jurisdiction of the Sea is the domain of admiralty and maritime law, a distinct and ancient body of law that governs ships, shipping, navigation, and all matters arising from commercial intercourse on the waters. It is fundamentally different from the common law in its origins, its principles, and its procedures. Where the common law is rooted in the customs of the English people, admiralty law is rooted in the customs of merchants and mariners from across the known world — the Lex Mercatoria, or Law Merchant, and the ancient maritime codes such as the Laws of Oleron and the Consolato del Mare. [1]

Blackstone devotes considerable attention to the courts of admiralty in his Commentaries, describing them as courts of civil law jurisdiction, proceeding according to the rules of the civil law of Rome rather than the common law of England. He notes that the High Court of Admiralty was established to adjudicate “all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries,” and that its jurisdiction extended to “all crimes and offences committed upon the high sea, or in great rivers beneath the first bridge.” [1] This geographical limitation, the sea and the tidal waters below the first bridge, was the crucial boundary that separated the admiralty’s jurisdiction from that of the common law courts.

Justice Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, provides the most thorough American treatment of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. He explains that the grant of this jurisdiction to the federal courts was one of the most important and least controversial provisions of the Constitution, because the need for a uniform, national law of the sea was universally recognized. [4] Commerce between nations, the enforcement of maritime contracts, the prosecution of piracy, and the regulation of prize; all of these required a single, consistent body of law applied by a single, authoritative court system. Story writes:

“The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred on the national government is, in its nature, peculiarly appropriate to a national tribunal. It is, in a great measure, the law of nations applied to the intercourse of maritime states, and the rights and duties of their citizens in their commercial and navigable transactions.” [4]

The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave concrete form to this constitutional grant. Section 9 of the Act provided that the district courts of the United States shall have “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen.” [3] The word “admiralty” appears no fewer than six times in the Judiciary Act, and the word “maritime” appears alongside it with equal frequency, reflecting the centrality of this jurisdiction to the new federal court system. [3]

The admiralty jurisdiction is, in essence, the jurisdiction of commerce — specifically, the commerce of the sea. It applies to those who voluntarily enter into maritime contracts, who navigate the waters, and who engage in the trade of nations. It does not, in its original conception, apply to the man or woman living on the land, tending their farm, practicing their trade, or going about their private affairs. The boundary between the land and the sea was, for the Founders, a jurisdictional boundary of the first importance.

C. The Jurisdiction of the Air: Ecclesiastical Law and the Claim of Universal Spiritual Authority

The theoretical jurisdiction of the Air is the most abstract and philosophically complex of the three domains. It is associated with ecclesiastical law; the law of the Church, and with the claim of a universal spiritual authority over the souls of all men and women. This claim finds its most direct and historically significant expression in the Papal Bull Unam Sanctam, issued by Pope Boniface VIII on November 18, 1302. [5]

Unam Sanctam is one of the most remarkable documents in the history of Western law and theology. It asserts, in unequivocal terms, that the Pope holds supreme authority over both the spiritual and temporal realms. Drawing on the metaphor of the “two swords” from the Gospel of Luke, Boniface argues that both the spiritual sword (the authority of the Church) and the temporal sword (the authority of kings and princes) are held by the Church, with the temporal sword wielded at the direction and sufferance of the spiritual power. The bull concludes with the famous declaration:

“Furthermore, we declare, we proclaim, we define that it is absolutely necessary for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff.” [5]

This claim to a universal jurisdiction over the spiritual lives of all people, a jurisdiction that transcends the territorial boundaries of any earthly kingdom, is the theoretical basis for the “Air” jurisdiction in the three-part framework. It represents a claim to authority that is not grounded in the law of the land (common law) or the law of the sea (admiralty), but in a higher, spiritual authority that claims dominion over the soul and spirit of every “human creature”.

In the context of the three-part framework, the Air jurisdiction represents the highest and most encompassing of the three domains. While the common law governs the body and its earthly affairs, and the admiralty governs commercial intercourse on the waters, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction claims authority over the immortal soul, the essence of what a human is, in the deepest theological and philosophical sense. The historical conflict between these three jurisdictions; the Church claiming supremacy over kings, kings asserting their independence from Rome, and common law courts defending the rights of the people against both, is the central drama of Western legal and political history from the medieval period through the Reformation and beyond.

Blackstone, writing in the 18th century, describes the ecclesiastical courts of England as a distinct system operating alongside the common law courts, with jurisdiction over matters of spiritual discipline, marriage, wills, and tithes. [1] He is careful to note that the common law courts had developed extensive mechanisms, including the writ of prohibition, to prevent the ecclesiastical courts from encroaching upon secular matters. The tension between these two jurisdictions, and the ultimate subordination of the ecclesiastical courts to the common law in England, is a key chapter in the history of English liberty.

II. The Constitutional Articles and the Jurisdictional Map of the American Republic

A. The People as the Source of All Authority: The Foundational Principle

The Constitution of the United States begins with three words that are the most important in the entire document: “We the People.” This preamble is not mere rhetoric; it is a precise legal and philosophical statement about the source of all governmental authority. The people of the United States are the creators of the government, not its subjects. They delegated specific, limited powers to the federal government through the Constitution, retaining all other powers for themselves and their states. It can be deduced that the “people” are the body politic of each sovereign state of the union of states. This principle or retained power is made explicit in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments:

“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” — Ninth Amendment [6]

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” — Tenth Amendment [6]

These two amendments together constitute a constitutional guarantee that the federal government’s jurisdiction is limited to what has been expressly delegated. The people, in their private capacity as men and women living on the land, are not subjects of the federal government in the way that citizens of a unitary state are subjects of their sovereign. They are the sovereigns, and the federal government is their agent, empowered only to act within the specific boundaries they have drawn.

B. Article I: The Legislative Power and the Enumerated Powers

Article I of the Constitution establishes the legislative branch — the Congress — and grants it specific, enumerated powers. These powers are listed in Section 8 and include the power to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, to coin money, to establish post offices, to declare war, and to raise and support armies. [6] The list is deliberately finite. The Founders understood that a government with unlimited legislative power was a government that could not be trusted with liberty.

The most consequential of these enumerated powers, for the purposes of this analysis, is the Commerce Clause: “The Congress shall have Power...To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” [6] As originally understood, this clause was intended to address a specific problem that had plagued the Articles of Confederation: the tendency of individual states to erect tariff barriers and other protectionist measures against the commerce of other states. The Commerce Clause was designed to create a free trade zone among the states, not to give Congress a general police power over the economic lives of the people. [11]

The word “commerce” itself, in the late 18th century, had a specific and limited meaning. As Professor Randy Barnett has argued, drawing on extensive historical evidence, “commerce” meant the trade or exchange of goods, including the means of transporting them. [11] It did not include manufacturing, agriculture, or the purely local activities of everyday life. Chief Justice John Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), gave the term a somewhat broader reading, defining commerce as “intercourse” between nations and states, but even Marshall was careful to preserve the distinction between interstate commerce and the “exclusively internal commerce of a State,” which he acknowledged was beyond Congress’s reach. [12]

The significance of Article I for the three-part jurisdictional framework is that it defines the outer limits of the federal government’s legislative jurisdiction over the Land. Congress can regulate commerce between the states and with foreign nations; activities that are, by their nature, connected to the Sea jurisdiction of trade and navigation. But Congress cannot, under the original understanding, reach into the purely private, non-commercial affairs of men and women living on the land. That domain belongs to the common law, and to the states.

C. Article II: The Executive Power and the Faithful Execution of the Laws

Article II establishes the executive branch and vests the executive power in the President. The President’s primary duty is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” [6] In the original constitutional design, the executive power was understood to be the power to enforce the laws passed by Congress, not to create new laws, not to adjudicate disputes, and not to exercise the judicial power of the United States. The executive branch was the arm of the government that operated in the world, carrying out the will of the legislature as interpreted by the judiciary.

The relevance of Article II to the jurisdictional framework becomes apparent when we consider the modern administrative state. The vast federal bureaucracy, the hundreds of agencies, departments, and commissions that now regulate nearly every aspect of American economic and social life is, technically, part of the executive branch. These agencies are created by Congress and their heads are appointed by the President. But they exercise powers that are, in substance, legislative (rulemaking), judicial (adjudication), and executive (enforcement); a combination that the Founders’ three-part separation of powers was specifically designed to prevent. [8]

D. Article III: The Judicial Power and the Courts of the United States

Article III vests the “judicial Power of the United States” in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” [6] This judicial power extends to specific categories of cases and controversies, including cases arising under the Constitution and federal laws, cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers, and, crucially, “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” [6]

The inclusion of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in Article III is a direct reflection of the three-part framework. The Founders recognized that the Sea jurisdiction, the law of commerce and navigation, was a matter of national concern requiring a uniform, federal court system. They therefore placed it squarely within the judicial power of the United States. The common law, by contrast, was not placed within the federal judicial power except in specific, limited circumstances (diversity of citizenship, federal questions). The general common law of the land remained the province of the state courts.

Federalist No. 80, authored by Alexander Hamilton, provides the clearest contemporary explanation of why admiralty jurisdiction was granted to the federal courts. Hamilton argued that cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction “so generally depend upon the law of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace.” [7] In other words, the Sea jurisdiction was federal because it was international; it governed the commercial intercourse of the nation with the rest of the world, and therefore required a single, authoritative national tribunal.

The Article III courts, as originally designed, were the guardians of the constitutional order. They were independent. Their judges had life tenure and protected salaries, and their jurisdiction was limited. They were not intended to be instruments of administrative governance, and they were not intended to adjudicate the purely private disputes of men and women living under the common law of their states, except in the specific circumstances enumerated in Article III.

E. The Bill of Rights: The Jurisdictional Firewall

The first ten amendments to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, function as a jurisdictional firewall between the federal government and the people. They enumerate specific rights that the federal government cannot abrogate, and they reserve all other rights and powers to the people and the states. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination and the taking of property without due process. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury in civil cases at common law where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars. [6]

The Seventh Amendment is particularly significant in the context of the three-part framework. By guaranteeing the right to a trial by jury in cases “at common law,” the amendment explicitly recognizes the common law as a distinct and protected jurisdiction. It signals that the Founders understood the common law to be the primary law governing the private disputes of the people, and that they intended to preserve the common law trial by jury; the institution through which the people themselves participate in the administration of justice, as a check on governmental power.

III. The Jurisdictional Trap: How the Original Design Was Inverted

A. The Commerce Clause Revolution of 1937

The most dramatic and consequential departure from the original constitutional design occurred in 1937, in the context of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s conflict with the Supreme Court over the constitutionality of New Deal legislation. For the first four years of the New Deal, the Supreme Court had largely adhered to the traditional understanding of the Commerce Clause, striking down federal legislation that attempted to regulate manufacturing, agriculture, and other local activities on the grounds that they were not “commerce” within the meaning of Article I. [13]

Roosevelt responded with his infamous “court-packing” plan, proposing to add one new justice to the Supreme Court for every sitting justice over the age of 70, up to a maximum of six additional justices. The plan was widely seen as an attempt to intimidate the Court into upholding New Deal legislation. Whether or not the plan directly caused the change, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence shifted dramatically in the spring of 1937, the famous “switch in time that saved nine.” In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, holding that Congress could regulate labor relations in a manufacturing plant because of the plant’s connection to interstate commerce. [13]

This decision marked the beginning of the end of the original Commerce Clause jurisprudence. By 1942, in Wickard v. Filburn, the Court had gone so far as to hold that a farmer growing wheat on his own land for his own consumption, a quintessentially local, non-commercial activity, was subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause because, in the aggregate, such home consumption of wheat could affect the interstate price of wheat. [11] The “substantial effects” test, as it came to be known, effectively transformed the Commerce Clause from a specific grant of power over interstate trade into a general federal police power over the national economy.

As Professor Gary Lawson of Boston University School of Law has argued, the post-New Deal administrative state is, in a meaningful sense, unconstitutional: “The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution. The original New Dealers were aware, at least to some degree, that their vision of the national government’s proper role and structure could not be squared with the written Constitution.” [8] This is not a fringe view; it reflects a serious scholarly assessment of the gap between the original constitutional design and the modern regulatory state.

B. The Abolition of General Federal Common Law: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938)

One year after the Commerce Clause revolution of 1937, the Supreme Court delivered another blow to the original constitutional order in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938). [14] This case arose from a personal injury claim by Harry Tompkins, who was struck by an open door on an Erie Railroad train while walking along a footpath beside the tracks in Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania state law, Tompkins would have been treated as a trespasser to whom the railroad owed minimal duty of care. To avoid this unfavorable state law, Tompkins brought his suit in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, hoping to benefit from the “general federal common law” that federal courts had been applying in diversity cases since Swift v. Tyson (1842).

The Swift doctrine, established by Justice Joseph Story, had held that federal courts in diversity cases were not bound by the common law decisions of the state courts, but could instead apply a “general commercial law” derived from universal principles of justice and commercial custom. [14] For nearly a century, this doctrine had allowed federal courts to develop a body of general common law that was, in many respects, more favorable to commercial parties than the law of any particular state.

In Erie, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Louis Brandeis, overturned Swift v. Tyson and held that there is no such thing as a “general federal common law.” Federal courts in diversity cases must apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit, including the state’s common law as declared by its courts. The Court held that the Swift doctrine had created an unconstitutional assumption of power by the federal courts, because “Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State.” [14] However, future cases slowly returned to a federal common law through the application of a strict federal jurisdiction statutes to a growing and refined federal common law; i.e. Clearfield Doctrine and Incorporation Doctrine.

The Erie decision had profound and far-reaching consequences for the jurisdictional landscape of the United States. By initially abolishing general federal common law, it eliminated the only remaining body of federal law that was not statutory. From that point forward, federal law became almost entirely the product of congressional legislation and executive regulation. The common law, the law of the Land, was relegated to the state courts, while the federal courts became increasingly focused on the interpretation and application of a vast and ever-growing body of federal statutes and administrative regulations.

C. The Rise of Administrative Courts and the Doctrine of Presumed Agency

The administrative state that emerged from the New Deal era operates through a system of agencies that combine legislative, executive, and judicial powers in a single body; precisely the combination that the Founders’ separation of powers was designed to prevent. These agencies create rules (quasi-legislative power), enforce those rules (executive power), and adjudicate disputes arising under those rules (quasi-judicial power), all within the same institutional structure. [8]

The adjudicative function of administrative agencies is performed by Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), who are technically employees of the agencies whose decisions they review. Unlike Article III judges, ALJs do not have life tenure or constitutionally protected salaries. They are members of the executive branch, not the judicial branch, and their decisions are subject to review by the agency head before they can be appealed to an Article III court. [9] This structure creates an obvious tension with the constitutional guarantee of an independent judiciary, and it has been the subject of sustained scholarly and judicial criticism.

The doctrine of presumed agency is the mechanism by which the administrative state extends its jurisdictional reach to the people. In the original constitutional design, the federal government’s jurisdiction was limited and specific; the burden was on the government to demonstrate that a particular person or activity fell within its enumerated powers. In the administrative state, this burden has been effectively reversed. Through the use of broadly defined statutory terms like “person,” “employee,” “taxpayer,” “driver,” “consumer”, the administrative agencies presume that anyone who engages in a regulated activity is subject to their jurisdiction, unless they can affirmatively demonstrate otherwise.

This presumption is reinforced by the doctrine of Chevron deference (now overturned by Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo in 2024, but operative for forty years), which required courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, even if the court would have reached a different interpretation on its own. [16] The effect of Chevron deference was to give agencies enormous discretion in defining the scope of their own jurisdiction; a power that, in the original constitutional design, belonged exclusively to the courts.

The combined effect of the Commerce Clause expansion, the abolition of general federal common law, the rise of administrative courts, and the doctrine of presumed agency is a legal environment in which the people, the creators of the government, find themselves presumed to be subjects of a regulatory apparatus that the original Constitution was specifically designed to prevent. The man or woman living on the land, going about their private affairs, is now presumed to be engaged in “commerce” subject to federal regulation, to be a “person” subject to administrative jurisdiction, and to be an “agent” of the state bound by its rules. The burden of proving otherwise falls on the individual man or woman, not on the government.

IV. Jurisdictional Pictorial

The following pictorial presents a visual representation of the three-part jurisdictional framework and, on the whole, reflects the historical and theoretical concepts examined in this analysis with reasonable accuracy. The following assessment addresses each of the three domains depicted. One reading this may recall this pictorial from past articles.

The Land jurisdiction is depicted as the domain of the common law, associated with the people, their rights, and their private affairs. The pictorial’s representation of men and women on the land, separate from the commercial and governmental structures, captures the foundational principle that the common law is the law of the people, not the law of the state, the corporation, or the church. This aligns precisely with Blackstone’s description of the common law as the birthright of the people and Coke’s insistence that the common law courts were the supreme guardians of individual liberty against all other jurisdictions. The association of the Land with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, as the constitutional reservoirs of the people’s unenumerated rights and powers, is a foundation of this domain.

The Sea jurisdiction is identified with admiralty and maritime law, commerce, and the law of nations. The reference of ships, trade, and commercial entities reflects the historical scope of the admiralty jurisdiction as the law governing those who voluntarily engage in maritime commerce. The association with federal courts and the Judiciary Act of 1789 is historically accurate, as that Act placed the admiralty jurisdiction squarely within the federal court system. This jurisdiction applies to those who enter into commercial contracts and engage in regulated commerce, rather than to the private man or woman on the land, reflects the original understanding of the admiralty jurisdiction.

The Air jurisdiction is identified with ecclesiastical law, canon law, and the authority of the Vatican, linked to the Papal Bull Unam Sanctam of 1302. This is a theoretically coherent representation of the historical claim to a universal spiritual jurisdiction over the souls of all persons. The association with the concept of the soul and the spiritual realm is consistent with the language of Unam Sanctam itself, which asserts that “every human creature” must be subject to the Roman Pontiff for the salvation of their soul. The First Amendment’s effective exclusion of this jurisdiction from the American legal system is an important qualification, but the historical and theoretical basis for its inclusion in the three-part framework is accurate in the historical record.

The most significant insight is the jurisdictional trap: the process by which the administrative state has extended the Sea jurisdiction, the law of commerce, into the domain of the Land, presuming that the people are engaged in regulated commerce and therefore subject to federal administrative jurisdiction. This is precisely the mechanism described in this analysis: the expansion of the Commerce Clause, the rise of administrative courts, and the doctrine of presumed agency have together created a legal environment in which the people are treated as commercial actors subject to federal regulation, rather than as sovereign men and women living under the common law of their states.

VI. The Constitutional Articles Mapped to the Three-Part Jurisdictional Framework

The following table summarizes the relationship between the three jurisdictions, the relevant Constitutional Articles, and the key legal authorities:

The critical observation from this table is that the administrative jurisdiction has no direct constitutional locus in the original design. It is a creature of the 20th century, built upon an expansive reading of Article I’s Commerce Clause and Article II’s executive power, and it has progressively displaced the common law jurisdiction of the Land as the primary legal framework governing the daily lives of the people.

VII. Conclusion: The Inversion of the Original Order

The original constitutional design of the United States reflected a sophisticated understanding of the three-part jurisdictional framework. The people, as the creators of the government, occupied the Land jurisdiction — the common law — and were governed primarily by the laws of their states. The federal government was given jurisdiction over the Sea — the admiralty and maritime domain of international commerce — and over a limited set of other specifically enumerated matters. The Air jurisdiction, the domain of ecclesiastical authority, was effectively excluded from the American legal system by the First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion.

This design has been progressively inverted over the course of the 20th century. The Commerce Clause has been expanded from a specific grant of power over interstate trade into a general federal police power. The administrative state has grown to encompass nearly every aspect of economic and social life. The doctrine of presumed agency has shifted the burden of proof from the government to the people. And the abolition of general federal common law has eliminated the only body of federal law that was not a product of congressional or executive action.

The result is a legal system in which the people — the sovereign creators of the government — find themselves presumed to be subjects of a vast regulatory apparatus that operates largely outside the constitutional framework of Article III courts, with their independent judges and jury trial guarantees. Understanding this inversion — its historical origins, its legal mechanisms, and its departure from the original constitutional design — is essential for any serious analysis of the modern American legal system and its relationship to the foundational principles of individual liberty and limited government.

It should be clear that contracts, the agreements we make or acquiesce to making, are what draw a man or woman into the commercial hook of federal and federal franchise frameworks. These agreements solidify presumption as a commercial agent in the international jurisdiction of the sea. Many, if not most of these agreements transacted without your full knowledge or understanding. The added complexity is the presumption by limited Supreme Court decisions that international commerce is effected by everything a man or woman does in their life. This presumption effectively ignores and eliminates common law and constitutional protections unless openly challenged. The limitation to currency in a debtor system, presumptive conversion of mankind to “persons” as a commercial agent, and the vast majority of the people giving into public schooling which has systematically removed the historical and natural law facts in the education of generations, has left America as a society that does not know how to keep the Republic.

Ask yourself… do you care? The theoretical “benefits and privileges” are tempting.

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References

[1] Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England. 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765–1769. Available at: https://lonang.com/library/reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-england/

[2] Libertarianism.org. “The Independent Judiciary: Edward Coke and the Common Law.” Available at: https://www.libertarianism.org/publications/essays/independent-judiciary-edward-coke

[3] Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, Sec. 9. Available at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/judiciary_act.asp

[4] Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. 3 vols. Boston: Hilliard, Gray and Company, 1833. Available at: https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s87.html

[5] Pope Boniface VIII. Unam Sanctam. November 18, 1302. Available at: https://sourcebooks.web.fordham.edu/source/B8-unam.asp

[6] United States Constitution, including Amendments I–X (Bill of Rights). Available at: https://constitution.congress.gov/

[7] Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist No. 80, “The Powers of the Judiciary.” 1788. Available at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed80.asp

[8] Lawson, Gary S. “The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State.” Harvard Law Review 107, no. 6 (1994): 1231–1254. Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/948

[9] Wikipedia. “Administrative Law Judge.” Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_law_judge

[10] Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237. Available at: https://sourcebook.acus.gov/wiki/Administrative_Procedure_Act

[11] Forte, David. “Commerce, Commerce, Everywhere: The Uses and Abuses of the Commerce Clause.” The Heritage Foundation. January 18, 2011. Available at: https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/commerce-commerce-everywhere-the-uses-and-abuses-the-commerce-clause

[12] Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/22/1/

[13] NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/301/1/

[14] Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Federal Judicial Center analysis available at: https://www.fjc.gov/history/cases/cases-that-shaped-the-federal-courts/erie-railroad-co-v-tompkins

[15] Vattel, Emer de. The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns. 1758. Available at: https://lonang.com/library/reference/vattel-law-of-nations/

[16] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024) (overturning Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf

This Time and The People Living In It…

From The Lord of the Rings:

What time do we live? What is the answer for those who make these times worse? There are certain people who have already decided your fate and judgement. They have determined their purpose is an obligation to control everyone else or that someone else will beat them to that control. Through a framework of surveillance, one where we largely volunteered into its infrastructure, we are embarking on a path that may end with all your decisions being made for you, including when and how you die.

Can you keep it — not just the republic, but your freedom?

An Analytical Framework of the Facts:

Natural Law | Constitutional Protections | Established Psychological Classification | Documented Corporate Conduct

I. Prefatory Note on Methodology

This document does not constitute a clinical diagnosis. No such determination can be made without direct clinical evaluation. What this analysis does is apply established psychological classification frameworks, specifically the Dark Triad (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) [1], Grandiose Narcissism (DSM-5, Narcissistic Personality Disorder criteria) [2], the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950) [3], and the Messiah/Savior Complex, to publicly documented behaviors, stated beliefs, and the ideological content of the manifesto, cross-referenced with Palantir’s actual operational identity as a universal surveillance corporation.

The analytical axioms remain constant throughout:

1. Creation Axiom: Mankind is a creation of the Creator who creates.

2. Guiding Principle: Do no harm to another of mankind unless in self-defense and protection of property, the highest right a man holds under natural law as articulated by Blackstone, Locke, Story, Vattel’s Law of Nations, and the Statutes at Large.

The Lexipol model: wherein a private limited liability corporation authors binding policy manuals adopted by over 3,000 law enforcement agencies across 35 states, effectively replacing legislative debate with proprietary corporate rules [4], serves as the structural parallel through which Palantir’s broader surveillance architecture must be understood. Both entities operate under color of law: the appearance of lawful authority exercised without actual constitutional or legislative foundation.

II. Who Is Alex Karp — The Documented Public Record

Before applying psychological frameworks, it is essential to establish the factual behavioral and biographical record.

Alexander Caedmon Karp was born in New York City in 1967 to a white father and a Black mother. He describes himself as having experienced a sense of vulnerability from an early age, being biracial, Jewish, and severely dyslexic. He earned a Bachelor of Arts in philosophy from Haverford College, a Juris Doctor from Stanford Law School (where he became close with Peter Thiel), and a doctorate in social theory from Goethe University Frankfurt, where he studied under Jürgen Habermas, Europe’s foremost living philosopher and the architect of communicative rationality, a theory that holds democratic discourse and mutual understanding as the foundation of legitimate society [5].

The biographical irony is profound and analytically significant: Karp studied under the philosopher who argued most forcefully that legitimate authority must be grounded in open, reasoned public discourse, and then built a company whose entire business model depends on the elimination of that openness through secret algorithmic surveillance of the public.

Documented behavioral observations from journalists, colleagues, and public record include the following:

• Karp maintains concurrent long-term relationships with two women simultaneously, described by a colleague as “geographically monogamous.”

• He has never learned to drive, stating: “I was too poor. And then I was too rich.”

• He skis 12 to 15 miles daily and owns multiple homes selected exclusively for proximity to cross-country ski trails.

• He regularly wears gear from an elite Norwegian ski team to which he has no connection.

• He places his phone in a Faraday cage at home to block signals, citing Chinese intelligence.

• In his most notorious job interview, he recited from memory a 1939 speech by Oswald Mosley, the British fascist leader, then performed tai chi moves and walked out without a word. The candidate was subsequently hired.

• He stated in a 2013 Forbes interview: “The only time I’m not thinking about Palantir is when I’m swimming, practicing Qigong, or during sexual activity.”

• He donated $180,000 to a New Hampshire hermit whose cabin burned down, described as “a gesture of solidarity, one introvert to another.”

• He has publicly acknowledged that people call him “batshit crazy” and has used this characterization as a point of pride.

• His salary was capped at $125,000 for years even as the company reached a $20 billion valuation, telling colleagues: “I only make money when you make money.”

• His politics shifted dramatically after October 7, 2023, when he held a Palantir board meeting in Tel Aviv, visited the site of the Kfar Aza massacre, and signed a defense contract with Israel’s Ministry of Defense.

III. What Palantir Actually Is: The Surveillance Reality

The manifesto’s language of “hard power built on software,” “addressing violent crime,” and “AI deterrence” is not abstract philosophy. It is a direct description of Palantir’s existing commercial and government product suite. Understanding the psychological profile of Karp requires understanding what he has actually built.

Palantir Gotham is the company’s flagship intelligence and law enforcement platform, deployed by police departments, the Department of Homeland Security, the NSA, the CIA, the FBI, and military intelligence agencies. It integrates disparate data sources, criminal records, social media, financial transactions, location data, surveillance footage, license plate readers, and more, into a unified analytical interface that allows operators to build comprehensive profiles of persons of interest and map their social networks [6].

Palantir Foundry is the civilian-facing version of the same architecture, deployed across healthcare systems, financial institutions, and government agencies to integrate and analyze population-level data.

ImmigrationOS, developed by Palantir under contract with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), is an AI system designed to track, profile, and facilitate the deportation of immigrants by aggregating data including Medicaid records, social security information, and location data [7]. The Electronic Frontier Foundation reported in January 2026 that ICE is actively using this tool, which feeds on Medicaid data to identify and locate people for arrest [8].

Predictive Policing: Palantir’s tools have been deployed by police departments to engage in predictive policing, the use of algorithmic probability scoring to identify persons likely to commit crimes before any crime has occurred. This directly eliminates the constitutional requirement of probable cause, replacing the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches with an algorithmic determination made by proprietary software whose methodology is hidden from public scrutiny, from courts, and from the people subject to its conclusions [9].

In April 2026, members of Congress, Representatives Goldman, Senator Wyden, and Representative Velázquez, formally demanded answers from ICE and DHS regarding Palantir’s collection of Americans’ personal data and its use to “fuel a mass surveillance” apparatus [10].

The Campaign Zero report of October 2025 explicitly identified Palantir as one of “the private companies quietly building a police state,” noting that it “builds data integration and surveillance and predictive policing tools into local law enforcement” [11].

This is the operational reality behind the manifesto’s elegant philosophical language. When Karp writes that:

“Silicon Valley must play a role in addressing violent crime,” he is not speaking abstractly. He is describing a product already deployed. When he writes that “hard power will be built on software,”

…he is describing a system already operational. The manifesto is not a vision statement, it is a justification document for infrastructure already in place.

IV. The Philosophical Betrayal: Habermas and the Inversion of Communicative Rationality

Jürgen Habermas, Karp’s doctoral mentor, argued in his foundational work The Theory of Communicative Action (1981) that legitimate social order must be built on communicative rationality, the capacity of people to reach mutual understanding through open, uncoerced discourse [5]. Habermas drew a sharp distinction between communicative action (oriented toward understanding) and strategic action (oriented toward success, i.e., the manipulation of others to achieve one’s own ends).

For Habermas, the colonization of the lifeworld, the everyday sphere of human communication, culture, and social reproduction, by systems (the market and the state, operating through money and power) was the central pathology of modern society. The Frankfurt School’s critical theory, from which Habermas emerged, was explicitly a project of resistance against the technocratic reduction of human life to instrumental calculation.

Karp’s company, Palantir, is the most advanced operational embodiment of precisely what Habermas spent his career warning against. It colonizes the lifeworld through algorithmic surveillance, reduces every man and woman to a data point within a system of strategic calculation, and places the power of that system in the hands of a private corporation answerable not to the people but to its shareholders and government clients. The student has not merely departed from the teacher’s philosophy, he has industrialized its antithesis.

Karp’s doctoral dissertation at Frankfurt was titled Aggression in the Lebenswelt, “Aggression in the Lifeworld.” The irony is complete: the man who wrote academically about aggression within the sphere of human social life went on to build the most sophisticated tool of state aggression against that same sphere ever created by a private corporation.

V. Psychological Classification Analysis

A. Grandiose Narcissism (DSM-5 Narcissistic Personality Disorder Criteria)

The DSM-5 defines Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empathy, manifesting in at least five of nine specific criteria [2]. The grandiose subtype, as distinguished from the vulnerable subtype, is characterized by overt superiority, dominance, entitlement, and a belief in one’s unique mission or destiny.

The manifesto and documented behaviors exhibit multiple indicators consistent with this framework:

Grandiosity and Sense of Special Mission: The manifesto’s framing of Silicon Valley as having a “moral debt” and an “affirmative obligation” to the nation positions Karp and his engineering class as uniquely chosen stewards of civilization’s survival. This is not a policy argument, it is a declaration of elect status. The claim that “AI weapons are inevitable” and that the only question is “who will build them” positions Palantir, and by extension Karp, as the indispensable actor in the survival of Western civilization.

Entitlement: The assertion that “public servants need not be priests”, that government should compensate like a corporation, reflects an entitlement framework in which the market logic of private enterprise is the only legitimate standard of value. The implicit corollary is that Palantir’s private model of governance is superior to democratic public administration.

Lack of Empathy: The manifesto contains no acknowledgment of the harm caused by Palantir’s surveillance tools to the people subjected to them. The millions of persons whose data is aggregated, whose movements are tracked, whose immigration status is fed into ImmigrationOS, whose communities are subjected to predictive policing algorithms, none appear in the manifesto’s moral universe. The document is entirely self-referential: the concerns are those of the “engineering elite,” the “public figures” deserving of “grace,” and the civilization requiring “hard power.”

Preoccupation with Fantasies of Unlimited Power: The manifesto’s call to “undo the neutering of Germany and Japan,” to move away from an all-volunteer military force, and to build “AI deterrence” to replace the atomic age reflects a preoccupation with civilizational-scale power that goes far beyond any legitimate corporate or policy interest. These are the fantasies of a man who sees himself as shaping the destiny of nations.

Belief in Own Uniqueness: Karp’s public statements consistently position him as a singular figure, a philosopher-CEO who is simultaneously too intellectual for Silicon Valley and too pragmatic for academia, too left for the right and too right for the left. This self-constructed uniqueness is a hallmark of grandiose narcissism: the subject exists outside all ordinary categories precisely because they are extraordinary.

B. Machiavellianism (Dark Triad Component)

Machiavellianism, as defined by Paulhus and Williams, is characterized by manipulativeness, indifference to morality, lack of empathy, and a calculated focus on self-interest [1]. High Machs are distinguished from psychopaths by their capacity for long-term strategic planning rather than impulsive action.

The manifesto is a Machiavellian document in its structure. It employs philosophical language, historical references, and moral appeals not to arrive at truth but to achieve a strategic outcome: the normalization of Palantir’s surveillance architecture as a patriotic and civilizational necessity. Consider the following rhetorical moves:

The invocation of “moral debt” (Point 1) is not a moral argument, it is a manipulation. It converts the voluntary existence of a corporation into a conscripted obligation, foreclosing debate by framing non-compliance as moral failure. The claim that “our adversaries will not pause for debate” (Point 5) is a classic Machiavellian foreclosure of deliberation: it removes the space for communicative rationality, the very thing Karp’s mentor Habermas built his life’s work defending, and replaces it with the urgency of strategic necessity. The appeal to “show grace to public figures” (Point 9) is a manipulation designed to insulate Karp and his class from accountability. The condemnation of “hollow pluralism” (Point 22) is a manipulation that frames constitutional protection of diverse peoples as a weakness to be overcome.

Each of these moves serves Palantir’s commercial and political interests. The manifesto does not argue for truth, it argues for the conditions under which Palantir’s business model becomes not merely acceptable but morally required.

C. The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., F-Scale Framework)

Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford’s landmark 1950 study The Authoritarian Personality identified a cluster of traits associated with susceptibility to fascist ideology and authoritarian leadership [3]. The F-scale (Fascism scale) measured nine components, several of which are directly observable in the manifesto’s content:

Conventionalism: The rigid adherence to conventional middle-class values. The manifesto’s condemnation of “dysfunctional and regressive” cultures (Point 21) and “hollow pluralism” (Point 22) reflects a demand for cultural conformity to a standard defined by the powerful.

Authoritarian Submission: A submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the in-group. The manifesto demands that Silicon Valley submit to the authority of national defense imperatives and that the public submit to the authority of the “engineering elite.”

Authoritarian Aggression: The tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values. The manifesto’s framing of “dysfunctional” cultures, its call to “address violent crime” through corporate surveillance, and its demand to “undo the neutering” of formerly aggressive nations all reflect this pattern.

Anti-Intraception: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded. The manifesto’s dismissal of “soaring rhetoric” (Point 4), its condemnation of the “psychologization of politics” (Point 10), and its demand to “rebel against the tyranny of apps” (Point 2) all reflect a contempt for the inner life and for the kind of reflective, communicative engagement that Habermas championed.

Power and Toughness: Preoccupation with the dominance-submission dimension; identification with power figures; emphasis on the conventionalized attributes of the ego. The manifesto’s entire framework is organized around “hard power,” military dominance, AI weapons, and the assertion that “free societies require hard power.”

Destructiveness and Cynicism: Generalized hostility, vilification of the human. The manifesto’s assertion that “not all cultures are equal” (Point 21) and its framing of certain cultures as “dysfunctional and regressive” reflects a cynical, hierarchical view of mankind that is incompatible with the natural law principle that all men are created by the same Creator.

Adorno made a critical distinction between “genuine conservatives” and “pseudo-conservatives”, arguing that the latter misuse conservative values to promote authoritarianism. The manifesto exhibits this pseudo-conservative pattern precisely: it invokes freedom, democracy, and national security while advocating for conscription, corporate surveillance, AI weapons, and the remilitarization of pacifist nations.

D. The Messiah/Savior Complex

The Messiah complex, as described in psychological literature, involves a state in which a person believes they are destined to save or redeem society, that they possess unique insight and capacity unavailable to ordinary people, and that the urgency of their mission justifies extraordinary means [12].

The manifesto is saturated with salvific language. Silicon Valley must “defend the nation.” AI weapons must be built to prevent civilizational collapse. The “engineering elite” has an “affirmative obligation.” The “atomic age is ending” and a new era must begin, one built by people like Karp. Germany and Japan must be re-armed. The all-volunteer military must be replaced with universal conscription so that “everyone shares the risk” of the wars that Karp’s company’s software will help plan and execute.

This is not a policy platform. It is a redemption narrative in which the author and his class are the indispensable saviors of Western civilization. The Messiah complex is particularly dangerous when combined with the resources and institutional power that Karp commands: Palantir’s contracts span the CIA, NSA, FBI, DHS, ICE, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the defense ministries of multiple allied nations. A man who believes he is saving civilization and who controls the surveillance infrastructure of that civilization is not subject to the ordinary checks of democratic accountability.

VI. The Structural Cross-Reference: Karp, Palantir, and the Lexipol Model

The Lexipol model and the Palantir model are two components of the same corporate police state architecture, operating at different layers of the enforcement stack.

Lexipol operates at the policy layer: it writes the rules that govern how police officers behave, when to use force, how to conduct stops, whether to enforce immigration law, without legislative authorization, without public input, and under a proprietary copyright that prevents public scrutiny of the policies that govern the use of state violence against the people [4]. As the Texas Law Review documented, Lexipol now authors the policies of more than 3,000 public safety agencies across 35 states, with 95% of California law enforcement agencies operating under its privately authored manuals.

Palantir operates at the intelligence and targeting layer: it provides the data infrastructure that tells police officers who to target, where to find them, and what their social networks look like, again without legislative authorization, without public input, and under proprietary algorithms that cannot be examined, challenged, or cross-examined in a court of law.

Together, these two corporate entities, one writing the rules of engagement, the other identifying the targets, constitute a complete corporate police state apparatus that operates entirely outside the constitutional framework of the Republic. Neither entity is elected. Neither is subject to the legislative process. Neither can be held accountable through the ordinary mechanisms of democratic governance. Both operate under color of law: the appearance of lawful authority derived from government contracts, without the constitutional foundation that would make that authority legitimate.

The manifesto’s Point 17, “Silicon Valley must play a role in addressing violent crime, as many politicians have abandoned serious efforts”, is the clearest statement of this agenda. It explicitly advocates for the substitution of corporate technological power for democratic legislative governance in the domain of public safety. This is not a suggestion. It is a description of what Palantir is already doing.

Under the natural law framework, this constitutes a fundamental violation of the principle that no man may harm another without cause. Predictive policing harms people, it subjects them to surveillance, targeting, and enforcement action, on the basis of algorithmic probability, not demonstrated harm. It punishes the thought, the association, the location, and the data profile rather than the act. It is, in the most precise natural law sense, the imposition of harm without the justification of self-defense or protection of property.

VII. The Philosophical Contradiction at the Core

The deepest contradiction in Karp’s public persona is this: he is a man trained in the tradition that most rigorously analyzed and condemned the very system he has built.

Habermas argued that the colonization of the lifeworld by systems of money and power was the central crisis of modernity. The Frankfurt School, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Fromm, spent decades analyzing how instrumental reason, when unchecked by communicative rationality, produces authoritarianism, surveillance, and the reduction of persons to objects of administrative management.

Karp absorbed this tradition at the doctoral level. He wrote his dissertation on aggression within the lifeworld. And then he built the most powerful instrument of lifeworld colonization in human history: a surveillance platform that reduces every man and woman to a data object within a system of strategic calculation, operated by a private corporation, deployed by state agencies, and justified by a manifesto that dismisses debate as weakness and calls caution “corrosive.”

The psychological literature on the Dark Triad notes that Machiavellianism is distinguished from simple psychopathy by its capacity for long-term strategic planning and its use of intellectual frameworks to achieve self-interested ends [1]. The manifesto is precisely this: a sophisticated intellectual framework deployed in service of the strategic interests of a surveillance corporation. The philosophy is real, Karp genuinely absorbed it, but it has been inverted and weaponized. The tools of critical theory have been turned against the people critical theory was designed to protect.

VIII. Summary Classification Table

IX. Conclusion: The Corporate Philosopher-King and the End of the Republic

The title The Technological Republic is the most revealing phrase in the entire manifesto. Plato’s Republic was built on the concept of the philosopher-king: the individual of superior intellect and virtue who, by virtue of that superiority, was entitled to rule without the consent of the governed. The philosopher-king did not need democratic accountability because his wisdom was self-evidently superior to the wisdom of the people.

Karp is presenting himself, and his class of “engineering elites”, as the philosopher-kings of the technological age. The manifesto is the philosophical justification for their rule. The surveillance infrastructure is the mechanism of their governance. The Lexipol policy manuals are the rules their subjects must follow. The AI weapons are the enforcement arm of their deterrence.

Under the natural law framework established at the outset of this analysis, this entire architecture is illegitimate. Mankind is created by the Creator who creates. The highest right of a man is the protection of his person and property from harm. No corporation, no algorithm, no manifesto, and no philosopher-king has the authority to override that right. The Technological Republic is not a republic. It is a surveillance oligarchy dressed in the language of philosophy, and the man writing the manifesto likely knows exactly what Habermas would say about it.

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References

[1] Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The Dark Triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36(6), 556–563. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_triad

[2] American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.). Narcissistic Personality Disorder criteria. https://www.psychiatry.org/news-room/apa-blogs/what-is-narcissistic-personality-disorder

[3] Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The Authoritarian Personality. Harper & Row. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authoritarian_personality

[4] Eagly, I. V., & Schwartz, J. C. (2018). Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking. Texas Law Review, 96(5). https://texaslawreview.org/lexipol/

[5] Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. Beacon Press. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Theory_of_Communicative_Action

[6] Privacy International. (2021). All Roads Lead to Palantir: A Review of How the Data Analytics Company Operates. https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/All%20roads%20lead%20to%20Palantir%20with%20Palantir%20response%20v3.pdf

[7] American Immigration Council. (2025, August 21). ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System to Track Immigrants. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/

[8] Electronic Frontier Foundation. (2026, January 15). Report: ICE Using Palantir Tool That Feeds On Medicaid Data. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/01/report-ice-using-palantir-tool-feeds-medicaid-data

[9] AICERTS. (2024). Predictive Policing Ethics Under Palantir Scrutiny. https://www.aicerts.ai/news/predictive-policing-ethics-under-palantir-scrutiny/

[10] Goldman, D., Wyden, R., & Velázquez, N. (2026, April 16). Goldman, Wyden, Velázquez Demand Answers on ICE Use of Palantir-Developed Technologies. https://goldman.house.gov/media/press-releases/goldman-wyden-velazquez-demand-answers-ice-use-palantir-developed-technologies

[11] Campaign Zero. (2025, October 2). The Private Companies Quietly Building a Police State. https://campaignzero.org/the-private-companies-quietly-building-a-police-state/

[12] Wikipedia. Messiah Complex. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messiah_complex

What is a Palantir?

In J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, a palantír (plural: palantíri) is an indestructible, dark crystal sphere used for far-seeing and telepathic communication. The term derives from the Quenya language, combining palan (”far”) and tir (”to watch over”), translating to “far-seer” or “those that watch from afar.”

Let that sink in first - those who watch from afar. With that in mind, what follows is the man behind the company that is telling you that he and silicon valley have a duty to put this apparatus of surveillance in place. That is the intention and plan. That plan is already in action.

So, what does the palantíri do exactly? J.R.R. Tolkien’s world essentially describes it as follows:

• Function: They allow users to see distant places, events in the past, or communicate directly with others using different stones by projecting thoughts and visions.

• Origin: They were crafted by the Noldor Elves in Valinor during the First Age, possibly by Fëanor, and later brought to Middle-earth by Elendil and his sons.

• Usage: Successful operation requires great strength of will; users with weaker minds can be dominated or deceived by stronger wills, such as Sauron, who used the stones to manipulate Saruman and Denethor.

• Physicality: The stones are perfectly smooth spheres, ranging from about one foot to several feet in diameter, with fixed poles aligned to the center of the world.

The Technological Republic - or - A Technocracy Controlling People

I. Introduction and Analytical Framework

This analysis examines the 22-point manifesto attributed to Palantir CEO Alex Karp, summarizing his book The Technological Republic. The evaluation is grounded in the foundational principles of natural law and constitutional protections as articulated in American historical jurisprudence, including the works of Blackstone, Locke, Story, the Statutes at Large, and Vattel’s Law of Nations.

The analysis applies the following core axioms as established:

1. Creation Axiom: Mankind is a creation of the Creator who creates.

2. Guiding Principle: Mankind operates under a single guiding principle: do no harm to another of mankind unless in self-defense and protection of property, the highest right a man has per America’s rich enlightenment awareness.

This review also incorporates context from previous analyses regarding Lexipol and the privatization of police policymaking [1]. Lexipol acts as a corporate entity that creates de facto law enforcement rules, bypassing the legislative process to establish “color of law” policies. Similarly, Palantir operates as a corporate entity integrating military and surveillance power into the public sphere. Both entities represent the outsourcing of state power to private, for-profit corporations, creating environments where corporate policy and technological deployment supersede constitutional rights and legislative oversight.

The 22 points are analyzed across six specific criteria:

• Contradictions: Internal logical fallacies or conflicts with stated goals.

• Opinion Statements / Color of Law Application: Subjective assertions using adjectives or nebulous phrases that can be broadly interpreted to enforce “color of law” (the appearance of legal authority without actual lawful basis).

• Constitutional Breaches: Direct or implied violations of constitutional protections or natural rights.

• Manufactured Terminology: Made-up words or ideas with no objective, historical legal understanding.

• Nebulous Content: Statements lacking real meaning, designed to obfuscate or provide blank-check authority.

• Historical Inaccuracies and Reinterpretation Presumptions: False claims about historical events, wars, or peace, used to justify current or future actions.

II. Point-by-Point Analysis

Point 1: Silicon Valley’s Moral Debt

“Silicon Valley owes a moral debt to the country that made its rise possible. The engineering elite has an affirmative obligation to participate in the defense of the nation.”

• Opinion / Color of Law: “Moral debt” and “affirmative obligation” are subjective, non-legal constructs. They attempt to convert a voluntary corporate existence into a conscripted duty to the state. This language can be used under color of law to mandate corporate compliance with government surveillance or military objectives without legislative acts.

• Constitutional Breach: The assertion of an “affirmative obligation to participate in the defense of the nation” breaches the Thirteenth Amendment (involuntary servitude) and First Amendment (compelled speech/action) if applied as a mandate. Under natural law, a man’s labor and property are his own, and he owes no inherent “debt” simply for existing within a geographic boundary.

• Nebulous Content: “Engineering elite” is an undefined class. Who qualifies? Who enforces their “obligation”?

Point 2: Rebel Against the Tyranny of Apps

“We must rebel against the tyranny of the apps. Is the iPhone our greatest creative achievement? It has changed our lives but may now be constraining our sense of the possible.”

• Manufactured Terminology: “Tyranny of the apps” is a manufactured, hyperbolic phrase. True tyranny involves the usurpation of natural rights by a governing force, not consumer software voluntarily used by the people.

• Nebulous Content: “Constraining our sense of the possible” has no legal, moral, or practical meaning. It is rhetorical filler designed to shift focus from consumer technology to state-aligned technology (e.g., Palantir’s surveillance software).

Point 3: Free Email is Not Enough

“The decadence of a culture or civilization will be forgiven only if it can deliver economic growth and security for the public.”

• Contradiction: The premise that “decadence” requires “forgiveness” via “security” contradicts the guiding principle of natural law (do no harm). It implies that a culture’s moral failings are absolved by the state’s ability to provide security, often at the cost of the very liberties that define a free civilization.

• Opinion / Color of Law: “Decadence” is purely subjective. Who defines it? “Security for the public” is the classic justification for expanding police powers and surveillance, operating under color of law to bypass individual rights.

• Constitutional Breach: The Constitution does not exist to “forgive decadence” through “economic growth and security.” It exists to secure the blessings of liberty. Prioritizing “security for the public” over individual rights is a direct path to the corporate police state seen in the Lexipol model.

Point 4: The Limits of Soft Power

“The limits of soft power and soaring rhetoric have been exposed. Free and democratic societies require hard power, which in this century will be built on software.”

• Opinion / Color of Law: The assertion that “free and democratic societies require hard power” is an opinion used to justify militarization. When “hard power” is “built on software,” it refers to mass surveillance, predictive policing (e.g., Palantir Gotham), and algorithmic enforcement.

• Constitutional Breach: “Hard power built on software” deployed domestically directly breaches the Fourth Amendment (protection against unreasonable searches and seizures) and the Fifth Amendment (due process). It replaces probable cause with algorithmic probability.

Point 5: AI Weapons are Inevitable

“The question is not whether A.I. weapons will be built; it is who will build them and for what purpose. Our adversaries will not pause for debate.”

• Contradiction: Claiming to defend a “free society” while insisting on building autonomous killing machines (AI weapons) that operate without human moral agency directly contradicts the natural law principle of “do no harm except in self-defense.” An AI cannot assess natural law or the soul of a man; it only calculates data.

• Nebulous Content: “Our adversaries will not pause for debate” is a classic fear-based rhetorical device used to bypass constitutional debate and legislative oversight, granting blank-check authority to defense contractors.

Point 6: National Service as a Universal Duty

“National service should be a universal duty. We should consider moving away from an all-volunteer force and only fight the next war if everyone shares the risk.”

• Constitutional Breach: A “universal duty” to national service is a direct violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against involuntary servitude. It strips a man of his highest right, ownership of his own body and labor.

• Contradiction: Forcing “everyone to share the risk” destroys the concept of a free society. A free man cannot be compelled to fight a war he did not declare or consent to.

Point 7: Build Better Tools for the Military

“If a U.S. Marine asks for a better rifle, we should build it; and the same goes for software. We must remain unflinching in our commitment to those we send into harm’s way.”

• Opinion / Color of Law: Equating a rifle (a physical tool of self-defense) with “software” (which in Palantir’s context means data mining and mass surveillance) is a false equivalence. It uses the emotional appeal of supporting soldiers to justify the creation of mass surveillance architectures that are ultimately turned inward on the domestic population.

Point 8: Public Servants Need Not Be Priests

“Any business that compensated its employees like the federal government would struggle to survive.”

• Nebulous Content: This point lacks a clear thesis related to governance or rights. It appears to be a justification for the privatization of government functions (the Lexipol/Palantir model), arguing that corporate efficiency should replace public administration, further removing accountability from the people.

Point 9: Show Grace to Public Figures

“We should show more grace towards those in public life. The lack of forgiveness may leave us with a poor cast of leaders.”

• Opinion / Color of Law: “Grace” and “forgiveness” are religious/moral concepts inappropriately applied to public accountability. In a constitutional republic, public servants are bound by strict oaths and laws. Demanding “grace” for leaders is a method to shield them from accountability for constitutional breaches, corruption, or violations of natural law.

Point 10: Psychologization of Politics

“The psychologization of modern politics is leading us astray. Those who look to politics to nourish their soul will be left disappointed.”

• Opinion / Nebulous Content: “Psychologization of modern politics” is a manufactured phrase. While it is true that politics cannot nourish the soul (which aligns with the natural law view of man as a spiritual creation), the statement itself is nebulous and serves as a distraction from the structural usurpation of rights by corporate-state partnerships.

Point 11: On the Demise of Enemies

“Our society is too eager to hasten and rejoice at the demise of its enemies. The vanquishing of an opponent is a moment to pause, not rejoice.”

• Nebulous Content: A moral platitude that lacks legal or structural meaning in the context of state power. It attempts to project a false sense of philosophical depth onto the machinery of war and surveillance.

Point 12: The End of the Atomic Age

“The atomic age is ending. A new era of deterrence built on A.I. is set to begin.”

• Opinion / Color of Law: “Deterrence built on A.I.” is a euphemism for omnipresent surveillance and algorithmic control. This justifies the corporate-state alliance (like Palantir’s contracts) under the guise of national survival, bypassing legislative approval for the deployment of such systems.

Point 13: America’s Progressive Values

“No other country has advanced progressive values more than the United States. It offers more opportunity for non-elites than any other nation.”

• Contradiction: The manifesto simultaneously advocates for an “engineering elite” directing hard power (Point 1, Point 4) while claiming to offer opportunity for “non-elites.” The corporate police state inherently divides society into the watchers (elites) and the watched (non-elites).

Point 14: American Power and Long Peace

“American power has made possible an extraordinarily long peace. Nearly a century without a great power conflict is a historic achievement.”

• Historical Inaccuracy / Reinterpretation Presumption: The claim of an “extraordinarily long peace” and “nearly a century without a great power conflict” is a gross historical inaccuracy and a reinterpretation of reality. Since World War II, the United States has been involved in near-constant warfare, proxy conflicts, and interventions (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Global War on Terror). This presumption redefines “peace” to mean merely the absence of direct nuclear conflict between superpowers, completely ignoring the millions of casualties and continuous violations of natural law in localized or proxy wars. This reinterpretation is used to justify the continued expansion of the military-industrial complex and surveillance state.

Point 15: Undo the Neutering of Germany and Japan

“The postwar defanging of Germany and commitment to Japanese pacifism were overcorrections that threaten the balance of power.”

• Historical Reinterpretation / Color of Law: “Defanging” and “overcorrections” are subjective terms used to advocate for global remilitarization. The post-WWII constitutions of Japan (Article 9) and Germany were established specifically to prevent the recurrence of aggressive war, aligning closely with the natural law principle of doing no harm unless in self-defense. Labeling pacifism as an “overcorrection” that “threatens the balance of power” is an opinion used to justify overturning established peace treaties and pushing for global armament, benefiting defense contractors like Palantir.

Point 16: Applaud Builders Where the Market Fails

“We should applaud those who attempt to build where the market has failed, like Elon Musk, whose grand ambitions are often dismissed.”

• Nebulous Content: A rhetorical defense of billionaire technologists. It attempts to frame state-funded defense contractors and corporate oligarchs as heroic “builders” operating outside the market, when in reality, they are deeply embedded in state-granted monopolies, subsidies, and government contracts.

Point 17: Silicon Valley and Violent Crime

“Silicon Valley must play a role in addressing violent crime, as many politicians have abandoned serious efforts.”

• Constitutional Breach / Color of Law: This is the direct intersection with the Lexipol model. It advocates for private tech corporations to assume police powers (”addressing violent crime”). When Silicon Valley (Palantir) provides predictive policing algorithms and Lexipol provides the policy manuals, the legislative process is entirely bypassed. Corporate algorithms and private policies become the de facto law, enforcing a police state under color of law, devoid of constitutional due process, probable cause, or public accountability.

Point 18: Ruthless Exposure of Public Figures

“The ruthless exposure of public figures’ private lives drives too much talent away from government service.”

• Opinion: Another attempt to shield the ruling class from scrutiny, contradicting the necessity of transparency in a republic. It implies that those who seek power over others should not be subject to rigorous examination.

Point 19: The Corrosiveness of Caution

“The caution we encourage in public life is corrosive. Those who say nothing wrong often say nothing much at all.”

• Contradiction: In the context of building AI weapons and mass surveillance, “caution” is the exact mechanism required to protect constitutional rights and prevent tyranny. Labeling caution as “corrosive” is a direct attack on the checks and balances designed to protect the people from the state.

Point 20: Resist Intolerance of Religious Belief

“The pervasive intolerance of religious belief in certain elite circles must be resisted.”

• Nebulous Content: While aligning somewhat with the natural law acknowledgment of a Creator, in this context, it is used as a cultural wedge issue rather than a legal defense of the First Amendment. It attempts to garner support from religious demographics for a fundamentally technocratic agenda.

Point 21: Not All Cultures Are Equal

“Some cultures have produced vital advances; others remain dysfunctional and regressive. The dogma that all cultures are equal glosses over harmful realities.”

• Opinion / Color of Law: “Dysfunctional,” “regressive,” and “harmful realities” are highly subjective adjectives. When a surveillance corporation defines which cultures are “dysfunctional,” it creates the foundation for algorithmic bias and targeted policing, violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It allows for the application of color of law against specific groups deemed “regressive” by the corporate-state apparatus.

Point 22: Resist Hollow Pluralism

“We must resist the shallow temptation of a vacant and hollow pluralism. We have resisted defining national cultures in the name of inclusivity, but inclusion into what?”

• Manufactured Terminology / Nebulous Content: “Hollow pluralism” is a manufactured concept. The purpose of the Republic is not to define a monolithic “national culture” into which one must be included, but to protect the natural rights of the people to exist without harm. This point attempts to replace constitutional protection of individual rights with a mandatory collective identity.

III. Synthesis: The Corporate-State Bypass (The Lexipol/Palantir Paradigm)

The analysis of this manifesto, when cross-referenced with the operational model of Lexipol, reveals a systemic architecture designed to bypass constitutional governance and natural law.

3. The Illusion of Law (Color of Law): Just as Lexipol authors private policy manuals that local police departments adopt as standard operating procedures, effectively replacing legislative debate on use-of-force and civil liberties [1], Palantir advocates for a framework where “hard power built on software” dictates national security and domestic policing. The policies and algorithms are proprietary, hidden from public scrutiny, yet they govern the actions of the state against the people.

4. Erosion of Natural Law: The guiding principle of “do no harm unless in self-defense” is entirely absent from the manifesto. Instead, it is replaced by “affirmative obligations” to the state, “universal duty” (conscription), and the deployment of “A.I. deterrence.” The individual man or woman is reduced to a data point within a “dysfunctional” or “functional” culture, subject to the predictive modeling of corporate software.

5. Historical Revisionism as Justification: By falsely claiming a century of “peace” (Point 14) and labeling post-WWII pacifism as an “overcorrection” (Point 15), the manifesto attempts to rewrite history to justify a perpetual state of militarization and surveillance. This reinterpretation ignores the reality of continuous warfare and uses the illusion of peace to demand even greater control.

6. The Subversion of the Republic: The title The Technological Republic is an oxymoron. A republic is governed by the rule of law derived from the consent of the governed and the protection of natural rights. The system described in the manifesto is an oligarchy or technocracy, where engineering elites and private corporations (acting under color of law) dictate the terms of existence, security, and force.

Liberty dies in the broad daylight, under the guise of public safety and convenience with your consent. When will the algorithm determine that you are a threat?

References

[1] Eagly, I. V., & Schwartz, J. C. (2018). Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking. Texas Law Review, 96(5). https://texaslawreview.org/lexipol/

[2] Karp, Alexander C., and Nicholas W. Zamiska. The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West. Crown Currency, February 18, 2025. ISBN: 978-0593798690. https://techrepublicbook.com

[3] Palantir Technologies (@PalantirTech). “Because we get asked a lot. The Technological Republic, in brief. [22-point summary excerpted from the book].” X (formerly Twitter), April 18, 2026, 6:45 PM. 35.5 million views.

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A Rebuttal to the Claim That Driver’s Licenses, Vehicle Registration, and Certificates of Title Apply to Private Travel Independent of Commercial Activity

I. Introduction: An Argument That Must Be Answered

Among the counter arguments most frequently deployed by law enforcement officers, municipal court judges, and private training entities such as Lexipol Media Group, one stands out for its apparent simplicity and its structural dependence on a misreading of statutory text. The argument is this: a standard driver’s license is entirely distinct from a commercial driver’s license (CDL). The CDL, it is said, governs commercial trucking and hazardous materials transport. The standard driver’s license, by contrast, governs the everyday travel of the people, private, non-commercial, and universally required. From this premise, the argument extends to certificates of title and vehicle registration: these requirements, it is asserted, attach to all conveyances used on the public right-of-way, independent of any commercial nexus, because the legislature has simply chosen to regulate all use of public roads as a matter of public safety.

This argument sounds reasonable on its surface. It is the argument that most law enforcement officers have been trained to accept, and it is the argument that most judges apply without examination. It is also, when subjected to the established canons of statutory construction, demonstrably false.

The falsity does not arise from a fringe interpretation or a novel legal theory. It arises from the application of rules that every first-year law student learns: that a statute must be read as a whole; that terms of art carry the meaning assigned to them by the legislature; that a word is known by the company it keeps (noscitur a sociis); that where a general term follows specific terms, it is limited to the same class (ejusdem generis); and that the expression of one thing excludes others (expressio unius est exclusio alterius). When these rules are applied to the definitional chains embedded in federal and state vehicle codes, the commercial limitation on every regulated term like “driver,” “operator,” “motor vehicle,” “vehicle,” “license,” “certificate of title,” “registration” is not merely plausible; it is the only reading the text supports.

This analysis examines those definitional chains across federal law and six representative state jurisdictions: California, Texas, Florida, New York, West Virginia, and the federal framework under Title 18 and Title 49 of the United States Code. It then addresses the certificate of title and registration arguments directly, demonstrating that those requirements are equally embedded in commercial definitions. It concludes by applying the canons of construction to the specific counter argument; that a driver’s license is not a commercial driver’s license and showing that this argument, when traced to its statutory source, collapses.

II. The Supremacy of the Common Law: Reception Statutes and Constitutional Guarantees

Before any specific vehicle code definition can be analyzed, the foundational layer of state law must be established. A frequent error in statutory interpretation, particularly in the context of law enforcement training, is the presumption that statutes exist in a vacuum, entirely displacing the common law. To the contrary, almost every state in the union explicitly declares that the common law is the supreme rule of decision, and that statutes are merely supplemental or corrective to that common law baseline. This principle is codified in “reception statutes” and constitutional provisions that adopt the common law of England as the operative law of the state.

When a fundamental right, such as the right of locomotion, exists at common law, a state statute cannot silently abrogate it. Any statute that touches upon a common law right must be read in harmony with the common law unless the legislature explicitly declares an intent to abrogate it.

A. The Reception Statutes

Every jurisdiction analyzed in this analysis has explicitly adopted the common law as its rule of decision. These reception statutes mandate that the common law prevails unless explicitly contradicted by the state constitution or a specific legislative act.

California: The California Civil Code establishes the common law as the rule of decision in all courts of the state:

“The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State.” [1]

Texas: The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code explicitly adopts the common law:

“The rule of decision in this state consists of those portions of the common law of England that are not inconsistent with the constitution or the laws of this state, the constitution of this state, and the laws of this state.” [2]

Florida: The Florida Statutes declare the common law to be in force:

“The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the Legislature of this state.” [3]

West Virginia: The West Virginia Code similarly adopts the common law:

“The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Constitution of this state, shall continue in force within the same, except in those respects wherein it was altered by the general assembly of Virginia before June 20, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, or has been, or shall be, altered by the Legislature of this state.” [4]

B. Constitutional Preservation of the Common Law

Beyond statutory adoption, state constitutions frequently elevate the preservation of the common law to an organic guarantee. This means that the legislature’s power to alter the common law is itself constrained by constitutional limits.

New York: The New York Constitution explicitly preserves the common law as the law of the state:

“Such parts of the common law, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said colony, on the nineteenth day of April, one thousand seven hundred seventy-five... shall be and continue the law of this state, subject to such alterations as the legislature shall make concerning the same. But all such parts of the common law, and such of the said acts, or parts thereof, as are repugnant to this constitution, are hereby abrogated.” [5]

C. The Implication for Statutory Construction

The existence of these reception statutes and constitutional provisions creates a structural barrier to the silent expansion of regulatory statutes. Because the common law is the baseline rule of decision, any statute that purports to regulate a common law right, such as the right of locomotion on the public highway, must be strictly construed.

If a state vehicle code uses a term like “motor vehicle” or “driver” without explicitly declaring an intent to abrogate the common law right of private travel, the statute must be read in a way that preserves the common law right. The common law recognizes the distinction between a private traveler exercising a fundamental right and a commercial carrier exercising a licensed privilege. Therefore, the reception statutes require that ambiguous or silent vehicle code definitions be interpreted to maintain that distinction, rather than to silently obliterate the common law right in favor of universal commercial regulation.

III. The Hierarchy of Definitional Authority: General Titles, Original Meaning, and the Doctrine of Explicit Nullity

Again, before examining the specific vehicle codes, it is necessary to establish the hierarchy of definitional authority. The false premise of universal licensing often relies on reading terms like “person,” “resident,” “State,” or “United States” according to their modern colloquial usage, ignoring the strict hierarchy of statutory construction. It also relies on the false assumption that a legislature can silently redefine a term that has an established original legal meaning without explicitly abrogating that prior meaning.

When a term is used in a state statute, its meaning is determined by a rigid order of operations:

1. The Specific Statute: If the specific chapter or section defines the term, that definition controls exclusively within that scope.

2. The General Title: If the specific statute is silent, the definition in the state code’s General Provisions or General Title controls (e.g., California Government Code, Texas Government Code Chapter 311, West Virginia Article 2-2).

3. Federal Conformity: If the state code is entirely silent, but the statute implements a federally funded regulatory framework (such as the Surface Transportation Assistance Act), the federal definition controls (in pari materia).

4. Original Meaning and the Law of Nations: If no statutory definition exists, the term must be read according to its original legal meaning at the time the framework was established, as documented in foundational authorities like Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856) or Vattel’s The Law of Nations (1758).

A. The General Title Limitations

Every state code contains a general title that limits the construction of terms throughout the code unless specifically overridden.

For example, when a vehicle code regulates a “person,” the lay reader assumes this means a man or woman. But the general titles of state codes consistently define “person” as an artificial or commercial entity, or a “natural person” acting in a commercial capacity.

• Texas Government Code § 311.005(2): “’Person’ includes corporation, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, and any other legal entity.” [6]

• California Government Code § 17: “’Person’ includes any person, firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, or company.” [7]

• Florida Statutes § 1.01(3): “The word ‘person’ includes individuals, children, firms, associations, joint adventures, partnerships, estates, trusts, business trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries, corporations, and all other groups or combinations.” [8]

• West Virginia Code § 2-2-10(a)(9): “’Person’ or ‘whoever’ includes corporations, societies, associations and partnerships, and other similar legal business organizations.” [9]

Under the canon of noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps), a “natural person” included in a list of artificial, commercial, and governmental entities is understood to be acting in the same capacity as those entities, as a commercial actor or agent, not as a man or woman in their private capacity.

B. The Three Meanings of “United States” and “State”

The terms “United States” and “State” are not monolithic. As the Supreme Court established in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), the term “United States” has three distinct legal meanings:

1. The sovereign nation in international law.

2. The sovereign territory of the several states united under the Constitution.

3. The municipal corporation acting as the government of the federal territories and the District of Columbia. [10]

When a general title defines “State” (capitalized), it frequently refers to the third meaning, the municipal corporation and its subdivisions. For example, when a statute defines a “resident” of the “State,” it is often defining a resident of the municipal corporation (a franchise or commercial nexus), not an inhabitant of the geographic landmass.

C. Resident, Inhabitant, and Domicile

The distinction between an inhabitant (a man or woman living on the land) and a resident (a term of art implying a commercial or jurisdictional nexus) is foundational to original legal meaning.

• Inhabitant: According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), an inhabitant is “one who has his domicile in a place; one who has an actual fixed residence in a place.” It implies a permanent, lawful presence on the land as a matter of right. [11]

• Resident: A resident, by contrast, is one who resides in a place for a time, often for commercial or statutory purposes. In federal tax law, for example, “residence” is determined by a presence test for aliens (26 C.F.R. § 1.871-2(b)), establishing a jurisdictional nexus for taxation. [12]

• Domicile: Vattel’s The Law of Nations defines domicile as a fixed residence with the intention of always staying there. A man or woman may be domiciled on the land of a state republic (an inhabitant) without being a “resident” of the municipal corporation (”the State”) for statutory purposes. [13]

When a vehicle code requires a “resident” to obtain a driver’s license within 30 days, it is invoking the statutory, commercial definition of resident under the general title, not the original meaning of an inhabitant exercising the right of locomotion.

D. The Doctrine of Explicit Nullity

A critical principle of statutory construction is that a legislature cannot silently redefine a term that has an established original legal meaning. When a legislature wishes to change the established legal meaning of a term of art (one that has been defined by common law, the law of nations, or prior statute), it must do so explicitly through a decree of nullity.

This requirement is grounded in two foundational doctrines:

1. Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law: Statutes that alter or abrogate common law rights must be strictly construed. As Sutherland’s Statutory Construction notes, an intent to change the common law will not be presumed from ambiguous statutory language. The abrogation must be explicit. [14]

2. Legislative Presumption: The legislature is presumed to know existing law when it legislates. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). If the legislature uses a term with an established common law meaning, it is presumed to have adopted that meaning unless it explicitly states otherwise. [15]

A silent redefinition, where a new statute simply uses a term like “transportation” or “resident” without acknowledging or displacing its prior, narrower meaning does not accomplish the change. The original meaning survives.

E. Constitutional Compliance and Strict Scrutiny

Even an explicit redefinition through a decree of nullity is void if it violates constitutional protections. The constitutional avoidance doctrine requires courts to construe statutes to avoid constitutional conflicts whenever possible.

If a legislature attempts to redefine “travel” as “transportation,” or “inhabitant” as “resident,” in a way that converts a constitutionally protected right into a licensed privilege, that redefinition must survive strict scrutiny because it burdens a fundamental right.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the right of locomotion is a fundamental constitutional right. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). [16] [17] The Court has never held that this right can be converted into a licensed privilege by statutory redefinition alone. As the Court noted in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) [18], “A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution.“ [19]

Therefore, when a state vehicle code uses broad language that might be read to encompass private travel, the constitutional avoidance doctrine requires the court to adopt the narrower, commercial reading because reading the statute to require a license for the fundamental right of locomotion would immediately trigger, and likely fail, strict scrutiny. The commercial limitation is not merely a matter of statutory definition; it is a constitutional necessity.

V. The Canons of Statutory Construction: The Tools of Analysis

There is another evaluation that must be completed before reviewing any statutes; it is necessary to establish the analytical framework. These are not invented rules. They are the foundational principles of statutory interpretation recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States and by every state appellate court in the nation.

• The Whole-Statute Rule. A statute must be read as a whole, with each provision interpreted in light of the others. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015). A court may not read a single subsection in isolation from the title, chapter, and article in which it appears. The scope of a title limits the scope of every provision within it.

• Noscitur a Sociis. A word is known by the company it keeps. When a term appears in a list, its meaning is informed by the other terms in the list. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995). When “natural person” appears in a list alongside “firm,” “corporation,” “association,” and “partnership,” the natural person is understood to be acting in the same commercial capacity as those artificial entities.

• Ejusdem Generis. Where a general term follows a list of specific terms, the general term is limited to the same class as the specific terms. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). Where a general term precedes specific terms, the specific terms limit the general.

• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius. The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). Where a statute expressly exempts certain activities from its scope, the absence of an exemption for other activities does not mean those activities are included; it means the legislature chose not to address them.

• Terms of Art. Where a legislature assigns a specific definition to a term, that definition governs throughout the statute. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The common meaning of a word is displaced by its statutory definition.

These five canons, applied consistently, produce the analysis that follows.

VI. The Federal Baseline: Title 18 and Title 49

A. The Commercial Definition of “Motor Vehicle” in Title 18

The starting point for any analysis of vehicle regulation is the federal definition of “motor vehicle” in Title 18 of the United States Code, which governs federal crimes and criminal procedure. Title 18, Chapter 2 addresses aircraft and motor vehicles. Section 31 provides the definitions applicable to that chapter.

18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6) defines “motor vehicle” as:

“every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.” [20]

This definition is not ambiguous. A motor vehicle, in the federal statutory sense, is a contrivance used for commercial purposes. The definition does not include private conveyances used for personal travel. The legislature knew how to include private use; it chose not to.

The statute defines “commercial purposes” with equal precision. 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(10) provides:

“The term ‘used for commercial purposes’ means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.” [20]

The phrase “or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit” is broad, but it is not unlimited. It requires a nexus to profit-seeking activity. A man or woman traveling from home to a friend’s house, to a place of worship, or to a public park is not engaged in an undertaking intended for profit. The definition does not reach that activity.

B. Title 49 and the Distinction Between a Driver’s License and a CDL

Title 49 of the United States Code governs transportation. Chapter 313 addresses commercial motor vehicle safety. The definitions in 49 U.S.C. § 31301 are critical because they establish the federal framework that states must follow to maintain highway funding under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act.

49 U.S.C. § 31301(3) defines “commercial driver’s license” as:

“a license issued by a State to an individual authorizing the individual to operate a class of commercial motor vehicles.” [21]

49 U.S.C. § 31301(6) defines “driver’s license” as:

“a license issued by a State to an individual authorizing the individual to operate a motor vehicle on highways.” [21]

The counter-argument seizes on this distinction: the CDL authorizes “commercial motor vehicles,” while the standard driver’s license authorizes “motor vehicles.” Therefore, the argument goes, the standard driver’s license applies to non-commercial vehicles.

This argument fails the whole-statute rule immediately. The term “motor vehicle” in the driver’s license definition does not exist in a vacuum. It is a term of art defined elsewhere in the code. At the federal level, “motor vehicle” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6) as a contrivance used for commercial purposes. The CDL and the standard driver’s license are not a commercial/non-commercial pair; they are a heavy-commercial/light-commercial pair. Both authorize the operation of commercial contrivances. The CDL authorizes the heavier class (typically over 26,001 pounds gross vehicle weight, or carrying hazardous materials, or transporting 16 or more passengers). The standard driver’s license authorizes the lighter class. The commercial nexus is present in both.

C. The Federal Highway Program and State Conformity

The states are not free to define these terms however they choose. Under 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., states that accept federal highway funds, which is every state, must conform their traffic laws to federal standards. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) set the definitional framework. States that deviate from this framework risk losing federal highway funding.

This conformity requirement means that when a state defines “motor vehicle,” “driver,” “operator,” or “license,” those definitions are not independent state creations. They are state implementations of a federal commercial regulatory framework. The commercial nexus at the federal level is therefore the commercial nexus at the state level, whether or not the state statute explicitly restates it.

VII. The State Definitional Chains: Six Jurisdictions

A. California Vehicle Code

California’s Vehicle Code is organized into Divisions. Division 1 contains the general definitions applicable throughout the code. Division 6 governs Drivers’ Licenses. The title-level scope of Division 6, “Drivers’ Licenses”, is not a general grant of authority to regulate all travel; it is a specific grant of authority to regulate the licensing of drivers, a term of art defined in Division 1.

The Definitional Chain:

1. Vehicle (VEH § 670): “A device by which any person or property may be propelled, moved, or drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.” [22]

2. Motor Vehicle (VEH § 415): “A vehicle that is self-propelled.” [23]

3. Driver (VEH § 305): “A person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.” [24]

4. Person (VEH § 470): “A natural person, firm, copartnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation.” [25]

5. Commercial Vehicle (VEH § 260(a)): “A motor vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code used or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit or designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property.” [26]

6. 6. Driver’s License (VEH § 12500): Requires a “person” to hold a “driver’s license” to “drive a motor vehicle upon a highway.” [27]

Application of the Canons:

Under noscitur a sociis, the term “natural person” in the definition of “person” (VEH § 470) appears in a list alongside “firm,” “copartnership,” “association,” “limited liability company,” and “corporation.” All of these other entities are artificial, commercial entities. The natural person, in this statutory context, is understood to be acting in the same commercial capacity as a commercial actor or agent of a commercial entity.

Under the whole-statute rule, Division 6’s requirement that a “person” hold a “driver’s license” to “drive a motor vehicle” must be read in light of the definition of “commercial vehicle” in § 260, which establishes that the regulated activity is the use of motor vehicles for hire, compensation, or profit. The license requirement attaches to the commercial activity, not to the private travel of a man or woman.

The Critical Subsection — VEH § 260(b):

“Passenger vehicles and house cars that are not used for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation, or profit are not commercial vehicles.” [26]

This provision is often cited by law enforcement as evidence that the code distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial vehicles, and that non-commercial vehicles are still regulated. But the provision does not say that non-commercial vehicles are regulated; it says they are not commercial vehicles. Under expressio unius, the exclusion of non-commercial passenger vehicles from the definition of “commercial vehicle” is an exclusion from the commercial regulatory framework, not an inclusion in a separate non-commercial regulatory framework. The legislature chose to regulate commercial vehicles. It chose not to regulate private conveyances under the same framework.

B. Texas Transportation Code

Texas organizes its vehicle regulations in the Transportation Code. Title 7 governs vehicles and traffic. Chapter 521 governs driver’s licenses. Chapter 541 provides the general definitions.

The Definitional Chain:

1. Vehicle (TX Transp. § 541.201(23)): “Every device in, on, or by which a person or property is or may be transported or drawn on a highway, other than a device used exclusively on stationary rails or tracks.” [28]

2. Motor Vehicle (TX Transp. § 541.201(11)): “A self-propelled vehicle or a vehicle that is propelled by electric power from overhead trolley wires.” [28]

3. Operator (TX Transp. § 541.001(1-a)): “A person who drives or has physical control of a vehicle.” [29]

4. Person (TX Transp. § 541.001(3)): “An individual, firm, partnership, association, or corporation.” [29]

5. Driver’s License (TX Transp. § 521.001(3)): “An authorization issued by the department for the operation of a motor vehicle.” [30]

6. License (TX Transp. § 521.001(6)): “An authorization issued by the department under this chapter for the operation of a motor vehicle.” [30]

Application of the Canons:

The Texas code uses the word “authorization” for both “driver’s license” and “license.” This is a term of art. An authorization is a grant of permission by the state to engage in a regulated activity. One does not need authorization to exercise a right; one needs authorization to engage in a privilege. The Texas legislature, by using the word “authorization,” confirmed that the operation of a motor vehicle is a privilege, a commercial privilege, not a right.

Under noscitur a sociis, the “individual” in the definition of “person” (§ 541.001(3)) appears alongside “firm,” “partnership,” “association,” and “corporation.” The individual, in this context, is acting in the same commercial capacity as those entities.

Under the whole-statute rule, the “authorization” for the “operation of a motor vehicle” must be read in light of the federal definition of “motor vehicle” as a contrivance used for commercial purposes. The authorization is for commercial operation.

C. Florida Statutes

Florida’s vehicle and traffic laws are found in Title XXIII, Chapters 316 through 322. Chapter 316 governs state uniform traffic control. Chapter 322 governs driver’s licenses.

The Definitional Chain:

1. Vehicle (FL Stat. § 316.003(75)): “Every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.” [31]

2. Motor Vehicle (FL Stat. § 316.003(46)): “Except when used in s. 316.1001, a self-propelled vehicle not operated upon rails or guideway, but not including any bicycle, electric bicycle, motorized scooter, electric personal assistive mobility device, mobile carrier, personal delivery device, swamp buggy, or moped.” [31]

3. Driver (FL Stat. § 316.003(21)): “Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.” [31]

4. Operator (FL Stat. § 316.003(53)): “Any person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.” [31]

5. Person (FL Stat. § 316.003(58)): “Any natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.” [31]

6. Commercial Motor Vehicle (FL Stat. § 316.003(14)): “Any self-propelled or towed vehicle used on the public highways in commerce to transport passengers or cargo...” [31]

Application of the Canons:

Florida’s definition of “commercial motor vehicle” is explicit: it is a vehicle “used on the public highways in commerce.” The word “commerce” is the operative term. Under the whole-statute rule, the “driver” and “operator” definitions, which apply to persons in control of “vehicles” and “motor vehicles,” must be read in light of the commercial purpose that defines those vehicles.

The distinction between “driver” (vehicle) and “operator” (motor vehicle) in Florida law is instructive. The “operator” is specifically tied to the “motor vehicle,” which is the commercially defined contrivance. The “driver” is tied to the broader “vehicle.” Both, however, are defined as “persons,” and “person” includes corporations and firms. The man or woman traveling privately is not a “person” in this statutory sense unless they have assumed that commercial role.

D. New York Vehicle and Traffic Law

New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Law (VAT) is organized by Article. Article 1 provides general definitions. Article 19 governs the licensing of drivers.

The Definitional Chain:

1. Motor Vehicle (NY VAT § 125): “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power, except (a) electrically-driven mobility assistance devices operated or driven by a person with a disability...” [32]

2. Driver (NY VAT § 113): “Every person who operates or drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Whenever the terms ‘chauffeur’ or ‘operator’ or ‘chauffeur’s license’ or ‘operator’s license’ are used in this chapter, they shall be deemed to mean ‘driver’ or ‘driver’s license’ as the case may be.” [33]

3. Person (NY VAT § 107): “Every natural person, firm, co-partnership, association or corporation.” [34]

Application of the Canons:

New York’s definition of “driver” is particularly revealing. It expressly equates “driver” with “chauffeur” and “operator.” A “chauffeur” is, by definition, a person employed to drive a motor vehicle, a commercial role. The legislature’s equation of “driver” with “chauffeur” and “operator” confirms that the statutory “driver” is a person engaged in the commercial activity of operating a vehicle, not a man or woman exercising the private right of locomotion.

Under noscitur a sociis, the “natural person” in the definition of “person” (§ 107) appears alongside “firm,” “co-partnership,” “association,” and “corporation”, all commercial entities. The natural person, in this context, is the natural person acting in a commercial capacity.

E. West Virginia Code

West Virginia’s motor vehicle laws are found in Chapter 17A (Motor Vehicle Administration, Registration, Certificate of Title and Antitheft Provisions) and Chapter 17C (Motor Vehicle Traffic Control).

The Definitional Chain:

1. Vehicle (WV Code § 17A-1-1(a)): “Every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.” [35

2. Motor Vehicle (WV Code § 17A-1-1(b)): “Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails.” [35]

3. Driver (WV Code § 17A-1-1(w)): “Every person who operates or is in actual physical control of a vehicle upon a highway.” [35]

4. Operator (WV Code § 17A-1-1(v)): “Every person who operates or is in actual physical control of a vehicle upon a highway.” [35]

5. Person (WV Code § 17A-1-1(x)): “Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.” [35]

Application of the Canons:

The West Virginia definitional chain reveals the same commercial structure as the other jurisdictions when subjected to the established canons of statutory construction.

Under noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps), the term “natural person” in the definition of “person” (WV Code § 17A-1-1(x)) appears in a list alongside “firm,” “copartnership,” “association,” and “corporation.” [35] All of these accompanying terms describe artificial, commercial entities. Therefore, the “natural person” regulated by this chapter is understood to be a natural person acting in the same commercial capacity as a firm or corporation, not a private man or woman exercising the right of locomotion.

Under the whole-statute rule, the terms “driver” and “operator” (WV Code § 17A-1-1(w) and (v)), defined as a “person” who operates a “vehicle”, must be read in light of this commercial limitation on the word “person.” [35] The driver or operator is a commercial actor.

Furthermore, West Virginia’s use of the terms “operate” and “operator” invokes the federal conformity requirement. Because West Virginia accepts federal highway funding under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, its regulatory framework must conform to federal standards. Under in pari materia, the state’s use of the term “operator” must be read consistently with the federal definition in 49 U.S.C. § 31132(2), which defines an “employee” as “an operator of a commercial motor vehicle... who directly affects commercial motor vehicle safety in the course of employment.” [44]

By remaining silent on a specific definition for “operate,” the West Virginia legislature did not silently expand the federal commercial term to include private travel. Under expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the explicit federal limitation of “operator” to commercial, compensated activity means that the state’s silence leaves the commercial limitation intact. If the state intended to regulate the constitutionally protected right of private travel under the guise of “operation,” it would have had to do so explicitly, triggering strict scrutiny.

This structural commercial limitation is precisely why West Virginia Code § 17A-3-1a creates only a rebuttable presumption that a person operating a vehicle on the highway is required to have a driver’s license. The rebuttable presumption is the legislature’s acknowledgment that the license requirement does not apply universally; it applies presumptively to those engaged in commercial activity, and that presumption can be rebutted by a man or woman demonstrating the absence of a commercial nexus.

West Virginia Code § 17A-3-1a creates a rebuttable presumption that a person operating a vehicle on the highway is required to have a driver’s license. As analyzed in the companion chapter on the WV practical application, this presumption is rebuttable precisely because the legislature recognized that not all travel on the highway is commercial. The rebuttable presumption is the legislature’s acknowledgment that the license requirement does not apply universally; it applies presumptively to those engaged in commercial activity, and that presumption can be rebutted by demonstrating the absence of a commercial nexus.

VIII. The Certificate of Title and Registration: The Same Commercial Chain

The counter argument does not stop at the driver’s license. It extends to certificates of title and vehicle registration, asserting that these requirements apply to all vehicles on the public right-of-way independent of commercial activity. This assertion is equally false, and the statutory chain is equally clear.

A. Federal Certificate of Title Framework

The federal framework for vehicle titling is found in 49 U.S.C. Chapter 327 (Anti-Car Theft Improvements Act). The purpose of the federal titling system is to track commercial transactions in motor vehicles like sales, transfers, liens, and encumbrances. The certificate of title is a commercial document. It records the chain of commercial ownership of a motor vehicle.

The National Motor Vehicle Title Information System (NMVTIS), established under 49 U.S.C. § 30502, is explicitly a commercial tracking system. Its purpose is to prevent title fraud in commercial transactions, not to regulate the private use of conveyances.

B. State Certificate of Title: The Commercial Nexus

In every state, the certificate of title requirement is embedded in the same commercial definitional chain as the driver’s license requirement. The “motor vehicle” that must be titled is the commercially defined contrivance. A private conveyance, one not used for hire, compensation, or profit is not a “motor vehicle” in the statutory sense and therefore does not require a certificate of title under the commercial regulatory framework.

California (VEH § 4000): “A person shall not drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle... unless it is registered under this code.” [36] The “motor vehicle” in this provision is the commercially-defined contrivance of VEH § 415, read in light of the commercial purpose of VEH § 260. The “person” is the commercially defined actor of VEH § 470.

West Virginia (WV Code § 17A-3-1): “Every owner of a vehicle which is operated or driven upon the public roads or highways of this state shall register the vehicle...” [37] The “owner” is defined in § 17A-1-1(y) as a “person” who holds the legal title to a “vehicle.” The “person” is the commercially defined actor. The “vehicle” is the commercially defined contrivance.

The pattern is uniform. The certificate of title and registration requirements are embedded in the same commercial definitional chain as the driver’s license requirement. They are commercial documents for commercial contrivances operated by commercial persons.

C. The Prohibition on Converting the Right of Locomotion into a Commercial Privilege

Proponents of universal licensing often argue that any travel connected to employment or business, even a private commute, falls within the commercial nexus. This argument conflates the fundamental right of locomotion with the state-granted privilege of commercial transportation, a distinction that has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court and foundational legal treatises.

The distinction between a right (which belongs to a man or woman by nature and constitutional guarantee) and a privilege (which is granted by the state and may be licensed or taxed) is absolute. Foundational legal dictionaries and treatises have long defined personal liberty as inherently including the right of locomotion; the power to move freely without state permission.

“Personal liberty consists of the power of locomotion, of changing situations, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of law.”—Blackstone’s Commentaries and Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1914) [38]

“Personal liberty largely consists of the right of locomotion—to go where and when one pleases… The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon… is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common right which he has under his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”—American Jurisprudence (1st), Constitutional Law, § 329, p. 1135 [39]

The Supreme Court has unequivocally barred the state from transforming this secured liberty into a taxable privilege. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) [18], the Court established the foundational rule that the state cannot impose a charge or require a license for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution:

“It is a license tax—a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution. ... The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down.”

The Court in Murdock further clarified that exercising a right does not become a commercial privilege merely because money changes hands to defray expenses or sustain the individual. A man is not hired or paid for the activity of traveling to his place of business; he is compensated for his time and labor at or for the place of business. Commuting to work in a personal conveyance is an exercise of the right of locomotion and access to livelihood, not a commercial use of the public highway.

State supreme courts, applying these federal principles, have specifically addressed the right to use the public highways. In Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 (1930) [40], the Virginia Supreme Court provided one of the most lucid articulations of the difference between the common right of travel and a state-granted privilege:

“The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day. This right is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will.”

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically noted that conditioning the right of movement upon the presentation of state-issued identification papers is a hallmark of totalitarianism, not a free society:

“Freedom of movement… is the very essence of our free society… ticketing of people and use of identification papers are routine matters under totalitarian regimes, yet abhorrent in the United States.”—Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) [41]

When the state does issue a driver’s license, the Supreme Court has recognized that the license and the information it contains are inherently commercial in nature, further reinforcing the distinction between the commercial regulatory framework and the private right to travel:

“Driver’s license information… is an article of commerce… The DPPA regulates the disclosure and resale of personal information contained in the records of state DMVs… because drivers’ personal, identifying information is, in this context, an article of commerce.”—Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) [42]

The private man or woman who uses a personal conveyance for private travel, including commuting to and from a place of business or employment, is exercising an indefeasible right of locomotion. That activity is not reached by the commercial regulatory framework, because the travel itself is not a compensable privilege, and the state is constitutionally barred from converting that right into a licensed article of commerce.

IX. The Rebuttable Presumption: Transport, Transportation, Operate, and Operator

One of the most sophisticated counter arguments deployed by law enforcement and municipal courts relies on statutory silence. State vehicle codes frequently use the terms “transport,” “transportation,” “operate,” and “operator” without defining them, or by defining them circularly (e.g., “an operator is a person who operates”). From this silence, the state presumes that these terms carry their broadest possible colloquial meaning: that “transportation” means any movement from point A to point B, and that “operate” means any physical manipulation of a vehicle’s controls.

This presumption is structurally false. When a state code is silent on a term of art that is foundational to a federally funded regulatory framework, the canons of statutory construction require that the federal definition be imported (in pari materia), and that the silence cannot be read to expand the term beyond its federal commercial scope (expressio unius).

A. The Federal Definition of “Transportation”

Title 49 of the United States Code governs transportation. Section 13102 provides the definitions for Part B (Motor Carriers, Water Carriers, Brokers, and Freight Forwarders).

49 U.S.C. § 13102(23) defines “transportation” as including:

“(A) a motor vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; and (B) services related to that movement, including arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passengers and property.” [43]

This definition is entirely commercial. It describes the infrastructure, instrumentalities, and services of the logistics and carriage industries. It does not describe a man or woman driving a personal conveyance to the grocery store.

Furthermore, the term “transportation” in Title 49 is inextricably linked to compensation. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14) defines “motor carrier” as “a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation.” [43] 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) defines “broker” as a person arranging for “transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” [43] In the federal statutory framework, “transportation” is the commercial carriage of passengers or property for hire.

B. The Federal Definition of “Operator”

The term “operator” follows the exact same commercial pattern. Under the commercial motor vehicle safety provisions of Title 49:

49 U.S.C. § 31132(2) defines “employee” as:

“an operator of a commercial motor vehicle (including an independent contractor when operating a commercial motor vehicle), a mechanic, a freight handler, or an individual not an employer, who— (A) directly affects commercial motor vehicle safety in the course of employment...” [44]

In the federal framework, an “operator” is an employee or independent contractor operating a commercial motor vehicle in the course of employment. The act of “operating” is the performance of a commercial function. It is not the exercise of the right of locomotion by a private man or woman.

C. The Rebuttable Presumption of State Silence

When a state vehicle code (such as the Texas Transportation Code or the California Vehicle Code) regulates “transportation” or requires a license for an “operator,” but fails to define those terms, it creates a rebuttable presumption. The state presumes the terms apply universally to all travel and all travelers.

This presumption is rebutted by the federal conformity requirement. Because states must conform their commercial motor vehicle regulations to federal standards under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act to receive federal highway funding, their use of federal terms of art (”transportation,” “operator”) must be read in pari materia with the federal definitions.

Under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the explicit federal limitation of “transportation” and “operator” to commercial, compensated activity means that the state’s silence cannot be interpreted as an expansion of those terms to include private, non-commercial travel. If the state intended to regulate the constitutionally protected right of locomotion under the guise of “transportation,” it would have to do so explicitly, and it would immediately face a strict scrutiny constitutional challenge. By remaining silent, the state avoids the constitutional challenge but leaves the commercial limitation intact.

The private man or woman traveling on the public right-of-way is not engaged in “transportation” (the commercial movement of passengers or property) and is not an “operator” (an employee or contractor affecting commercial motor vehicle safety). Therefore, the licensing and registration statutes that govern transportation and operators do not apply to them.

X. The Multi-State Comparative Tables

Table 1: Definitional Chain — Terms of Art Across Jurisdictions

Table 2: The CDL vs. Driver’s License — Subsets of the Same Commercial Framework

Table 3: Certificate of Title and Registration — Commercial Nexus

XI. The Canons Applied: Dismantling the Counter-Argument

The counter-argument that a driver’s license is not a commercial driver’s license and therefore applies to all travel, can now be addressed with precision.

Step 1: What does “driver’s license” authorize? It authorizes the operation of a “motor vehicle.” (All jurisdictions.)

Step 2: What is a “motor vehicle”? At the federal baseline, it is a contrivance used for commercial purposes. (18 U.S.C. § 31.) At the state level, it is a self-propelled vehicle, a term of art defined within a code that is structured around the commercial use of vehicles.

Step 3: Who is required to hold the license? A “person.” In every jurisdiction, “person” is defined to include corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations; all artificial, commercial entities. Under noscitur a sociis, the natural person in this list is the natural person acting in a commercial capacity.

Step 4: Is the CDL/driver’s license distinction a commercial/non-commercial distinction? No. Both licenses authorize the operation of “motor vehicles.” The CDL authorizes the heavier class; the standard license authorizes the lighter class. Both are subsets of the commercial regulatory framework. The distinction is one of degree, not of kind.

Step 5: Does the absence of the word “commercial” in the standard driver’s license definition mean it applies to non-commercial travel? No. Under the whole-statute rule, the term “motor vehicle” in the driver’s license definition carries its commercial meaning from the definitional section. The absence of the word “commercial” in the driver’s license definition does not sever the commercial nexus; it merely reflects that the commercial nexus is established by the definition of “motor vehicle,” not by the definition of the license itself.

Step 6: What about the “public safety” argument? The argument that licensing is required for public safety, independent of commercial activity, is a policy argument, not a statutory argument. The legislature may have public safety motivations, but the legislature must express those motivations in statutory text. The text, as written, establishes a commercial regulatory framework. A court may not substitute its own policy preferences for the legislature’s chosen text. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (courts defer to statutory text, not to administrative policy preferences).

XII. Conclusion: The Statutory Text Speaks for Itself

The argument that a driver’s license applies to all travel, that vehicle registration is required for all conveyances on the public right-of-way, and that certificates of title are mandatory for all vehicles regardless of commercial use, is not supported by the statutory text of any jurisdiction examined in this analysis. It is supported by administrative practice, by judicial habit, and by the training materials of private corporations like Lexipol Media Group. But administrative practice and judicial habit are not law. The text is law.

When the text is read as a whole, when the terms of art are given their statutory meanings, when the canons of construction are applied consistently, the conclusion is the same in every jurisdiction: the commercial regulatory framework governs commercial activity. The man or woman traveling privately, in a personal conveyance, with no commercial nexus, is not within the scope of that framework.

The true “pseudo-legal” argument is the one that reads the word “person” in a list of corporations and firms and concludes that it means all human beings in all circumstances. The true “pseudo-legal” argument is the one that reads “motor vehicle”, a term defined as a commercial contrivance and concludes that it means every automobile on the road. The true “pseudo-legal” argument is the one that reads a licensing statute, a grant of permission to engage in a commercial privilege and concludes that it applies to the exercise of a fundamental right.

The statutes, the canons, and the binding precedents say otherwise.

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References

[1] California Civil Code § 22.2 (West 2024).

[2] Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 5.001(a) (West 2024).

[3] Florida Statutes § 2.01 (2024).

[4] West Virginia Code § 2-1-1 (2024).

[5] N.Y. Const. art. I, § 14.

[6] Texas Government Code § 311.005(2) (West 2024).

[7] California Government Code § 17 (West 2024).

[8] Florida Statutes § 1.01(3) (2024).

[9] West Virginia Code § 2-2-10(a)(9) (2024).

[10] Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).

[11] Bouvier, J. (1856). A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. Childs & Peterson.

[12] 26 C.F.R. § 1.871-2(b) (2024).

[13] Vattel, E. d. (1758). The Law of Nations (Book I, Ch. 19, § 218).

[14] Singer, N. J., & Singer, S. (2007). Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th ed., Vol. 3, § 61:1). Thomson Reuters.

[15] Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).

[16] Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868).

[17] Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).

[18] Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/319/105/

[19] Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).

[20] 18 U.S.C. § 31 (2024). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section31

[21] 49 U.S.C. § 31301 (2024). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title49-section31301

[22] California Vehicle Code § 670 (West 2024).

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

[23] California Vehicle Code § 415 (West 2024).

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

[24] California Vehicle Code § 305 (West 2024).

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

[25] California Vehicle Code § 470 (West 2024).

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

[26] California Vehicle Code § 260 (West 2024). https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/vehicle-code/veh-sect-260/

[27] California Vehicle Code § 12500 (West 2024).

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

[28] Texas Transportation Code § 541.201 (West 2024).

https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov

[29] Texas Transportation Code § 541.001 (West 2024).

https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov

[30] Texas Transportation Code § 521.001 (West 2024). https://codes.findlaw.com/tx/transportation-code/transp-sect-521-001/

[31] Florida Statutes § 316.003 (2024). https://codes.findlaw.com/fl/title-xxiii-motor-vehicles/fl-st-sect-316-003/

[32] New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 (McKinney 2024). https://codes.findlaw.com/ny/vehicle-and-traffic-law/vat-sect-125/

[33] New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 113 (McKinney 2024). https://law.justia.com/codes/new-york/vat/title-1/article-1/113/

[34] New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 107 (McKinney 2024). https://newyork.public.law/laws/n.y._vehicle_&_traffic_law_section_107

[35] West Virginia Code § 17A-1-1 (2024). https://codes.findlaw.com/wv/chapter-17a-motor-vehicle-administration-registration-certificate-of-title-and-antitheft-provisions/wv-code-sect-17a-1-1/

[36] California Vehicle Code § 4000 (West 2024).

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

[37] West Virginia Code § 17A-3-1 (2024).

https://codes.wv.gov

[38] Rawle, F. (Ed.). (1914). Bouvier’s Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia (8th ed., Vol. 2). West Publishing Company. (Citing William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, Ch. 1).

[39] American Jurisprudence (1st ed., Vol. 11, Constitutional Law, § 329). (1938). Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company.

[40] Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930). https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/thompson-v-smith-893892661

[41] Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/378/500/

[42] Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/528/141/

[43] 49 U.S.C. § 13102 (2024). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title49-section13102

[44] 49 U.S.C. § 31132 (2024). https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title49-section31132

I. Introduction: The Presumption of Fraud

When a man or woman exercising the right of locomotion places a physical notice on their conveyance, often occupying the space traditionally reserved for a state-issued license plate, law enforcement officers frequently charge them with displaying a “fraudulent” or “fictitious” license plate. This charge rests on a fundamental category error. It conflates the location of an object with its legal character, and it presumes that any display on the rear of a conveyance is an attempt to simulate a government-issued instrument of commerce.

This chapter systematically dismantles that presumption. By examining the common law elements of fraud, the statutory definitions of license plates, the constitutionally protected right to give notice, and the First Amendment right to free expression, this analysis demonstrates that displaying a statement of right or jurisdictional status is not, and cannot be a fraudulent license plate as a matter of law.

II. The Elements of Fraud and the Requirement of Deception

Fraud is not merely the display of something unusual; it is a specific, well-defined legal concept with strict elements that must be met. Whether in civil tort or criminal statute, fraud requires deception.

A. The Common Law Elements

At common law, fraud requires five elements [1]:

1. A false representation of a material fact

2. Knowledge that the representation is false (scienter)

3. Intent to deceive or induce reliance

4. Justifiable reliance by the victim

5. Resulting damage

The core of fraud is the intent to deceive. A man who prints a piece of paper that reads “Private Property - Not for Commerce” and places it on his conveyance is making a declarative statement of his legal position. He is not claiming that the state issued the paper. He is not attempting to trick the state into believing the vehicle is registered when it is not. To the contrary, the entire purpose of the notice is to explicitly declare that the vehicle is not registered and that the man is not operating in commerce.

A declaration of non-participation cannot logically be construed as a fraudulent attempt to participate.

B. The Forgery and Counterfeit Distinction

To charge a man or woman with a fraudulent plate violation is to allege forgery or counterfeiting. The legal definition of forgery requires the making or altering of a false document with the intent to defraud [2]. A counterfeit is an imitation intended to be passed off as genuine [3].

A private notice that cites a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provision, a federal statute, or a declaration of private property lacks the essential characteristics of a state-issued plate. It lacks the state name, the reflective material, the validation stickers, and the sequential alphanumeric numbering system. An officer who observes such a notice knows immediately that it was not issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Because it is not designed to simulate a state plate, and makes no claim to be genuine state property, it lacks the essential element of counterfeit or forgery. It is not a fake license plate; it is a genuine private notice.

III. The Statutory Definition of a License Plate

The second structural flaw in the fraudulent plate charge is the assumption that any rectangular object displayed on the rear of a conveyance is legally a “license plate.”

A “license plate” is a specific statutory creation. It is a government-issued marker that evidences a commercial franchise or registration contract. For example, California Vehicle Code § 4850 requires the department to “issue to the owner two partially or fully reflectorized license plates or devices.” [4]

A license plate is the property of the issuing state. It is the physical token of the registration contract. Therefore, for an object to be a “fraudulent license plate,” it must be a fraudulent version of that specific state property.

A private notice is not a license plate at all. It is a sign. If a man tapes a “For Sale” sign in his rear window, he is not displaying a “fraudulent window.” He is displaying a sign. If he bolts a piece of metal to his bumper that reads “Non-Domestic,” he is not displaying a fraudulent license plate; he is displaying a metal sign. The fact that the sign is bolted to the manufacturer’s plate bracket is irrelevant to its legal character. The bracket is merely a piece of plastic or metal attached to the conveyance; it does not magically transform any object placed within it into a state-regulated instrument.

IV. Multi-State Statutory Analysis

An examination of state vehicle codes confirms that the offense of displaying a fraudulent or fictitious plate requires the intent to represent the object as a genuine state-issued document.

A. California

California Vehicle Code § 4463(a)(1) makes it a felony for a person who,

“with intent to prejudice, damage, or defraud... Alters, forges, counterfeits, or falsifies a... license plate” or “alters, forges, counterfeits, or falsifies the document, device, or plate with intent to represent it as issued by the department.” [5]

The statute explicitly requires the “intent to represent it as issued by the department.”

B. Texas

Texas Transportation Code § 502.473(a) states that a person commits an offense if the person attaches to or displays on a motor vehicle a registration insignia that:

“(1) is assigned to a different motor vehicle; (2) is assigned to the vehicle under any other motor vehicle law other than by the department; (3) is assigned for a registration period other than the registration period in effect; or (4) is fictitious.” [6]

A “fictitious” insignia implies a fake version of a real insignia, not a private notice that makes no claim to be a registration insignia at all.

C. The Pattern of Requirement

Across jurisdictions, the pattern is consistent: the crime is not the display of an unapproved sign, but the display of a sign intended to deceive the state into believing a registration contract exists. A notice that explicitly denies the existence of such a contract cannot satisfy this statutory requirement.

V. The First Amendment and the Right to Notice

The criminalization of private notices on conveyances also runs afoul of fundamental constitutional protections, specifically the First Amendment right to free expression and the Due Process right to give notice.

A. Wooley v. Maynard and Compelled Speech

In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Supreme Court addressed the First Amendment implications of license plates. The State of New Hampshire required noncommercial vehicles to bear plates with the state motto, “Live Free or Die.” George Maynard, a Jehovah’s Witness, found the motto repugnant to his beliefs and covered it up. The State prosecuted him.

The Supreme Court held that the State may not constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property. The Court stated:

“We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all... The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’” [7]

If the State cannot compel a man to display a state message on his private property, the inverse principle is equally powerful: the State cannot prohibit a man from displaying his own message on his private property, provided it does not constitute fraud or obscure a required regulatory mark (if the vehicle is, in fact, subject to regulation). The placement of a private notice is an exercise of the “right to speak freely” on one’s own property.

B. The Due Process Right of Notice

Notice is a foundational concept in American jurisprudence. Under the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, a party whose rights may be affected by an action must be informed [8]. Conversely, a man or woman who wishes to assert a right, claim an exemption, or establish a jurisdictional boundary has both the right and often the duty to give public notice of that fact.

When a man places a “Private Property” notice on his conveyance, he is performing a recognized legal act. He is establishing the rebuttable presumption that the conveyance is not a “motor vehicle” used in commerce, and that he is not a “driver” or “operator” subject to the commercial vehicle code.

By charging this act of giving notice as “fraud,” law enforcement effectively criminalizes the assertion of rights. It creates a paradox: if the man displays nothing, the officer presumes he is operating a commercial motor vehicle without registration. If the man displays a notice explicitly rebutting that presumption, the officer charges him with fraud. This places the man in an impossible position where both silence and speech are criminalized.

VI. Property Rights and the Commercial Nexus

The state’s claim that the license plate bracket is reserved exclusively for state use rests on the prior assumption that the conveyance itself is a “motor vehicle” subject to the state’s registration franchise.

As established in Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915), the purpose of registration and licensing regulations is:

“to secure some compensation for the use of facilities provided at great cost from the class for whose needs they are essential, and whose operations over them are peculiarly injurious.” [9]

This is a commercial compensation rationale.

If a man or woman is exercising the fundamental right of locomotion in a private conveyance, and is not engaged in commercial transportation for hire, the conveyance is not subject to the commercial registration franchise. Because the conveyance is not subject to the franchise, the state has no jurisdiction to dictate what may or may not be displayed on the private property. The bracket belongs to the owner, not the state.

VII. The Weaponization of Fraud Statutes

The use of fraudulent license plate statutes against private notices is an example of statutory weaponization. It takes a statute designed to punish people who print fake DMV tags to avoid paying commercial registration fees, and twists it to punish people who are explicitly declaring that they are outside the registration system entirely.

A notice is not a plate. A declaration of non-participation is not a simulation of participation. And the exercise of the First Amendment right to free expression and the Due Process right to give public notice of one’s legal status is not, and can never be, fraud.

Chapter VIII — The FMCSA Intrastate Number as Proper Notice

The question frequently arises whether displaying a Department of Transportation (DOT) or Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) intrastate number, accompanied by a clear notice of “non-commercial, non-business, private,” constitutes proper notice, and whether this negates the charge of displaying a “fraudulent plate.”

This specific method of notice is structurally sound, legally precise, and directly leverages the federal government’s own regulatory classifications to establish the private, non-commercial nature of the conveyance.

The FMCSA Registration Framework

The FMCSA is the federal agency responsible for regulating commercial motor vehicles. However, the FMCSA’s Unified Registration System (URS) explicitly recognizes that not all conveyances are commercial.

When a man or woman registers with the FMCSA, they must self-classify their operation. The FMCSA system includes specific categories for non-business, private transportation. As the FMCSA’s own guidance states regarding the “occasional transportation of personal property by individuals not for compensation nor in the furtherance of a commercial enterprise”:

“If a person meets this exemption’s requirements, he or she is not subject to the FMCSRs [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations], including ELD [Electronic Logging Device] requirements.” [10]

Furthermore, the FMCSA explicitly distinguishes between a Commercial Motor Vehicle (CMV) and a Non-CMV. A non-CMV is a vehicle that does not meet the weight thresholds or is not used in interstate commerce for compensation. [11]

The Intrastate DOT Number as a Declaration of Status

While the FMCSA primarily regulates interstate commerce, some states require an intrastate DOT number for specific operations. However, a man or woman can apply for a USDOT number and explicitly classify their use as “Private” and “Non-Business” (exempt).

By obtaining this number under the non-commercial/private classification, the man or woman is securing a federal administrative acknowledgment of their status. The FMCSA system processes the application and issues the number based on the declaration that no commercial activity is occurring, no compensation is being received, and therefore, no commercial insurance or operating authority (MC Number) is required. [12]

The Notice Analysis

When this specific DOT number is displayed on the conveyance, accompanied by the text “non-commercial, non-business, private,” it creates a legally impenetrable notice for several reasons:

1. It is Not a Forgery or Counterfeit: The DOT number displayed is a real, federally issued tracking number. It is not a fake license plate; it is a genuine federal registration number that correlates to a specific, verifiable record in the FMCSA database.

2. It Negates Fraudulent Intent: The core element of fraudulent plate statutes (e.g., California Vehicle Code § 4463 or Texas Transportation Code § 502.473) is the “intent to represent as issued by the department” (the state DMV) or the intent to deceive. Displaying a valid federal DOT number with an explicit “non-commercial” notice cannot be deceptive because it accurately directs any inquiring officer to the exact federal database where the non-commercial status is recorded.

3. It Rebuts the Commercial Presumption: Law enforcement officers are trained to presume that any conveyance on the road without a state-issued license plate is operating unlawfully. The DOT number disrupts this presumption by providing an alternative, recognized federal identifier that explicitly confirms the conveyance is operating outside the commercial franchise. It speaks the language of the administrative state (a DOT number) to assert a right outside of it.

4. It Establishes the Property Right: By utilizing the FMCSA’s own “non-business” exemption categories, the man or woman establishes that the conveyance is private property being used for the right of locomotion, not a “motor vehicle” engaged in “transportation” for hire.

Conclusion on FMCSA Notice

The use of a DOT intrastate number, secured under a non-commercial/private classification, displayed with a clear notice, is arguably one of the most robust methods of providing notice. It uses the federal government’s own regulatory definitions to confirm the private status of the conveyance. If an officer were to charge this as a “fraudulent plate,” the defense is absolute: the number is genuine, the classification was accepted by the federal agency, the notice is accurate, and there is zero intent to deceive. It is the exact opposite of fraud; it is absolute transparency.

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References

[1] Wex Legal Dictionary, “Fraud,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fraud

[2] Wex Legal Dictionary, “Forgery,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School.

[3]Wex Legal Dictionary, “Counterfeit,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School.

[4] California Vehicle Code § 4850(a).

[5] California Vehicle Code § 4463(a)(1).

[6] Texas Transportation Code § 502.473(a).

[7]Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).

[8]Wex Legal Dictionary, “Notice,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/notice

[9] Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915).

[10] Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). “Hours of Service Frequently Asked Questions: Non-Business Transportation.” U.S. Department of Transportation.

[11] Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). “What is the difference between a commercial motor vehicle (CMV) and a Non-CMV?” U.S. Department of Transportation.

[12] Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). “Getting Started with Registration: Unified Registration System.” U.S. Department of Transportation.

An Analysis of Corporate Structure, Private Equity Influence, and the Manufacturing of “Authority” in Law Enforcement Training. All that follows is publicly available information. References are provided at the end of the article.

Table of Contents

• Executive Summary

• Chapter I: Corporate Origins and the Private Equity Ownership Chain

• Chapter II: The Praetorian Digital Merger and the Creation of Lexipol Media Group

• Chapter III: The Insurance Subsidy Mechanism — How Policies Spread Without Democracy

• Chapter IV: Lexipol’s Policy Content — Liability Reduction vs. Constitutional Policing

• Chapter V: Opposition to Reform — Active Lobbying Against Legislative Change

• Chapter VI: The “Sovereign Citizen” Narrative as a Commercial Product

• Chapter VII: The Closed Loop — Policy Vendor, Training Provider, and Media Channel

• Chapter VIII: The Transparency Deficit and the Accountability Vacuum

• Conclusion: Recognizing the Source

• References

Executive Summary

When law enforcement officers read articles on Police1 about the dangers of individuals who question jurisdiction, assert the right to travel, or identify themselves as nationals rather than citizens, they are not reading the impartial findings of a government agency, a legislative body, or a democratically accountable oversight committee. They are reading the editorial product of Lexipol Media Group, a subsidiary of Lexipol LLC, a for-profit corporation currently owned by GTCR, a Chicago-based private equity firm managing approximately $50 billion in equity capital. [1]

This report investigates the corporate structure, funding mechanisms, and policy influence of Lexipol. It reveals a structural conflict of interest of considerable magnitude: the same private corporation that writes the use-of-force policies for over 8,000 American law enforcement agencies also owns the media channels, including Police1, that educate officers on those policies and shape their worldview about who constitutes a threat. [2] [3] By examining academic studies published in the Texas Law Review, the Indiana Law Journal, and the Harvard Law Review, this investigation documents how Lexipol spreads its policies not through democratic deliberation, but through financial subsidies provided by municipal liability insurance risk pools, a mechanism that effectively privatizes the governance of public police forces without any public vote or legislative authorization. [2] [4] [5]

Furthermore, the report analyzes how Lexipol actively lobbies against legislative reforms designed to tighten use-of-force standards, preferring vague, discretionary standards that reduce municipal liability payouts but provide insufficient protection for constitutional rights. [4] In this context, the Police1 articles characterizing a broad range of legal arguments as “sovereign citizen ideology” can be understood not as objective legal analysis, but as commercial content designed to amplify a threat narrative that drives demand for Lexipol’s proprietary training modules and policy subscriptions.

The central question this report poses is straightforward: when Police1 dismisses well-grounded legal arguments about the right of locomotion, the distinction between nationals and citizens, and the terms of art used in statutory construction as “pseudo-legal arguments” and “conspiracy theories,” on what legal authority does it rely? The answer, upon examination, is none. The Police1 articles cite no statute, no regulation, and no binding court decision. They are opinion pieces published by a commercial entity with a financial interest in perpetuating the threat categories they describe.

Chapter I: Corporate Origins and the Private Equity Ownership Chain

The Founders: Risk Management and Liability Defense

Lexipol was founded in 2003 in Aliso Viejo, California, by Gordon Graham and Bruce D. Praet. [6] Both men brought specific, commercially oriented perspectives to the enterprise, perspectives shaped not by constitutional scholarship or community policing philosophy, but by the economics of municipal liability litigation.

Gordon Graham was a 33-year veteran of the California Highway Patrol who rose to the rank of captain before retiring and developing a career as an attorney and risk management consultant. Graham’s post-retirement work focused on helping public safety agencies reduce their exposure to civil liability through standardized training and policy documentation. His central thesis was that most police misconduct lawsuits are preventable through consistent, documented training; a thesis that is commercially valuable regardless of whether the training itself advances constitutional policing. [7]

Bruce D. Praet brought a complementary perspective from the defense side of the courtroom. Praet was a former police officer turned civil rights defense attorney whose specialty was defending police officers and departments in federal civil rights lawsuits. His firm, Jones Mayer in Fullerton, California, boasted a remarkable record: eight consecutive federal civil rights lawsuits involving use of force and vehicle pursuits, all won. [8] Praet’s intimate knowledge of how police misconduct lawsuits are won and lost made him uniquely positioned to design policies that would be defensible in court, even if they were not necessarily designed to prevent the underlying misconduct.

This founding orientation, liability reduction rather than constitutional compliance, is critical to understanding everything that followed. Lexipol was not designed to help police departments honor the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, or the Fourteenth Amendment. It was designed to help police departments win lawsuits. These are related but not identical goals, and the distinction matters enormously when evaluating the “authority” of Lexipol’s training materials.

The Subscription Model and Early Expansion

Lexipol’s initial product was a subscription-based policy manual service. For an annual fee, police departments received a standardized policy manual that Lexipol’s attorneys continually updated to reflect changes in case law. The manuals were state-specific, meaning they incorporated the relevant state statutes and court decisions applicable to each subscribing jurisdiction. The service also included “Daily Training Bulletins”; brief, two-minute training modules delivered electronically that reinforced the policy content.

The appeal to small and medium-sized departments was obvious. Maintaining a legally current, comprehensive policy manual is expensive and time-consuming. For a department of 20 officers in a rural county, the cost of retaining a police law specialist to continuously update their manual was prohibitive. Lexipol offered a turnkey solution at a fraction of the cost. By 2012, the company claimed that 95% of California police agencies were using its policies; a market penetration figure that, if accurate, would represent one of the most remarkable monopolies in the history of American public administration. [2]

The Riverside Company Acquisition (2014)

In August 2014, The Riverside Company, a global private equity firm headquartered in Cleveland and New York, acquired Lexipol. [9] The Riverside Company specializes in acquiring and growing lower-middle-market companies, typically with revenues between $10 million and $100 million at the time of acquisition. The Lexipol acquisition fit this profile precisely.

Under Riverside’s ownership, Lexipol’s market penetration accelerated dramatically. The private equity model demands growth, not merely organic growth, but the kind of aggressive, capital-fueled expansion that generates the returns necessary to justify the investment. Lexipol’s expansion strategy under Riverside had two components: geographic expansion into new states, and product expansion into new public safety sectors (fire, EMS, corrections, and local government).

By 2018, a survey conducted by Professors Eagly and Schwartz for the Texas Law Review found that 83% of California’s 200 largest law enforcement agencies were using Lexipol policies. [2] Nationally, the company expanded from serving 40 agencies in 2003 to over 3,500 agencies by 2021, representing roughly one-fifth of all American law enforcement organizations. [4] This growth was not achieved through superior product quality alone; it was achieved through the insurance subsidy mechanism described in Chapter III.

The GTCR Buyout (2021)

In October 2021, The Riverside Company sold Lexipol to GTCR LLC, a leading Chicago-based private equity firm, for an undisclosed sum. [1] The transaction was financed in part by a unitranche credit facility arranged by AllianceBernstein Private Credit, with advisory services provided by Baird, Shea & Company, and Vaquero Capital. [1]

GTCR LLC, which manages approximately $50 billion in equity capital, was founded in 1980 as Golder Thoma & Co. by Stanley Golder, Carl Thoma, and Bryan Cressey. [11] The firm became GTCR when Bruce Rauner was promoted to partner; the “R” in GTCR stands for Rauner. Bruce Rauner later left the firm in 2012 and subsequently served as the Republican Governor of Illinois from 2015 to 2019. [12]

GTCR’s Fund XIV, raised in 2023, totaled $11.5 billion. The fund’s limited partners include major public pension funds such as the Washington State Investment Board and the Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System, as well as university endowments, private foundations, and sovereign wealth funds. [13] This means that the teachers, firefighters, and public employees whose pension funds are invested in GTCR are, indirectly, the beneficial owners of the corporation that writes the policies governing the police forces of their own communities.

Under GTCR’s ownership, Lexipol operates under the financial imperative of private equity-scale returns. This imperative requires continuous growth in subscription revenues, which is achieved by expanding the perceived need for standardized training and policy updates across the approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States. The “sovereign citizen” threat narrative, as will be explored in Chapter VI, serves this commercial imperative directly.

Chapter II: The Praetorian Digital Merger and the Creation of Lexipol Media Group

Praetorian Digital and the Police1 Platform

In February 2019, while still under Riverside’s ownership, Lexipol executed a merger that fundamentally altered its reach and influence. Lexipol merged with Praetorian Digital, a digital media company founded in approximately 1999 by Alex Ford, a Dartmouth College graduate. [3] Praetorian Digital owned a portfolio of public safety news and information websites, the crown jewel of which was Police1 (formerly PoliceOne.com), which billed itself as “the nation’s leading law enforcement resource website.” [10]

Police1 was founded in 1999 and grew to become the dominant digital media destination for American law enforcement professionals. At its peak, the site claimed millions of monthly unique visitors and served as the primary online community for officers seeking news, training resources, product reviews, and professional development content. The site’s editorial voice carried considerable weight within law enforcement culture precisely because it was perceived as a peer-to-peer resource; a place where officers and police leaders shared knowledge, not a place where a commercial vendor sold products.

Praetorian Digital’s other properties included FireRescue1, EMS1, Corrections1, and Gov1, creating a comprehensive portfolio of public safety media brands. Each of these platforms served as a trusted editorial voice within its respective public safety community, and each was now, through the merger, under the ownership of a private equity-backed policy vendor.

The Structural Conflict of Interest

The merger created Lexipol Media Group and established a structural conflict of interest of profound significance. Prior to 2019, Lexipol was a policy vendor and Police1 was an independent media platform. After 2019, both were owned by the same corporation. The implications of this consolidation are worth examining in detail.

When an officer reads an article on Police1 about the “sovereign citizen threat,” they are consuming content produced by the same corporate entity that sells the training modules required to mitigate that threat. When Police1 publishes an article warning officers about individuals who assert the right to travel without a license, it is simultaneously creating demand for the Lexipol training module on handling “sovereign citizen” encounters. When Police1 characterizes legal arguments about national vs. citizen status as “pseudo-legal,” it is protecting the commercial interest of its parent company, which benefits from officers treating such arguments as threats rather than legitimate legal questions.

This is not a speculative inference. It is the logical consequence of vertical integration in a commercial enterprise. A company that both defines the threat and sells the solution to the threat has an inherent financial interest in ensuring that the threat is perceived as real, widespread, and dangerous. The editorial independence that might otherwise check this tendency does not exist when the editorial platform and the commercial vendor are the same entity. [3]

The PoliceOne Academy Training Pipeline

The merger also created a seamless pipeline from editorial content to commercial training. Police1’s editorial content drives officers to PoliceOne Academy, Lexipol’s online training platform, which offers continuing education credits and certifications. The “sovereign citizen” articles on Police1 link directly to PoliceOne Academy training courses on handling “sovereign citizen” encounters. The training courses, in turn, reinforce the policy frameworks in Lexipol’s subscriber policy manuals.

This pipeline, editorial content to training product to policy manual, is a sophisticated commercial ecosystem. Each component reinforces the others, and each generates revenue for Lexipol. The officer who reads a Police1 article about “sovereign citizens” is being funneled toward a commercial product, not toward primary legal authority.

Chapter III: The Insurance Subsidy Mechanism — How Policies Spread Without Democracy

How did a private corporation achieve near-monopoly status in police policymaking in states like California without passing a single law or holding a single public hearing? The answer lies in the municipal liability insurance industry, and it is one of the most important and least-understood mechanisms in American public administration.

The Harvard Law Review Analysis

In 2017, Professor John Rappaport of the University of Chicago Law School published a landmark article in the Harvard Law Review titled “How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police.” [5] Rappaport’s research documented a phenomenon that had been largely invisible to legal scholars and the public: private liability insurers exert massive, unseen regulatory power over American law enforcement, often more effectively than the constitutional constraints theoretically imposed by the courts.

Because police misconduct lawsuits can result in multi-million-dollar settlements and judgments, municipalities purchase liability insurance through commercial carriers or join municipal risk pools such as Joint Powers Authorities (JPAs) in California and equivalent entities in other states. These insurers and risk pools have a direct financial interest in reducing liability payouts. To achieve this, they mandate or heavily incentivize the adoption of specific risk-management tools and practices.

Rappaport found that insurers and risk pools were requiring or incentivizing subscribing agencies to adopt specific training programs, specific use-of-force policies, and specific documentation practices. The most significant of these requirements was the adoption of standardized policy manuals, and the most widely promoted provider of those manuals was Lexipol. [5]

The Subsidy Loop in Practice

The mechanism works as follows. A police chief in a small California county receives a notice from their Joint Powers Authority that the JPA will reimburse a significant portion of the cost of a Lexipol subscription. The chief, facing budget constraints and the ever-present threat of civil rights lawsuits, signs the contract. The JPA’s subsidy effectively makes Lexipol the default choice, not because it is the best policy framework from a constitutional standpoint, but because it is the cheapest option when insurance subsidies are factored in.

Specific documented examples of this subsidy mechanism include:

The Washington Counties Risk Pool (WCRP) reimburses member counties for 80% of their Lexipol law enforcement policy manual subscription costs. [14] This is not a trivial subsidy; it means that for most small counties in Washington State, the effective out-of-pocket cost of a Lexipol subscription is minimal, while the cost of developing an independent, locally tailored policy manual is prohibitive.

PRISM (the Public Risk Innovation, Solutions, and Management organization in California) provides an annual “Risk Management Subsidy” to member agencies that can be applied to programs like Lexipol. [15] PRISM serves hundreds of California public agencies, and its subsidy program has been a significant driver of Lexipol adoption in the state.

Similar subsidy programs exist through the California Association of Joint Powers Authorities (CAJPA) and equivalent organizations in other states. [2]

The Democratic Deficit

The consequence of this mechanism is a profound democratic deficit. Police policy, the rules governing when officers can use force, how they must handle traffic stops, what constitutes a lawful search, and how they should respond to individuals who assert constitutional rights is supposed to be a matter of democratic governance. It should be set by elected officials, subject to public comment, and accountable to the communities being policed.

Instead, through the insurance subsidy mechanism, police policy in thousands of American communities is effectively set by a private equity-owned corporation whose primary obligation is to its investors, not to the public. The communities being policed have no vote, no comment period, and no meaningful oversight over the content of the policies governing their police departments. [2] [5]

As Professors Eagly and Schwartz noted in the Texas Law Review:

“Reliance on this private entity to establish standards for public policing also raises several concerns arising from its for-profit business model, focus on liability risk management, and lack of transparency or democratic participation.” [2]

Chapter IV: Lexipol’s Policy Content — Liability Reduction vs. Constitutional Policing

Understanding that Lexipol’s policies are designed to reduce municipal liability rather than to advance constitutional policing is essential to evaluating the “authority” of its training content. The two goals are related but not identical, and the gap between them has real consequences for the people being policed.

The Graham v. Connor Standard

Lexipol’s use-of-force policies are anchored to the standard established in the 1989 Supreme Court case Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386. [16] Graham held that claims of excessive force by law enforcement officers are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard, which asks whether the force used was “objectively reasonable” from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, without the benefit of hindsight.

The Graham standard is the minimum constitutional floor for use of force — it is the least protective standard that the Supreme Court has held to be constitutionally permissible. Many legal scholars, civil rights organizations, and police reform advocates have argued that the Graham standard is insufficient because it allows officers to justify almost any use of force by claiming they “reasonably” perceived a threat, even when the threat was based on a misperception or an implicit bias.

Lexipol chose to anchor its policies to the Graham standard rather than to any higher standard. This choice is commercially rational: policies that closely track the minimum constitutional floor are the most defensible in litigation, because any force that meets the Graham standard will survive judicial scrutiny. But it is not the choice that best protects the constitutional rights of the people being policed. [4]

What Lexipol Refuses to Include

In their 2022 Indiana Law Journal study, Eagly and Schwartz documented specific policy reforms that Lexipol refused to incorporate into its subscriber manuals:

Use-of-force matrices are structured frameworks that tie specific levels of officer-perceived resistance to specific levels of permissible force. They reduce officer discretion by providing clear, bright-line rules about what force is appropriate in what circumstances. Lexipol declined to include use-of-force matrices, preferring the more flexible “objectively reasonable” standard that allows officers to justify force based on their subjective perception of the situation. [4]

Mandatory de-escalation requirements would require officers to attempt to de-escalate situations before resorting to force. Many police reform advocates and law enforcement organizations, including the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), have endorsed de-escalation as a best practice. Lexipol declined to make de-escalation mandatory in its template policies. [4]

Bright-line prohibitions on specific tactics, such as chokeholds, neck restraints, and shooting at moving vehicles, would provide clear, unambiguous rules that officers could not circumvent through post-hoc rationalization. Lexipol declined to include such prohibitions in its standard templates. [4]

The pattern is consistent: Lexipol systematically chose maximum officer discretion over clear constitutional limits. This choice serves the company’s liability-reduction mission, because discretionary standards are harder to prove violated than bright-line rules. But it also means that Lexipol’s policies provide less protection for the constitutional rights of the people being policed than alternative frameworks would.

Chapter V: Opposition to Reform — Active Lobbying Against Legislative Change

Lexipol does not merely write passive policies; it actively engages in political advocacy to prevent the enactment of laws that would require higher standards of constitutional policing. This lobbying activity reveals the extent to which the company’s commercial interests are aligned with the status quo of maximum officer discretion and minimum accountability.

AB-931 (California, 2017)

In 2017, California Assemblymember Shirley Weber introduced AB-931, the Police Accountability and Community Protection Act. The bill would have changed the legal standard for deadly force from “reasonable” to “necessary,” requiring officers to use deadly force only when it was truly necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily injury, and only after exhausting other reasonable options.

Lexipol’s response was immediate and aggressive. The company published an article on Police1 calling on “law enforcement, from chief executives down to line officers” to “actively campaign for its defeat.” Lexipol’s Twitter account warned that the bill was “bad for law enforcement, the legal system and the community.” [17]

AB-931 was defeated, in part because of the organized opposition from law enforcement groups that Lexipol helped to mobilize. The defeat of AB-931 meant that California’s use-of-force standard remained anchored to the Graham v. Connor “reasonable” standard, the standard on which Lexipol’s policies were built.

AB-392 (California, 2019)

In 2019, a successor bill, AB-392, was introduced. The bill was ultimately passed and signed into law, but only after significant amendments that weakened its original intent. Lexipol lobbied against AB-392 as well, and after its passage, co-founder Bruce Praet publicly took credit for the amendments that diluted the bill.

In a communication to Lexipol subscribers, Praet advised that the new law “made no meaningful change” to existing standards and that departments could continue to rely on the old framework. [4] This advice was commercially motivated: if AB-392 had genuinely changed the standard, Lexipol would have needed to update its policies and retrain its subscribers; a significant operational cost. By characterizing the change as meaningless, Lexipol protected its existing product.

As Eagly and Schwartz concluded in the Indiana Law Journal: “Lexipol’s resistance to reform is not incidental to its business model; it is integral to it. A company that profits from providing liability-minimizing policies has a structural incentive to resist reforms that would require higher standards of constitutional policing.” [4]

Chapter VI: The Scrivener’s Error — The Flawed Foundation of the Graham Standard

Lexipol’s commercial reliance on the Graham v. Connor “objectively reasonable” standard is inextricably linked to the judicial doctrine of qualified immunity. The Graham standard provides the substantive Fourth Amendment floor for use of force, but it is qualified immunity that shields officers from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they violate that standard, provided the specific application of the right was not “clearly established.”

However, recent legal scholarship has demonstrated that the entire doctrine of qualified immunity, the shield that makes Lexipol’s liability-reduction model possible, rests on a catastrophic historical error.

1. The Lost “Notwithstanding Clause”

The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983) was enacted by the 42nd Congress specifically to hold state actors accountable for civil rights violations. As originally enacted, the statute contained a crucial provision that legal scholars now refer to as the “Notwithstanding Clause.” The original text stated that any person acting under color of law who subjects another to the deprivation of rights shall be liable to the party injured:

“...any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding.” [22]

This clause was an explicit command from Congress: the liability created by Section 1983 applied regardless of any state-level common-law immunities that officials might have enjoyed before 1871. The text was absolute.

2. The 1874 Scrivener’s Error

In 1874, a reviser tasked with compiling the first official codification of federal laws (the Revised Statutes of the United States) made a profound error. For reasons unknown, the reviser simply omitted the Notwithstanding Clause from the text. [22] This was not a legislative act; the reviser had no authority to alter the substance of the law. It was, in effect, a typo.

This defective 1874 text became the basis for the version of Section 1983 that appears in the United States Code today.

3. The Supreme Court’s Flawed Assumption

Beginning in the mid-20th century, the Supreme Court began to construct the modern doctrine of qualified immunity. It did so by reasoning that since the (defective) text of Section 1983 was “silent” on the matter of immunity, Congress must have intended to incorporate the common-law immunities that existed in 1871.

As legal scholars Alexander Reinert, Patrick Jaicomo, and Daniel Nelson have demonstrated, this reasoning is fundamentally flawed. [22] [23] The statute as enacted was not silent; it contained the Notwithstanding Clause, which explicitly displaced those very immunities. The Supreme Court built the qualified immunity doctrine by reading the wrong text.

In a 2023 concurrence, Fifth Circuit Judge Don R. Willett acknowledged this foundational error:

“It seems a tall order to square the modern qualified-immunity regime with Congress’ originally enacted language. But however seismic the implications of this lost-text research, ‘as middle-management circuit judges,’ we cannot overrule the Supreme Court.” [24]

4. The Impact on the Enforcement Threshold

The revelation of the Scrivener’s Error fundamentally alters the enforcement threshold analysis. Under the law as written by Congress, any state “custom or usage” (including a claim of common-law immunity) is irrelevant, “notwithstanding.” The text is absolute: “Every person” who violates the law “shall be liable.” [23]

Lexipol’s policy framework relies on the assumption that the Graham standard, combined with qualified immunity, provides an impenetrable shield against liability. But as state legislatures (such as Colorado and New Mexico) begin to abolish qualified immunity at the state level, and as the Scrivener’s Error research gains traction in the federal appellate courts, the threshold of acceptable enforcement behavior is changing. [25] [26]

A training model that relies on a judicially invented doctrine built on a 150-year-old typo is structurally fragile. When qualified immunity erodes, the “objectively reasonable” justifications engineered by Lexipol policies will face unshielded scrutiny before juries. The self-preservation of the private policy vendor is increasingly at odds with the legal reality facing the officers it trains.

Chapter VII: The “Sovereign Citizen” Narrative as a Commercial Product

Understanding Lexipol’s corporate structure and business model provides the necessary context for analyzing the Police1 articles on individuals who assert constitutional rights, question jurisdiction, or identify themselves as nationals rather than citizens.

The FBI’s 2011 Designation and the Training Market It Created

In September 2011, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Analysis Section published an article in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin classifying “sovereign-citizen extremists” as a domestic terrorist movement. [18] The article cited specific instances of violence, including the tragic 2010 shooting in West Memphis, Arkansas, in which two police officers were killed by a father and son who had been associated with the “sovereign citizen” movement.

The FBI’s designation was significant for two reasons. First, it provided a federal imprimatur for treating a broad category of behavior, including the assertion of constitutional rights, the questioning of jurisdiction, and the use of specific legal terminology, as a potential indicator of violence. Second, it created a massive new “threat category” for law enforcement training purposes. Police departments nationwide were now expected to train their officers to recognize and respond to “sovereign citizen” encounters.

For a company like Lexipol, a new, federally designated threat category is a commercial opportunity of considerable magnitude. Police departments require training to identify and manage the new threat. Lexipol Media Group (through Police1) provides the editorial content that amplifies the threat and defines its indicators, while Lexipol LLC (through PoliceOne Academy and its policy manuals) sells the training and policy updates to mitigate it.

The Definitional Problem

The foundational problem with the “sovereign citizen” threat category, as applied in the Police1 articles, is that the term has no statutory definition. It does not appear in the United States Code. It does not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. It is not defined in any state statute. It is a term of art invented by law enforcement and academic researchers to describe a loosely affiliated movement, and it has been progressively expanded to encompass a wider and wider range of behaviors and beliefs.

The Police1 articles exemplify this definitional expansion. The articles identify the following as indicators of “sovereign citizen” ideology: referring to oneself as a “U.S. National,” a “Non-Resident Alien,” a “Non-Citizen National,” a “Diplomat,” an “American National,” a “State National,” or an “American State National.” [19] They also identify the following verbal cues as indicators: “living man or living woman,” “natural woman or natural man,” “free person on the land,” “flesh and blood person,” and “secure party creditor.”

The problem with this list is that many of these terms have specific, legally recognized meanings in federal statutes and binding court decisions. “National” and “Non-Citizen National” are defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22). “Non-Resident Alien” is a defined term in the Internal Revenue Code. The distinction between a “living man” and a “person” in the legal sense is grounded in the statutory definitions of “person” in 26 U.S.C. §§ 6671(b) and 7343. By treating these legally recognized terms as indicators of dangerous ideology, the Police1 articles conflate legitimate legal argument with criminal behavior.

The Absence of Legal Citation

The most revealing feature of the Police1 articles is what they do not contain: a single citation to primary legal authority. The articles do not cite the United States Code. They do not cite the Code of Federal Regulations. They do not cite a single binding Supreme Court decision. They do not cite a single federal statute that defines “sovereign citizen” or that makes the assertion of constitutional rights a criminal offense.

This absence is not accidental. It reflects the nature of the articles as commercial content rather than legal scholarship. The articles do not need to prove that the “right of locomotion” is legally invalid; they only need to convince subscribing police departments that engaging with the argument poses a liability or safety risk that requires Lexipol’s training to manage. The goal is not legal accuracy; the goal is product engagement.

By contrast, the legal arguments that the Police1 articles dismiss as “pseudo-legal” are grounded in specific, verifiable, binding authority. The right of locomotion is established in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The distinction between a national and a citizen is codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) and acknowledged in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The limited definition of “person” in the Internal Revenue Code is established in 26 U.S.C. §§ 6671(b) and 7343. These are not “pseudo-legal arguments”; they are primary legal authorities that any competent attorney would recognize.

Chapter VIII: The Closed Loop — Policy Vendor, Training Provider, and Media Channel

The full significance of Lexipol’s structure becomes apparent when the three components of its business are viewed together: the policy manual subscription service, the PoliceOne Academy training platform, and the Police1 media channel. Together, these three components create a closed loop that is extraordinarily difficult for outside perspectives to penetrate.

The Policy Manual: Setting the Rules

The Lexipol policy manual is the foundational product. It defines the rules governing officer behavior in hundreds of specific situations, from use of force to vehicle pursuits to handling individuals who assert constitutional rights. Because the manual is proprietary and copyrighted, its full content is not publicly available for scrutiny. [2] The rules governing the police are, in effect, private corporate property.

The manual is updated continuously to reflect changes in case law, but the changes are determined by Lexipol’s attorneys, not by elected officials or community representatives. When a new court decision expands or contracts police authority, Lexipol decides how to incorporate that decision into its template policies. This discretion is exercised with the company’s liability-reduction mission in mind, not with the goal of maximizing constitutional compliance.

The Training Platform: Reinforcing the Rules

PoliceOne Academy is Lexipol’s online training platform, offering continuing education credits and certifications for law enforcement officers. The platform delivers the “Daily Training Bulletins” that reinforce the policy content, as well as longer courses on specific topics. The “sovereign citizen” encounter training is a prominent offering on the platform.

The training content is developed by Lexipol’s staff and contractors, not by independent legal scholars or constitutional law experts. It reflects the same liability-reduction orientation as the policy manuals. Officers who complete the training are taught to recognize “sovereign citizen indicators”; a list that, as noted above, includes legally recognized terms, and to respond in ways that minimize the department’s liability exposure.

The Media Channel: Shaping the Culture

Police1 is the editorial layer of the closed loop. Through Police1, Lexipol shapes law enforcement culture by determining what information officers receive, how threats are framed, and which legal arguments are characterized as legitimate versus dangerous. The Police1 articles on “sovereign citizens” are not merely informational; they are cultural products that define who is a threat and who is not.

Because Police1 is perceived as a peer-to-peer resource rather than a commercial vendor’s marketing channel, its editorial content carries a credibility that a direct advertisement would not. When an officer reads a Police1 article warning about “sovereign citizen” tactics, they are not consciously aware that they are reading content produced by the company that sells the training to handle those tactics. The commercial motivation is invisible; only the threat is visible.

Chapter IX: The Transparency Deficit and the Accountability Vacuum

The final dimension of the Lexipol problem is the transparency deficit, the systematic absence of public accountability for a corporation that exercises quasi-governmental authority over the conduct of public police forces.

Proprietary Policies in Public Agencies

Lexipol’s policies are copyrighted and treated as trade secrets. [2] When a community wants to know the exact rules governing its police department’s use of force, its protocols for handling individuals who assert constitutional rights, or its policies on immigration enforcement, they often find that the policy manual is a private corporate product. The policies are technically the property of the subscribing agency, but the underlying templates and training content are Lexipol’s intellectual property.

California’s S.B. 978, signed into law in 2018 with support from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, requires local police departments to publish their training, policies, practices, and operating procedures on their websites. [19] This law has improved transparency for the final policy documents, but Lexipol’s underlying templates, training modules, and Daily Training Bulletins remain proprietary. The rules governing the rules, so to speak, are still private.

No Democratic Deliberation

The most fundamental accountability problem is the absence of democratic deliberation. In a constitutional democracy, the rules governing the exercise of government power over citizens are supposed to be made through a democratic process: elected officials deliberate, the public comments, and the rules are enacted through a transparent legislative or regulatory procedure.

Lexipol’s policies bypass this process entirely. They are not enacted by elected officials. They are not subject to public comment. They are not reviewed by civil rights organizations or constitutional law scholars before adoption. They are purchased by police chiefs and city managers who are responding to financial incentives from insurance pools, not to democratic mandates from their communities. [2] [5]

The Electronic Frontier Foundation has documented this accountability vacuum extensively. In a 2021 report, EFF identified 379 agencies using Lexipol policies and raised the question of “whether police are soliciting guidance from the community or policy makers or...simply accepting the recommendations from a private company that is not accountable to the public.” [19]

The NGO and Association Connections

Lexipol’s influence is further amplified through its connections to major law enforcement professional associations. The company is an active sponsor and exhibitor at the annual conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the premier professional association for police executives and Lexipol’s primary customer base. [20] The National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA) offers its members a 5% discount on Lexipol subscriptions, effectively endorsing the product to its membership. [21]

These associations provide Lexipol with legitimacy and access. When a police chief sees that the IACP, the most prestigious organization in their profession is associated with Lexipol, they are more likely to trust the company’s products. The association endorsements function as a form of professional credentialing that supplements the insurance subsidies in driving adoption.

Conclusion: Recognizing the Source

The assertion of authority by Police1 regarding the legal status of nationals, the right of locomotion, and the definition of “sovereign citizens” must be viewed through the lens of its corporate parentage. Lexipol Media Group is not an arbiter of constitutional law. It is not a government agency. It is not a democratically accountable body. It is the marketing and editorial arm of a private equity investment designed to generate returns by selling risk-management software to municipalities.

When Police1 dismisses well-grounded legal arguments as “pseudo-legal,” it does so without citing primary legal authority because its goal is not legal scholarship; its goal is liability management and product engagement. The articles serve a commercial function: they define a threat category, amplify the perceived danger of that category, and drive demand for the training products that Lexipol sells to mitigate it.

The legal arguments that Police1 characterizes as dangerous ideology, the right of locomotion, the distinction between nationals and citizens, the statutory construction of “person,” the voluntary nature of Social Security participation are grounded in specific, verifiable, binding legal authority. They are not pseudo-legal. They are the product of careful reading of the United States Code, the Code of Federal Regulations, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. They deserve to be evaluated on their legal merits, not dismissed through the commercial framing of a private equity-owned training vendor.

For law enforcement officers, legal professionals, and citizens who wish to understand the legal landscape accurately, the first step is to recognize the source of the information they are receiving. When that source is a corporation with a financial interest in perpetuating a threat narrative, the appropriate response is to demand primary legal authority, the same standard of evidentiary rigor that any court of law would require.

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References

[1] PR Newswire. (2021, October 13). GTCR Makes Growth Investment in Lexipol. Retrieved from https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/gtcr-makes-growth-investment-in-lexipol-301399350.html

[2] Eagly, I. V., & Schwartz, J. C. (2018). Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking. Texas Law Review, 96(5), 891–975. Retrieved from https://texaslawreview.org/lexipol/

[3] GlobeNewswire. (2019, February 8). Lexipol and Praetorian Digital Merge, Creating Comprehensive Content, Training and Policy Platform for Public Safety. Retrieved from https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/02/08/1714214/0/en/Lexipol-and-Praetorian-Digital-Merge.html

[4] Eagly, I. V., & Schwartz, J. C. (2022). Lexipol’s Fight Against Police Reform. Indiana Law Journal, 97(1), 1–62. Retrieved from https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol97/iss1/1/

[5] Rappaport, J. (2017). How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police. Harvard Law Review, 130(6), 1539–1614. Retrieved from https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-130/how-private-insurers-regulate-public-police/

[6] Lexipol. (n.d.). About Us. Retrieved from https://www.lexipol.com/about-us/

[7] Graham Research Consultants. (n.d.). About Gordon Graham. Retrieved from https://www.gordongraham.com/about

[8] Force Science. (2018, January 15). Veteran Attorney Cites “10 Ways to Lose Police Lawsuits”. Retrieved from https://www.forcescience.com/2018/01/veteran-attorney-cites-10-ways-to-lose-police-lawsuits/

[9] The Riverside Company. (2014). Riverside Company Acquires Lexipol. Retrieved from https://www.riversidecompany.com/portfolio/lexipol

[10] Praetorian Digital / Police1. (n.d.). About Police1. Retrieved from https://www.police1.com/about-police1/

[11] Wikipedia. (n.d.). GTCR. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GTCR

[12] Wikipedia. (n.d.). Bruce Rauner. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruce_Rauner

[13] GTCR. (2023, May 23). GTCR Closes $11.5 Billion Fund XIV. Retrieved from https://www.gtcr.com/gtcr-closes-11-5-billion-fund-xiv/

[14] Washington Counties Risk Pool. (n.d.). Lexipol Reimbursement. Retrieved from https://www.wcrp.info/lexipol-reimbursement-request.asp

[15] PRISM. (n.d.). Risk Management Subsidy. Retrieved from https://www.prismrisk.gov/member-services/services/in-house-services/risk-management-subsidy/

[16] Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).

[17] American Friends Service Committee. (2022). Lexipol LLC | AFSC Investigate. Retrieved from https://investigate.afsc.org/company/lexipol

[18] Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2011, September 1). Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved from https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/sovereign-citizens-a-growing-domestic-threat-to-law-enforcement

[19] Electronic Frontier Foundation. (2018, October 1). Victory! New California Law Requires Police Policy Transparency. Retrieved from https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/victory-new-california-law-requires-police-policy-transparency

[20] International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2024). IACP Annual Conference Exhibitors. Retrieved from

https://www.theiacpconference.org/

[21] National Sheriffs’ Association. (n.d.). NSA Partner Benefits — Lexipol. Retrieved from https://www.sheriffs.org/partner-benefits

[22] Reinert, A. A. (2023). Qualified Immunity’s Flawed Foundation. California Law Review, 111(1), 201-274.

[23] Jaicomo, P., & Nelson, D. (2026). Section 1983 (Still) Displaces Qualified Immunity.Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 49(1), 151-225.

[24]Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th 971, 979 (5th Cir. 2023) (Willett, J., concurring).

[25] Colorado Senate Bill 20-217 (2020) (Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity Act).

[26] New Mexico Civil Rights Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4A-1 et seq. (2021).

I. Introduction: The Jurisdictional Matrix

The article on “Are you a “National” or a “Citizen”?” established a comprehensive framework demonstrating the distinction between a sovereign state national and a federal “U.S. citizen,” and how the corporate state exercises jurisdiction primarily through commercial nexus. This section provides a practical case study, analyzing how the specific statutory language of West Virginia’s vehicle and tax codes, when subjected to rigorous statutory construction analysis, excludes a declared national from personal property taxation by its own terms. The central question is: Does a man or woman who is a national and inhabitant of West Virginia, who has not voluntarily entered the commercial system, fall within the jurisdictional grant of the state’s personal property tax statutes? This article will demonstrate, the answer is a definitive no, based not on interpretation or theory, but on the state’s own statutory definitions and the foundational principles of American law.

II. The Unalienable Right of “Property”: The Allodial Foundation

Before analyzing any tax statute, we must first establish the original, constitutional meaning of “property.” In modern parlance, “property” is often used to describe a thing that is owned. However, in its original legal sense, “property” is not the thing itself, but the absolute right to it. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856) defines “property” as:

“the right and interest which a man has in lands and chattels to the exclusion of others.” [1]

This right is allodial, the highest form of ownership, free from any feudal duties or obligations to a superior lord. It is the right to “use or dispose of them in the most absolute manner as he pleases.” [1] This concept is the bedrock of American liberty; without the absolute right to property, all other rights are rendered meaningless.

It is the highest right a man or woman can have. It is not the land, the home, or the automobile itself; it is the unqualified right of dominion over those things. This stands in stark contrast to the modern concept of “fee simple absolute,” which is the highest estate recognized in modern property law but is still subject to the four government powers: taxation, eminent domain, police power, and escheat . Allodial title is superior to fee simple. The state cannot lawfully tax the allodial right itself, for to do so would be to claim a superior ownership interest, reducing the man or woman to a mere tenant on the state’s land.

Escheat is the passing of an interest in land to the state when a decedent has no will, no heirs, or devisees. In the United States, escheat rights are governed by the laws of each state. Probate is usually used to determine escheat rights: Cornell Law Dictionary

The American Revolution theoretically replaced the Crown’s allodium with the people’s sovereignty, making allodial title possible. The original grants of land from the sovereign (the United States or the individual states) were conveyed via Land Patents, which stand as the supreme, indefeasible title to the land. As the U.S. Attorney General opined in 1869, “A Land Patent issued by the United States is legal and conclusive evidence of title to the land conveyed.” [2] All subsequent deeds are derivative and inferior to the original patent.

III. The Statutory Division: Creating Regulated Categories

The jurisdictional trap is sprung through the semantic conversion of the absolute right of “property” into regulated, taxable categories. The state, lacking the authority to tax the allodial right, instead creates statutory categories, “real property” and “personal property”, and induces men and women to voluntarily place their property into these categories.

Bouvier’s notes this division:

“Property is divided into real property, (q. v.) and personal property. (q. v.)” [1]

These are not descriptions of the things themselves; they are regulatory classifications created by statute for the purpose of administration and control. West Virginia’s general definitions in Title 2 codify these divisions:

• “Land” or “lands” and the words “real estate” or “real property” include lands, tenements and hereditaments, all rights thereto and interests therein, except chattel interests; [3]

• “Personal property” includes goods, chattels, real and personal, money, credits, investments, and the evidences thereof; [3]

By dividing the indivisible right of “property” into these two statutory classes, the state creates a system where it can regulate and tax the category, even though it cannot tax the right.

IV. The Mechanism of Conversion: Unwitting Joinder

A man or woman’s absolute property is converted into taxable “personal property” or “real property” through acts of unwitting joinder to the state’s commercial jurisdiction. These acts include:

1. Applies for a Certificate of Title: By applying for a title, one asks the state to create a commercial instrument that represents the property, thereby bringing it into the UCC framework and converting it into “personal property.”

2. Records a Deed: Recording a deed in the county clerk’s office transforms a private land transfer into a public record, converting the absolute property right into a regulated “real property” interest held in fee simple.

3. Registers the Property: Registration is an act of placing the property on a state-controlled list, subjecting it to state regulation.

4. Describes it as “Personal/Real Property” on Forms: When filling out tax forms, deeds, or other government documents, using the state’s terminology (”personal property,” “real property”) is an admission that the property falls within that regulated category.

Each of these is a voluntary act that converts the absolute right into a regulated status, creating the commercial nexus necessary for taxation. In each case, the man or woman has taken their private, allodial property right and voluntarily submitted it to the state’s commercial/administrative jurisdiction. They have, in effect, exchanged their absolute right for a qualified, regulated one, and in doing so, have become a statutory “person” in the eyes of the state.

V. The West Virginia Case Study: A Orchestration of Semantic Abuse

West Virginia’s statutory framework provides a masterclass in how this semantic conversion is used to create jurisdiction where none exists. The state’s personal property tax statute, WV Code § 11-5-1, states:

“All personal property belonging to persons residing in this state...shall be entered in the personal property book, and be subject to equal and uniform taxation...” [4]

This statute’s jurisdiction depends entirely on the meaning of “persons residing in this state.” An analysis of the state’s own definitions and rules of construction reveals that a national inhabitant is excluded by the statute’s own terms.

This single sentence contains three jurisdictional hooks:

1. It taxes “personal property,” not “property.”

2. It applies to “persons,” not men or women.

3. It applies to persons “residing,” not inhabitants.

A. The Controlling Authority of Title 2 and the Canons of Construction

Before examining the specific terms of the tax statute, we must first consult the state’s own rulebook for statutory interpretation. West Virginia Code, Chapter 2, Article 2, provides the foundational rules and definitions that govern the entire code unless a specific title or section expressly provides otherwise. This article is the controlling authority for interpreting undefined terms, and it requires adherence to several key legal doctrines that were not addressed from the previous analysis.

1. The Presumption of Consistent Usage

When a legislature uses a term of art, it is presumed to adopt the historical legal meaning of that term. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this principle in Morissette v. United States, stating:

“where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.” [5]

This means that when the WV legislature uses terms like “person” and “resident,” it is borrowing the entire common law history of those terms, unless it explicitly states otherwise.

2. Strict Construction of Taxing Statutes

It is a long-settled rule that statutes imposing taxes must be strictly construed against the government and in favor of the man or woman. Any ambiguity in a tax statute must be resolved in favor of the one being taxed, not the tax collector.

3. The Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine

Courts are bound to interpret statutes in a way that avoids creating constitutional problems. If a broad interpretation of “resident” would raise profound constitutional questions about due process and the limits of state jurisdiction, courts must choose a narrower interpretation that avoids those questions.

4. The Explicit Declaration of Nullity Requirement

For the West Virginia legislature to override the centuries-old common law meaning of a term like “resident,” it would have to do so with an explicit declaration of nullity. The code would need to state, in unambiguous terms, that it was abrogating the common law meaning. As we will see, no such declaration exists.

B. The “Person” Trap (Title 2)

With these principles in mind, we turn to the state’s own controlling definition of “person.” WV Code § 2-2-10(a)(9) provides:

“’Person’ or ‘whoever’ includes corporations, societies, associations and partnerships, and other similar legal business organizations;” [6]

This definition is even more restrictive than the one found in the vehicle code. It lists only artificial legal entities. It does not mention “man,” “woman,” “inhabitant,” or even “natural person.” Applying the maxims of statutory construction:

• Noscitur a Sociis: “Person” is known by the company it keeps, corporations, societies, etc. It is a legal fiction.

• Ejusdem Generis: The phrase “other similar legal business organizations” limits the class to artificial entities.

• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: By expressing only artificial entities, the statute excludes living men and women.

Conclusion: Under the state’s own controlling general definition, a man or woman is not a “person” unless they have voluntarily assumed the status of a legal business organization.

C. The “Resident” Trap (Title 11, 2 & Title 17A)

The tax statute applies to persons “residing” in the state. Critically, neither Title 11 (Taxation) nor Title 2 (General Provisions) defines “resident” or “residing.” This legislative silence, combined with the principles of construction, forces us to turn to the established hierarchy of authority to determine the term’s original meaning:

Because no explicit declaration of nullity exists, the original meaning controls: a “resident” is an alien, not a sovereign inhabitant.

This legislative silence is not an oversight; it is a deference to the established common law. When a statute uses a term of art without defining it, and the general rules of construction are also silent, the original public meaning controls. This principle is anchored in several foundational doctrines:

1. The Presumption of Consistent Usage: Courts presume that the legislature uses words in their established legal sense. As the Supreme Court has affirmed, “where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.“ [5]

2. Strict Construction of Taxing Statutes: It is a long-settled rule that statutes imposing taxes must be strictly construed against the government and in favor of the man or woman.

3. Constitutional Avoidance: A statute must be interpreted to avoid constitutional questions. To interpret “resident” in a novel, expansive way would raise profound constitutional questions about due process and the limits of state jurisdiction.

The Unrebutted Original Meaning of “Resident”

Because the West Virginia Code is silent, the original meaning of “resident” from the Law of Nations and founding-era jurisprudence controls. As established previously, a “resident” is an alien or a person in a subordinate status, distinct from a national or inhabitant. [7]

For the West Virginia legislature to override this centuries-old legal meaning, it would have to do so with an explicit declaration of nullity. The tax code would need to state, in unambiguous terms, that it was abrogating the common law meaning. No such declaration exists.

Conclusion: Exclusion by General Definition and Original Meaning

Therefore, the personal property tax statute fails to establish jurisdiction over a national inhabitant on two fundamental grounds:

1. Exclusion by General Definition: The controlling definition of “person” in WV Code § 2-2-10 is limited to artificial legal entities and does not include a man or woman standing in their sovereign capacity.

2. Exclusion by Original Meaning: The controlling term “residing” in the tax statute is undefined. Therefore, its original common law meaning applies, which excludes sovereign inhabitants and applies only to aliens or those in a subordinate status.

Any attempt by the state to enforce the tax against a national inhabitant is an unconstitutional overreach, resting on a presumption that has been nullified by the state’s own general rules of construction and the foundational principles of our legal system.

D. The “Employment” Trap (Title 17A)

WV Code § 17A-3-1a creates a “rebuttable presumption” of residency based on six criteria, including voter registration, public school enrollment, and accepting employment. [10] A national inhabitant who avoids these commercial/political activities rebuts this presumption.

Even if we were to ignore the controlling authority of Title 2 and the common law, the vehicle code’s rebuttable presumption of residency in § 17A-3-1a is itself a jurisdictional trap. The fifth criterion, “Accepts employment or engages in any trade, profession or occupation”, relies on the federal definition of “trade or business” from 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(26), which includes the performance of the functions of a public office. [11]

When a man or woman signs a W-4 and is classified as an “employee,” they have unwittingly converted their private labor into a federal “trade or business” and assumed the status of a federal “employee,” thereby triggering the presumption of residency.

According to § 17A-3-1a(b), a presumption of residency is created if a person engages in any of the following six activities [12]:

A declared national who has consciously avoided these commercial and political entanglements has, by definition, rebutted this presumption. A man or woman who is not registered to vote, does not use public schools, does not receive public assistance, has not accepted employment, and has not filed for a homestead exemption does not meet the statutory criteria. By not engaging in these activities, the national provides the contrary evidence necessary to rebut the presumption that they are a “resident.”

E. The “State” Trap (Title 2)

WV Code § 2-2-10(a)(13) defines “State” and “United States” to include the District of Columbia and federal territories and defines “State” and “United States” for the entire code [13]:

“’State’, when applied to a part of the United States and not restricted by the context, includes the District of Columbia and the several territories, and the words ‘United States’ also include the said district and territories;”

This is a direct incorporation of the federal territorial framework established in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt [14]. It confirms that, unless the context demands otherwise (e.g., referring to the organic Republic of West Virginia), the term “State” within the code refers to the corporate “STATE” operating within the federal zone, which includes D.C. and the territories. This provides the statutory basis for the commercial nexus that triggers the Clearfield Doctrine, a legal principle that allows federal courts to create federal common law when there is a significant federal interest requiring a uniform rule across the nation.

VI. The Destruction of the Highest Right and the Path to Restoration

Through this semantic abuse, the state converts the absolute right of property into a regulated, taxable status. The man or woman, by unwittingly identifying as a “person” and a “resident,” and by converting their property into “personal property,” is stripped of their allodial right and becomes a mere tenant, paying tax (rent) to the corporate State (the landlord).

The path to restoration requires a conscious and deliberate reversal of this process:

1. Reclaim National Status: Formally declare one’s status as a national of the state, not a “U.S. citizen.”

2. Rescind All Commercial Contracts: Formally rescind all contracts with the corporate state (driver’s license, voter registration, etc.) via documented, unrebutted notice.

3. Perfect Land Title: Trace the chain of title for one’s land back to the original Land Patent (the allodial title from the sovereign) and record it, showing no encumbrances.

4. Remove All Encumbrances: Pay off all liens, bonds, and other government obligations attached to the property.

5. Live Privately: Cease all activities that create a presumption of residency or commercial nexus.

By taking these steps, a man or woman can sever all commercial nexus, rebut all presumptions, and restore their status as a inhabitant who is sovereign holding allodial title to their property, outside the jurisdictional reach of the corporate State’s taxing authority.

VII. Final Conclusion: Exclusion by Two Fundamental Grounds

The West Virginia legislature, through its own precise definitions and the application of long-standing principles of statutory construction, has created a framework that excludes a national who is sovereign from the scope of its commercial vehicle and tax codes. The power to tax personal property under § 11-5-1 is limited to “persons residing” in the state [15]. A declared national is excluded on two fundamental and independent grounds:

1. Exclusion by General Definition: The controlling definition of “person” in WV Code § 2-2-10 is limited to artificial legal entities and does not include a man or woman standing in their sovereign capacity.

2. Exclusion by Original Meaning: The controlling term “residing” in the tax statute is undefined. Therefore, its original common law meaning applies, which excludes inhabitants who are sovereign and applies only to aliens or those in a subordinate status.

Any attempt by the state to enforce the tax against a national who is an inhabitant is an unconstitutional overreach, resting on a presumption that has been nullified by the state’s own general rules of construction and the foundational principles of our legal system.

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References

[1] Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856)

[2] U.S. Attorney General Opinion (September 1869)

[3] West Virginia Code § 2-2-10

[4] West Virginia Code § 11-5-1

[5] Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)

[6] West Virginia Code § 2-2-10(a)(9)

[7] Emer de Vattel,The Law of Nations, Book I, Ch. 19, § 213 (1758)

[8] Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)

[9] Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), “Inhabitant”

[10] West Virginia Code § 17A-3-1a

[11] 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(26)

[12] West Virginia Code § 17A-3-1a(b)

[13] West Virginia Code § 2-2-10(a)(13)

[14] Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)

[15] West Virginia Code § 11-5-1

Introduction: The Central Observation

This article reviews evidence-based records of the historical, financial, and legal threads that suggest a long-term, structural subversion of the American Republic. The central observation is that a cohesive, inter-generational project has been underway to transform the United States from a constitutional republic of sovereign states and people into a component of a centrally-controlled world order, managed by a network of private financial and political interests. This analysis will proceed without the use of dismissive or pejorative framing, focusing instead on the documented evidence and the logical connections between seemingly disparate events and concepts.

The inquiry is guided by several key questions. It begins with the prescient warnings of Representative Jacob Thorkelson in 1940 and examines his political fate. It investigates the ideological underpinnings of this alleged subversion, tracing a line from the foundational strategies of the Communist League to the modern agendas of elite international organizations like the Bilderberg Group and the World Economic Forum. A significant portion of the analysis is dedicated to the creation and operation of the Federal Reserve System, presenting the case that it functions as a private banking cartel with the power to control the nation’s economy. Furthermore, the report delves into the legal framework that underpins this transformation, focusing on the binding Supreme Court precedent in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt which established multiple, distinct legal definitions of the “United States.” This legal analysis explores how the manipulation of language and jurisdiction may have converted sovereign people into statutory “persons” subject to a de facto government. Finally, the report synthesizes these threads to assess whether a form of collectivist subversion has been achieved, not through overt revolution, but through the quiet, incremental capture of the nation’s financial, legal, and political institutions.

Part I: Historical Foundations & Early Warnings

Chapter 1: The Cassandra of Congress: Jacob Thorkelson of Montana

In the 76th Congress, a lone voice emerged to articulate a complex and alarming theory of national subversion. Jacob Thorkelson, a Norwegian-born physician and first-term Republican Congressman from Montana, used the platform of the House of Representatives to place into the Congressional Record a series of detailed speeches and documents. He alleged that the United States was the target of two converging, yet competing, internationalist plots. His warnings, delivered in 1940 as the world descended into war, were largely ignored at the time and have since been relegated to the footnotes of history. An examination of his political career and the specific content of his speeches, however, reveals a man who, for his efforts, was swiftly removed from power, and whose concerns mirror many of the themes of this present analysis.

Born in Egersund, Norway, in 1876, Thorkelson immigrated to the United States in 1892. After a career as a navigator and sailing master, he pursued medicine, graduating from the University of Maryland in 1911 and eventually establishing a practice in Montana [1]. In 1938, he was elected to Congress, defeating the incumbent Democrat Jerry J. O’Connell. Once in office, Thorkelson began to use the Congressional Record as a repository for a vast collection of materials that he believed proved a conspiracy against American sovereignty. He identified two primary forces at play: a push for a “British Union” that would re-absorb the United States into the British Empire, and a parallel push from what he termed “international money changers” for a “Jewish-controlled union” to establish their own world government [2].

In a speech on August 19, 1940, Thorkelson was explicit:

It is, therefore, best for us to stay out of both of these, in order to save what is left of this Republic as it was given to us in 1787, by a people who knew more about international intrigue and the real problems that confronted the world, than we know today. [2]

He argued that organizations endowed by figures like Andrew Carnegie were actively working to “eliminate Americanism” and substitute it with “an English version of our history” in order to achieve a “British-American Union” [2]. He cited Carnegie’s own writing, which expressed the hope that

“as surely as the sun in the heavens once shone upon Britain and America united, so surely is it one morning to rise, to shine upon, to greet again the reunited states” [2].

Thorkelson saw this agenda being advanced through scholarships, exchange professorships, and the subsidizing of churches and educational institutions. He also detailed the activities of organizations like The Pilgrims Society, which he characterized as a key vehicle for promoting Anglo-American unity at the expense of American independence.

Simultaneously, Thorkelson pointed to the British-Israel World Federation as a vehicle for the second plot, which he linked to international finance. He inserted into the record extensive lists purporting to show Jewish genealogical influence within the British aristocracy, arguing that this financial and social power was being leveraged to guide world events toward a global government under their control [2].

The political establishment and the press of his time reacted with hostility to Thorkelson’s pronouncements. His focus on the alleged influence of Jewish people in international finance and his insertion of long genealogical lists into the record led to widespread accusations of anti-Semitism. His willingness to reprint sympathetic interviews with foreign leaders like Adolf Hitler and his praise for the organizational principles of other governments led to characterizations of him as a fascist sympathizer [3, 4]. Contemporary journalists, for example, referred to him as the “mouthpiece of the Nazi movement in congress,” and modern historians have described his rhetoric in similar terms [5]. For his part, Thorkelson claimed that such labels were merely a rhetorical device, stating they were “created by the anti-Americans as a cloak to shield their own subversive activities” [3].

The consequences for Thorkelson were politically fatal. When he ran for re-election in the 1940 Republican primary, he was soundly defeated by former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin, a well-known pacifist. His subsequent political career consisted of a series of failed campaigns: for the U.S. Senate in 1942 and for Governor of Montana in 1944. He died of heart ailments in Butte, Montana, in 1945, his political career in ruins and his warnings largely forgotten [1]. Whether Thorkelson was a dangerous crank or a maligned prophet who identified the outlines of a genuine, long-term political project is a central question. His fate, however, serves as a cautionary tale about the potential consequences of challenging powerful, entrenched interests.

Chapter 2: The Specter of Communism: From the League to the Long March Through the Institutions

While Representative Thorkelson focused on threats from Anglo-American elites and international financiers, a parallel and arguably more foundational ideological threat was outlined decades earlier by the architects of communism. To understand the modern claims of institutional subversion in America, it is necessary to examine the foundational strategies of the communist movement itself, which explicitly called for a long-term, incremental takeover of societal structures. This strategy, a far cry from the caricature of violent street revolution, was detailed by Frederick Engels and later echoed in documents that purport to lay bare a multi-generational plan to transform the United States from within.

In his 1885 work, On the History of the Communist League, Frederick Engels provides a candid history of the movement’s early days. He describes how the League, a secret society, evolved from a conspiratorial group into a propaganda organization. Crucially, Engels outlines the strategy of infiltration. He notes with pride that by 1850, a League emissary, Heinrich Bauer, had successfully brought the leaders of the German Workers’ Brotherhood into the fold, to the point that a touring student democrat “had found all fit forces already in the hands of the League” [6]. This historical account reveals a core tenet of the movement: not to create a new army of revolutionaries from scratch, but to co-opt and control existing organizations, turning their own momentum and membership toward the League’s ultimate purpose. Engels also makes a critical distinction between agitating for immediate revolution and playing a longer game. He and Marx were castigated by more impatient elements for their “cool estimation of the situation,” which recognized that revolution was only possible when economic conditions were right. In the meantime, the work of organization and infiltration was paramount [6].

This strategy of infiltration and long-term subversion is the central theme of a document that has circulated for decades: the “45 Communist Goals.” This list was entered into the U.S. Congressional Record on January 10, 1963, by Florida Representative Albert S. Herlong, Jr. [7]. The list was taken from W. Cleon Skousen’s 1958 book, The Naked Communist. The goals outline a comprehensive plan to undermine and capture American society without a single shot being fired. An examination of these goals reveals a detailed blueprint for what has been termed the “long march through the institutions.”

The goals can be broadly categorized:

• International Policy: Goal #1 calls for U.S. recognition of Red China, while others advocate for weakening American allies and promoting the United Nations as a “one world government” (Goals #2, #3, #11).

• Internal Political and Legal Subversion: This includes goals to “capture one or both of the political parties in the United States” (Goal #15), use court decisions to weaken basic American institutions (Goal #16), and get control of the schools to use them as transmission belts for socialist propaganda (Goal #17).

• Cultural and Social Degradation: A significant number of goals target the cultural fabric of the nation. They include eliminating prayer in schools (Goal #28), discrediting the family as an institution (Goal #40), promoting promiscuity and easy divorce (Goal #25, #41), presenting homosexuality as “normal, natural, healthy” (Goal #26), and discrediting the Constitution and the American Founding Fathers (Goals #29, #30). Other goals aim to infiltrate the press (Goal #20), gain control of key positions in radio, TV, and motion pictures (Goal #21), and break down cultural standards of morality by promoting pornography and obscenity in media (Goal #24).

Just a few years before this list was entered into the record, a Congressional committee was formed to investigate the very source of funding for such subversive activities. The United States House Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, commonly known as the Reece Committee after its chairman, B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee, was tasked in 1953 with investigating the use of funds by large, tax-exempt foundations. The committee’s director of research, Norman Dodd, delivered a stunning report. Based on his team’s investigation of the minutes and records of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, among others, Dodd concluded that these powerful and respected institutions were actively working to promote a form of collectivism and to undermine the constitutional principles of the United States.

Dodd testified that the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment, as early as 1908, were discussing how to alter the life of the entire American people to a form of state socialism. He claimed their minutes showed that they believed war was the most effective agent of societal change and that they actively sought to involve the United States in World War I. Dodd’s investigation further alleged that the foundations worked in concert to control the teaching of history in the United States, promoting a narrative that favored collectivism and internationalism over the principles of individual liberty and national sovereignty enshrined in the Constitution. The Reece Committee’s work was cut short and its findings were largely dismissed by the mainstream press, but its official report remains a stark historical document alleging that the very institutions of American philanthropy had been turned into engines of ideological subversion [8].

Taken together, the foundational strategy outlined by Engels, the specific blueprint of the 45 Goals, and the official findings of the Reece Committee paint a consistent picture. They suggest a multi-pronged, multi-generational effort to transform the United States, not by force, but by the slow, methodical capture of its key cultural, educational, legal, and political institutions, funded by the immense wealth of tax-exempt foundations. This provides a crucial ideological context for the financial and legal subversions to be examined in the subsequent chapters.

Part II: The Financial Coup: The Federal Reserve System

If the ideological subversion of American institutions represents a long-term cultural and political project, the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 represents its financial counterpart: a swift and decisive restructuring of the nation’s entire monetary and credit system. The narrative of the Fed’s creation is not a story of public debate and transparent legislation, but one of secrecy, elite consensus, and the capture of public power by private interests. This financial architecture, put in place over a century ago, is arguably the central enabling mechanism for the expansion of government power and the erosion of national sovereignty.

Chapter 3: The Secret Conclave on Jekyll Island

The official justification for the creation of a central bank was the need to prevent the kind of financial panics that had periodically plagued the United States, most recently the severe Panic of 1907. This crisis, which saw a run on banks and a contraction of credit, created the political will for significant banking reform. However, the reform that emerged was not forged in the halls of Congress, but conceived in absolute secrecy by a small cabal of the nation’s most powerful bankers and financiers.

In November 1910, a group of six men boarded a private train car in New Jersey under the cover of a duck hunting trip. Their destination was the exclusive Jekyll Island Club, off the coast of Georgia, described at the time as “the richest, the most exclusive, the most inaccessible” club in the world [9]. The attendees were:

• Nelson W. Aldrich: Republican Senator from Rhode Island, Chairman of the National Monetary Commission, and father-in-law to John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

• A. Piatt Andrew: Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

• Henry P. Davison: Senior partner at J.P. Morgan & Company.

• Frank A. Vanderlip: President of the National City Bank of New York, representing the interests of William Rockefeller.

• Paul M. Warburg: A partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co., representing the Rothschild and Warburg banking dynasties in Europe, and arguably the most knowledgeable expert on central banking in the group.

• Arthur Shelton: Senator Aldrich’s private secretary.

The secrecy was absolute. The participants were instructed to come one at a time, to use only their first names to avoid identification by the staff, and for decades they denied the meeting ever took place. It was not until the 1930s that the story was publicly confirmed [9]. The purpose of this clandestine gathering was to draft a piece of legislation that would create a central banking cartel in America. The goal was to end the instability of the free banking era, but to do so in a way that concentrated power in the hands of the major Wall Street banks, insulated them from competition, and shifted the risk of their speculative losses onto the public. As Vanderlip later wrote in his autobiography, “We had disappeared from the world onto a deserted island. We put in the most intense period of work that I have ever had” [9].

Over the course of a week, they hammered out the details of a plan for a “Reserve Association of America.” It would be a single central bank with regional branches, controlled by bankers, that would hold the reserves of all member banks, create an “elastic” currency (i.e., one that could be expanded or contracted at will), and serve as the lender of last resort. In essence, they designed a system that would privatize profit while socializing risk, all under the guise of public service and financial stability.

Chapter 4: The Federal Reserve Act of 1913: A Public Act with Private Interests

The plan developed on Jekyll Island became the basis for the “Aldrich Plan,” which was presented to Congress. It was initially met with suspicion from a public and a political class wary of concentrating so much power in the hands of Wall Street bankers. However, with the election of Democrat Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the plan was repackaged under a new name and with cosmetic changes to make it more politically palatable.

The final legislation, known as the Federal Reserve Act, was passed on December 23, 1913, when many members of Congress had already left for the Christmas holiday. While it created a Board of Governors appointed by the President to provide a veneer of public control, the underlying structure was a direct reflection of the Jekyll Island plan. The system is composed of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, which are not government agencies but privately owned corporations. Their stock is owned by the private “member banks” within their district. These private banks elect the majority of the directors of their regional Fed branch.

This structure creates a fundamental conflict of interest. The Federal Reserve System, which sets monetary policy, regulates banks, and is supposed to act in the public interest, is owned and controlled by the very banks it is supposed to regulate. It is a cartel, legally established and protected by the government. The system’s power lies in its ability to create “money” out of thin air in the form of Federal Reserve Notes, which are not backed by any tangible asset but by the “full faith and credit” of the U.S. government. This fiat currency system allows the government to finance its operations not just through direct taxation, but through borrowing from the central bank. This process, known as monetizing the debt, is the primary engine of inflation, which acts as a hidden tax on the people by devaluing the currency.

The profound and radical nature of this change was not lost on some at the time. It is often reported that President Woodrow Wilson, who signed the Act into law, later expressed deep regret. A quote widely attributed to him states:

I am a most unhappy man. I have unwittingly ruined my country. A great industrial nation is controlled by its system of credit. Our system of credit is concentrated. The growth of the nation, therefore, and all our activities are in the hands of a few men. We have come to be one of the worst ruled, one of the most completely controlled and dominated Governments in the civilized world - no longer a Government by free opinion, no longer a Government by conviction and the vote of the majority, but a Government by the opinion and duress of a small group of dominant men. [10]

While the exact sourcing of this specific quotation is debated, it accurately reflects the substance of Wilson’s own writings in his 1913 book, The New Freedom, where he lamented the control that a small group of bankers held over the nation’s credit and commerce. The creation of the Federal Reserve did not break this control; it institutionalized it. It created a permanent mechanism for the private control of public credit, enabling the growth of a massive federal government, the financing of perpetual wars, and the gradual erosion of the people’s wealth through inflation. It was, in effect, a financial coup d’état, the necessary precondition for the subsequent expansion of the administrative state and the pursuit of a globalist agenda.

Part III: The Architecture of Global Governance

The establishment of a private central bank provided the financial engine for a vast expansion of government power, but it did not in itself provide the political or ideological direction. The vision of a world managed by a select group of experts and elites, operating above the constraints of national sovereignty and democratic accountability, required the creation of a network of influential, nominally private organizations. These groups, operating as forums for consensus-building and policy development, form the intellectual and political architecture for what is now commonly referred to as global governance. This network has its roots in an Anglo-American project to reunite the English-speaking peoples and has evolved into a more complex global structure, but its core purpose—to manage world affairs from the top down—has remained consistent.

Chapter 5: The Anglo-American Establishment and the Round Table Groups

The idea of a world dominated by the English-speaking peoples, and specifically a reunion of the United States and Great Britain, was a powerful current in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As Representative Thorkelson warned in 1940, industrialist Andrew Carnegie was a key proponent of this vision. In his 1893 book Triumphant Democracy, Carnegie explicitly called for a “British-American Union,” a goal he believed was inevitable [2]. This was not merely a sentimental hope; it was an active political project pursued by some of the wealthiest and most powerful men of the era.

The most influential figure in this movement was Cecil Rhodes, the British mining magnate and imperialist. Rhodes amassed a fortune in southern Africa and envisioned a world secretly governed by an elite, English-speaking fraternity. In his will, he famously endowed the Rhodes Scholarship at Oxford University. The stated purpose was to bring promising young men from the colonies, Germany, and the United States to be educated in England, thereby instilling in them a sense of common purpose and preparing them to serve as leaders within a unified global system. The scholarship was, in effect, a long-term plan to create a ruling class loyal to Rhodes’s vision of an Anglo-American world order.

Out of Rhodes’s vision grew a network of semi-secret organizations known as the Round Table Groups, established in Britain and its dominions in the early 20th century. The American branch of this network was founded in 1921 as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) [11]. The CFR was established in the aftermath of World War I by a group of American diplomats, financiers, and academics who had been part of President Wilson’s delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. From its inception, the CFR’s purpose was to influence American foreign policy in an internationalist direction. Though it is a private, non-partisan organization, its membership has consistently included a who’s who of American power: past and future presidents, secretaries of state, CIA directors, Wall Street CEOs, media executives, and top academics. The CFR operates not as a public forum, but as a venue for off-the-record discussions where the elite can forge a consensus on foreign policy matters, which is then disseminated through its influential journal, Foreign Affairs, and through the actions of its members in government and the private sector. For a century, the CFR has served as the primary nexus between Wall Street finance and Washington foreign policy, acting as a de facto shadow government that provides the personnel and policy direction for the U.S. administrative state, regardless of which political party is in power.

Chapter 6: The Modern Globalists: Bilderberg, WEF, and the Push for a New World Order

After World War II, the Anglo-American project expanded into a broader transatlantic and, eventually, global network. The model of the CFR, a private, invitation-only forum for elite consensus-building, was replicated on an international scale. The most famous and secretive of these organizations is the Bilderberg Group, which held its first meeting in 1954 at the Hotel de Bilderberg in the Netherlands [12]. Founded by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, the group’s stated purpose was to foster dialogue between Europe and North America. Its annual meetings, which are held under strict secrecy, bring together 120 to 150 of the most powerful people in politics, finance, media, and academia from North America and Western Europe. The guest list is a closely guarded secret, and attendees are bound by the “Chatham House Rule,” which allows them to use the information they receive, but not to reveal the identity or affiliation of the speaker. This secrecy has, of course, fueled accusations that the group is not merely a discussion forum, but a secret cabal that makes global policy decisions outside of any democratic process.

More recently, the World Economic Forum (WEF), founded by German engineer and economist Klaus Schwab in 1971, has taken on a more public-facing role in promoting the agenda of global governance. The WEF’s annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, is a major media event, bringing together world leaders, corporate titans, and celebrities to discuss global problems. The WEF has been a vocal proponent of what it calls the “Great Reset,” an agenda launched in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Great Reset calls for a fundamental restructuring of the world economy, moving away from traditional free-market capitalism toward a system of “stakeholder capitalism,” where global corporations would work in partnership with governments to manage the global economy and solve social problems [13]. Critics argue that this model would further concentrate power in the hands of a global technocratic elite, creating a system of corporate socialism that bypasses national sovereignty and democratic accountability.

This long-term project of building a global order was given its most famous public expression by a man whose family has been deeply enmeshed in these networks for generations: George H. W. Bush. His father, Senator Prescott Bush, was a partner at Brown Brothers Harriman, a Wall Street investment firm. During the 1930s and early 1940s, Prescott Bush was a director of the Union Banking Corporation, a firm that financed German industrialist Fritz Thyssen, one of Adolf Hitler’s early financial backers. In 1942, the U.S. government seized the assets of Union Banking Corporation under the Trading with the Enemy Act [14]. George H. W. Bush himself was a member of the secret society Skull and Bones at Yale, served as Director of the CIA, and was a member of the CFR.

On September 11, 1990, in a televised address to a joint session of Congress, President Bush used the first Gulf War as the occasion to announce the arrival of this long-sought goal. He stated:

We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony... A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. [15]

In a subsequent speech to Congress on January 29, 1991, he was even more explicit about the mechanism for this new order:

“What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind... an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.S.’s founders” [16].

The vision was clear: a world governed not by sovereign, independent nations, but by international law and institutions, led by a powerful and credible United Nations. This was the culmination of the project begun by Rhodes and Carnegie, financed by the Federal Reserve, and nurtured in the secret meetings of the CFR and Bilderberg Group. It was the open declaration of a plan to subordinate American sovereignty to a global governmental architecture.

Part IV: The Legal Inversion: Statutory Word Magic and the De Facto State

The ideological project of collectivism and the financial architecture of the central bank are powerful tools, but to apply them to the people of the American states requires a third component: a legal mechanism of subversion. This mechanism operates through the careful and deliberate manipulation of language within the statutory framework of the federal government. It creates a jurisdictional trap, a legal sleight-of-hand that pulls the sovereign people of the constitutional Republic into the jurisdiction of a federal, corporate entity. This is achieved by creating specific, technical definitions for common words like “United States,” “state,” and “person,” which differ from their common understanding. The key to this entire legal structure is a binding Supreme Court precedent that is almost entirely unknown to the general public, but which provides the foundational legal basis for a parallel, de facto government.

Chapter 7: The Three United States: The Binding Precedent of Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt

In 1945, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a ruling in the case of Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652. The case concerned a state tax matter, but in its ruling, the Court made a foundational distinction that has profound implications for the nature of American governance. The Court explicitly defined the term “United States” in three distinct ways. This was not a matter of opinion or theory, but a statement of binding legal precedent. The Court declared:

The term “United States” may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution. [17]

This precedent establishes, at the highest legal level, that the term “United States” is not a monolithic entity. It can refer to:

1. The States of the Union: The collective of the several states that form the constitutional Republic.

2. The Federal Territory: The territory over which the federal government exercises direct sovereignty, such as the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, etc.

3. The International Sovereign: The entity that exists on the world stage, also known as the de facto federal government.

This distinction is not merely academic. It is the conversion of terms that allows for a dual legal system. When a federal statute uses the term “United States,” which of these three entities is it referring to? The answer is found in a core principle of legal interpretation known as the canons of statutory construction. The controlling canon in this instance is that when a statute provides its own definitions for its terms, those definitions are controlling and override the common, everyday meaning of the words. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed;

“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.” (Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949)) [18].

This principle is the “word magic” that allows for the creation of a separate legal jurisdiction that exists in parallel to the constitutional Republic. By defining terms like “United States” and “State” within a given statute to refer to the federal territory and its subdivisions, Congress can create a body of law that applies only within that specific jurisdiction, while appearing to apply to the entire country.

Chapter 8: The Statutory “Person” and the Inversion of Sovereignty

The application of this principle is most clearly seen in the definitional sections of major federal statutes, particularly the Internal Revenue Code. Title 26 of the U.S. Code is the law that governs federal taxation. Section 7701 of that code provides the definitions that control for the entire title. It states:

(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—
(9) United States. The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.
(10) State. The term “State” shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title. [19]

Here, the code explicitly defines the “United States” for the purposes of the tax code as the federal zone (”the States”) and the District of Columbia. It does not refer to the 50 states of the Union in their sovereign capacity. It then defines “State” to include the District of Columbia and other federal territories. This creates a closed legal loop. The tax code, by its own definitions, applies within the jurisdiction of the de facto federal government, not within the sovereign states of the Union.

The mechanism by which the people of the sovereign states are brought into this federal jurisdiction is through the creation of another statutory entity: the “person.” The law makes a critical distinction between a sovereign man or woman, and a legal fiction called a “person.” By applying for and accepting government-issued licenses, permits, and, most importantly, a Social Security Number, a man or woman voluntarily enters into a contract with the federal government. This contract creates a legal entity, a “person” (often referred to as a “strawman”), which is a creature of the state and subject to its statutes. This statutory “person” is a resident of the federal zone, and it is this entity, not the sovereign man or woman, that is liable for income taxes and subject to the vast web of federal regulations.

This represents a complete inversion of sovereignty. In the constitutional Republic, the people are sovereign, and the government is their servant, delegated with limited and enumerated powers. In the statutory de facto system, the government is sovereign, and the “person” is its subject, a debtor and a pauper obligated to comply with its commands. The word “state” itself is inverted. In the original sense, the “state” is the body politic, the collective of the sovereign people. In the statutory sense, the “State” is the controlling governmental apparatus. The people, having been legally transformed into statutory “persons,” are duped into believing they are subjects of this apparatus, when in fact their true status as sovereigns of the Republic remains, albeit dormant and unexercised. This legal framework, built on the foundation of Hooven & Allison and the canons of construction, is the hidden engine of the subversion, allowing for the application of collectivist policies and the extraction of wealth by the financial elite through a system of legal deception.

Part V: Synthesis and Conclusion: The Great Inversion

The preceding analysis has traced three distinct but interwoven threads: the ideological, the financial, and the legal. The ideological thread, running from the Communist League to the modern World Economic Forum, provides the blueprint for a centrally managed, collectivist world order. The financial thread, centered on the creation of the Federal Reserve, provides the monetary engine to fund this order, independent of the will of the people. The legal thread, anchored by the precedent of Hooven & Allison, provides the jurisdictional mechanism to apply this new order to a population that remains largely unaware of the legal inversion that has taken place. This final section will synthesize these threads to answer the central question of the inquiry: has America become communist? And what are the observable outcomes of this century-long transformation?

Chapter 9: Connecting the Threads: Has America Become Communist?

The answer to the question of whether America has become communist is not a simple yes or no. If by “communist” one means the overt, totalitarian, state-ownership model of the Soviet Union or Maoist China, the answer is clearly no. However, if one understands communism not as a specific model, but as a political and ideological project aimed at the abolition of private property, the dissolution of national sovereignty, and the concentration of power in the hands of a technocratic elite, then the evidence presented in this analysis suggests that the United States has undergone a profound and successful, albeit quiet, collectivist subversion.

This has not been a violent revolution, but a Fabian-style, incremental takeover; the “long march through the institutions” described in Part I. The 45 Communist Goals laid out in 1963 can be viewed as a chillingly accurate progress report. The capture of the educational system (Goal #17), the discrediting of the Constitution and the Founding Fathers (Goals #29, #30), the breakdown of cultural morality (Goals #24, #25, #26), the infiltration of the media (Goal #20), and the use of the courts to weaken basic institutions (Goal #16) have all been largely accomplished. These ideological victories, funded by the very tax-exempt foundations the Reece Committee warned about, have created a population conditioned to accept the premises of collectivism.

This ideological softening was enabled by the financial coup of 1913. The Federal Reserve System, by creating a debt-based fiat currency, allows the federal government to spend far beyond its means, funding an ever-expanding administrative state and a global military empire. This is the mechanism that finances the welfare-warfare state, which in turn creates dependency and consolidates power in the central government. The recent attempts to acquire vast territories like Greenland or to further integrate the economy of Canada are not the actions of a limited, constitutional republic. They are the actions of a centralized, imperial power, the “de facto” government acting as the international sovereign described in Hooven & Allison, expanding its territorial and economic control.

This entire structure is locked into place by the legal inversion described in Part IV. By inducing the sovereign people of the states into the jurisdiction of the federal corporation through contracts and the creation of statutory “persons,” the system subjects them to a legal framework that is, by its own definition, foreign to the constitutional Republic. The people become the surety for the national debt, their labor and property pledged through the Social Security system and other contracts to back the borrowing of the federal government from the private central bank. This is the ultimate inversion: the people, who were once the masters of the government, have become the servants of the State, their wealth systematically drained to fund a globalist project they do not understand and did not consent to.

Chapter 10: Conclusion: A Republic, If You Can Keep It

This analysis has presented a body of evidence to support a cohesive and deeply unsettling conclusion: that the United States of America as a constitutional Republic has been effectively supplanted by a parallel and superior de facto government. This is only a snapshot of the available evidence that all points to the same conclusion. This corporate entity, operating under the name “United States,” is controlled by a network of private financial interests and internationalist political actors. It operates through a private central bank, is funded by a debt-based currency system that functions as a hidden tax, and exercises jurisdiction over a population that has been legally and contractually transformed from citizens who are sovereign as the body politic that is the original definition of state, into subject “persons.”

The warnings of Jacob Thorkelson in 1940, the strategic blueprint of the Communist League, the secret creation of the Federal Reserve, the agenda of the Council on Foreign Relations and the World Economic Forum, and the legal precedent of Hooven & Allison are not disparate conspiracy theories. They are data points in a consistent, multi-generational project to dismantle the American Republic and absorb it into a centrally managed global order. The “word magic” of statutory construction is not a fringe legal theory; it is the fundamental mechanism by which this is achieved, hidden in plain sight within the U.S. Code itself.

The implications of this reality are profound. It suggests that the political debates that occupy the public sphere are largely a distraction, a managed spectacle to maintain the illusion of democratic choice. The real power lies not with the elected officials, but with the permanent, unelected bureaucracy and the financial and corporate interests that control the system from behind the scenes. It suggests that the erosion of individual liberty, the decline of economic prosperity, and the endless foreign wars are not policy failures, but policy successes, the intended outcomes of a system designed to concentrate wealth and power.

Benjamin Franklin, upon exiting the Constitutional Convention, was famously asked what kind of government the delegates had created. “A republic,” he was attributed with stating, “if you can keep it.” The evidence presented here suggests that those who came after failed to keep it. They allowed it to be subverted from within, transformed by a slow, methodical process of ideological, financial, and legal warfare into something entirely different. Recognizing the nature and extent of this transformation is the necessary first step for a people who wish to reclaim their sovereignty.

Ask yourself: was Jacob Thorkelson wrong back in 1940? We have had 86 years to reflect on his observations and evidence. What do you see today? Are you free, or is it an illusion of freedom? Are you treated as though your rights are first? Are you free to travel without impingement? Do you have the same rights from one state to the next? Do you own your land outright with full allodial title transfer from origin to today? Do you have your MCO (Manufacturer’s Certificate of Origin - original title) for your automobile? Are you marked with a number that follows you around for your life? Do you pay taxes on goods exported from any State? Do you truly own anything, or are you just a “registered owner”? Do you believe you have to get a license to exercise a right? Do you have property, or only “real” property or “real” estate? If you do not, who does?

References

[1] “Jacob Thorkelson.” Wikipedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_Thorkelson

[2] Thorkelson, Jacob. Congressional Record, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, August 19, 1940. (Provided as attachment: us-congressional-record-1940-british-israel-world-$1.pdf)

[3] “Thorkelson Linked to ‘front’ Group in Defendant’s Statement.” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1940. Available at: https://www.jta.org/archive/thorkelson-linked-to-front-group-in-defendants-statement

[4] “National News Thorkelson Uses U.S. Congress To Spread Hatred.” Jewish Weekly, March 1, 1940. Available at: https://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/jewishweekly?a=d&d=JW19400301.2.28&

[5] Morrison, John; Catherine Wright Morrison. Mavericks: The Lives and Battles of Montana’s Political Legends. Montana Historical Society, 2003, p. 188.

[6] Engels, Frederick. On the History of the Communist League. (Provided as attachment: OnTheHistoryoftheCommunistLeaguebyFrederickEngels.pdf)

[7] Herlong, Albert S. Jr. Congressional Record, 88th Congress, 1st Session, January 10, 1963, pp. 855-856. (Referenced from: https://calvert.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/calvert.house.gov/files/1963_Herlong_Current%20Communist%20Goals_CongRecord.pdf)

[8] United States House Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations (Reece Committee). Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations. 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1954.

[9] “Jekyll Island Conference.” Federal Reserve History. Available at: https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/jekyll-island-conference

[10] Quoted in various sources, attributed to Woodrow Wilson. While the exact wording is debated, the sentiment aligns with Wilson’s concerns expressed in The New Freedom (1913).

[11] “Council on Foreign Relations.” Wikipedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations

[12] “Bilderberg Group.” Wikipedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilderberg_Group

[13] Schwab, Klaus; Malleret, Thierry. COVID-19: The Great Reset. Forum Publishing, 2020.

[14] “Prescott Bush.” Wikipedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prescott_Bush

[15] Bush, George H. W. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget.” September 11, 1990. The American Presidency Project. Available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-persian-gulf-crisis-and-the-federal-budget

[16] Bush, George H. W. “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” January 29, 1991. The American Presidency Project. Available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-2

[17] Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671-672 (1945). Available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/324/652/

[18] Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949).

[19] 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(9)-(10). Available at: https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title26-section7701&num=0&edition=prelim

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The Legal and Jurisdictional Distinction Between “National” and “Citizen” and the Consequent Exclusion of State Nationals from Federal and State Legislative Codes

I. Question Presented

Under the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and controlling case law, does a legal and jurisdictional distinction exist between a “citizen of the United States” and a “national”? If so, do federal and state legislative codes, through specific definitions and jurisdictional limitations, operate to exclude a “national” of one of the several states of the Union (i.e., a man or woman domiciled on the land of a sovereign state) from the purview of statutes written for a “citizen of the United States”?

II. Brief Answer

Yes. A profound legal and jurisdictional distinction exists between a “citizen of the United States” and a “national.” This distinction is explicitly codified in federal law, affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, and rooted in the foundational principles of American federalism. Federal statutes, particularly the Immigration and Nationality Act, create a two-tiered system of “nationals and citizens” versus “nationals, but not citizens.”

Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that the term “United States” has multiple, distinct meanings, and in the context of most federal civil statutes, it refers not to the 50 states of the Union but to the federal government’s own territory (the “federal zone”). State legislative codes that incorporate these federal definitions, or use terms like “U.S. citizen” without defining them, effectively adopt this limited federal jurisdiction.

Consequently, a national of one of the several states, a man or woman whose status is derived from the nativity or inhabitation on the land of a sovereign state and not from a grant of federal privilege, is legally and jurisdictionally excluded from the scope of federal and state civil statutes written for the statutory “citizen of the United States”. This latter “citizen”is a person who is subject to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the federal government.

III. Statement of Facts

This memorandum is predicated on a series of verifiable legal facts derived from the Constitution of the United States, the United States Code, and the published decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The central issue revolves around the precise legal meaning of terms like “citizen,” “national,” “United States,” and “State,” and how the interpretation of these terms defines the boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction.

The analysis began with an excerpt of legal text asserting that U.S. citizenship is not the default status at birth and that a distinction exists between a “national” and a “citizen.” This prompted a deep-dive verification of the cited authorities, including Section 308 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1408) and Section 302 of Public Law 94-241.

Further research, expanded to include the foundational Supreme Court cases of Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, which defined the three meanings of “United States,” and the Slaughter-House Cases, which clarified the dual nature of state and federal citizenship created by the Fourteenth Amendment. The analysis also incorporated the definitions within the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) and an examination of how these federal frameworks are mirrored in state-level legislation, using the West Virginia vehicle code as a case study.

This memorandum synthesizes these verified sources to construct a complete legal analysis of the resulting jurisdictional and statutory exclusion of a national of a physical state.

IV. Analysis

The argument that a state national is excluded from the purview of most federal and state civil statutes rests on a chain of legal reasoning supported by a robust body of primary legal authority. The analysis unfolds in several stages: first, by establishing the explicit two-tiered system of “national” versus “citizen” in federal law; second, by defining the limited territorial jurisdiction of the federal government; third, by examining the historical and constitutional basis of state nationality; and finally, by demonstrating how these principles converge to exclude the “man on the land” from statutes written for the federal “citizen.”

A. The Statutory Framework: A Two-Tiered System of Status

The foundation of the distinction between a “national” and a “citizen” is not a matter of interpretation or inference; it is explicitly codified in Title 8 of the U.S. Code, governing Aliens and Nationality. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not treat these terms as synonymous. Instead, it meticulously constructs a legal framework in which one is a subset of the other, creating two distinct classes of people and individuals who owe allegiance to the United States.

1. The Definition of a “National of the United States”

The INA provides a clear and dispositive definition of who qualifies as a “national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) states:

The term “national of the United States” means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.

This definition is structured as a dichotomy. It establishes that while all citizens are nationals, not all nationals are citizens. It creates a distinct category—the “non-citizen national”—composed of persons who owe permanent allegiance to the United States but who do not hold the status of “citizen.” This is the first and most crucial legislative pillar supporting the entire analysis. The statute itself compels a distinction.

2. Codification of the “National, but not Citizen” Status

Congress did not leave the status of “non-citizen national” as a mere theoretical possibility. It explicitly defined who falls into this category at birth. 8 U.S.C. § 1408, titled “Nationals but not citizens of the United States at birth,” provides a list of such persons. It begins:

Unless otherwise provided in section 1401 of this title, the following shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth:
(1) A person born in an outlying possession of the United States on or after the date of formal acquisition of such possession;
(2) A person born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of parents both of whom are nationals, but not citizens, of the United States, and have had a residence in the United States, or one of its outlying possessions prior to the birth of such person...

This section gives concrete legal force to the distinction made in § 1101(a)(22). It creates a class of people who are, from the moment of birth, legally and statutorily designated as “nationals” but are explicitly not “citizens.” This statutory reality makes it impossible to argue that the terms are interchangeable. When a later statute refers only to a “citizen,” it cannot logically be read to include a person whom Congress has expressly designated as a “national, but not citizen.”

3. The Counterpart: “Nationals and Citizens at Birth”

In direct contrast to § 1408, the preceding section, 8 U.S.C. § 1401, defines who is a “national and citizen of the United States at birth.” This section includes categories such as a person born “in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The parallel structure of § 1401 (”nationals and citizens”) and § 1408 (”nationals, but not citizens”) is a deliberate legislative choice. It reinforces the two-tiered system. One cannot simply ignore the differentiating phrase “but not citizens” as mere surplusage; it has independent legal significance.

4. The Voluntary Path to “National but not Citizen” Status

The distinction is further solidified by a statutory provision that allows a person who acquired federal citizenship under a specific act to formally renounce that citizenship and revert to the status of a non-citizen national. Section 302 of Public Law 94-241, which approved the “Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America,” contains a remarkable provision. It allows a person who became a U.S. citizen solely through the Covenant to make a declaration to become a non-citizen national. The prescribed oath reads:

“I being duly sworn, hereby declare my intention to be a national but not a citizen of the United States.”

This provision is a powerful confirmation of the legal framework. It demonstrates that: (a) the two statuses are legally distinct and mutually exclusive at any given time; (b) a person can consciously and voluntarily choose the status of a non-citizen national over that of a citizen; and (c) this choice is recognized and given effect by U.S. law. It provides a clear pathway for an individual to formally reject the obligations and privileges of federal citizenship in favor of the underlying status of a national.

5. The Principle of Statutory Construction

The legal maxim Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of another”, is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation. When a legislative body includes specific language in one section and omits it in another, the difference is presumed to be intentional.

Applied here, when a federal or state statute specifies that a requirement applies to a “citizen of the United States,” the express mention of “citizen” necessarily excludes the other known and statutorily defined class of persons: the “national, but not citizen.” To read “citizen” as encompassing “national” would be to violate this core principle and render the careful distinctions made by Congress in Title 8 of the U.S. Code meaningless. The law demands that these distinctions be given effect.

This statutory analysis establishes, beyond any reasonable doubt, that U.S. law creates and recognizes two distinct statuses. The next step is to understand the jurisdictional context in which these statuses operate, which is essential to determining who is subject to which laws.

B. The INA as Codification, Not Creation: Chronological and Interpretive Context

A crucial question arises regarding the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) itself: Did the INA create the distinction between “national” and “citizen,” or did it merely codify a pre-existing constitutional reality? Furthermore, is the list of “nationals, but not citizens” found in 8 U.S.C. § 1408 an exhaustive list, or is it merely illustrative of a broader principle? The answers to these questions are found in a simple examination of historical chronology and proper statutory construction.

The Chronological Evidence: Slaughter-House Precedes the Territories

As established earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughter-House Cases in 1872 was a landmark moment in American jurisprudence. It was here that the Court formally articulated the two-tiered framework of citizenship created by the Fourteenth Amendment: the “citizen of the State” and the “citizen of the United States,” each with its own distinct set of privileges and immunities.

Now, consider the territories that are used as the primary examples of the “national, but not citizen” status in 8 U.S.C. § 1408—the “outlying possessions.” The historical record is dispositive:

This timeline is not a coincidence; it is dispositive proof. The legal and constitutional distinction between the two classes of status was already well-established jurisprudence for over a quarter-century before the United States even acquired the territories where the “non-citizen national” status would be statutorily applied. Therefore, the INA, enacted in 1952, could not have created this distinction. It merely codified and gave statutory form to a pre-existing constitutional principle that had been recognized since at least 1872. The INA is a reflection of this principle, not its source.

The Interpretive Question: Is 8 U.S.C. § 1408 Exhaustive or Illustrative?

This brings us to the second critical question: Does § 1408, by listing specific categories of persons born in outlying possessions, create an exhaustive and exclusive list of who can be a “national, but not citizen”? The answer is no. The list is illustrative of how the principle applies within the federal government’s own territorial jurisdiction, but it does not, and cannot, extinguish the broader, constitutionally-grounded category of the state national.

There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the INA is an act of Congress, and like all such acts, it is primarily concerned with matters within the federal government’s enumerated powers, namely, immigration, naturalization, and the governance of its own territories. The INA’s silence on the status of a “national of one of the several States” is not an oversight or an exclusion; it is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundary. Congress has no power to define or regulate the status of the people of the sovereign states who are the very source of its own authority.

Second, as noted previously, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) provides a functional definition of a national: “a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” A national of Pennsylvania or Virginia, who owes allegiance to their sovereign state (which is a member of the United States), perfectly fits this functional definition. They are not a “citizen of the United States” under § 1401 (as they are not born in the “United States” in the federal sense), but they clearly owe permanent allegiance.

Third, the U.S. Department of State’s own guidance on this matter is revealing. On its website regarding “Certificates of Non Citizen Nationality,” the Department states that the term “outlying possessions” is defined in the INA as “American Samoa and Swains Island” and correctly notes that “No other statutes define any other territories or any of the states as outlying possessions.” This is not a denial that state nationals exist. It is an admission that the states are not outlying possessions. They are sovereign members of the Union, a category of polity that exists entirely outside the framework of federal territories and possessions to which § 1408 applies.

Conclusion on the INA’s Scope

The correct legal interpretation is that the national/citizen distinction is a fundamental principle of American constitutional law, first clearly articulated in the Slaughter-House Cases. The INA did not invent this principle. It simply provided the statutory mechanics for how this principle would be applied to persons born within the territories under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the federal government. Therefore, 8 U.S.C. § 1408 should be read as providing examples of the “national, but not citizen” status as it pertains to the federal zone. It does not and cannot erase the primary, pre-existing, and constitutionally-grounded status of the state national, the man or woman who is a member of the sovereign body politic of one of the several states of the Union.

C. The Jurisdictional Framework: The Three Meanings of “United States”

Having established that federal law creates a two-tiered system of status, the next critical step is to define the jurisdiction within which these statuses operate. The power of a government to legislate is inextricably linked to territory. A law passed by Congress does not automatically apply everywhere; its reach is defined and limited by the Constitution. Understanding the term “United States” not as a single geographical monolith, but as a term with multiple, context-dependent legal meanings, is the key to unlocking the entire jurisdictional framework.

1. The Legal Maxim: Context is Everything

A first principle of legal interpretation is that the meaning of a word is determined by its context. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this concept. In Tyler v. Tuel, the Court stated, “the meaning of a word, or phrase, may be ascertained by reference to the nature of the subject-matter and the context.” This principle is not merely academic; it is a crucial tool for preventing the misapplication of law and the unlawful expansion of jurisdiction. When analyzing a statute, one cannot simply assume the common, everyday meaning of a term. One must ask: in what legal sense is this term being used?

Nowhere is this principle more important than in the use of the term “United States.”

2. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt: The Supreme Court Defines “United States”

The single most important case for understanding the jurisdictional limits of federal law is Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945). In this case, the Supreme Court was forced to determine whether goods imported from the Philippine Islands (then a U.S. possession) into Ohio were considered “imports” for the purpose of state taxation. To answer this, the Court had to precisely define the term “United States.” The Court’s analysis is the bedrock of this memorandum’s jurisdictional argument. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the majority, declared:

The term “United States” may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution.

This statement is not an obscure piece of dicta; it is the central holding of the case. The Court established that there are three distinct, legally operative meanings of “United States”:

Understanding which of these three meanings is being used in any given statute is the key to defining its jurisdictional reach.

3. Meaning #2: The “United States” of Federal Legislative Jurisdiction

From the perspective of statutory exclusion, the second meaning, the territory over which federal sovereignty extends, is the most critical. This is the “United States” of federal civil law. Its constitutional basis is found in two key clauses:

• Article I, Section 8, Clause 17: This gives Congress the power “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”

• Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2: This gives Congress the power “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”

These clauses grant Congress a form of direct, municipal legislative power over a specific geographical area: the District of Columbia, federal territories (like Guam and Puerto Rico), and federal enclaves within the states. This area is often referred to as the “federal zone.” When Congress legislates for this jurisdiction, it acts not as the general government of the Union, but as a local, municipal government. This is the “United States” that is the subject of most provisions of the U.S. Code.

The Supreme Court confirmed this distinction in the famous Insular Cases. In Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), the Court grappled with the status of Puerto Rico. It concluded that the island was “a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution.” This established the doctrine that the Constitution does not follow the flag in every respect; there is a distinction between the states of the Union and the territories subject to the plenary power of Congress.

4. Application in the Internal Revenue Code

The Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 of the U.S. Code) provides a perfect example of how “United States” is used in its limited, territorial sense. The definitions section, 26 U.S.C. § 7701, is intentionally circular to achieve this limitation:

• § 7701(a)(9) - United States: “The term ‘United States’ when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.”

At first glance, this seems to include the 50 states. However, the very next definition clarifies the jurisdictional sleight of hand:

• § 7701(a)(10) - State: “The term ‘State’ shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.”

By defining “State” to include the District of Columbia, the Code creates a statutory equivalency. It defines the “United States” as a collection of entities that are jurisdictionally equivalent to the District of Columbia; that is, federal territories over which Congress has direct legislative power. It does not refer to the sovereign states of the Union in their capacity as separate political bodies. This construction ensures that the Internal Revenue Code, as a body of federal municipal law, applies primarily within the “federal zone.”

5. Meaning #3: The Constitutional Republic

The third meaning identified in Hooven, the “collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution”, is the United States of America in its original, foundational sense. This is the Union of sovereign states that created the federal government as their agent. When the Constitution speaks of the “United States,” it is generally in this sense. A person who is a citizen (a national) of one of these sovereign states, like Pennsylvania or Virginia, is a constituent member of this constitutional Republic. Their status is derived from their relationship to their state, not from a grant of privilege by the federal government.

This distinction is not trivial. It is the essence of federalism. The federal government has limited, enumerated powers. The states, and the people thereof, retain all powers not delegated. Therefore, a law written for the “United States” in the federal territorial sense (Meaning #2) cannot, by definition, apply to a person whose status is solely grounded in the “United States” as the Union of states (Meaning #3), unless that person voluntarily enters the federal jurisdiction.

This jurisdictional analysis, grounded in the first principles of the Constitution and articulated by the Supreme Court, provides the second major pillar of our argument. It establishes that the place for which federal civil laws are written is, by default, the limited federal zone, not the sovereign states of the Union.

D. Historical Foundation: The Primacy of State Nationality

To fully grasp the exclusionary effect of modern statutes, one must look beyond the current U.S. Code and understand the original political structure of the American Union. The modern presumption that a person is born a “citizen of the United States” first, and a citizen of a state second, is a historical inversion. Originally, the opposite was true: a person was a member of the national body politic because they were a citizen of a sovereign State. This concept of state nationality is a first principle of the Republic, and its erosion in popular understanding, but not in latent legal reality, is central to the jurisdictional issues at hand.

1. The Law of Nations and Original Citizenship

The Founders did not invent the concepts of nation, citizen, and sovereign ex nihilo. They drew heavily upon a long tradition of political philosophy, most notably the work of Emer de Vattel in The Law of Nations. Vattel, a Swiss jurist, was highly influential, and his work was cited by the Supreme Court as early as 1793. Vattel defined citizens as “the members of a civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages.” He further clarified the concept of a “native” or “indigene”:

The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. ... The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children; and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent.

In the context of the American founding, the “country” was the sovereign State: Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania. The federal Union was a compact between these sovereign states. Therefore, a man born in Virginia to parents who were citizens of Virginia was a native-born citizen, or national, of Virginia. Their allegiance was to their state. It was through their state’s membership in the Union that they participated in the federal compact. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Elmendorf v. Taylor, “the courts of the United States are bound to take notice of the laws of the several states.” This reflects the understanding that the states were distinct sovereigns, not mere administrative subdivisions of a national government.

This original understanding is reflected in the text of the Constitution itself. Article IV, Section 2, states, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” It does not speak of a primary federal citizenship, but of the comity between citizens of the sovereign states.

2. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Creation of a New Citizenship

The traditional understanding of citizenship was profoundly altered by the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Section 1 of the Amendment famously declares:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States...

This clause created, for the first time, a direct, primary federal citizenship. It also, for those who fall under its purview, makes state citizenship a consequence of federal citizenship (”...and of the State wherein they reside”). This was a radical shift from the original model. However, it did not extinguish the original model; it simply created a new, parallel class of citizen.

3. The Slaughter-House Cases: The Supreme Court Confirms Dual Citizenship

Just five years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret its meaning in the landmark Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). The Court’s decision is arguably the most important for understanding the continued existence of a separate state nationality. The Court explicitly rejected the idea that the Amendment had consolidated all rights under federal protection. Instead, it affirmed the existence of two distinct classes of citizenship:

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.

The Court went on to explain that the “privileges and immunities” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were only those that owed their existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws. It did not protect the fundamental civil rights that belong to citizens of a state. The Court provided examples of federal privileges and immunities, such as the right to come to the seat of government, to access seaports, and to be protected on the high seas. It explicitly stated that the fundamental rights, to acquire and possess property, to pursue happiness and safety, “with very few exceptions, ... lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal government.”

This holding is of monumental importance. It confirms that even after the Fourteenth Amendment, there remains a distinct state citizenship (or state nationality) that is the source of fundamental rights, and that these rights are separate from the privileges of the new federal citizenship. A man whose status is grounded in this state nationality is not relying on the privileges and immunities of a “citizen of the United States” and is therefore not the subject of the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause in the same way a federal citizen is.

4. Minor v. Happersett and the Nature of Citizenship

Two years later, in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), the Court further explored the nature of citizenship in the context of a voting rights case. While the case is famous for its holding on women’s suffrage, its discussion of citizenship is highly relevant. The Court, seeking a definition of “citizen,” looked to the pre-14th Amendment understanding:

The word “citizen” is often used to convey the idea of membership in a nation. ... There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations.

Crucially, the Court acknowledged that the United States had no citizens at its inception but those of the several states. The Court affirmed that citizenship was a political status derived from membership in the political community, the state. This historical analysis reinforces the conclusion from Slaughter-House: the original form of citizenship in the American system was state nationality. The federal citizenship created by the Fourteenth Amendment was a subsequent, and separate, legal construct.

This historical and jurisprudential foundation is the third pillar of the argument. It establishes that “state nationality” is not a fringe theory but the original form of citizenship in the American republic, a status confirmed as distinct and separate from federal citizenship by the Supreme Court itself. A person standing in this capacity, a national of a sovereign state, is not the same legal entity as the statutory “citizen of the United States” for whom federal and state civil codes are written.

E. Domicile and Residence: The Jurisdictional Trap of Voluntary Submission

Having established the distinct legal categories of person (national vs. citizen) and place (the federal zone vs. the sovereign states), the analysis must now turn to the primary mechanism that connects person to place for the purpose of civil law: domicile and its modern statutory counterpart, residence. This section will demonstrate that these are not simple, descriptive terms, but are in fact terms of art with profound jurisdictional consequences. The modern, casual usage of these terms has become dangerously ambiguous, conflating the natural, inherent status of a state national with the voluntary, subordinate status of a federal “resident.”

This ambiguity is a cornerstone of the modern administrative state’s power. It operates as a jurisdictional trap, inducing sovereign state nationals to unwittingly confess to a subordinate status, thereby waiving their unalienable rights and voluntarily subjecting themselves to a jurisdiction to which they would not otherwise be subject. Deconstructing this trap requires a precise, three-part analysis: first, understanding the three distinct kinds of domicile; second, uncovering the true, historical meaning of the term “resident”; and third, exposing how the statutory conflation of these terms creates a presumption of jurisdiction.

1. The Three Kinds of Domicile: Origin, Choice, and Operation of Law

The modern confusion surrounding domicile stems from the failure to distinguish between its three legally distinct forms, as recognized in authoritative legal treatises like Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.). Domicile is not a single concept, but a category with three sub-types:

This three-part framework is essential. The modern statutory definition of “domicile” or “residence” almost exclusively refers to domicile of choice or domicile by operation of law, while ignoring the foundational domicile of origin.

a. Domicile of Origin: The Status of the State National

As C.J.S. explains, “A person acquires a domicile of origin at birth. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents... at the time of his birth.” This is the primary, common-law domicile. It is not chosen; it is inherited. This aligns perfectly with Vattel’s concept of nativity: “The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.”

A man or woman born on the land of a sovereign state (e.g., Pennsylvania) to parents who are nationals of that state acquires a domicile of origin in that state. This is their natural, political status. It is the anchor of their state nationality and is not dependent on their own intent or choice. This domicile cannot be taken away; it can only be displaced by the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.

The concept of domicile of origin is further clarified by C.J.S.: “While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it may be elsewhere.” The key is not the physical location of birth, but the legal status of the parents at the time of birth. If the parents are nationals of Pennsylvania, the child acquires a domicile of origin in Pennsylvania, even if born temporarily in another location.

b. Domicile of Choice: The Status of the Federal Subject

In stark contrast, a domicile of choice is entirely voluntary. It is “the place which a person has chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it is based on the intention of the person.” C.J.S. is clear that two elements must concur to establish a domicile of choice: (1) actual residence or physical presence, and (2) the intent to remain there permanently or indefinitely.

The treatise elaborates: “For the acquisition of a domicile of choice, actual residence or physical presence in a particular locality and intent to remain are required, or must concur. The intent to remain may be formed after removal to the new location.” Furthermore, “residence without intention or intention without residence is of no avail.”

This is the “domicile” that modern statutes and court cases, like International Shoe, are concerned with. When a statute imposes a tax on a “resident” or requires “domicile” for a privilege, it is referring to a domicile of choice. It is asserting jurisdiction based on the presumption that the person has voluntarily chosen to make that jurisdiction their legal home, thereby availing themselves of its privileges and subjecting themselves to its obligations. This is a contractual relationship based on consent.

A state national, standing in their domicile of origin within their sovereign state, has not, by that fact alone, acquired a domicile of choice in the federal zone. They have not taken the two required steps: establishing a physical residence in the District of Columbia and forming the intent to make it their permanent home.

c. Domicile by Operation of Law: The Statutory Imposition

The third type, domicile by operation of law, is a creature of statute. C.J.S. defines it as “that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence. It ordinarily results from legal domestic relations.”

This form of domicile is imposed by law, regardless of the person’s actual physical location or intent. Examples include the domicile of a minor child being fixed by the domicile of the custodial parent, or the domicile of a wife being fixed by the domicile of her husband under older common law rules. This is a legal fiction, a statutory construct that can override the natural principles of domicile of origin and domicile of choice.

The significance of this category is that it reveals the power of statutes to create legal fictions that bind a man’s person to jurisdictions. However, such statutes can only operate on persons who are subject to the legislative authority of the body enacting the statute. A state national, who is not subject to the plenary legislative power of Congress over the federal zone, cannot have a “domicile by operation of law” imposed upon them by federal statute unless they have voluntarily subjected themselves to that jurisdiction.

2. Nativity, Inhabitation, and Naturalization: The Horizontal Movement Between Sovereign States

Having established the three kinds of domicile, it is now possible to address a critical question: how does a man or woman who is a national of one sovereign state (e.g., Virginia) become a national of another (e.g., West Virginia)? This process, which we can call state-to-state naturalization, is a horizontal movement between sovereign equals. It is fundamentally different from the vertical submission to a superior jurisdiction that occurs when one confesses to being a statutory “resident.”

This distinction is rooted in the original constitutional framework, which recognized the states as distinct sovereign republics. The process of moving from one to another was not a matter of changing one’s allegiance to the Union, but of changing one’s membership from one state’s body politic to another’s. This was governed by the principles of the Law of Nations, as articulated by Vattel, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

a. The Vattelian Framework: Natural Settlement vs. Acquired Settlement

Vattel provides the essential framework for understanding this process in his discussion of “settlement”:

The natural, or original settlement, is that which we acquire by birth, in the place where our father has his; and we are considered as retaining it, till we have abandoned it, in order to choose another. The acquired settlement (adscititium) is that where we settle by our own choice.

This framework maps directly onto the American system:

1. Nativity (Natural Settlement): A man or woman born in Virginia to parents who are nationals of Virginia acquires a “natural settlement” or domicile of origin in Virginia. They are a Virginian by nativity.

2. Choice (Acquired Settlement): If that Virginian moves to West Virginia with the intent to make it their permanent home, they establish an “acquired settlement” there. This is a voluntary act of choosing a new state to be a member of.

According to Vattel, a person who has “fixed his abode in a foreign country” (i.e., established an acquired settlement in a separate sovereign jurisdiction) “is become a member of another society, at least as a perpetual inhabitant; and his children will be members of it also.” This is the core of state-to-state naturalization: by establishing an acquired settlement in a new state, one becomes a “perpetual inhabitant” and a member of that new society.

b. The American Definition of “Inhabitant”: A Member of the Body Politic

Here we must address a critical evolution in legal terminology. While Vattel, in his European context, sometimes used “inhabitant” to refer to a privileged alien, the American legal tradition elevated the term to mean a full member of the body politic, synonymous with “citizen.”

The Supreme Court confirmed this in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), when analyzing the language of the Articles of Confederation:

“...the words ‘free inhabitants,’ as then used, were synonymous with citizens... If we look into the Constitutions and State papers of that period, we find the inhabitants or people of these colonies, or the inhabitants of this State or Commonwealth, employed to designate those whom we should now denominate citizens.”

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.) further clarifies this distinction, noting that while “inhabitant,” “citizen,” and “resident” can be used synonymously, they have also been held to be distinct:

“...the terms ‘resident’ and ‘inhabitant’ have also been held not synonymous, the latter implying a more fixed and permanent abode than the former, and importing privileges and duties to which a mere resident would not be subject.”

This is the American innovation. An inhabitant is a full member of the state’s body politic, with all the attendant privileges and duties. A resident, by contrast, is a person of lesser status, an alien who is merely permitted to dwell there. Therefore, when a Virginian naturalizes in West Virginia, they become an inhabitant of West Virginia, not a mere “resident.”

c. The Role of the Privileges and Immunities Clause

Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides the mechanism for this horizontal naturalization:

“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”

The Supreme Court, in the Slaughter-House Cases, explained the purpose of this clause:

“...to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens... the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.”

This clause ensures that when a Virginian moves to West Virginia and establishes an acquired settlement, West Virginia must treat them as one of its own citizens (inhabitants). It prevents discrimination and allows for the free movement of people between the sovereign states, enabling them to become full members of their new chosen state’s body politic.

d. The Complete Framework: Nativity, Naturalization, and Inhabitation

We can now construct the complete framework for a state national’s status:

This entire process occurs on a horizontal plane, between sovereign state republics. It does not involve any submission to federal jurisdiction. The naturalized West Virginian remains a state national, an inhabitant of a sovereign state, and is not, by virtue of this move, a statutory “citizen of the United States” or a “resident” in the federal sense.

This clarifies that a man or woman’s connection to the land is primary. Their status as an inhabitant of a sovereign state, whether by birth or by choice, is distinct from and superior to the statutory status of a “resident” of a federal-nexus entity. The jurisdictional trap is sprung only when the inhabitant is induced to confess to being a “resident,” thereby waiving their status as a member of the sovereign body politic and consenting to be treated as a subordinate alien.

As C.J.S. explains, “A person acquires a domicile of origin at birth. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents... at the time of his birth.” This is the primary, common-law domicile. It is not chosen; it is inherited. This aligns perfectly with Vattel’s concept of nativity: “The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.”

A man or woman born on the land of a sovereign state (e.g., Pennsylvania) to parents who are nationals of that state acquires a domicile of origin in that state. This is their natural, political status. It is the anchor of their state nationality and is not dependent on their own intent or choice. This domicile cannot be taken away; it can only be displaced by the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.

The concept of domicile of origin is further clarified by C.J.S.: “While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it may be elsewhere.” The key is not the physical location of birth, but the legal status of the parents at the time of birth. If the parents are nationals of Pennsylvania, the child acquires a domicile of origin in Pennsylvania, even if born temporarily in another location.

3. The Term of Art “Resident”: A Confession of Alienage

The jurisdictional trap is sprung with the seemingly innocuous term “resident.” Modern usage treats it as a simple synonym for “inhabitant,” but its true legal meaning, grounded in centuries of law, is precisely the opposite. A “resident” is not a member of the sovereign body politic; a resident is an alien granted permission to stay.

a. The Authoritative Historical Definitions

Authoritative legal dictionaries from the era of the founding leave no room for doubt. Vattel, whose Law of Nations was the primary reference for the Founders on questions of citizenship and allegiance, drew a sharp distinction between citizens and residents:

Residents, as distinguished from citizens, are aliens who are permitted to take up a permanent abode in the country. Being bound to the society by reason of their dwelling in it, they are subject to its laws so long as they remain there, and, being protected by it, they must defend it, although they do not enjoy all the rights of citizens. They have only certain privileges which the law, or custom, gives them. Permanent residents are those who have been given the right of perpetual residence. They are a sort of citizens of a less privileged character, and are subject to the society without enjoying all its advantages. Their children succeed to their status; for the right of perpetual residence given them by the State passes to their children.

This definition is dispositive. According to Vattel, a resident is:

1. An alien, not a citizen.

2. Permitted to remain by the sovereign, not present by right.

3. Subject to the laws of the jurisdiction, but not entitled to all the rights of citizens.

4. A person of “less privileged character” compared to citizens.

Black’s Law Dictionary, in its first edition (1891), confirms this understanding with a definition that reveals the feudal origins of the term:

Resident – A tenant who was obliged to reside on his lord’s land and not depart from the same; a resident may not be entitled to all the privileges or subject to all the duties of an inhabitant.

This definition is even more stark. A “resident” is a tenant on the land of another, obliged to reside there, and not permitted to depart without permission. This is the language of feudalism, of serfdom. It describes a person who is subordinate to a lord, dwelling on the lord’s land by sufferance, not by right.

Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856) provides additional context, defining “resident” in the context of international law:

Resident, international law. A minister, according to diplomatic language, of a third order, less in dignity than an ambassador, or an envoy. This term formerly related only to the continuance of the minister’s stay, but now it is confined to ministers of this class.

And in the context of persons:

Resident, persons. A person coming into a place with intention to establish his domicil or permanent residence, and who in consequence actually remains there. Time is not so essential as the intent, executed by making or beginning an actual establishment, though it be abandoned in a longer, or shorter period.

Bouvier’s definition of “resident, persons” appears, at first glance, to be more neutral. However, when read in the context of Vattel’s definition and the international law definition, it becomes clear that a “resident” is one who is coming into a place from outside, establishing a new domicile by choice, and thereby subjecting themselves to the laws of that place. This is not the status of a native-born national; it is the status of a newcomer, an alien seeking to establish a legal connection to a foreign jurisdiction.

b. The Jurisdictional Confession

When a state national fills out a government form like a voter registration, a tax form, a driver’s license application, and declares under penalty of perjury that they are a “resident” of the “State of X,” they are not merely stating where they live. They are making a legal declaration and a jurisdictional confession. They are unwittingly:

1. Waiving their sovereign status as a national of the state, standing in their domicile of origin.

2. Declaring themselves to be an alien with respect to that jurisdiction, a person who has come into the place from outside and established a domicile of choice there.

3. Voluntarily subjecting themselves to the authority of the administrative state as a person of lesser privilege, a “tenant” on the land of the incorporated “State.”

4. Entering into a feudal relationship with the government, confessing to be a subject rather than a sovereign.

This confession is the key that unlocks the door to jurisdiction. No law can compel a man or woman to change their status. The Constitution forbids bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. But by voluntarily confessing to “residency,” the state national provides the administrative state with the crucial element it needs to assert jurisdiction: consent. The maxim volenti non fit injuria (to a willing person, injury is not done) applies. By voluntarily declaring themselves a “resident,” the national agrees to be treated as one.

c. The Statutory Conflation of “Domicile” and “Residence”

The ambiguity is compounded by the fact that statutes frequently use the terms “domicile” and “residence” interchangeably, despite their distinct legal meanings. As C.J.S. notes, “While ‘domicile’ and ‘residence’ are frequently used synonymously, they are not, in precise usage, convertible terms.” The treatise explains that “’domicile’ is a larger term, of more extensive signification, while ‘residence’ is of a more temporary character.”

However, C.J.S. also confirms that in statutory usage, the terms are often conflated: “The terms ‘domicile’ and ‘residence,’ as used in statutes, are commonly, although not necessarily, construed as synonymous.” It further states that “whenever the terms ‘residence’ and ‘domicile’ are used in connection with subjects of domestic policy, the terms are equivalent... where a statute prescribes residence as a qualification for the enjoyment of a privilege or benefit.”

This creates a legal trap. A state national may be an “inhabitant” of a state in the natural sense (i.e., they dwell there by right of their nativity and domicile of origin), but they are not a “resident” or “domiciliary” of the federal-nexus “State” for which the statute is written. By using the term “resident,” the statute creates a powerful presumption that the person has established a domicile of choice and is therefore subject to the law. This conflation of terms is a primary tool for the improper extension of civil jurisdiction over state nationals.

4. The State National as a “Non-Resident Alien” to the Federal Zone

When these precise definitions are applied to the federal system, the conclusion is inescapable. A state national, whose legal connection is their domicile of origin in a sovereign state, has not established a domicile of choice in the federal zone (the “United States” in its territorial sense). Furthermore, they are not a “resident” (an alien) in that zone, but a sovereign member of their own state. Therefore, with respect to the civil laws of that federal jurisdiction, they are a “non-resident.”

The Internal Revenue Code confirms this with perfect clarity. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1)(B) defines a “nonresident alien” as an individual who is neither a “citizen of the United States” nor a “resident of the United States.” As established in Section IV-A, a state national is not a statutory “citizen of the United States” under 8 U.S.C. § 1401. And because their only legal domicile is their domicile of origin in a sovereign state (which is a “foreign” jurisdiction to the federal zone, as will be demonstrated in the next section), and they have not confessed to being a subordinate “resident” there, they are not a statutory “resident of the United States.”

Thus, for the purposes of federal income tax and other federal civil statutes, the state national is, by the Code’s own definitions, a nonresident alien. This is not a matter of interpretation or evasion; it is a direct application of the statutory definitions and the legal principles of domicile and residence.

F. The Scope of Federal Legislative Jurisdiction

The final piece of the analytical puzzle is to confirm the limited nature of federal legislative power within the sovereign states of the Union. The argument that a state national is excluded from federal civil law would be moot if Congress had the power to legislate for everyone, everywhere within the nation’s borders. However, the first principles of the Constitution and a long line of Supreme Court precedent establish that this is not the case.

1. The Doctrine of Enumerated Powers

The federal government is a government of limited, enumerated powers. The Tenth Amendment makes this explicit: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Unlike the states, which have general police powers, Congress can only legislate on subjects specifically granted to it by the Constitution.

In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Supreme Court provided a powerful articulation of this principle:

Every journey to a forbidden end begins with the first step; and the danger of such a step by the federal government in the direction of taking over the powers of the states is that the end of the journey may find the states so despoiled of their powers, or—what may amount to the same thing—so relieved of the responsibilities which possession of the powers necessarily enjoins, as to reduce them to little more than geographical subdivisions of the national domain. It is safe to say that if, when the Constitution was under consideration, it had been thought that any such danger lurked behind its plain words, it would never have been ratified.

This confirms that the federal government has no general authority to regulate the internal affairs of the states.

2. States as “Foreign” to Federal Jurisdiction

From the perspective of legislative jurisdiction, the sovereign states are “foreign” to the federal government. This is not to say they are foreign nations in the international sense, but that they are separate and distinct legal jurisdictions. The Supreme Court recognized this as early as 1793 in Chisholm v. Georgia, where the debate centered on whether a state could be sued like a common corporation, reflecting its status as a separate sovereign. The outcome of the ruling that a citizen of one State could sue another State created much outrage and led to the 11^th Amendment to the Bill of Rights. This essentially overturned this ruling of out of State suits by citizens of another State (without their permission), but it did not remove the general ability to sue a State.

The legal encyclopedia Corpus Juris Secundum confirms this understanding, stating that in the context of federal law, the term “territory” refers to political subdivisions created by Congress, and that states of the Union are considered “foreign states” with respect to the legislative jurisdiction of the federal government.

This is a crucial point. If a state is a “foreign” jurisdiction to the federal government, then Congress cannot write civil laws that directly bind the people domiciled within that state, any more than it could write laws to bind the people of Canada. Its legislative authority stops at the border of the federal zone, unless a specific, enumerated power (like regulating interstate commerce) is being exercised.

3. The Prohibition on Extraterritorial Legislation

A foundational maxim of law is that a government’s laws have no force beyond its territorial jurisdiction. This principle, known as the prohibition on extraterritorial legislation, was famously articulated by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877):

The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity...

While Pennoyer was discussing the relationship between states, the principle applies with equal force to the relationship between the federal government and the states. The federal government, when acting as the municipal legislature for the federal zone (the “United States” in its territorial sense), cannot extend its civil laws into the territory of a sovereign state to bind the people domiciled there. To do so would be an act of unlawful extraterritorial legislation.

This analysis of domicile and federal jurisdiction completes the core legal argument. It shows that the federal government’s civil legislative power is, by default, confined to the federal zone. A state national, domiciled in a sovereign state, is legally a “non-resident” with respect to that jurisdiction. Therefore, they are not the subject of its civil laws.

G. State-Level Exclusion Mechanisms: The Mirroring of Federal Jurisdiction

The principles of limited federal jurisdiction and the distinct status of a state national are not confined to the federal sphere. They have a direct and powerful impact at the state level. The exclusion of a state national from the purview of civil statutes is completed when state legislatures, either intentionally or unintentionally, adopt the federal jurisdictional framework. This creates a system where state codes, while appearing to have general applicability, are in fact written for and apply only to the federal “citizen” residing within the state, not the sovereign state national domiciled on the land. This mirroring occurs through several key mechanisms.

1. Incorporation of Federal Jurisdiction by Reference

Perhaps the most direct mechanism is when a state statute explicitly incorporates federal jurisdictional terms. As previously discussed, the West Virginia vehicle code provides a textbook example. The definition of “State” in WV Code § 17-1-18 reads:

“’State’ shall mean the State of West Virginia, unless by the context some other state or territory or federal district of the United States is meant or intended.”

By including the phrase “territory or federal district of the United States,” the West Virginia legislature is importing the entire jurisdictional framework of Hooven & Allison. It is acknowledging that the legal context may require the term “State” to mean a place that is jurisdictionally equivalent to a federal territory. When a subsequent provision in the vehicle code applies to a “citizen of the United States” residing in the “State,” it is referring to a federal citizen residing in a jurisdiction that is, for the purposes of that statute, being treated as a federal-style entity.

This is not an isolated phenomenon. State codes across the Union are replete with similar provisions that cross-reference federal law or federal jurisdictions, thereby binding the application of the state statute to the limited federal context.

2. The Use of “U.S. Citizen” Without Definition

Another common exclusion mechanism is the use of the term “U.S. citizen” or “citizen of the United States” in state statutes without defining what that term means. When a state statute requires that a person be a “U.S. citizen” to vote, hold office, or receive a benefit, it is incorporating by reference the federal definition of that term as found in 8 U.S.C. § 1401. As established in Section IV-A, a state national is not a “citizen of the United States” under that federal definition. Therefore, they are excluded from the state statute’s requirements.

Currently, 31 of the 50 states require “U.S. citizen” status for voting, but do not define which “United States” they are referring to. This creates a presumption that they are using the federal definition, which excludes state nationals.

3. The Requirement of “Domicile” or “Residence”

As demonstrated in Section IV-D, the terms “domicile” and “residence” are terms of art that, in statutory usage, typically refer to a domicile of choice or a confession of alien residency. When a state statute requires that a person have “domicile” or “residence” in the state to be subject to a tax or regulation, it is not referring to the natural domicile of origin of a state national. It is referring to a voluntary establishment of a new domicile of choice, or a confession of residency as an alien.

A state national who has not voluntarily established a new domicile of choice in the incorporated “State of X” (the federal-nexus entity), and who has not confessed to being a “resident” (an alien), does not meet the statutory requirement. They stand on their domicile of origin, which is not the same as the statutory “domicile” or “residence” required by the code.

4. The “Foreign State” Doctrine

The principle that states are “foreign” to each other and to the federal government has profound implications for state-level jurisdiction. If the sovereign state of West Virginia is a “foreign state” with respect to the legislative jurisdiction of the federal government, then the incorporated “State of West Virginia” (the state acting as an agent of the federal government or as a corporate entity) is also a “foreign state” with respect to the nationals of the sovereign state of West Virginia.

This may seem paradoxical, but it is the logical consequence of the dual nature of statehood in the American system. There is the sovereign state (the body politic composed of the people), and there is the incorporated State (the governmental corporation that acts as an administrative agent). The civil statutes of the incorporated State apply to persons who have voluntarily subjected themselves to its jurisdiction by establishing a domicile of choice there or by confessing to residency. They do not automatically apply to nationals of the sovereign state who have not taken such voluntary action.

This completes the demonstration that state legislative codes, through the incorporation of federal definitions and the use of jurisdictional terms of art, effectively exclude state nationals from their scope. The exclusion operates at both the federal and state levels, creating a comprehensive legal framework in which the “man on the land” is not subject to the civil statutes written for the federal “citizen” or “resident.”

5. The Buck Act: Extending Federal-Style Taxation into States

The Buck Act, passed in 1940 and codified at 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110, is another critical piece of the jurisdictional puzzle. The Act permits states to levy sales or use taxes and income taxes on transactions or persons residing within “federal areas.” A “federal area” is defined as:

...any lands or premises held or acquired by or for the use of the United States or any department, establishment, or agency of the United States; and any Federal area, or any part thereof, which is located within the exterior boundaries of any State, shall be deemed to be a Federal area located within such State.

On its face, the Act appears to be a simple grant of taxing authority. However, its effect is to create a mechanism by which state tax laws can be applied to persons who are connected to the federal jurisdiction, even while they are physically within the borders of a sovereign state. When a state enacts an income tax that applies to every “resident” of the state, and defines “resident” in a way that includes federal employees or persons receiving federal privileges, it is using the authority of the Buck Act to tax a federal subject.

This creates a parallel system of taxation. The state is not taxing its own sovereign nationals based on its inherent power. Instead, it is acting as a collection agent, taxing the federal “persons” and “citizens” within its borders. The state national, who is not a federal employee, not residing in a federal area, and not a recipient of a taxable federal privilege, is not the subject of this tax.

These mechanisms, working in concert, create a comprehensive legal framework that effectively isolates and excludes the state national. State codes, by adopting federal definitions and targeting federal persons, are not written for the man or woman on the land. They are written for the statutory “citizen” who has a domicile within the federal jurisdiction, either directly or through the acceptance of federal privileges.

H. The Jurisdictional Anomaly: State Sovereign Immunity and Administrative Proceedings

Having established the foundational principles of state nationality, domicile, and the jurisdictional limits of the federal government, we must now address a critical anomaly that appears to contradict the entire framework: the routine naming of states as parties in administrative court proceedings. If the Eleventh Amendment protects the sovereign states from suit, how is it possible for a federal administrative agency to bring an action against a state, seemingly placing the state on parity with a man or woman?

The historical context of Chisholm v. Georgia and the subsequent ratification of the Eleventh Amendment plays a part in this analysis. The answer to this profound jurisdictional puzzle lies not in a single doctrine, but in the confluence of several legal principles that, taken together, reveal the dual character of the American states and the mechanism by which they can be subjected to federal jurisdiction.

1. The Legacy of Chisholm v. Georgia and the Eleventh Amendment

As previously discussed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), held that a state could be sued by a citizen of another state in federal court. This decision, which was seen as a direct assault on state sovereignty, was swiftly overturned by the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in 1795. The amendment explicitly states:

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”

This amendment restored the common-law principle of state sovereign immunity, which holds that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. The Supreme Court has since expanded this doctrine, holding that states are also immune from suit in their own courts (Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)) and in federal administrative proceedings initiated by private parties (Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002)).

This raises the central question: if states are immune from suit in administrative proceedings, how can they be named as parties?

2. The Dual Character of the State: Sovereign vs. Corporation

The key to understanding this anomaly is to recognize that the American states have a dual character. They exist simultaneously as:

1. Sovereign Republics: The original, organic states of the Union, which retain their full sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

2. Corporate Entities: Municipal corporations or federal-nexus entities that engage in commercial or proprietary activities.

This distinction is not a modern invention; it is deeply rooted in American legal history. As the UNC School of Government notes in its analysis of governmental immunity:

“The distinction ‘grows out of the dual character of municipal corporations.’ Every city ‘has a two-fold existence—one as a governmental agency, the other as a private corporation.’”

While this doctrine was originally applied to cities, it has been extended to counties and, by logical extension, to the states themselves when they choose to engage in proprietary activities.

3. The Governmental-Proprietary Function Distinction

When a state acts in its governmental capacity (e.g., enforcing laws, levying taxes), it is acting as a sovereign and is immune from suit. However, when it acts in a proprietary or commercial capacity (e.g., operating a port, selling liquor, participating in a federal program), it steps down from its sovereign pedestal and acts as a private corporation. In this capacity, it has no sovereign immunity.

This distinction is the lynchpin of the jurisdictional mechanism. When an administrative agency names the “STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA” as a party, it is not suing the sovereign Republic of West Virginia; it is suing the corporate entity that has engaged in a proprietary function.

4. The Clearfield Doctrine: States as Commercial Actors

The Supreme Court’s decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), provides the final piece of the puzzle. The Clearfield Doctrine holds that when the federal government (or a federal-nexus entity) engages in commercial transactions, those transactions are governed by federal common law, not state law. The Court reasoned that the need for uniformity in federal commercial transactions outweighs the interests of any individual state.

When a state chooses to participate in a federal program or accept federal funds, it enters the commercial arena and becomes subject to the Clearfield Doctrine. It is no longer acting as a sovereign, but as a commercial entity transacting business with the federal government. In this capacity, it is subject to federal common law and can be sued in federal administrative proceedings.

5. The Complete Picture: How States Are Sued in Administrative Courts

We can now construct the complete picture of how a state can be named as a party in an administrative proceeding without violating the Eleventh Amendment:

1. The State Acts in a Proprietary Capacity: The state, through its corporate entity (e.g., “STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA”), chooses to engage in a commercial or proprietary function, such as participating in a federal program or accepting federal funds.

2. The State Enters the Federal Commercial Arena: By engaging in this proprietary function, the state steps down from its sovereign pedestal and enters the federal commercial arena as a corporate entity.

3. The Clearfield Doctrine Applies: The state’s actions are now governed by federal common law under the Clearfield Doctrine, not by its own sovereign laws.

4. Sovereign Immunity is Waived: By entering the commercial arena and subjecting itself to federal common law, the state has implicitly waived its sovereign immunity for disputes arising from that commercial activity.

5. The State Can Be Sued: The state, in its corporate capacity, can now be named as a party in a federal administrative proceeding, just like any other commercial entity. The Eleventh Amendment is not violated because the entity being sued is not the sovereign state, but the corporate “STATE.”

This is how the apparent contradiction is resolved. The states are not being sued as sovereigns; they are being sued as corporate entities that have voluntarily entered the commercial arena and subjected themselves to federal jurisdiction. This brings the corporate “STATE” into parity with a man or woman, both of whom are legal persons without sovereign immunity in the context of commercial transactions.

This analysis reveals the profound legal and jurisdictional consequences of the states’ decision to participate in federal programs and engage in commercial activities. By doing so, they have created a dual identity for themselves, and it is this dual identity that allows them to be named as parties in administrative proceedings, despite the clear mandate of the Eleventh Amendment.

I. The Corporate Character of Counties and Cities: Proof by Party Status

The preceding analysis has established that the “STATE” as a corporate entity, along with its officers acting as corporate agents, can be brought into federal commercial jurisdiction, thereby losing sovereign immunity. This section addresses a final, critical piece of evidence that reinforces this entire framework: the legal status of counties and cities when they are named as parties in a legal proceeding.

1. The Historical Distinction: Instrumentalities vs. Corporations

Historically, counties were not considered corporations. They were viewed as “quasi-corporations” or mere “instrumentalities” of the state, created for the convenience of the sovereign to carry out its governmental functions at a local level. As an instrumentality, a county had no separate legal existence from the state and was therefore shielded by the state’s sovereign immunity. A suit against the county was, in effect, a suit against the state itself and was barred.

Cornell Law’s Wex Legal Dictionary clarifies this distinction:

“Quasi-municipal corporations are legal entities that possess some properties similar to corporations like leadership boards and the capacity to be sued. However, quasi-municipal corporations are often shielded from some actions being brought against them in the performance of their public duties, especially when acting solely as an instrument of the state.”

This is the key: when acting solely as an instrument of the state, a county is shielded. The question then becomes, when does it cease to act solely as an instrument?

2. The Transformation to Municipal Corporation

Over time, states have, through their legislative power, transformed counties and cities from mere instrumentalities into full municipal corporations. These are not sovereign entities, but they are corporate bodies with a separate legal personality. The Supreme Court in the landmark case of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), defined the nature of these entities:

“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently, they usually are given the power to acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property.”

Crucially, the Court in Hunter also established that these municipal corporations are creatures of the state, wholly subject to its control:

“The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part...”

This holding proves two things:

1. Municipal corporations are not sovereign; they are subordinate to the state.

2. They are corporations, not mere delegated agencies, because they have the power to hold property and exercise other corporate functions.

3. Proof by Party Status: The Capacity to Sue and Be Sued

This brings us to the dispositive evidence. One of the defining characteristics of a corporation, as distinct from a mere agency or instrumentality, is the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name.

When a county or city is named as a party in a lawsuit, for example, “JOHN SMITH vs. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY”, it is irrefutable proof that the county is acting as a municipal corporation. If it were acting solely as an instrument of the state, the suit would have to be against the state itself (and would be barred by sovereign immunity). The fact that the county can be a party demonstrates that it has a separate legal identity.

Therefore, the act of naming a county or city as a party to a suit proves its corporate character rather than its delegated character. It is an admission on the record that the entity is not the sovereign, but a subordinate corporate body.

4. The Forfeiture of Sovereign Immunity

Because municipal corporations are not sovereign, they do not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity in the same way the organic state does. While they may have a limited “governmental immunity” for certain governmental functions, this is a statutory privilege granted by the state, not an inherent right of sovereignty. When they engage in proprietary or commercial functions, this immunity is dissolved.

When a county or city is named as a party in a commercial dispute (e.g., a contract dispute, a tort claim arising from a proprietary function, or a proceeding involving commercial paper), it stands on equal footing with any other corporate litigant. It has no sovereign character to assert.

J. The Commercial Nature of Vehicle and Tax Codes: The Ultimate Clearfield Trigger

The final piece of the jurisdictional puzzle lies in understanding that state vehicle and tax codes are, by their very nature and legal definition, commercial in character. This is the ultimate trigger for the Clearfield Doctrine, as it demonstrates that when a state enforces these codes, it is not acting in its sovereign capacity, but as a commercial actor in the federal arena.

1. The Distinction Between Travel and Transportation

The foundation of this analysis rests on the critical legal distinction between the right to travel and the privilege of engaging in commercial transportation. The right of a man or woman to move themselves and their property from one place to another, the right of locomotion, is a fundamental, constitutionally protected liberty. It is not a privilege granted by the state.

However, the use of the public highways for purposes of gain is an entirely different matter. This is a privilege that the state can regulate, license, or even prohibit. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this distinction:

“The streets belong to the public, and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and, generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper.” (Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 144 (1924))

“...no person has a vested right to use the public highways for a commercial purpose...” (Willis v. Buck, 263 P. 982, 281 Mont.472, (1928))

2. “Driver” and “Motor Vehicle” as Commercial Terms of Art

State vehicle codes are not written to regulate the right of locomotion; they are written to regulate commerce. This is evident from the very definitions they employ:

• ”Driver”: As established in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), a “driver” is “One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle...” The term denotes a commercial relationship, one who is employed for hire.

• ”Motor Vehicle”: The federal definition, which serves as the model for many state codes, is explicit. 18 U.S.C. § 31(6) defines a “motor vehicle” as a conveyance “used for commercial purposes on the highways...”

Therefore, when a state vehicle code regulates “drivers” and “motor vehicles,” it is, by definition, regulating commercial activity. A private man or woman traveling in their own conveyance for their own purposes is not a “driver” of a “motor vehicle” in the legal sense.

3. Vehicle Registration and Licensing as Commercial Instruments

Vehicle registration, titles, and driver’s licenses are not mere administrative documents; they are commercial instruments that create a nexus with the state as a commercial entity:

• Certificate of Title: A certificate of title is a negotiable instrument that represents ownership of the vehicle. It is a form of commercial paper.

• Driver’s License: A driver’s license is a commercial permit to operate a motor vehicle for hire or for other commercial purposes. It is a license to engage in a regulated business.

• Registration: Vehicle registration is the process by which a vehicle is entered into the state’s commercial system, making it subject to regulation and taxation.

When a man or woman applies for a driver’s license or registers a vehicle, they are voluntarily entering into a commercial relationship with the corporate “STATE” and agreeing to be bound by its commercial regulations.

4. Taxation as a Commercial Activity

Similarly, most forms of state taxation are commercial in nature:

• Income Tax: A tax on the income derived from commercial activity.

• Sales Tax: A tax on the sale of goods and services in commerce.

• Property Tax: A tax on real estate, which is a form of commercial property.

When the state levies and collects these taxes, it is acting as a commercial entity, not as a sovereign. The tax assessment itself is a form of commercial paper, a debt owed to the corporate “STATE.”

5. The Complete Clearfield Trigger

This brings us to the complete and undeniable trigger for the Clearfield Doctrine:

1. The state, acting as the corporate “STATE,” adopts uniform commercial codes (the UCC) and uniform vehicle and tax codes that are commercial in nature.

2. The state accepts federal funding for the administration of these commercial codes, creating a direct federal nexus.

3. The state issues commercial paper (vehicle titles, driver’s licenses, tax assessments) related to these codes.

4. When a dispute arises over these commercial codes or instruments, the state administrative courts are adjudicating a commercial matter.

5. Under the Clearfield Doctrine, these commercial matters are governed by federal common law, not state law.

6. The state, its courts, and its officers are all acting in a commercial capacity, stripped of sovereign immunity, and are brought into parity with the man or woman on the other side of the dispute.

This is the ultimate jurisdictional mechanism. The state’s vehicle and tax codes are not exercises of sovereign authority over the people; they are the commercial regulations of a corporate entity, and when the state seeks to enforce them, it does so not as a sovereign, but as a mere merchant in the federal marketplace.

K. Conclusion: The Excluded Man on the Land

The cumulative weight of this legal analysis leads to a clear and unavoidable conclusion. The American legal system, through its own statutes, Supreme Court precedents, and foundational principles, creates a distinction between the statutory “citizen of the United States” and the sovereign “national of a state.” The former is a legal person subject to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the federal government, a jurisdiction primarily limited to the federal zone. The latter is a man or woman whose status is derived from their domicile on the land of one of the several sovereign states of the Union.

Federal and state civil codes are, by default, written for the statutory “citizen.” They achieve the exclusion of the state national through a precise and consistent legal architecture:

1. Statutory Distinction: Federal law itself separates “nationals” from “citizens,” making the terms legally distinct.

2. Jurisdictional Limitation: The term “United States” in most civil statutes refers to the limited federal territory, not the 50 states of the Union.

3. Domicile as the Anchor: Civil jurisdiction attaches based on domicile. A state national, domiciled in a sovereign state, is a “non-resident” with respect to the federal zone.

4. State-Level Mirroring: State codes adopt federal jurisdictional terms and target federal persons, thereby excluding the sovereign state national from their purview.

Therefore, the man or woman on the land, the state national, is not the “person” for whom these statutes are written. Their rights and obligations are derived from the common law and the constitution of their sovereign state, not from the civil statutes of the federal government or the state codes that mirror federal jurisdiction. To subject a state national to these statutes is to misapply the law and to violate the fundamental principles of federalism and limited government that are the bedrock of the American Republic.

This is not a declaration of immunity from all law. It is a recognition of the proper jurisdiction for law. The state national is subject to the criminal laws of the state in which they stand, and they are accountable for any harm they cause to others under the common law. What they are not, under a correct reading of the law, is a voluntary subject of a federal corporation, bound by the civil statutes created for the administration of the government’s own territory and its own statutory citizens.

Conclusion: The Complete Corporate Hierarchy

This final piece of evidence on counties and cities completes the picture of the corporate hierarchy that operates in parallel to the sovereign structure:

1. The sovereign State (the organic Republic) is immune from suit.

2. The corporate “STATE” (e.g., “STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA”) is a commercial entity that waives immunity when it enters the commercial arena.

3. Counties and Cities, as municipal corporations, are subordinate corporate entities created by the state. They do not have sovereign immunity and their capacity to be sued proves their corporate status.

4. State and local officers, when acting as agents of these corporate entities, are stripped of their official character and become parties to the suit.

This entire structure operates under the principles of commercial law, where all parties are legal fictions (corporations, persons) brought into parity before a commercial tribunal. The naming of a county or city as a party is a clear and undeniable signal that the proceeding is taking place not in a court of the sovereign, but in a commercial forum where all parties are corporate entities.

V. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

Understanding this legal framework has significant practical applications for a state national seeking to live in accordance with their proper status. It requires a conscious and deliberate effort to rebut the government’s presumptions and to operate within the correct legal and jurisdictional context.

• On Government Forms: When confronted with a form asking for “U.S. Citizen” status, the state national should never simply check “Yes.” They must rebut the presumption by either attaching an affidavit of status or by clearly annotating the form to define their status as a “national of the United States (constitutional Republic)” and a “citizen/national of the [State Name] state.”

• Income Taxation: A state national is a “nonresident alien” with respect to the federal income tax. They should use a Form W-8BEN (modified and customized as provided in the code form Instructions for the Requester of Forms W-8BEN, W-8ECI, W-8EXP, and W-8IMY), not a W-9, to declare this status to any payor, certifying that they are a foreign person with respect to the jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Code. You may also use a letter declaring your status for your employer to put in their files. Simply be very careful of terms used.

• Interactions with Government Agencies: In all correspondence and interactions, the state national should consistently and accurately declare their status. They should avoid using a U.S. mailing address without clarification, instead using a location in a sovereign state, such as “[City], [State] Republic (or state), [Without USDC but near [XXXXX]].”

• Legal Proceedings: If brought into a court, the state national must immediately and consistently challenge the court’s jurisdiction, asserting their status as a non-resident and a non-subject of the statutes being enforced.

Living as a state national is not a path of evasion, but one of precision. It requires a deep understanding of the law and a steadfast commitment to operating within its true jurisdictional boundaries.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This memorandum has demonstrated through primary legal and lawful sources that a clear and profound distinction exists between a “citizen of the United States” and a “national of a state.” This distinction is not a theoretical or frivolous argument; it is embedded in the very text of the U.S. Code, affirmed by the Supreme Court, and grounded in the history of the American founding.

The statutory “citizen” is a person subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, a jurisdiction that is, for civil purposes, primarily territorial. The state national is a member of the sovereign body politic of one of the states of the Union. By incorporating federal jurisdictional terms and targeting federal persons, both federal and state civil statutes are constructed in a way that legally and jurisdictionally excludes the state national. Recognizing this framework is the first and most critical step for any man or woman seeking to reclaim their status as a sovereign and to live freely under the protection of the Constitution, rather than as a subject of the administrative state.

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VII. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/2/419/

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)

FMC v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002)

Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/324/652/

Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/207/161/

Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/88/162/

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/83/36/

Tyler v. Tuel, 10 U.S. 324 (1810)

Barney v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82, 93 Mont. 115

Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 22, 337 Ill 200

Ex parte Hoffert, 148 N.W. 20 (N.D. 1914)

Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash 516

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1897)

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/154/447/

Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924 )

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/264/140/

Washington State v. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864

Willis v. Buck, 263 P. 982, 281 Mont. 472 (1928 )

Wynehamer v. New York, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856)

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 17

U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2

U.S. Constitution, Amendment X

U.S. Constitution, Amendment XI

U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV

Federal Statutes

8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Definitions - Immigration and Nationality Act)
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1101

8 U.S.C. § 1401 (Nationals and citizens of the United States at birth)
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1401

8 U.S.C. § 1408 (Nationals but not citizens of the United States at birth)
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1408

26 U.S.C. § 7701 (Definitions - Internal Revenue Code)
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/7701

48 U.S.C. § 1801 (Covenant - Northern Mariana Islands; Section 302 of Public Law 94-241)
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title48-section1801

18 U.S.C. § 31(6) - Definition of “motor vehicle”

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/31

18 U.S.C. § 31(10 ) - Definition of “used for commercial purposes”

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/31

State Statutes

West Virginia Code § 17-1-18 (Definitions - Motor Vehicles)
https://code.wvlegislature.gov/17-1-18/

West Virginia Code Title 17 (Motor Vehicles)

West Virginia Code Title 17A (Motor Vehicle Administration)

West Virginia Code Title 17C (Traffic Regulations and Laws of the Road)

West Virginia Code Chapter 46 - Uniform Commercial Code

https://code.wvlegislature.gov/46/

West Virginia Code Chapter 17C - Traffic Regulations and Laws of the Road

https://code.wvlegislature.gov/17C/

West Virginia Code Chapter 17E - Uniform Commercial Driver’s License Act

https://code.wvlegislature.gov/17E/

Treatises and Legal Encyclopedias

28 Corpus Juris Secundum, Domicile §§ 4, 7, 9, 11 (2005)

86 Corpus Juris Secundum, Territories § 1

Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, Book I, Ch. 19, §§ 212, 213, 215, 218 (1758)
https://lonang.com/library/reference/vattel-law-of-nations/vatt-119/

Blackstone's Commentaries

Legal Dictionaries

Black’s Law Dictionary, 1st ed. (1891)

Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990)

John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856)
https://www.constitution.org/1-Constitution/bouv/bouvier_r.htm

Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1914)

Secondary Sources

Cornell Law School, Quasi-municipal corporation, Wex Legal Dictionary (2023)
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/quasi-municipal_corporation

Constitution Annotated, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 (Privileges and Immunities Clause)

Dickinson Law Review, analysis of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States and federal common law

Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 27.1, analysis of sovereign immunity in administrative proceedings

American Jurisprudence (1st Ed.), Constitutional Law, §329, p.1135

Bipartisan Infrastructure Law - West Virginia Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of Transportation (2022)

https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-01/BIL_West_Virginia.pdf

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA ), West Virginia FY 2024 Annual Grant Application

https://www.nhtsa.gov/document/west-virginia-fy-2024-annual-grant-application

West Virginia Department of Transportation, Grant Administration

https://transportation.wv.gov/highways/Planning/grant_administration/Pages/default.aspx

THE NON-RESIDENT, NON-PERSON POSITION: A COMPREHENSIVE LAWFUL ANALYSIS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction and Purpose
II. Foundation: Sovereignty, Consent, and the Declaration of Independence
III. The Power of Words: Statutory Construction and “Word Magic”
IV. Deconstructing “United States”: Three Distinct Legal Meanings
V. Treasury Department Recognition of Nontaxpayers
VI. What Constitutes “Presence” for State and Federal Jurisdiction
VII. The Biblical Basis for the Non-Resident, Non-Person Position
VIII. Foreign v. Alien: The Choice of a State National
IX. The Law of Nations: Foreigners and Non-Residents
X. “Idiots” (Non-Compos Mentis) and Being Governed
XI. Simulating Legal Process: The Crime of Serving Nonresidents
XII. “Sovereign” = “Foreign” and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
XIII. Detailed Tax Status Implications
XIV. Passport Implications: “National” vs. “Citizen” and the Meaning of “State”
XV. Conclusion
XVI. References

I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

This memorandum of law articulates the legal position known as the “non-resident, non-person” status. This position is grounded in statutory construction principles, Supreme Court precedent, the Law of Nations, the Declaration of Independence, and Biblical principles of religious freedom. The purpose of this document is to provide a comprehensive, standalone analysis that walks the reader through the logical progression of how statutory language creates a jurisdictional framework that most people unknowingly volunteer into, and how understanding the precise legal definitions reveals the limited scope of federal civil jurisdiction.

This memorandum is designed to be accessible to the average reader while maintaining legal rigor. It is intended to stand on its own as an independent work, with all key citations verified from primary sources rather than relying solely on secondary interpretations. The analysis herein demonstrates that people born on one of the states of the Union are, in fact, inhabitants as defined in the Law of Nations and sovereigns as recognized in the Declaration of Independence, and that they may lawfully choose to remain non-residents and non-persons under federal and state civil statutory codes.

The phenomenon this memorandum addresses is what can be called “word magic” or “terms of art”; the use of common words in statutory law that have entirely different legal meanings than their ordinary usage would suggest. This creates a system where people believe they understand what the law says, when, in reality, they are subject to definitions and meanings they never consented to and often do not even know exist. Understanding this “word magic” is essential to understanding the limits of governmental jurisdiction and the preservation of one’s rights that are natural, unalienable, and inherent upon nativity.

II. FOUNDATION: SOVEREIGNTY, CONSENT, AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The foundation of American government rests upon the principle that all just powers derive from the consent of the governed. This principle is enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, which states:

This foundational principle establishes that government power is not inherent or absolute, but rather delegated by the people who are the ultimate sovereigns. President Theodore Roosevelt articulated this principle powerfully in his address at the Jamestown Exposition in 1907:

This passage establishes several critical points. First, that the people are sovereign in the American system of government. Second, that sovereigns bear responsibility for governing themselves. Third, that the failure to govern oneself results in being governed by others. This creates a hierarchy of sovereignty that can be visualized as concentric circles, with the individual at the center and progressively larger governmental entities surrounding that core. If one were to tilt that same concentric set of circles around a horizontal axis, you would see a cone of hierarchy with the smallest cone of the people at the top.

The Hierarchy of Sovereignty

The relationship between different levels of government and the individual can be understood through what might be called the “onion diagram” of sovereignty. At the center is self-government, the individual exercising sovereignty over himself or herself. Surrounding that is family government, then church government, then city government, county government, state government, federal government, and finally international government. Each outer layer exists to serve and protect the inner layers, not to dominate or control them. Thus, the base of the cone or the outer layer of the onion is the first line of defense for the inner core or highest peak of the people.

This hierarchical understanding is critical because it establishes that the interior levels govern and direct the external levels. Citizens govern and direct their city, county, state, and federal governments by exercising their political right to vote and serve on jury duty. The government does not grant rights to the people; rather, the people delegate certain limited powers to the government through constitutions and charters. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins:

“Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law.”[3]

This means that the people, as sovereigns, are the source of law, not its subjects. They create governments and delegate to those governments certain specific, limited powers. Any power not delegated remains with the people. This principle is enshrined in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

Consent as the Dividing Line

The principle of consent creates a bright-line distinction between those who are subject to civil statutory law and those who are not. If all just powers derive from the consent of the governed, then any exercise of power without consent is unjust and lacks the force of law. This principle applies equally to individual people and to governments. A state of the Union, as a sovereign entity, cannot be subjected to federal legislative jurisdiction without its consent. Similarly, an individual man or woman who has not consented to a particular statutory scheme cannot be subjected to it without violating the fundamental principle upon which American government is founded.

The method by which consent is given or withheld in the context of civil statutory law is through the legal concept of domicile. Domicile is the legal residence one chooses for purposes of determining which government’s civil laws apply. By choosing a domicile within a particular jurisdiction, one consents to be governed by the civil statutory laws of that jurisdiction. Conversely, by not choosing such a domicile, by remaining a non-resident, one withholds consent and remains outside the jurisdiction of those civil statutory laws. Then the man inhabits the land and maintains claim to his property.

This principle is not radical or novel. It is the foundational principle of American government, repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court and embedded in the structure of the Constitution itself.

III. THE POWER OF WORDS: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND “WORD MAGIC”

One of the most powerful tools used to expand governmental jurisdiction beyond its constitutional limits is the manipulation of language through statutory definitions. This phenomenon can be called “word magic”, the practice of taking common words that have well-understood meanings in ordinary usage and redefining them in statutory law to mean something entirely different. When people read statutes using the common meanings of words, they believe they understand what the law says. However, the law is actually operating under entirely different definitions that create obligations and liabilities the reader never intended to accept.

The Canon of Statutory Construction: Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

A fundamental rule of statutory construction is the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” This principle holds that when a statute defines a term, that definition excludes all other meanings. If a statute defines “person” to mean “an officer or employee of a corporation,” then “person” in that statute does not include a man or woman who is not an officer or employee of a corporation, even though in common usage “person” would certainly include any human being.

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this principle. In Sutherland Statutory Construction, it is stated:

“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”[4]

This means that statutory definitions control over common usage. No matter how strongly you believe a word means something based on your everyday understanding, if the statute defines it differently, the statutory definition governs. This creates the “word magic” effect: the statute appears to say one thing to the casual reader, but actually means something entirely different to those who understand the statutory definitions. It is also known as a “term of art” that has a specific or precise meaning within a limited and specific discipline, field, or context.

Key Terms of Art: Common Meaning vs. Legal Meaning

The following table illustrates how certain key terms have entirely different meanings in common usage versus their statutory definitions in federal law:

This table demonstrates the profound disconnect between what words mean in common usage and what they mean in statutory law. When a federal statute refers to the “United States,” it is almost never referring to the 50 states of the Union. When it refers to a “person,” it is almost never referring to a flesh-and-blood man or woman who is not acting in a corporate capacity. When it refers to a “resident,” it is not referring to someone who has established a permanent home, but rather to someone who is merely present with an indefinite intent to remain.

The Three Meanings of “United States”

Perhaps the most important example of “word magic” is the term “United States.” In common usage, “United States” refers to the country composed of the 50 states. However, in legal usage, the term has three entirely distinct meanings, as the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt:

“The term ‘United States’ may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution.”[5]

These three meanings are:

1. The United States as a sovereign: This refers to the federal government itself as a legal entity, analogous to “France” or “Germany” as sovereign nations.

2. The United States as territory: This refers to the land over which the federal government exercises exclusive legislative jurisdiction, namely the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and other federal territories and possessions.

3. The United States as a collective name: This refers to the 50 states united under the Constitution, sometimes called “the United States of America” to distinguish it from the other two meanings.

In most federal statutes, particularly tax statutes, “United States” refers to meaning #2—the federal territories and possessions, not the 50 states. This is confirmed by examining the statutory definition of “United States” in the Internal Revenue Code:

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9): “The term ‘United States’ when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.”

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(10): “The term ‘State’ shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.”

When these two definitions are read together, they reveal that “United States” in the Internal Revenue Code means the District of Columbia and other federal territories, because “State” is defined to include the District of Columbia. The 50 states of the Union are excluded from this definition because they are foreign to the federal government for purposes of legislative jurisdiction.

This is further confirmed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Downes v. Bidwell, one of the Insular Cases, which addressed the status of territories acquired after the Spanish-American War:

“Neither of them [the District of Columbia nor the territories] is a state in the sense in which that term is used in the Constitution.”[6]

This means that when federal statutes refer to “State,” they are referring to federal territories and possessions, not the 50 states of the Union. The 50 states are “foreign states” with respect to federal legislative jurisdiction, as confirmed by Black’s Law Dictionary:

“Foreign States: Nations outside of the United States… Term may also refer to another state; i.e. a sister state. The term ‘foreign nations’, … should be construed to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is brought; and hence, one state of the Union is foreign to another, in that sense.”[12]

This “word magic” allows federal statutes to appear to apply to people in the 50 states, when in fact they only apply to people in federal territories or to those who have voluntarily elected to be treated as if they were in federal territories by choosing a federal domicile.

The Limited Definition of “Person” in the Internal Revenue Code

Another critical example of “word magic” is the definition of “person” in the Internal Revenue Code. In common usage, “person” means any human being. However, in the Internal Revenue Code, “person” is defined much more narrowly for purposes of enforcement.

For civil penalties under Subchapter B of Chapter 68, “person” is defined as:

26 U.S.C. §6671(b): “The term ‘person’, as used in this subchapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.”[7]

For crimes and forfeitures under Chapter 75, “person” is defined as:

26 U.S.C. §7343: “The term ‘person’ as used in this chapter includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.”[8]

These definitions make clear that “person” in the enforcement provisions of the Internal Revenue Code refers only to officers and employees of corporations and partnerships, that is, to people acting in a representative capacity on behalf of artificial entities. A man or woman who is not acting as an officer or employee of a corporation or partnership is not a “person” within these definitions and therefore cannot be subject to civil penalties or criminal prosecution under these provisions.

This is consistent with the principle that the Internal Revenue Code is a franchise that applies only to those engaged in federal privileges, such as operating a federal corporation or partnership. Those who are not engaged in such privileges are outside the scope of the franchise and therefore outside the scope of its enforcement provisions.

This can also be verified in terms like “trade or business”, “wages”, “taxpayer”, “employee”, “employer”, “United States”, States”, and many other 26 U.S.C. definitions, that when taken in entirety, rarely apply to the man or woman who has a home on a physically defined state or the state as the sovereign body politic of people.

IV. DECONSTRUCTING “UNITED STATES”: THREE DISTINCT LEGAL MEANINGS EXPANDED

As established in the previous section, the term “United States” has three distinct legal meanings. Understanding these meanings is essential to understanding the limits of federal jurisdiction and the basis for the non-resident, non-person position.

Meaning #1: The United States as a Sovereign

The first meaning of “United States” is as the name of the federal government itself, acting in its capacity as a sovereign entity in the family of nations. In this sense, “United States” is analogous to “France” or “Germany”—it is the name of the government, not the name of the territory or the people. This meaning is used in international law contexts, such as treaties and diplomatic relations.

Meaning #2: The United States as Territory

The second meaning of “United States” is as the territory over which the federal government exercises exclusive legislative jurisdiction. This includes:

• The District of Columbia

• Puerto Rico

• Guam

• U.S. Virgin Islands

• American Samoa

• Northern Mariana Islands

• Other federal territories, possessions, and enclaves

This is the meaning most commonly used in federal statutes, particularly tax statutes. When the Internal Revenue Code refers to “the United States,” it is referring to this federal zone, not to the 50 states of the Union.

This is confirmed by examining the statutory definitions in the Internal Revenue Code:

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(9): “The term ‘United States’ when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.”

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(10): “The term ‘State’ shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.”

When these definitions are read together, they create a circular definition: “United States” includes “the States,” and “State” includes “the District of Columbia.” This means that “United States” in the Internal Revenue Code refers primarily to the District of Columbia and other federal territories, because that is where the federal government has exclusive legislative jurisdiction.

The 50 states of the Union are not included in this definition because the federal government does not have exclusive legislative jurisdiction over them. The states of the Union are sovereign entities that have delegated only certain specific, enumerated powers to the federal government. All powers not delegated remain with the states or the people, as confirmed by the Tenth Amendment:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”[13]

Meaning #3: The United States as a Collective Name

The third meaning of “United States” is as the collective name for the 50 states united under the Constitution. This is sometimes called “the United States of America” to distinguish it from the other two meanings. This meaning is used in the Constitution itself and in contexts where the reference is to the country as a whole, including all 50 states.

This meaning is the one most people think of when they hear “United States,” but it is not the meaning used in most federal statutes. This disconnect between common understanding and legal meaning is a prime example of “word magic.”

The States of the Union Are “Foreign” to Federal Legislative Jurisdiction

Because the federal government does not have exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the 50 states of the Union, those states are considered “foreign” to federal legislative jurisdiction. This is confirmed by multiple authorities:

19 Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Corporations, §883-884 (2003):

“The United States Government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state.”[14]

Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 648:

“Foreign States: Nations outside of the United States… Term may also refer to another state; i.e. a sister state. The term ‘foreign nations’, … should be construed to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action is brought; and hence, one state of the Union is foreign to another, in that sense.”[12]

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 10 L.Ed. 274 (1839):

“The States between each other are sovereign and independent. They are distinct and separate sovereignties, except so far as they have parted with some of the attributes of sovereignty by the Constitution. They continue to be nations, with all their rights, and under all their national obligations, and with all the rights of nations in every particular; except in the surrender by each to the common purposes and objects of the Union, under the Constitution. The rights of each State, when not so yielded up, remain absolute.”[15]

This means that people born on and domiciled on the 50 states of the Union are foreign to federal legislative jurisdiction. They are not “domestic” to the federal zone. They are outside the territorial jurisdiction of federal civil statutes unless they have voluntarily elected to come within that jurisdiction by choosing a federal domicile or engaging in federal privileges.

V. TREASURY DEPARTMENT RECOGNITION OF NONTAXPAYERS

The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service have, in various publications and regulations, recognized the existence of nontaxpayers—people who are not subject to the federal income tax. While these publications are not binding law, they provide important evidence that the government itself recognizes that not everyone is subject to federal taxation.

IRS Publication 519: U.S. Tax Guide for Aliens

IRS Publication 519, titled “U.S. Tax Guide for Aliens,” provides guidance on how aliens (non-citizens) are taxed. The publication distinguishes between resident aliens and nonresident aliens. Resident aliens are taxed on their worldwide income, just like U.S. citizens. Nonresident aliens are taxed only on their U.S.-source income and income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.

The publication states:

“For tax purposes, an alien is an individual who is not a U.S. citizen. Aliens are classified as nonresident aliens and resident aliens.”[16]

This publication implicitly recognizes that there are people who are not subject to U.S. taxation on their worldwide income—namely, nonresident aliens. If a foreign national can be a “nonresident alien” and thereby limit their tax liability, then logically, an American national born in a state of the Union can also be a “nonresident” with respect to federal jurisdiction and thereby limit their tax liability in the same way.

The Distinction Between “Taxpayer” and “Nontaxpayer”

The Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations repeatedly use the term “taxpayer” to refer to those who are subject to tax. The use of this specific term implies that there are also “nontaxpayers”, people who are not subject to tax. If everyone were subject to tax, there would be no need to use the limiting term “taxpayer”; the statutes could simply refer to “persons” or “individuals.”

The fact that the statutes consistently use “taxpayer” as a term of art suggests that there is a specific class of people who fall within that definition, and by implication, a class of people who do not. Those who do not are “nontaxpayers.”

Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. §1.871-2(b): Residence Defined

One of the most important Treasury Regulations for understanding who is and is not subject to federal income tax is 26 C.F.R. §1.871-2(b), which defines “residence” for purposes of determining whether an alien is a resident or nonresident:

“(b) Residence defined. An alien actually present in the United States who is not a mere transient or sojourner is a resident of the United States for purposes of the income tax. Whether he is a transient is determined by his intentions with regard to the length and nature of his stay. A mere floating intention, indefinite as to time, to return to another country is not sufficient to constitute him a transient. If he lives in the United States and has no definite intention as to his stay, he is a resident. One who comes to the United States for a definite purpose which in its nature may be promptly accomplished is a transient; but, if his purpose is of such a nature that an extended stay may be necessary for its accomplishment, and to that end the alien makes his home temporarily in the United States, he becomes a resident, though it may be his intention at all times to return to his domicile abroad when the purpose for which he came has been consummated or abandoned.”[9]

This regulation makes clear that “residence” for income tax purposes is based on intent and presence, not on domicile. A person can be physically present in the United States and still be a “nonresident” if they are a “mere transient or sojourner” with a definite purpose that will be promptly accomplished.

This regulation applies to aliens, but the same principle applies to American nationals. If an American national born on a state of the Union does not have a domicile in the federal zone (District of Columbia or federal territories) and does not intend to make the federal zone their permanent home, then they are a “nonresident” with respect to federal jurisdiction, just as a foreign national can be a “nonresident alien.”

The Concept of “Nontaxpayer” in Case Law

Federal courts have recognized the concept of “nontaxpayers” in various cases. For example, in Economy Plumbing & Heating v. United States, 470 F.2d 585 (Ct. Cl. 1972), the court stated:

“The revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law.”[17]

This passage makes clear that the revenue laws apply only to “taxpayers,” and that “nontaxpayers” are “without their scope.” This means that if you are not a “taxpayer,” the revenue laws simply do not apply to you. You are outside the system entirely.

The question then becomes: who is a “taxpayer”? The answer is found in the statutory definitions and in the concept of domicile. A “taxpayer” is someone who has a domicile in the federal zone or who is engaged in a federal privilege (such as operating a federal corporation or engaging in a “trade or business” as defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26)). Someone who does not have such a domicile and is not engaged in such privileges is a “nontaxpayer.”

VI. WHAT CONSTITUTES “PRESENCE” FOR STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The concept of “presence” is critical to understanding jurisdiction, both at the state and federal levels. “Presence” is not the same as “domicile,” and the distinction between the two is essential to the non-resident, non-person position.

Domicile vs. Residence vs. Presence

These three terms are often used interchangeably in common speech, but they have distinct legal meanings:

• Domicile is the place where a person has their permanent home and to which they intend to return whenever absent. Domicile is a matter of intent combined with physical presence. A person can have only one domicile at a time, and domicile continues until a new domicile is established elsewhere.

• Residence is the place where a person is physically present with some degree of permanence, but without necessarily intending to make it their permanent home. A person can have multiple residences.

• Presence is simply being physically located in a place, without any requirement of permanence or intent to remain.

For purposes of civil statutory jurisdiction, domicile is the key factor. A person is subject to the civil statutory laws of the jurisdiction where they have their domicile. This is confirmed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), which states that the capacity to sue or be sued is determined by the law of the person’s domicile.

However, for purposes of tax jurisdiction, the federal government has attempted to expand its reach by using the concept of “residence” rather than “domicile.” This is where 26 C.F.R. §1.871-2(b) becomes critical. That regulation defines “residence” for tax purposes based on intent and presence, not on domicile. This allows the government to claim that someone is a “resident” for tax purposes even if they do not have a domicile in the federal zone.

The “Presence” Test for Federal Income Tax Jurisdiction

Under 26 C.F.R. §1.871-2(b), a person is a “resident” for income tax purposes if they are:

1. Actually present in the United States, and

2. Not a mere transient or sojourner.

The regulation further explains that whether someone is a “transient” is determined by their intentions regarding the length and nature of their stay. If they come for a definite purpose that can be promptly accomplished, they are a transient. If they come for a purpose that requires an extended stay, and they make their home temporarily in the United States, they become a resident.

This creates a facts-and-circumstances test based on intent. The government bears the burden of proving that a person had the intent to remain in the United States for an extended period and thereby became a “resident.” If a person can demonstrate that they were merely present as a transient or sojourner, they are not a “resident” and therefore not subject to income tax on their worldwide income.

The “Presence” Test for State Jurisdiction

States also have “presence” tests for determining jurisdiction, particularly for purposes of taxation and civil litigation. These tests are generally based on the concept of “minimum contacts” established by the U.S. Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

Under the minimum contacts doctrine, a state can exercise jurisdiction over a person or entity only if that person or entity has “minimum contacts” with the state such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Mere physical presence in a state, without more, is generally not sufficient to establish jurisdiction for all purposes.

For tax purposes, states generally require either domicile or a significant physical presence combined with intent to remain. A person who is merely passing through a state, or who is present for a temporary purpose, is not subject to that state’s income tax.

The Importance of Intent

The common thread in both federal and state “presence” tests is intent. Physical presence alone is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. There must also be an intent to remain for a significant period or to establish a home (even if temporary) in the jurisdiction.

This means that a person can control their jurisdictional status by controlling their intent. If they are physically present in a jurisdiction but maintain the intent to leave and return to their domicile elsewhere, they can remain a “nonresident” even while physically present. This is particularly important for people who travel frequently or who are temporarily present in a jurisdiction for work or other purposes.

The Distinction Between “Inhabitants” and “Residents”

Under the Law of Nations, as explained by Vattel, there is an important distinction between “inhabitants” and “residents”:

• Inhabitants are members of the body politic of a nation or state. They are the sovereigns who created the government and to whom the government is accountable. Inhabitants have full political rights, including the right to vote and hold office.

• Residents are foreigners who have been permitted to take up a permanent abode in a country. They are subject to the laws of the country and must defend it, but they do not have all the rights of inhabitants. They are a sort of “second-class citizens.”

Vattel explains:

“Residents, as distinguished from citizens, are aliens who are permitted to take up a permanent abode in the country. Being bound to the society by reason of their dwelling in it, they are subject to its laws so long as they remain there, and, being protected by it, they must defend it, although they do not enjoy all the rights of citizens. They have only certain privileges which the law, or custom, gives them. Permanent residents are those who have been given the right of perpetual residence. They are a sort of citizen of a less privileged character, and are subject to the society without enjoying all its advantages.”[10]

This distinction is critical because it shows that not everyone present in a jurisdiction is an “inhabitant” with full political rights. Some are merely “residents”, foreigners who are temporarily or permanently present but who remain foreign to the body politic.

In the American context, people born on states of the Union are inhabitants of their respective states. They are members of the body politic of their state and are sovereigns in that capacity. They are not “residents” of the federal zone unless they have chosen to establish a domicile there. Without such a domicile, they remain “nonresidents” with respect to federal jurisdiction, even if they are physically present in the federal zone.

VII. THE BIBLICAL BASIS FOR THE NON-RESIDENT, NON-PERSON POSITION

For those who hold sincere religious beliefs, the non-resident, non-person position is not merely a legal strategy, but a matter of religious conviction protected by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. The Bible repeatedly instructs believers to remain “foreign” and “separate” from the world and its governments, and to avoid entangling themselves in the affairs of secular authorities.

Biblical Commands to Remain “Foreign” and “Separate”

The Bible uses the language of “foreigners,” “strangers,” “sojourners,” and “pilgrims” to describe the proper relationship between believers and the world. Consider the following passages:

Exodus 23:32-33:

“You shall make no covenant [contract or franchise] with them [foreigners, pagans], nor with their [pagan government] gods [laws or judges]. They shall not dwell in your land [and you shall not dwell in theirs by becoming a ‘resident’ or domiciliary in the process of contracting with them], lest they make you sin against Me [God]. For if you serve their [government] gods [under contract or agreement or franchise], it will surely be a snare to you.”[18]

This passage commands believers not to make covenants (contracts or franchises) with pagan governments or to become “residents” or “domiciliaries” in their jurisdictions. Doing so is described as serving “their gods” and as a “snare”, something that will trap and harm the believer.

James 1:27:

“Pure and undefiled religion before God and the Father is this: to visit orphans and widows in their trouble, and to keep oneself unspotted [’foreign,’ ‘sovereign,’ and/or ‘alien’] from the world [and the corrupt BEAST governments and rulers of the world].”[19]

This passage defines true religion as including keeping oneself “unspotted” from the world, which can be understood as remaining “foreign,” “sovereign,” or “alien” to worldly governments.

James 4:4:

“Adulterers and adulteresses! Do you not know that friendship [statutory ‘citizenship’] with the world [or the governments of the world] is enmity with God? Whoever therefore wants to be a friend [STATUTORY ‘citizen,’ ‘resident,’ ‘inhabitant,’ ‘person’ franchisee] of the world [or the governments of the world] makes himself an enemy of God.”[20]

This passage equates “friendship with the world” with being an enemy of God. In the context of civil law, “friendship with the world” can be understood as accepting statutory “citizenship,” “residence,” or “person” status under civil franchises.

Revelation 18:4:

“And I heard another voice from heaven [God] saying, ‘Come out of her [be legally ‘foreign’ to Babylon the Great Harlot, a democratic, rather than republican, state full of socialist non-believers], my people [Christians], lest you share in her sins, and lest you receive of her plagues.’”[21]

This passage commands believers to “come out” of Babylon—to be legally “foreign” to corrupt governmental systems—lest they share in the sins and judgments of those systems.

2 Corinthians 6:17-18:

“Come out from among them [the unbelievers and government idolaters]
And be separate [’foreign’ and ‘sovereign’], says the Lord.
Do not touch what is unclean,
And I will receive you.
I will be a Father to you,
And you shall be my sons and daughters,
Says the Lord Almighty.”[22]

This passage commands believers to “come out” and “be separate”—to be “foreign” and “sovereign”—from unbelievers and those who worship government as an idol.

The Bible Identifies Believers as “Foreigners” and “Strangers”

The New Testament repeatedly describes believers as “foreigners,” “strangers,” “sojourners,” and “pilgrims” in this world. Consider the following passages:

Hebrews 11:13-16:

“These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off were assured of them, embraced them and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth. For those who say such things declare plainly that they seek a homeland. And truly if they had called to mind that country from which they had come out, they would have had opportunity to return. But now they desire a better, that is, a heavenly country. Therefore God is not ashamed to be called their God, for He has prepared a city for them.”[23]

This passage describes believers as “strangers and pilgrims on the earth” who are seeking a “heavenly country.” They are not citizens of earthly kingdoms, but rather citizens of the Kingdom of God.

1 Peter 2:11:

“Beloved, I beg you as sojourners and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts which war against the soul.”[24]

This passage addresses believers as “sojourners and pilgrims”—temporary residents who are passing through this world on their way to their true home.

Philippians 3:20:

“For our citizenship is in heaven, from which we also eagerly wait for the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ.”[25]

This passage states that the believer’s citizenship is in heaven, not in any earthly government. This suggests that believers should not claim statutory “citizenship” in earthly governments, as doing so would be inconsistent with their heavenly citizenship.

The Bible Commands Believers Not to Be “Yoked” with Unbelievers

The Bible also commands believers not to be “unequally yoked” with unbelievers, which has implications for participation in civil franchises:

2 Corinthians 6:14:

“Do not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers. For what fellowship has righteousness with lawlessness? And what communion has light with darkness?”[26]

Being “yoked” refers to being joined together in a common enterprise, like two oxen yoked together to pull a plow. In the context of civil law, accepting statutory “citizenship,” “residence,” or “person” status creates a “yoke” with the government and with all those who participate in that system, many of whom are unbelievers. This creates an “unequal yoke” that the Bible forbids.

The First Amendment Protects Religious Exercise

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the free exercise of religion:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”[27]

This means that if a person holds a sincere religious belief that they must remain “foreign” and “separate” from civil government franchises, the government cannot compel them to participate in those franchises without violating their First Amendment rights.

When a law infringes on a fundamental constitutional right, courts apply strict scrutiny, which requires the government to prove:

1. The law serves a compelling governmental interest, AND

2. The law is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest using the least restrictive means possible.

This test comes from cases like:

Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960):

“Even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.”

This doctrine was further bolstered by the RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act – 42 U.S.C. §2000bb).

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Free Exercise Clause protects not only religious beliefs, but also religious conduct motivated by those beliefs. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that Amish parents could not be compelled to send their children to public school beyond the eighth grade because doing so would violate their sincere religious beliefs. The Court stated:

“The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”[28]

If the Free Exercise Clause protects the right of Amish parents to withdraw their children from public school, it surely protects the right of believers to withdraw themselves from civil statutory franchises that would require them to violate their religious convictions about remaining “foreign” and “separate” from worldly governments.

The Body as a Temple: Church and State

The Bible teaches that the believer’s body is a temple of the Holy Spirit:

1 Corinthians 3:16-17:

“Do you not know that you are the temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwells in you? If anyone defiles the temple of God, God will destroy him. For the temple of God is holy, which temple you are.”[29]

If the believer’s body is a temple, then the believer is literally a church. This means that the separation of church and state requires that the government not interfere with the believer’s self-governance. The believer, as a church, must be “civilly dead” under civil statutory law and governed only by God’s law.

This principle supports the non-resident, non-person position because it establishes that believers have a religious right to remain outside the jurisdiction of civil statutory law and to be governed only by God’s law as revealed in the Bible.

VIII. FOREIGN V. ALIEN: THE CHOICE OF A STATE NATIONAL

One of the most important distinctions in understanding the non-resident, non-person position is the difference between being “foreign” and being an “alien.” These terms are often used interchangeably in common speech, but they have distinct legal meanings, and the choice between them has significant implications.

Definitions: Foreign vs. Alien

Foreign means “located outside a country or place, especially one’s own” or “originating from, characteristic of, belonging to, or being a citizen of a country or place other than the one under discussion.”[30] In legal terms, “foreign” simply means “outside the jurisdiction.” It does not necessarily imply allegiance to another sovereign.

Alien means “a person who is not a citizen or national of a particular country” or “a person who owes allegiance to a foreign sovereign.”[31] In legal terms, “alien” implies not only being outside the jurisdiction, but also being subject to another sovereign.

The distinction is subtle but critical. A person can be “foreign” to a jurisdiction without being an “alien” if they are not subject to any other sovereign. This is the status of a state national—someone who is a national of one of the states of the Union but who is not a statutory “citizen” of the United States (federal government).

The Status of a “State National”

A “state national” is someone who:

1. Was born in a constitutional state of the Union (one of the 50 states);

2. Has not chosen a domicile in the federal zone (District of Columbia or federal territories);

3. Has not accepted any federal statutory privilege or franchise;

4. Owes allegiance to the people of their state, not to the federal government.

A state national is foreign to federal legislative jurisdiction because they are outside the federal zone and have not consented to federal jurisdiction by choosing a federal domicile. However, they are not an “alien” because they are not subject to any foreign sovereign. They are a national of their state, which is itself a sovereign entity.

This status is recognized in federal law. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines “national” as:

8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21): “The term ‘national’ means a person owing permanent allegiance to a state.”[11]

Note that this definition says “a state,” not “the United States.” This means that a person can be a national of a state of the Union without being a national of the United States (federal government). The term “state” in this definition can refer to any sovereign state, including the states of the Union.

The Choice: Foreign or Alien?

When a state national interacts with the federal government or with the government of another state, they must choose how to characterize their status. They can characterize themselves as:

1. Foreign — meaning outside the jurisdiction, but not subject to any other sovereign; or

2. Alien — meaning outside the jurisdiction and subject to another sovereign (their state).

The choice between these characterizations has significant legal implications, particularly in the context of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611, establishes the rules for when foreign sovereigns can be sued in U.S. courts. The Act begins with findings and a declaration of purpose:

28 U.S.C. §1602: “The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts. Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection with their commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.”[32]

The FSIA establishes that foreign states have sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless they fall within one of the exceptions listed in the Act, such as engaging in commercial activity or waiving immunity.

The principles of the FSIA apply not only to foreign nations, but also to the states of the Union in their relationship with the federal government and with each other. As the Supreme Court held in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, the states of the Union are “nations” with respect to each other:

“The States between each other are sovereign and independent. They are distinct and separate sovereignties, except so far as they have parted with some of the attributes of sovereignty by the Constitution. They continue to be nations, with all their rights, and under all their national obligations, and with all the rights of nations in every particular; except in the surrender by each to the common purposes and objects of the Union, under the Constitution.”[15]

This means that a state national, as a member of the body politic of a sovereign state, can claim the protections of the FSIA when interacting with the federal government or with other states. They are “foreign” to those jurisdictions and have sovereign immunity unless they have waived it by engaging in commercial activity or by some other means.

The Relationship Between “Foreign” and “Alien” in the Internal Revenue Code

The Internal Revenue Code distinguishes between “foreign” and “alien” in its definitions:

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(5): “The term ‘foreign’ when applied to a corporation or partnership means a corporation or partnership which is not domestic.”[33]

This definition applies only to corporations and partnerships, not to individuals. However, it establishes the principle that “foreign” means “not domestic”, that is, outside the jurisdiction.

For individuals (broad term of art), the Code uses the term “nonresident alien” to refer to someone who is both a nonresident and an alien:

26 C.F.R. §1.871-1(a): “The term nonresident alien individual means an individual whose residence is not within the United States, and who is not a citizen of the United States.”[34]

This definition has two requirements: (1) residence is not within the United States, and (2) not a citizen of the United States. A state national satisfies both requirements if they do not have a residence (domicile) in the federal zone and if they are not a statutory “citizen of the United States” under 8 U.S.C. §1401.

However, the term “alien” in this definition implies that the person is subject to a foreign sovereign. A state national is not subject to a foreign sovereign in the sense of a foreign nation, but they are subject to their state, which is itself a sovereign. This creates an ambiguity: is a state national an “alien” with respect to federal jurisdiction?

The answer depends on how the state national chooses to characterize their status. If they claim to be a “national” of their state under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21), then they are not an “alien” in the sense of being subject to a foreign nation. They are simply “foreign” to federal jurisdiction. However, if they claim to be an “alien” in the sense of being subject to their state as a foreign sovereign, then they may be able to claim the protections of the FSIA.

The Strategic Choice

The choice between characterizing oneself as “foreign” or “alien” is a strategic one that depends on the context. In general, it is preferable to characterize oneself as “foreign” rather than “alien” because “foreign” does not imply subjection to another sovereign. A state national is a sovereign in their own right, as a member of the body politic of their state. They are not “subject to” their state in the sense of being subordinate to it; rather, they are part of the sovereign people who created the state.

However, in certain contexts, such as when claiming the protections of the FSIA, it may be advantageous to characterize oneself as an “alien” in the sense of being a national of a foreign sovereign state (one of the states of the Union). This allows the state national to claim sovereign immunity from federal jurisdiction unless they have waived that immunity.

The key point is that a state national has a choice in how to characterize their status, and that choice should be made strategically based on the legal context and the desired outcome.

IX. THE LAW OF NATIONS: FOREIGNERS AND NON-RESIDENTS

The Law of Nations, as articulated by Emerich de Vattel in his seminal work published in 1758, is the foundational document relied upon by the Founding Fathers in writing the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution itself references the Law of Nations in Article I, Section 8, which gives Congress the power “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”[35]

Vattel’s Law of Nations provides critical definitions and principles regarding “foreigners” and “non-residents” that are essential to understanding the non-resident, non-person position.

Vattel’s Definition of “Inhabitants”

Vattel distinguishes between “inhabitants” and “residents” (foreigners):

“The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are foreigners, who are permitted only to stay and live in the country. Bound to the society by their residence, they are subject to the laws of the state while they reside in it; and they are obliged to defend it, because it grants them protection, though they do not participate in all the rights of citizens. They enjoy only the advantages which the law or custom gives them. The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united to the society without participating in all its advantages.”[10]

This passage establishes several key points:

1. Inhabitants are members of the body politic—the sovereigns who created the government.

2. Residents (foreigners) are those who are permitted to stay and live in the country but who are not members of the body politic.

3. Residents are “subject to the laws of the state while they reside in it,” but they do not participate in all the rights of citizens.

4. Residents are “a kind of citizens of an inferior order.”

This distinction is critical because it shows that not everyone present in a jurisdiction is an “inhabitant” with full political rights. Some are merely “residents”—foreigners who are temporarily or permanently present.

In the American context, people born in states of the Union are inhabitants of their respective states. They are members of the body politic and are sovereigns in that capacity. They are not “residents” of the federal zone unless they have chosen to establish a domicile there.

Vattel on Foreigners and the Laws

Vattel explains that foreigners are subject to the laws of the country they are in, but only to the general laws that maintain public order, not to laws that relate to citizenship:

Book II, Chapter VIII, Section 101: Foreigners are subject to the laws.

“But, even in those countries which every foreigner may freely enter, the sovereign is supposed to allow him access only upon this tacit condition, that he be subject to the laws, —I mean the general laws made to maintain good order, and which have no relation to the title of citizen or of subject of the state. The public safety, the rights of the nation and of the prince, necessarily require this condition; and the foreigner tacitly submits to it, as soon as he enters the country, as he cannot presume that he has access upon any other footing. The sovereignty is the right to command in the whole country; and the laws are not simply confined to regulating the conduct of the citizens towards each other, but also determine what is to be observed by all orders of people throughout the whole extent of the state.”[36]

This passage establishes that foreigners are subject to the “general laws made to maintain good order,” but not to laws that “have relation to the title of citizen or of subject of the state.” In other words, foreigners are subject to criminal laws and laws necessary for public safety, but not to civil statutory laws that create privileges, franchises, or obligations specific to citizens or subjects.

This principle is directly applicable to the non-resident, non-person position. A state national who is “foreign” to federal jurisdiction is subject to federal criminal laws (to the extent they are constitutional) but is not subject to federal civil statutory laws such as the Internal Revenue Code, which create obligations specific to “taxpayers” and “citizens.”

Vattel on the State Having No Right Over the Person of a Foreigner

Vattel further explains that the state has no right over the person of a foreigner:

Book II, Chapter VIII, Section 108: The state has no right over the person of a foreigner.

“The state has no right over the person of a foreigner who does not reside in its territory. It can neither detain him nor punish him, unless he has committed some crime against it. And even in that case, if he has escaped to his own country, it cannot pursue him there, but must demand his extradition from his sovereign.”[37]

This passage establishes that the state has no inherent right over the person of a foreigner. It can only exercise authority over a foreigner if the foreigner has committed a crime or if the foreigner has voluntarily submitted to the state’s jurisdiction.

This principle supports the non-resident, non-person position because it establishes that a state national who is “foreign” to federal jurisdiction cannot be subjected to federal authority unless they have committed a crime or have voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction by choosing a federal domicile or accepting a federal privilege.

Vattel on Foreigners Continuing as Members of Their Own Nation

Vattel also explains that foreigners continue to be members of their own nation even while present in another country:

Book II, Chapter VIII, Section 107: Foreigners continue members of their own nation.

“Foreigners continue to be members of their own nation, and to be subject to their own sovereign, even while they reside in a foreign country. They retain all their rights as citizens of their own country, and they are bound by all their obligations to their own sovereign.”[38]

This passage establishes that a foreigner does not lose their status as a member of their own nation simply by being present in another country. They continue to owe allegiance to their own sovereign and to be subject to the laws of their own nation.

In the American context, this means that a state national who is present in the federal zone (District of Columbia or federal territories) continues to be a member of the body politic of their state and continues to owe allegiance to their state, not to the federal government. They do not become a “citizen of the United States” simply by being physically present in the federal zone.

Vattel on the Obligation to Trade with Foreigners

Vattel explains that nations have an obligation to trade with foreigners and to allow them to conduct foreign trade:

Book I, Chapter VIII, Section 87: Obligation to carry on foreign trade.

“For the same reason, drawn from the welfare of the state, and also to procure for the citizens every thing they want, a nation is obliged to promote and carry on a foreign trade.”[39]

This passage establishes that nations have an obligation to allow foreign trade. This means that a state cannot prohibit foreigners from conducting trade simply because they are foreigners. Any such prohibition would violate the Law of Nations.

This principle is important because it establishes that a state national who is “foreign” to federal jurisdiction cannot be prohibited from conducting trade simply because they have not accepted a federal privilege or franchise. They have a right under the Law of Nations to conduct trade as a foreigner, without being required to obtain licenses, use government-issued identification numbers, or submit to other requirements that apply only to “residents” or “citizens.”

This is not to be confused with 26 U.S.C. definitions of “trade or business” as it relates to public office. These two “terms of art” have very different meanings even if they are the same word. Instead the context is very different.

Vattel on Prohibiting Foreign Merchandise

Vattel also addresses the circumstances under which a nation may prohibit foreign merchandise:

Book I, Chapter VIII, Section 90: Prohibition of foreign merchandise.

“Every state has consequently a right to prohibit the entrance of foreign merchandises; and the nations that are affected by such prohibition have no right to complain of it, as if they had been refused an office of humanity. Their complaints would be ridiculous, since their only ground of complaint would be, that a profit is refused to them by that nation who does not choose they should make it at her expense. It is, however, true, that if a nation was very certain that the prohibition of her merchandises was not founded on any reason drawn from the welfare of the state that prohibited them, she would have cause to consider this conduct as a mark of ill-will shown in this instance, and to complain of it on that footing. But it would be very difficult for the excluded nation to judge with certainty that the state had no solid or apparent reason for making such a prohibition.”[40]

This passage establishes that a nation may prohibit foreign merchandise only if the prohibition is founded on a reason drawn from the welfare of the state. If the prohibition is arbitrary or based on ill-will, it violates the Law of Nations.

This principle is important because it establishes that the federal government cannot prohibit a state national from conducting trade simply because they have refused to accept a federal privilege or franchise. Any such prohibition would be arbitrary and would violate the Law of Nations. The government would need to demonstrate that the prohibition is necessary for the welfare of the state, which would be difficult to do in most cases.

X. “IDIOTS” (NON-COMPOS MENTIS) AND BEING GOVERNED

One of the most fascinating aspects of the non-resident, non-person position is the legal concept of “idiots” or “non-compos mentis” (not of sound mind). This term has a specific legal meaning that is entirely different from its common usage as an insult. Understanding this legal meaning provides important insights into the nature of government jurisdiction and the requirement of knowledge and consent.

The Etymology of “Idiot”

The word “idiot” comes from the Greek word idiōtēs, which means “private citizen,” “layman,” or “person lacking professional skill.” In ancient Athens, an “idiot” was someone who was concerned exclusively with private affairs rather than public affairs. The term originally had no connotation of mental deficiency; it simply referred to someone who was not engaged in public life.

Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines “idiot” as:

“IDIOT. A person who has been without understanding from his nativity, and whom the law, therefore, presumes never likely to attain any.”

“IDIOTA. In the Civil Law. An unlearned, illiterate, or simple person. Calvin. A private man; one not in office.”[41]

Wikipedia explains the etymology:

“Idiot is a word derived from the Greek ἰδιώτης, idiōtēs (’person lacking professional skill’, ‘a private citizen’, ‘individual’), from ἴδιος, idios (’private’, ‘one’s own’). In Latin the word idiota (’ordinary person, layman’) preceded the Late Latin meaning ‘uneducated or ignorant person’. Its modern meaning and form dates back to Middle English around the year 1300, from the Old French idiote (’uneducated or ignorant person’).

An idiot in Athenian democracy was someone who was characterized by self-centeredness and concerned almost exclusively with private—as opposed to public—affairs. Idiocy was the natural state of ignorance into which all persons were born and its opposite, citizenship, was effected through formalized education. In Athenian democracy, idiots were born and citizens were made through education (although citizenship was also largely hereditary). ‘Idiot’ originally referred to ‘layman, person lacking professional skill’, ‘person so mentally deficient as to be incapable of ordinary reasoning’. Declining to take part in public life, such as democratic government of the polis (city state), was considered dishonorable. ‘Idiots’ were seen as having bad judgment in public and political matters.”[42]

This etymology reveals that an “idiot” in the original sense is a private person who is not engaged in public affairs. This is precisely the status of a non-resident, non-person—someone who has chosen to remain private and not to participate in the public franchises offered by the government.

“Idiots” and Mens Rea

In criminal law, a fundamental principle is that a person cannot be convicted of a crime unless they have mens rea—a guilty mind. Mens rea means that the person knew that their act was wrong and willfully did it anyway.

Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines mens rea as:

“MENS REA. A guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent. Guilty knowledge and wilfulness.”[43]

If a person does not know that an act is a crime, they cannot have mens rea and therefore cannot be lawfully convicted of the crime. This is why the courts routinely say that “every citizen is supposed to know the law”:

“Every man is supposed to know the law. A party who makes a contract with an officer without having it reduced to writing is knowingly accessory to a violation of duty on his part. Such a party aids in the violation of the law.”
Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1877)[44]

The implication is that knowing the law is an integral part of being a “good citizen.” Those who do not know the law are “bad citizens”, or, in the original sense of the word, “idiots.”

However, there is a critical distinction here. The courts say that “every citizen is supposed to know the law,” not “every man is supposed to know the law.” This implies that those who are not statutory “citizens” are not required to know the statutory civil code, because it does not apply to them. They are “foreigners” among “citizens,” and they accurately satisfy the definition of “idiot” in the original sense, private persons not engaged in public affairs.

The Impossibility of Knowing All the Laws

In modern America, there are so many laws on the books that it is literally impossible for any man, if reduced to a person, to know all of them, much less to comply with all of them. This means that everyone who attempts to be a “good citizen” by learning and following the law will inevitably violate at least some laws, simply because there are too many to know.

This creates an absurd situation where the government can selectively prosecute anyone it chooses, because everyone is technically a criminal. This is the very definition of tyranny—a system where the law is so complex and pervasive that everyone is guilty of something, and the government can enforce the law selectively against its enemies.

The only way to avoid this trap is to refuse to be a statutory “citizen” or “resident” and to remain an “idiot” in the original sense—a private person not engaged in public affairs. By remaining outside the civil statutory system, one is not required to know or comply with the vast body of civil statutory law. One is subject only to the common law and criminal law, which are based on simple, understandable principles that any reasonable person can know and follow.

A famous quote attributed to Lavrentiy Beria, head of Joseph Stalin’s secret police, who allegedly said:

“Show me the man and I’ll show you the crime.”

This quote captures the principle that when laws are so numerous, vague, and pervasive that everyone inevitably violates something, the government can selectively prosecute anyone it chooses. This transforms the rule of law into a tool of tyranny.

Civil liberties attorney Harvey Silverglate wrote a book titled Three Felonies a Day: How the Americans Are Committing Three Felonies a Day Without Knowing It (2009), arguing that the average American unknowingly commits approximately three federal felonies per day due to:

• Vague and overly broad criminal statutes

• The proliferation of federal regulations with criminal penalties

• The expansion of federal criminal law into areas traditionally governed by state law

“Idiots” and Representation

Another important aspect of the “idiot” concept is the relationship between “idiots” and representation. In the original Greek sense, an “idiot” was someone who represented themselves rather than being represented by others. They were concerned with their own private affairs rather than delegating those affairs to public officials.

This connects to the concept of “re-presentation”, being presented again through a representative. When a person accepts statutory “citizenship” or “residence,” they are agreeing to be “re-presented” by public officials. They are delegating their sovereignty to those officials and accepting the officials’ decisions as binding on them.

In contrast, an “idiot” in the original sense is someone who refuses to be “re-presented.” They insist on representing themselves and on making their own decisions. They are sovereigns in their own right and do not delegate their sovereignty to others.

This is the essence of the non-resident, non-person position. It is a refusal to be “re-presented” by public officials and an insistence on self-governance. It is a claim to be an “idiot” in the original, honorable sense of the word—a private citizen who governs themselves.

The Government’s Use of the “Idiot” Defense

Ironically, the government itself routinely uses the “idiot” defense when accused of wrongdoing. When government employees are accused of violating the law, they claim that they were “just following procedures” and that they do not know the law. In other words, they claim to be “idiots” in the sense of not knowing the law.

However, when private citizens make the same claim, the government responds that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” and prosecutes them anyway. This double standard reveals the hypocrisy of the system. The government claims the right to be “idiots” who are not responsible for knowing the law, while denying that same right to private citizens.

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this double standard in Olmstead v. United States:

“Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)[45]

This passage establishes that government officials must be subject to the same rules as private citizens. If the government claims the right to be “idiots” who are not responsible for knowing the law, then private citizens have the same right.

The non-resident, non-person position is, in part, an assertion of this right. It is a claim to be an “idiot” in the original sense—a private person not engaged in public affairs and not required to know or comply with the vast body of civil statutory law that applies only to public officials and those engaged in public franchises.

XI. SIMULATING LEGAL PROCESS: THE CRIME OF SERVING NONRESIDENTS

One of the most important legal protections for non-residents is the principle that serving civil legal process on a nonresident is the crime of “simulating legal process.” This principle establishes that courts and government agencies cannot simply assert jurisdiction over anyone they choose; they must first establish that the person is subject to their jurisdiction.

The Definition of “Simulating Legal Process”

“Simulating legal process” is defined in various state statutes. For example, the Texas Penal Code states:

“A person commits the offense of simulating legal process if he or she ‘recklessly causes to be delivered to another any document that simulates a summons, complaint, judgment, or other court process with the intent to . . . cause another to submit to the putative authority of the document; or take any action or refrain from taking any action in response to the document, in compliance with the document, or on the basis of the document.’”
Texas Penal Code Annotated, § 32.48(a)(2)[46]

This statute makes it a crime to deliver a document that simulates legal process to someone who is not actually subject to the jurisdiction of the court or agency issuing the document. The document must be intended to cause the recipient to submit to the putative (supposed) authority of the document or to take action based on it.

In addition to state-level crimes such as simulating legal process, the act of knowingly serving a non-resident through the mail to fraudulently assert jurisdiction may also constitute a federal crime under the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1341. This statute criminalizes the use of the mail to execute any “scheme or artifice to defraud,” which arguably includes an agency’s misrepresentation of its own authority to obtain money or property. Furthermore, the use of a legal fiction or statutory “person” in the address may implicate 18 U.S.C. §1342, which prohibits using a fictitious name to carry on such a scheme.

While these are criminal statutes that must be prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney and do not provide a direct private right of action, they form the basis for a powerful civil remedy. Mail fraud is a predicate act under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. A pattern of such mailings could give rise to a civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. §1964(c), allowing the injured non-resident to sue for treble damages.

Application to Nonresidents

If a man is a nonresident with respect to a particular jurisdiction, then they are not subject to the civil statutory laws of that jurisdiction. Any civil legal process served on them by courts or agencies of that jurisdiction is “simulating legal process” because it purports to assert authority that does not actually exist.

For example, if a state tax agency serves a tax assessment on a person who is a nonresident of that state, the assessment is “simulating legal process” because the agency has no authority to tax nonresidents (except in limited circumstances, such as income derived from sources within the state). The nonresident is not subject to the state’s civil statutory tax laws and therefore cannot be lawfully assessed or collected from.

Similarly, if the Internal Revenue Service serves a tax assessment on a person who is a nonresident of the federal zone (District of Columbia and federal territories) and who is not engaged in any federal privilege or franchise, the assessment is “simulating legal process” because the IRS has no authority to tax such a person. The person is outside the scope of the Internal Revenue Code and therefore cannot be lawfully assessed or collected from.

The Ecclesiastical Court Case: Michael Runningwolf v. State of Texas

A Texas court addressed the issue of simulating legal process in the context of an ecclesiastical (church) court in Michael Runningwolf v. State of Texas, 317 S.W.3d 829 (2010). In that case, a member of a church issued an “abatement” (a form of legal process) to a non-member in connection with a custody dispute. The non-member complained, and the church member was prosecuted for simulating legal process.

The court held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine (which protects churches from government interference in their internal affairs) did not apply because the recipient of the “abatement” was not a member of the church:

“The record shows that Coleman, to whom the ‘Abatement’ was delivered, was not a member of appellant’s church. That being so, the church’s position on the custody matter is not a purely ecclesiastical matter over which the trial court should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction. This is not an internal affairs issue because the record conclusively establishes that the recipient is not a member of the church. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not operate to prevent the trial court from exercising its jurisdiction over this matter.”
Michael Runningwolf v. State of Texas, 317 S.W.3d 829 (2010)[47]

This case establishes an important principle: legal process can only be served on members of the organization issuing the process. If the recipient is not a member, then serving process on them is “simulating legal process” and is a crime.

Application to Government “Franchise Courts”

The same principle applies to government courts and agencies. Courts such as tax court, traffic court, family court, and social security administrative court are “franchise courts”, courts that have jurisdiction only over those who have accepted a particular franchise (taxpayer, driver, spouse, social security recipient, etc.). These courts can only lawfully serve process on “members” of the franchise, that is, on those who have voluntarily accepted the franchise by choosing a domicile in the jurisdiction or by engaging in the privileged activity.

If a person is a nonresident and has not accepted the franchise, then they are not a “member” and cannot be lawfully served with process by the franchise court. Any process served on them is “simulating legal process” and is a crime.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “franchise courts” as private courts:

“franchise court. Hist. A privately held court that (usu.) exists by virtue of a royal grant [privilege], with jurisdiction over a variety of matters, depending on the grant and whatever powers the court acquires over time.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p. 668[48]

If franchise courts are private courts, then they can only exercise jurisdiction over those who have consented to their jurisdiction by accepting the franchise. Serving process on non-members is “simulating legal process.”

The Burden of Proof

When a franchise court serves process on a person, the court (as the moving party) has the burden of proving that the person is a “member” of the franchise and therefore subject to the court’s jurisdiction. The court must prove that the person has:

1. Chosen a domicile in the jurisdiction, or

2. Engaged in the privileged activity that is the subject of the franchise, or

3. Otherwise consented to the jurisdiction of the court.

If the court cannot satisfy this burden of proof, then the process is “simulating legal process” and the court has no jurisdiction. The man can move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and if the court refuses to dismiss, the man can file a criminal complaint against the judge and prosecutor for simulating legal process.

XII. “SOVEREIGN” = “FOREIGN” AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

One of the most important legal principles supporting the non-resident, non-person position is the equivalence between “sovereign” and “foreign.” In law, a sovereign is necessarily foreign to any jurisdiction other than their own. This principle is embodied in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and in numerous Supreme Court decisions.

Biblical Foundation: “Sovereign” = “Foreign”

The Bible repeatedly instructs believers to remain “unspotted” from the world, which can be understood as remaining “foreign” and “sovereign”:

James 1:27:

“Pure and undefiled religion before God and the Father is this: to visit orphans and widows in their trouble, and to keep oneself unspotted [’foreign’, ‘sovereign’, and/or ‘alien’] from the world [and the corrupt BEAST governments and rulers of the world].”[19]

James 4:4:

“Adulterers and adulteresses! Do you not know that friendship [statutory ‘citizenship’] with the world [or the governments of the world] is enmity with God? Whoever therefore wants to be a friend [STATUTORY ‘citizen’, ‘resident’, ‘inhabitant’, ‘person’ franchisee] of the world [or the governments of the world] makes himself an enemy of God.”[20]

These passages equate remaining “unspotted” from the world with being “foreign” and “sovereign.” They command believers not to become “friends” with the world, which in legal terms means not to accept statutory “citizenship,” “residence,” or “person” status.

The Legal Principle: Sovereignty Implies Foreignness

In law, sovereignty and foreignness are two sides of the same coin. A sovereign is someone who is not subject to any higher authority. By definition, a sovereign is “foreign” to any jurisdiction other than their own, because they are not subject to the laws of that other jurisdiction.

The U.S. Supreme Court explained this principle in The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

“Before we can proceed in this cause we must, therefore, inquire whether we can hear and determine the matters in controversy between the parties, who are two states of this Union, sovereign within their respective boundaries, save that portion of power which they have granted to the federal government, and foreign to each other for all but federal purposes. So they have been considered by this Court, through a long series of years and cases, to the present term...

Those states, in their highest sovereign capacity, in the convention of the people thereof; on whom, by the revolution, the prerogative of the crown, and the transcendant power of parliament devolved, in a plenitude unimpaired by any act, and controllable by no authority... adopted the constitution, by which they respectively made to the United States a grant of judicial power over controversies between two or more states. By the constitution, it was ordained that this judicial power, in cases where a state was a party, should be exercised by this Court as one of original jurisdiction. The states waived their exemption from judicial power... as sovereigns by original and inherent right, by their own grant of its exercise over themselves in such cases, but which they would not grant to any inferior tribunal. By this grant, this Court has acquired jurisdiction over the parties in this cause, by their own consent and delegated authority.”
The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 12 Pet. 657, 9 L.Ed. 1233 (1838)[49]

This passage establishes several critical principles:

1. The states of the Union are sovereign within their respective boundaries.

2. The states are foreign to each other for all but federal purposes.

3. Sovereigns have an exemption from judicial power unless they waive that exemption by their own consent.

4. The states waived their exemption from the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction only for specific cases enumerated in the Constitution, and only by their own grant and consent.

These principles apply equally to people who are members of the body politic of a state. As sovereigns, they are foreign to federal jurisdiction and to the jurisdiction of other states. They have an exemption from judicial power unless they waive that exemption by their own consent. The method of providing that consent is by choosing a domicile within the jurisdiction or by engaging in a privilege or franchise offered by that jurisdiction.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), codified at 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611, establishes the framework for determining when foreign sovereigns can be sued in U.S. courts. The Act begins with findings and a declaration of purpose:

28 U.S.C. §1602: “The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts. Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection with their commercial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.”[32]

The FSIA establishes that foreign sovereigns have immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless they fall within one of the exceptions listed in the Act. The primary exceptions are:

1. Waiver of immunity — The foreign sovereign has explicitly or implicitly waived its immunity. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(1).

2. Commercial activity — The action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign sovereign. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2).

3. Property taken in violation of international law — The action is based upon rights in property taken in violation of international law. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3).

4. Certain tort claims — The action is based upon a tort committed in the United States. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(5).

The key principle is that immunity is the default, and jurisdiction exists only if one of the exceptions applies. The burden is on the party seeking to assert jurisdiction to prove that an exception applies.

Application to State Nationals

The principles of the FSIA apply not only to foreign nations, but also to the states of the Union and to individuals who are members of the body politic of those states. As the Supreme Court held in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, the states of the Union are “nations” with respect to each other and with respect to the federal government:

“The States between each other are sovereign and independent. They are distinct and separate sovereignties, except so far as they have parted with some of the attributes of sovereignty by the Constitution. They continue to be nations, with all their rights, and under all their national obligations, and with all the rights of nations in every particular; except in the surrender by each to the common purposes and objects of the Union, under the Constitution.”[15]

If the states are “nations,” then the people of those states are nationals of those nations. As nationals of sovereign states, they have the same sovereign immunity that foreign nations have under the FSIA. They are immune from the jurisdiction of federal courts and of the courts of other states unless they have waived that immunity by consent or by engaging in commercial activity. The commercial activity needs to be active and not passive. In other words, said commercial activity must be by willful executive position, employment agreement, or stated agency. This does not protect a man or woman through corporate veil piercing by acts of fraud, theft, or other trespass.

The method of waiving immunity is by choosing a domicile within the jurisdiction or by engaging in a privilege or franchise offered by that jurisdiction. If a state national has not chosen a federal domicile and has not engaged in any federal privilege or franchise, then they have not waived their sovereign immunity and cannot be subjected to federal jurisdiction.

The Separation of Powers

The equivalence between “sovereign” and “foreign” is an unavoidable result of the separation of powers between the states and the federal government. The Constitution creates a federal system in which the federal government has only limited, enumerated powers, and all other powers are reserved to the states or to the people.

This separation of powers means that the federal government is “foreign” to the states, and the states are “foreign” to the federal government. Neither can exercise jurisdiction over the other except in the specific areas where jurisdiction has been granted by the Constitution.

Similarly, the people of the states are “foreign” to the federal government. The federal government has no jurisdiction over them except in the specific areas where jurisdiction has been granted by the Constitution. Outside those areas, the people retain their sovereignty and their immunity from federal jurisdiction.

The Separation Between Public and Private

The equivalence between “sovereign” and “foreign” is also a result of the separation between public and private. The public sphere is the realm of government and collective action. The private sphere is the realm of individual rights and private action.

When a person accepts statutory “citizenship,” “residence,” or “person” status, they are entering the public sphere and subjecting themselves to public law. When a person remains a non-resident, non-person, they are remaining in the private sphere and retaining their private rights.

The private sphere is “foreign” to the public sphere. Private individuals are not subject to public law unless they have consented to be subject to it by entering the public sphere. This is the essence of the non-resident, non-person position.

XIII. DETAILED TAX STATUS IMPLICATIONS

The non-resident, non-person position has profound implications for tax status. Understanding these implications requires a detailed analysis of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations, as well as the principles of jurisdiction and consent discussed in previous sections.

The Internal Revenue Code as a Franchise

The Internal Revenue Code is not a general law that applies to everyone. Rather, it is a franchise, a privilege offered by the federal government to those who choose to accept it. The franchise consists of the right to engage in certain activities (such as operating a federal corporation or engaging in a “trade or business” as defined in the Code) in exchange for paying taxes on the income derived from those activities.

Like any franchise, the Internal Revenue Code applies only to those who have accepted the franchise. Those who have not accepted it are outside the scope of the Code and are not subject to its provisions.

Who Is Subject to Federal Income Tax?

The Internal Revenue Code imposes income tax on several categories of persons:

1. Citizens and residents of the United States — 26 U.S.C. §1(a)-(d).

2. Nonresident aliens engaged in a trade or business within the United States — 26 U.S.C. §871(b).

3. Nonresident aliens with U.S.-source income not effectively connected with a trade or business — 26 U.S.C. §871(a).

The key question is: what do these terms mean?

“Citizens of the United States”

The term “citizen of the United States” has multiple meanings in federal law. In the Constitution, it refers to citizens of the states of the Union who are also citizens of the federal republic. However, in federal statutes, particularly tax statutes, it refers to citizens of the federal zone (District of Columbia and federal territories).

This is confirmed by examining the definition of “United States” in the Internal Revenue Code, which refers to the federal zone, not to the 50 states. A “citizen of the United States” in the tax code is someone who was born in the federal zone or who has been naturalized as a federal citizen.

A person born in a state of the Union is not a “citizen of the United States” in this statutory sense unless they have chosen a federal domicile or have otherwise accepted federal citizenship.

“Residents of the United States”

The term “resident of the United States” is defined in 26 C.F.R. §1.871-2(b) as someone who is actually present in the United States and who is not a mere transient or sojourner. As discussed in Section VI, this is a facts-and-circumstances test based on intent.

A person born in a state of the Union who does not have a domicile in the federal zone and who does not intend to make the federal zone their permanent home is not a “resident of the United States” for tax purposes, even if they are physically present in the federal zone.

“Nonresident Aliens”

The term “nonresident alien” is defined in 26 C.F.R. §1.871-1(a) as an individual whose residence is not within the United States and who is not a citizen of the United States.

A state national who does not have a domicile in the federal zone and who is not a statutory “citizen of the United States” satisfies this definition. However, the term “alien” implies that the person is subject to a foreign sovereign. As discussed in Section VIII, a state national may choose to characterize themselves as “foreign” rather than “alien” to avoid this implication.

The “Trade or Business” Requirement

Even if a person is a “nonresident alien,” they are subject to federal income tax only if they are “engaged in a trade or business within the United States.” This term is defined in 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26):

26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26): “The term ‘trade or business’ includes the performance of the functions of a public office.”[50]

This definition is critical. It establishes that “trade or business” is not simply any commercial activity, but rather the performance of the functions of a public office. In other words, “trade or business” refers to working for the federal government or performing government functions.

A state national who is not a federal employee and who is not performing government functions is not “engaged in a trade or business” and therefore is not subject to federal income tax, even if they are earning income from commercial activities.

The Limited Definition of “Person” for Enforcement

As discussed in Section III, the Internal Revenue Code defines “person” very narrowly for purposes of enforcement:

26 U.S.C. §6671(b): “The term ‘person’, as used in this subchapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.”[7]

26 U.S.C. §7343: “The term ‘person’ as used in this chapter includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.”[8]

These definitions make clear that only officers and employees of corporations and partnerships can be subject to civil penalties or criminal prosecution under the Internal Revenue Code. A man or woman who is not acting in such a capacity is not a “person” and cannot be subjected to enforcement.

The Concept of “Taxpayer” vs. “Nontaxpayer”

As discussed in Section V, the Internal Revenue Code consistently uses the term “taxpayer” to refer to those who are subject to tax. This implies that there are also “nontaxpayers”—people who are not subject to tax.

The case of Economy Plumbing & Heating v. United States makes this explicit:

“The revenue laws are a code or system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers. The latter are without their scope. No procedure is prescribed for nontaxpayers, and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies in due course of law.”
Economy Plumbing & Heating v. United States, 470 F.2d 585 (Ct. Cl. 1972)[17]

A state national who is a non-resident, non-person is a “nontaxpayer.” The revenue laws do not apply to them, and no procedure is prescribed for them. They are outside the scope of the Internal Revenue Code entirely.

Practical Implications

The practical implications of the non-resident, non-person position for tax status are:

1. No requirement to file tax returns: A nontaxpayer has no obligation to file federal income tax returns because they are not a “taxpayer” within the meaning of the Code.

2. No requirement to pay federal income tax: A nontaxpayer has no obligation to pay federal income tax because they are not subject to the tax.

3. No requirement to use a Social Security Number or Taxpayer Identification Number: These numbers are used to identify “taxpayers.” A nontaxpayer has no obligation to obtain or use such a number.

4. No requirement to withhold taxes from employees: Withholding requirements apply only to “employers” who are engaged in a “trade or business.” A state national who is not engaged in a “trade or business” has no withholding obligations.

5. No liability for civil penalties or criminal prosecution: As discussed above, only “persons” as defined in 26 U.S.C. §6671(b) and §7343 can be subject to penalties or prosecution. A state national who is not acting as an officer or employee of a corporation or partnership is not a “person” and cannot be subjected to enforcement.

The Burden of Proof

When the IRS asserts that a person is a “taxpayer” and is subject to federal income tax, the IRS bears the burden of proving:

1. That the man they are claiming to be a “person” is a “citizen of the United States,” “resident of the United States,” or “nonresident alien”;

2. That the person is “engaged in a trade or business within the United States”;

3. That the person had taxable income;

4. That the person is a “person” within the meaning of the enforcement provisions.

If the IRS cannot satisfy this burden of proof, then the person is a “nontaxpayer” and is outside the scope of the Internal Revenue Code.

XIV. PASSPORT IMPLICATIONS: “NATIONAL” VS. “CITIZEN” AND THE MEANING OF “STATE”

The distinction between “national” and “citizen” has important implications for passport status and for understanding the true meaning of “state” in American law.

The Statutory Definition of “National”

The Immigration and Nationality Act defines “national” as:

8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21): “The term ‘national’ means a person owing permanent allegiance to a state.”[11]

Note that this definition says “a state,” not “the United States.” This means that a person can be a national of a state of the Union without being a national of the United States (federal government).

The Distinction Between “National” and “Citizen”

The Immigration and Nationality Act also distinguishes between “nationals” and “citizens”:

8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(22): “The term ‘national of the United States’ means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes allegiance to the United States.”[51]

This definition establishes that there are two categories of “nationals of the United States”:

1. Citizens of the United States — These are people who were born or naturalized in the federal zone or who have otherwise acquired federal citizenship.

2. Non-citizen nationals of the United States — These are people who owe allegiance to the United States but who are not citizens. This category includes people born in American Samoa and Swains Island, who are nationals but not citizens.

However, this definition does not include a third category: nationals of the states of the Union who are not nationals of the United States. These are people who owe allegiance to a state of the Union but who do not owe allegiance to the federal government.

The Status of a “State National”

A “state national” is someone who:

1. Was born on a state of the Union;

2. Owes allegiance to the people of that state;

3. Does not owe allegiance to the federal government;

4. Has not chosen a federal domicile;

5. Has not accepted any federal privilege or franchise.

A state national is a “national” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21) because they owe permanent allegiance to “a state”—namely, their state of the Union. However, they are not a “national of the United States” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(22) because they do not owe allegiance to the United States (federal government).

Passport Implications

The U.S. Department of State issues passports to “nationals of the United States,” which includes both citizens and non-citizen nationals. However, the Department of State has historically been reluctant to issue passports to state nationals who claim not to be nationals of the United States.

The reason for this reluctance is that the Department of State interprets “national of the United States” to include only those who owe allegiance to the federal government, not those who owe allegiance only to a state of the Union. This interpretation is questionable, as it ignores the plain language of 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21), which defines “national” as owing allegiance to “a state,” not necessarily to “the United States.”

A state national who seeks a passport may need to argue that they are a “national” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21) and that they are entitled to a passport on that basis. Alternatively, they may choose to obtain a passport as a “citizen of the United States” while reserving their rights and clarifying that their acceptance of the passport does not constitute a waiver of their status as a state national.

The True Meaning of “State”

The confusion over passport status arises in part from confusion over the meaning of “state.” In American law, “state” has multiple meanings:

1. A state of the Union — One of the 50 states, such as California or Texas.

2. A federal territory or possession — The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.

3. The body politic — The people who make up the sovereign entity.

The third meaning is the most important for understanding the non-resident, non-person position. In political theory, a “state” is not a geographical territory or a government entity. Rather, a “state” is the people who occupy a territory and who have organized themselves into a body politic.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “state” in this sense:

“State: As a noun, a people permanently occupying a fixed territory bound together by common habits and custom into one body politic exercising, through the medium of an organized government, independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making war and peace and of entering into international relations with other states.”[52]

This definition makes clear that a “state” is a people, not a territory or a government. The people are the sovereigns who created the government and to whom the government is accountable.

When 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21) defines “national” as “a person owing permanent allegiance to a state,” it is referring to allegiance to the people of a state, not to the government of a state or to the territory of a state. A state national owes allegiance to their fellow citizens—the body politic of their state—not to the state government or to the federal government.

The Neighbor Principle

This understanding of “state” as “the people” leads to what might be called the “neighbor principle.” A state national owes allegiance to their neighbors—the people who live in the same geographical area and who are part of the same body politic. They do not owe allegiance to governments or to abstract political entities.

This principle is consistent with the Biblical command to “love your neighbor as yourself” (Matthew 22:39). A state national’s allegiance is to their neighbors, not to governments. This is the essence of republicanism, government by the people, for the people, and of the people.

The Implications for Sovereignty

Understanding “state” as “the people” has profound implications for sovereignty. It means that sovereignty resides in the people, not in governments. Governments are merely the servants of the people, created by the people to protect their rights and to serve their interests.

When a person accepts statutory “citizenship,” “residence,” or “person” status, they are transferring their sovereignty from themselves to the government. They are agreeing to be governed by the government’s laws rather than governing themselves.

When a person remains a non-resident, non-person, they are retaining their sovereignty. They are governing themselves and are accountable only to their neighbors—the body politic of their state, not to governments.

This is the ultimate meaning of the non-resident, non-person position. It is a claim to sovereignty and to self-governance. It is a refusal to transfer sovereignty to governments and an insistence on remaining accountable only to the people, one’s neighbors, who make up the body politic.

XV. CONCLUSION

This memorandum has presented a comprehensive analysis of the non-resident, non-person position, grounded in statutory construction principles, Supreme Court precedent, the Law of Nations, the Declaration of Independence, and Biblical principles. The analysis demonstrates that this position is not a radical or frivolous theory, but rather a logical application of fundamental legal principles that have been recognized throughout American history.

The key points established in this memorandum are:

1. All just powers derive from the consent of the governed, as stated in the Declaration of Independence. Any exercise of power without consent is unjust and lacks the force of law.

2. Statutory definitions create “word magic” by redefining common words to have entirely different legal meanings. Understanding these definitions is essential to understanding the limits of governmental jurisdiction.

3. “United States” has three distinct legal meanings, and in most federal statutes, it refers to the federal zone (District of Columbia and territories), not to the 50 states of the Union.

4. The Treasury Department recognizes the existence of “nontaxpayers”, people who are not subject to federal income tax. The distinction between “taxpayer” and “nontaxpayer” is based on domicile and consent.

5. “Presence” is not the same as “domicile”, and physical presence in a jurisdiction does not automatically create tax liability or subject a person to civil statutory law.

6. The Bible commands believers to remain “foreign” and “separate” from worldly governments, and the First Amendment protects the free exercise of this religious belief.

7. “Foreign” and “alien” are distinct concepts, and a state national may choose to characterize themselves as “foreign” rather than “alien” to avoid implying subjection to another sovereign.

8. The Law of Nations distinguishes between “inhabitants” and “residents”, with inhabitants being members of the body politic and residents being foreigners temporarily or permanently present.

9. “Idiots” (non-compos mentis) in the original sense are private persons not engaged in public affairs, and this status provides protection from being required to know and comply with the vast body of civil statutory law.

10. Serving civil legal process on nonresidents is the crime of “simulating legal process”, and courts and agencies can only lawfully serve process on “members” of their jurisdiction.

11. “Sovereign” = “Foreign”, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act establishes that sovereigns have immunity from jurisdiction unless they waive it by consent or by engaging in commercial activity.

12. The Internal Revenue Code is a franchise that applies only to those who have accepted it, and a non-resident, non-person is a “nontaxpayer” outside the scope of the Code.

13. “National” and “citizen” are distinct concepts, and a state national is a national of their state who owes allegiance to the people of that state, not to the federal government.

14. “State” means “the people”, not a territory or a government, and a state national owes allegiance to their neighbors—the body politic of their state.

These principles, taken together, establish that people born on states of the Union are inhabitants and sovereigns who may lawfully choose to remain non-residents and non-persons under federal and state civil statutory codes. This choice is protected by the principles of consent, sovereignty, and religious freedom that are foundational to American law.

The non-resident, non-person position is not an attempt to evade lawful obligations. Rather, it is an assertion of the right to self-governance and to be free from unjust exercises of governmental power. It is a claim to the status that the Founding Fathers intended for all Americans, that of free, sovereign individuals who govern themselves and who delegate only limited, specific powers to their governments.

This memorandum provides the legal foundation for understanding and asserting the non-resident, non-person position. It is offered as a comprehensive, standalone analysis that can serve as a reference for those who seek to understand the limits of governmental jurisdiction and to preserve their natural rights and sovereignty.

XVI. REFERENCES

[1] Declaration of Independence (1776). Available at: https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript

[2] President Theodore Roosevelt, Opening of the Jamestown Exposition, Norfolk, VA (April 26, 1907).

[3] Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

[4] Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:1 (7th ed.).

[5] Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671-672 (1945). Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/324/652

[6] Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 261 (1901). Available at: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/182/244.html

[7] 26 U.S.C. §6671(b). Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/6671

[8] 26 U.S.C. §7343. Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/7343

[9] 26 C.F.R. §1.871-2(b). Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.871-2

[10] Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, §§212-213 (1758). Available at: http://famguardian.org/Publications/LawOfNations/vattel.htm

[11] 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(21). Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1101

[12] Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 648 (1990).

[13] U.S. Constitution, Amendment X.

[14] 19 Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Corporations, §§883-884 (2003).

[15] Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 10 L.Ed. 274 (1839).

[16] IRS Publication 519, U.S. Tax Guide for Aliens (2024). Available at: https://www.irs.gov/publications/p519

[17] Economy Plumbing & Heating v. United States, 470 F.2d 585, 589 (Ct. Cl. 1972).

[18] Exodus 23:32-33 (NKJV).

[19] James 1:27 (NKJV).

[20] James 4:4 (NKJV).

[21] Revelation 18:4 (NKJV).

[22] 2 Corinthians 6:17-18 (NKJV).

[23] Hebrews 11:13-16 (NKJV).

[24] 1 Peter 2:11 (NKJV).

[25] Philippians 3:20 (NKJV).

[26] 2 Corinthians 6:14 (NKJV).

[27] U.S. Constitution, Amendment I.

[28] Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).

[29] 1 Corinthians 3:16-17 (NKJV).

[30] Wikidiff: Alien vs Foreign—What’s the Difference? Available at: https://wikidiff.com/alien/foreign

[31] Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 74 (1990).

[32] 28 U.S.C. §1602. Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1602

[33] 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(5). Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/7701

[34] 26 C.F.R. §1.871-1(a). Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.871-1

[35] U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 10.

[36] Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, Chapter VIII, Section 101 (1758).

[37] Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, Chapter VIII, Section 108 (1758).

[38] Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, Chapter VIII, Section 107 (1758).

[39] Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, Chapter VIII, Section 87 (1758).

[40] Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, Chapter VIII, Section 90 (1758).

[41] Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 880 (1951).

[42] Wikipedia: Idiot. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idiot

[43] Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 880 (1951).

[44] Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1877).

[45] Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

[46] Texas Penal Code Annotated, § 32.48(a)(2).

[47] Michael Runningwolf v. State of Texas, 317 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. App. 2010).

[48] Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p. 668 (1999).

[49] The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 12 Pet. 657, 9 L.Ed. 1233 (1838).

[50] 26 U.S.C. §7701(a)(26). Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/7701

[51] 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(22). Available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1101

[52] Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 1407 (1990).

END OF MEMORANDUM

NOTICE: This memorandum is provided for educational and informational purposes only. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Anyone considering asserting the non-resident, non-person position should conduct their own research, verify all citations independently, and consult with competent counsel before taking any action.

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Backed by your labor…

Most Americans never voted on the structure that governs their financial lives. They never approved the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, they were never asked whether the government should confiscate gold in 1933, and they certainly didn’t consent to the abandonment of gold-backed currency in 1971. Yet every dollar in their pocket—and every rise and fall in the economy—rests on a system built entirely on their labor, their property, and their future productivity.

The public was never clearly told that they are the collateral backing the national debt. But that is the quiet truth behind every Treasury bond issued and every dollar created.

Today, as the Federal Reserve expands its balance sheet again through “reserve management purchases,” many believe this is something technical or harmless. In reality it is the latest chapter in a long story: a century-long shift from money to currency, from value to promise, from sovereignty to dependence. And every step of that shift placed more burden on the people while giving more control to the banking structure that issues the dollars they use.

This is that story, in plain words.

1. What “expanding the balance sheet” really means

When the Federal Reserve “expands its balance sheet,” it is simply creating new dollars out of nothing to buy government debt. The process is elegant on paper and devastating in practice:

• The government issues bonds it cannot fund through taxes or other means.

• The Fed creates new dollars electronically to buy those bonds.

• Those new dollars enter the financial system as bank reserves.

• More dollars exist, but nothing new was produced.

This dilutes every existing dollar in circulation.
Prices rise.
Savings buy less.
Wages lag behind.

The result is inflation—a silent tax on everyone who holds dollars.

This expansion is not backed by gold or silver or any tangible commodity. It is backed by the future labor of the American people. Treasury bonds represent claims on that labor. The government pledges the productivity of its citizens to support the debt. And the Federal Reserve monetizes that debt to keep the system running.

This is not a conspiracy. It is the mechanism of modern fiat currency.

2. 1913: The Origin of the Debt Machine

In 1913, Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act. The decision was not submitted to the people. It transferred the nation’s monetary authority from Congress, where the Constitution placed it, to a private banking consortium.

The Federal Reserve was empowered to:

• Issue currency

• Set interest rates

• Act as lender of last resort

• Buy government debt

But the key shift was philosophical:
Money would now be created through debt rather than through intrinsic value.

A dollar no longer represented something; it represented a promise.

This structure ensured that:

• Government debt would grow

• Banks would earn interest

• The dollar would inflate over time

• The people would carry the burden

The seeds of today’s economy were planted in that moment.

3. 1933: The Emergency Banking Act and the seizure of real money

During the Great Depression, instead of letting the banking system fail and return to a sound footing, the government chose to save the banks by taking from the people.

The Emergency Banking Act of 1933:

• Authorized the confiscation of gold from citizens

• Ended the ability of Americans to redeem dollars for gold

• Centralized monetary power

• Forced the public into a purely paper system

The people were stripped of real money and given promises in return.

From that moment on, the dollar was not a claim on a tangible asset; it was a claim on government credit, a credit supported by taxes, inflation, and the population itself.

4. 1971: The final break: dollars from nothing

By 1971, other nations grew tired of holding U.S. dollars that were supposedly redeemable for gold but backed by endless deficits. They began demanding gold instead of paper.

Rather than honor the promise, President Nixon closed the gold window. From that day forward:

• The dollar became a pure fiat instrument

• No commodity backed it

• No limit constrained its creation

• Government spending and bank leverage could expand without restraint

The dollar was now entirely based on the people’s faith, and the government’s power to tax them.

This was the tipping point. The money illusion became complete.

5. 2008–2026: The QE era—debt upon debt

After 2008, the Federal Reserve discovered a new tool: quantitative easing, which simply means creating new dollars to buy government and corporate debt in massive amounts. This was modeled after a similar practice in Japan during their ongoing debt crisis.

The amounts were staggering:

• Trillions during the Great Recession

• Trillions more during COVID

• And now, beginning again in 2025–2026, the Fed has restarted balance-sheet expansion through “reserve management purchases,” insisting it is not QE while doing what QE does:

  • Create currency

  • Support government deficits

  • Inflate financial markets

  • Push the burden onto the public

Every round of QE makes the dollar worth slightly less.
Every dollar printed is a claim against the people’s future productivity.

Inflation is not an accident. It is the operating model.

6. The hidden tax: how the people pay

No politician votes for inflation.
No citizen approves it.
But everyone pays for it.

Inflation transfers wealth quietly:

• The government spends new dollars first

• Banks and financial institutions receive the dollars early

• Asset holders see inflated valuations

• The public receives the dollars last, after they have lost their purchasing power

This is the Cantillon Effect: those closest to the money printer gain; those farthest from it lose.

It is a tax disguised as economic policy.

7. The next phase: CBDCs and digital control

Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) are presented as innovation, modernization, or efficiency.

In reality, they represent:

• Programmable currency

• Trackable transactions

• Instant taxation

• Automatic compliance

• Centralized control over individual financial freedom

A CBDC is not a new system.
It is simply the existing inflationary, debt-based model placed into biometric digital form, where the issuer has:

• Real-time visibility

• Real-time control

• Real-time enforcement

It is the endgame of a century-long project: moving money from a public good to a managed system of behavioral control.

8. What about Bitcoin?

Bitcoin is often described as the alternative; but governments and central banks already understand its advantage:

• Fixed supply

• Digital structure

• Public ledger

• Programmability

• High transparency

In other words, Bitcoin is a prototype of the kind of system central banks want, minus the decentralized ownership.

Many analysts expect:

• Tightening regulations

• Taxation of on/off ramps

• Institutional custody dominance

• Eventual absorption of Bitcoin into the broader digital monetary ecosystem

Bitcoin showed them what’s possible.
CBDCs will replicate what’s useful; and discard what isn’t (like decentralization).

9. The truth behind the system

When all the complexity is removed, the truth is simple:

1. Money was replaced with debt.

2. Debt is backed by the people’s labor and property.

3. The people were never asked.

4. Every expansion of the money supply makes their work worth less.

5. Boom and bust cycles are engineered through credit expansion and withdrawal.

6. Inflation is not a mistake; it is the method of extracting value without consent.

7. Each step deepens dependence on a central authority.

8. CBDCs represent the digital finalization of the same system.

Once you see the structure, everything that happens today, the Fed’s balance sheet moves, liquidity injections, rising prices, endless deficits, the push for digital money; it all makes perfect sense.

It is not chaos; it is design. And the burden is carried by the people who never asked for it.

When There Are Fewer People Left to Carry the Burden

There is one final piece to the story, one that very few economists or policymakers are willing to confront openly.

A debt-based currency system assumes a simple formula:

More people in the future = more workers = more taxpayers = more productivity to service the growing debt.

But what happens when the formula breaks?

Across the United States, Europe, and most developed nations, birth rates have fallen below replacement levels. More people are dying than being born. For the first time in the modern era, the future labor pool, the very thing that backs the currency, is shrinking.

In a system where every new dollar is a claim on future productivity, fewer people means:

• Less future labor

• Less tax revenue

• Less consumption

• Less growth

• And a greater burden on the remaining population

When the population can no longer support the debt pyramids built on their backs, the system does not reform itself. It shifts the weight downward.

This creates a widening divide:

• The elite, those closest to the money creation mechanism, accumulate more wealth, more influence, and more insulation from the inflation they helped create.

• The poor and middle class, those farthest from the money spigot, lose purchasing power, lose savings, and lose independence.

As the base weakens, those in power respond predictably:

They expand the role of government, not as protector, but as caretaker.

Dependency becomes the policy. Security replaces sovereignty. Comfort replaces freedom. The people are nudged, then pushed into a system where they rely on the very entity that engineered the problem.

This is how civilizations slip back into feudalism:

• Lords with resources

• Serfs with obligations

• Authority justified by fear

• Control justified by “protection”

• Every need met by the system, at the cost of autonomy

In medieval England, peasants owed labor to the landholder. Today, debt-funded currency quietly extracts that same labor through inflation, taxation, and economic pressure. The forms change. The mechanism does not.

And as biometric digital currencies (CBDCs) rise, the ancient structure is reborn in modern skin: a centrally controlled medium of exchange that determines who may buy, sell, or participate in society.

This echoes a familiar warning:

“No man might buy or sell, save he that had the mark…”
— Revelation 13:16–17

Whether one views this symbolically, spiritually, or historically, the message is unmistakable:

A system that controls currency ultimately controls people.

The Social Security Number, required for banking, employment, taxation, and identification, is already a primitive form of such a “mark”: a number tied to a name, without which one cannot easily function economically.

As the system moves digital, toward CBDCs, biometric IDs, programmable transactions, the control becomes tighter, more immediate, and more complete.

Not because of prophecy alone. Because of design. Because of apathy. Because, over time, people exchanged responsibility and accountability for comfort, benefits, and privileges administered by a government they created, but which now rules over them.

And behind that government sits the true sovereign of the modern age:

The issuers of currency: the new kings, the bankers.

When the population shrinks, the debt grows, and the people look to the State for support, the loop closes. A century of monetary engineering comes to its natural end: a world where freedom contracts, dependency expands, and economic participation is granted only to those within the system.

That is where the road leads unless responsibility and sovereignty return to the people who unwittingly surrendered them.

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Insurance or Debt Service?

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Historical Context and Legislative Origins

The Social Security Act of 1935 was enacted on August 14, 1935, during the Great Depression as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislative program. The Act was presented to the American people as a system of social insurance designed to provide retirement, disability, and survivor benefits. The program was to be funded through dedicated payroll taxes imposed under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), which mandates contributions from both employees and employers.

The historical context of the Social Security Act’s passage is critical to understanding its true nature. By the time President Roosevelt was elected in 1933, the national debt had skyrocketed during peacetime between 1930 and 1934. The Federal Reserve System, established in 1913, was tightening the money supply even as the national debt expanded. The federal government needed a mechanism to guarantee payment of interest on the burgeoning national debt. The Social Security system, as will be discussed in detail below, effectively transformed American citizens into collateral for the national debt by bringing their future labor into the federal revenue system.

Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor from 1933 to 1945, wrote in the forward to Edwin E. Witte’s book The Development of the Social Security Act: “The President wanted everybody covered for every contingency in life—’cradle to grave,’ he called it—under the social insurance system... But the Government of the United States is not an insurance company and so it could not be done.”

Edwin Witte, one of the originators of the Social Security Act, admitted in testimony before the Ways and Means Committee (pages 936-946 of the hearings) that Social Security was “sold as if it were insurance” and that this was a mistake. It was not until 1953 that an originator of the Act publicly admitted that Social Security is not insurance.

The Supreme Court’s Characterization: Welfare, Not Contract

The Supreme Court has consistently characterized the Social Security system as a form of social welfare legislation, rather than a contractual or property right. In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), the Court rejected the argument that a worker who has paid into the Social Security system has an “accrued property right” to benefits. The Court stated:

To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of ‘accrued property rights’ would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it demands. ... It was doubtless out of an awareness of the need for such flexibility that Congress included in the original Act, and has since retained, a clause expressly reserving to it ‘[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision’ of the Act. § 1104, 49 Stat. 648, 42 U.S.C. § 1304.

This principle is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1304, the “Reservation of Rights Clause,” which states: “The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby reserved to the Congress.” This provision makes clear that Congress retains plenary power to modify or eliminate any aspect of the Social Security system at any time.

In Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), the Supreme Court further clarified that Social Security taxes are not earmarked for specific people. The Court held that “the proceeds of both taxes [the employee and employer taxes] are to be paid into the Treasury like other internal revenue taxes generally, and are not earmarked in any way.” This means that FICA tax revenue goes into the general fund of the United States Treasury, not into individual accounts or a segregated trust fund.

The Social Security Administration and the Social Security Number

The administration of the Social Security system is the responsibility of the Social Security Administration (SSA), an independent agency of the federal government. The SSA issues Social Security Numbers (SSNs) ostensibly to track one’s earnings and determine their eligibility for benefits. However, the use of SSNs has expanded far beyond this original purpose. SSNs are now used by federal and state agencies, private employers, financial institutions, and countless other entities as a universal identifier.

Despite this widespread use and the common assumption that SSNs are mandatory, the SSA’s own publications contradict this belief. SSA Publication No. 05-10002, titled “Your Social Security Number and Card,” explicitly states: “Giving your number is voluntary even when you’re asked for the number directly.” This admission is consistent with the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a), Section 7 of which prohibits federal, state, and local government agencies from denying any right, benefit, or privilege to man because of their refusal to disclose their Social Security Number, except in specific circumstances authorized by federal statute.

Furthermore, SSA Publication No. 05-10023, titled “Social Security Numbers for Children,” states on page 4: “Getting a Social Security number for your baby is strictly voluntary.” The original version of this brochure emphasized the word “voluntary” in bold letters.

Recent Case Law: Jordan v. Blinken (aka Rubio) (2025)

Recent federal court decisions have reinforced the voluntary nature of SSN disclosure and the limits on government power to compel participation in the Social Security system. In Jordan v. Rubio, Case No. 1:24-cv-01844 (D.D.C. 2025), a landmark decision, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that a U.S. citizen could obtain a passport without providing a Social Security Number, based on a sincere religious objection to the use of government-issued identification numbers.

The plaintiff in Jordan had lived her entire life without a Social Security Number, based on deeply held religious convictions. When she applied for a U.S. passport, the State Department initially denied her application because she refused to provide an SSN. The plaintiff filed suit under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, arguing that the SSN requirement substantially burdened her religious exercise.

The court agreed, finding that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring an SSN for passport issuance, and that even if such an interest existed, the government had not used the least restrictive means to further that interest. The court noted that the plaintiff had provided alternative forms of identification and documentation, including a Letter of No Record from the state where she was born (in lieu of a birth certificate), and that the government’s interest in tracking citizens for tax purposes was not sufficient to override her religious freedom.

The Jordan v. Rubio decision is a significant victory for people seeking to limit their participation in the Social Security system. It establishes that sincere religious objections to SSN use are legally cognizable under RFRA, and that the government’s interest in universal SSN enrollment is not absolute.

The Statutory Framework: Definitions and Jurisdictional Limits

The authority of the federal government to impose FICA taxes and require Social Security participation is derived from specific statutory definitions found in the Internal Revenue Code. These definitions are not as broad as commonly assumed.

26 U.S.C. § 3121(d) defines an “employee” for FICA purposes. The definition includes officers of corporations, people who have the status of an employee under common law rules, and certain other specific categories of workers. Critically, the definition uses the word “includes,” which in statutory construction suggests that the list is not exhaustive but is also not universal.

26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) defines “employee” for income tax withholding purposes, stating that the term “includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term ‘employee’ also includes an officer of a corporation.”

The specific focus on government employees and corporate officers in these definitions has led to the legal argument that private citizens who are not government employees or corporate officers, and who do not fall within the common law definition of “employee,” are not subject to mandatory FICA taxes or Social Security enrollment.

The Definition of “Employment”

26 U.S.C. § 3121(b):

“For purposes of this chapter, the term employment means any service, of whatever nature, performed… by an employee for the person employing him, irrespective of the citizenship or residence of either, (A) within the United States, or (B) on or in connection with an American vessel or American aircraft under a contract of service which is entered into within the United States or during the performance of which and while the employee is employed on the vessel or aircraft it touches at a port in the United States, if the employee is employed on and in connection with such vessel or aircraft when outside the United States…”

This definition is geographically limited to the “United States,” which, refers to the federal territories.

Section 2: The Definition of “Wages”

26 U.S.C. § 3121(a):

“For purposes of this chapter, the term wages means all remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash…”

If you are not engaged in “employment” as defined in the statute, then your remuneration is not “wages” for FICA tax purposes.

The specific focus on government employees and corporate officers in these definitions has led to the factual reality that private citizens who are not government employees or corporate officers, and who do not fall within the common law definition of “employee,” are not subject to mandatory FICA taxes or Social Security enrollment.

26 U.S.C. § 7701 provides general definitions for the Internal Revenue Code, defining a “person” as “an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.” The distinction between “person” (which includes artificial entities) and “individual” (a natural person) is significant in interpreting the scope of federal tax jurisdiction.

Purpose and Scope of This Article

This memorandum will provide a comprehensive analysis of the Social Security system, examining the statutory framework, case law, constitutional principles, and practical remedies available to people who seek to understand their rights and limit their participation in the system. The analysis will demonstrate that:

1. Social Security is a welfare program, not a contractual right, and Congress can modify or eliminate it at any time.

2. There is no trust fund; FICA taxes go into the general Treasury.

3. The statutory definitions of “employee” and “wages” create jurisdictional limits on mandatory participation.

4. SSN disclosure is voluntary, as admitted by the SSA itself.

5. Religious objections to SSN use are protected under RFRA, as demonstrated in Jordan v. Rubio.

6. The Federal Reserve System is a network of privately owned corporations, not a federal agency.

7. Practical legal remedies exist for people who wish to limit their participation in the Social Security system.

II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is there a contractual or property right to Social Security benefits, or can Congress modify or eliminate the program at any time?

2. Do Social Security taxes paid by workers go into a trust fund or individual accounts, or are they paid into the general Treasury of the United States?

3. Has the Supreme Court ever ruled that the Social Security Act is constitutional as a welfare program, or has it only upheld the Act as a valid exercise of the taxing power?

4. Do the statutory definitions of “employee,” “employer,” and “wages” in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3401, 7701) create a jurisdictional basis for universal mandatory participation in the Social Security system, or do these definitions limit the scope of mandatory participation to specific categories of workers?

5. Is there a legal distinction between “state inhabitants” and “federal citizens,” and if so, does this distinction affect one’s obligation to participate in the Social Security system?

6. Is disclosure of a Social Security Number mandatory for all American citizens, or is it voluntary as stated in Social Security Administration publications?

7. What legal protections are available to people who have sincere religious objections to obtaining or using a Social Security Number?

8. Can a U.S. citizen obtain a passport or other essential government documents without providing a Social Security Number?

9. What is the relationship between the Social Security system and international agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act?

10. What is the legal status of the Federal Reserve System? Is it a federal agency or a network of privately owned corporations?

11. Are American citizens, through the Social Security system, serving as collateral for the national debt?

12. What is the legal theory of “tacit procuration,” and does obtaining a Social Security Number constitute voluntary submission to federal jurisdiction through an adhesion contract?

13. Are FICA taxes classified as income taxes, or are they a different category of tax?

14. What practical legal remedies and procedures are available to people who wish to limit or terminate their participation in the Social Security system?

III. SHORT ANSWER

1. No, there is no contractual or property right to Social Security benefits. The Supreme Court in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), definitively held that Social Security benefits are not an “accrued property right” and that Congress has plenary power to “alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the Social Security Act. This power is expressly reserved in 42 U.S.C. § 1304. Social Security is a welfare program, not a contractual retirement plan.

2. No, Social Security taxes do not go into a trust fund or individual accounts. The Supreme Court in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), held that FICA tax proceeds “are to be paid into the Treasury like other internal revenue taxes generally, and are not earmarked in any way.” The money goes into the general fund of the United States Treasury, and Congress can spend it for any purpose it deems to serve the general welfare.

3. No, the Supreme Court has never ruled that the Social Security Act is constitutional as a welfare program. In both Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), the Court upheld the Act solely as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power. The Court explicitly declined to rule on the larger constitutional question of whether the Act is valid as a welfare program, following the principle of constitutional avoidance articulated in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).

4. No, the statutory definitions do not create universal mandatory participation. The definitions of “employee” in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d) and § 3401(c) specifically emphasize government employees and corporate officers. The use of the word “includes” in these definitions suggests that they are not exhaustive but also not universal. A private citizen who is not a government employee or corporate officer, and who does not fall within the common law definition of “employee,” has a plausible legal argument that mandatory FICA taxes do not apply.

5. Yes, there is a legal distinction, and it may affect Social Security obligations. The concept of dual citizenship—state citizenship and federal citizenship—has been recognized in case law such as Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1953). The Buck Act (4 U.S.C. §§ 104-113) addresses the limited circumstances in which federal jurisdiction extends to state inhabitants. The argument is that “state inhabitants” who have not voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction are not subject to federal programs like Social Security.

6. Disclosure of a Social Security Number is voluntary. The Social Security Administration’s own Publication No. 05-10002 explicitly states: “Giving your number is voluntary even when you’re asked for the number directly.” This is consistent with the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a), Section 7, which prohibits government agencies from denying rights, benefits, or privileges based on refusal to disclose an SSN, except where specifically authorized by federal statute.

7. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) provides strong protections. RFRA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless it demonstrates a compelling governmental interest and uses the least restrictive means. Sincere religious objections to SSN use are legally cognizable under RFRA.

8. Yes, as demonstrated in Jordan v. Rubio (2025). In this landmark case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that a citizen with sincere religious objections could obtain a passport without providing a Social Security Number. The court found that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest sufficient to override the plaintiff’s religious freedom under RFRA. The plaintiff also obtained a passport without a birth certificate, using a Letter of No Record instead.

9. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465) implemented GATT provisions requiring SSNs for newborns. This international agreement, which the United States adopted, created a global tracking network for people. However, SSA Publication No. 05-10023 states that “Getting a Social Security number for your baby is strictly voluntary,” indicating that even international agreements do not override the voluntary nature of SSN enrollment in U.S. law.

10. The Federal Reserve System is a network of privately owned corporations, not a federal agency. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982), held that Federal Reserve Banks are “independent, privately owned and locally controlled corporations,” not federal instrumentalities. Each Federal Reserve Bank is owned by the commercial banks in its region, and they operate without day-to-day federal government control.

11. Yes, there is a legal argument that citizens serve as collateral for the national debt. The Social Security system brings the future labor of American citizens into the federal revenue system, effectively making their productive capacity part of the collateral base for the national debt. This was a key purpose of the system’s creation during the debt expansion of the 1930s.

12. Tacit procuration is the legal theory that by voluntarily obtaining an SSN, one submits to federal jurisdiction. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract offered on a “take it or leave it” basis. The argument is that applying for an SSN constitutes acceptance of an adhesion contract and tacit procuration (silent agency), whereby someone grants the federal government authority to act on their behalf. The legal maxim states: “An ungrateful freeman is reduced to slavery.”

13. FICA taxes are classified as Gift and Estate Taxes (IRS Tax Class 5), not Income Taxes (IRS Tax Class 2). FICA is an employment tax, which is a distinct category from income tax. The tax is imposed on the privilege of federal employment, not on the right to earn wages. The distinction is critical because rights cannot be taxed, but privileges can be.

14. Several practical remedies are available. People can:

• Refuse to apply for an SSN, citing the voluntary nature admitted by the SSA.

• Assert religious objections under RFRA, following the Jordan v. Rubio precedent.

• Challenge the applicability of the “employee” definition in their specific circumstances.

• File proper Privacy Act notices when agencies request SSN disclosure.

• Use alternative forms of identification for government documents.

• Properly complete W-4, W-4V forms, or formal letter of cancelled withholding with the man or company who provides work for compensation which to claim exemption from withholding where applicable.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Non-Contractual Nature of Social Security: No Promise to Pay Benefits

The foundational legal principle governing the Social Security system is that it does not create a contractual relationship between the government and participants. There is no promise to pay benefits, no accrued property right, and no legal entitlement that cannot be modified or eliminated by Congress. This principle was definitively established by the Supreme Court and is codified in the Social Security Act itself.

1. Flemming v. Nestor: The Definitive Rejection of Property Rights in Benefits

The Supreme Court’s decision in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), is the cornerstone of Social Security jurisprudence. The case involved Ephram Nestor, a Bulgarian immigrant who had paid into the Social Security system for 19 years. In 1956, Nestor was deported under the Immigration and Nationality Act for having been a member of the Communist Party from 1933 to 1939. Following his deportation, his Social Security benefits were terminated pursuant to a 1954 amendment to the Social Security Act that denied benefits to deported aliens.

Nestor sued, arguing that the termination of his benefits violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights because he had an “accrued property right” in the benefits he had earned through his contributions to the system. The Supreme Court rejected this argument entirely.

Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated:

To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of ‘accrued property rights’ would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it demands. It was doubtless out of an awareness of the need for such flexibility that Congress included in the original Act, and has since retained, a clause expressly reserving to it ‘[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision’ of the Act. Section 1104, 49 Stat. 648, 42 U.S.C. § 1304. That provision makes express what is implicit in the institutional needs of the program.

The Court further explained:

We must conclude that a person covered by the Act has not such a right in benefit payments as would make every defeasance of ‘accrued’ interests violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

This holding means that no matter how many years a worker has paid into the Social Security system, and no matter how much money has been withheld from their paychecks, they do not have a legally enforceable right to receive benefits. Congress can change the eligibility requirements, reduce benefit amounts, or eliminate the program entirely without violating any constitutional rights. It is all voluntary to maintain the constitutionality of the program, and hence not a right due to its voluntary nature.

2. The Reservation of Rights Clause: 42 U.S.C. § 1304

The Supreme Court’s holding in Flemming is based on the express language of the Social Security Act itself. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 states in its entirety:

§ 1304. Reservation of right to amend or repeal

The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby reserved to the Congress.

This single sentence, enacted as part of the original Social Security Act in 1935, reserves to Congress unlimited power to modify or eliminate any aspect of the Social Security system. It is a clear statement that the Act does not create permanent, vested rights.

The reservation clause is not merely a formality. It has real legal effect. It means that:

• Congress can change eligibility requirements at any time (e.g., raising the retirement age, imposing means testing).

• Congress can reduce or eliminate benefit amounts.

• Congress can terminate benefits for entire categories of recipients (as it did for deported aliens in Flemming).

• Congress can change the funding mechanism or eliminate the program entirely.

Participants in the Social Security system have no legal recourse if Congress exercises this reserved power, no matter how unfair or arbitrary the changes may seem.

3. Implications: Social Security as Welfare, Not Retirement Planning

The non-contractual nature of Social Security has profound implications. It means that Social Security is fundamentally different from a private pension plan or a retirement savings account. In a true pension or retirement plan, the participant has a property right in the benefits they have earned. The plan administrator has a fiduciary duty to manage the funds for the benefit of the participants. If the administrator fails to pay benefits as promised, the participant can sue for breach of contract.

None of these protections exist in the Social Security system. The government is not a fiduciary. There is no trust relationship. There is no contract. Social Security is a welfare program, funded by current tax revenues, and subject to the political decisions of Congress.

This characterization is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Helvering v. Davis (discussed in the next section) that Social Security taxes are general revenue taxes, not contributions to a fund held in trust for the taxpayer’s benefit.

The practical consequence is that people who rely solely on Social Security for their retirement are placing their financial security in the hands of future Congresses, which have no legal obligation to maintain the current benefit structure. As the Supreme Court noted, the system demands “flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions.” Those “adjustments” can include reducing or eliminating benefits.

4. The Biblical Warning Against Government Dependency

The non-contractual, revocable nature of Social Security benefits validates the biblical warnings against dependence on government charity. The Apostle Paul, quoting King David in Romans 11:9, warned: “Let their table become a snare and a trap, a stumbling block and a retribution for them.” The “table” refers to government provision, which becomes a trap when citizens become dependent on benefits that can be taken away at any time.

Proverbs 23:1-3 warns: “When you sit down to eat with a ruler, observe carefully what is before you, and put a knife to your throat if you are given to appetite. Do not desire his delicacies, for they are deceptive food.” Government benefits are “deceptive food” precisely because they appear to be secure but can be eliminated by legislative action.

The Social Security system exemplifies this principle. Millions of Americans have planned their retirements around the assumption that Social Security benefits will be available. Yet the Supreme Court has made clear that there is no legal guarantee of payment. The “table” of government provision is indeed a snare.

5. Conclusion on Non-Contractual Nature

The legal framework established by Flemming v. Nestor and codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1304 is unambiguous: Social Security is not a contractual right, and participants have no property interest in benefits. This is the first and most important fact that the government has not adequately communicated to the American people. The system is presented as a retirement program, but it is legally a welfare program subject to congressional modification or elimination at any time.

B. The Trust Fund Myth: Your Money Goes to the General Treasury

A common misconception about the Social Security system is that workers “pay into” a trust fund or individual account, and that their contributions are held in reserve to fund their future benefits. This is false. The Supreme Court has held that Social Security taxes go directly into the general Treasury of the United States, where they are commingled with all other federal revenues and can be spent for any purpose Congress chooses.

1. Helvering v. Davis: No Earmarking of Social Security Taxes

The Supreme Court addressed the nature of Social Security taxes in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), one of two companion cases that upheld the constitutionality of the Social Security Act. The case involved a challenge to the old-age benefits provisions of the Act.

Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, explained the financial structure of the Social Security system:

The proceeds of both the employee and employer taxes are to be paid into the Treasury like internal-revenue taxes generally, and are not earmarked in any way.

This single sentence destroys the myth of the Social Security “trust fund.” The Court made clear that FICA taxes are general revenue taxes that go into the Treasury’s general fund, not into a segregated account or trust fund held for the benefit of the taxpayer.

The Court continued:

In the general fund of the Treasury, the proceeds of the tax are available for any expenditure which Congress may authorize. The proceeds of the tax, when collected, are paid into the Treasury of the United States like internal revenue taxes generally.

This means that the moment FICA taxes are collected, they become part of the general revenues of the United States and can be used for any purpose—military spending, foreign aid, debt service, or any other expenditure authorized by Congress. There is no legal requirement that the money be reserved for Social Security benefits.

2. The “Trust Fund” is an Accounting Fiction

Despite the Supreme Court’s clear holding in Helvering, the Social Security Administration and the federal government continue to refer to the “Social Security Trust Fund.” This terminology is misleading. The so-called trust fund is not a fund in any meaningful sense. It is an accounting mechanism that tracks the cumulative surplus or deficit of Social Security tax revenues compared to benefit payments.

When Social Security tax revenues exceed benefit payments (as they did for many decades), the surplus is not held in reserve. Instead, it is immediately spent by the federal government on other programs, and the Social Security Trust Fund is credited with special-issue Treasury bonds. These bonds are IOUs—promises by the federal government to pay itself back in the future.

When Social Security benefit payments exceed tax revenues (as is now the case), the Trust Fund “redeems” these bonds. But redemption does not mean that money is withdrawn from a reserve account. It means that the federal government must raise the money through current taxation, borrowing, or spending cuts. The bonds in the Trust Fund are not assets in any real sense; they are simply a record of how much the government owes to the Social Security system.

As the Supreme Court noted in Helvering, Congress has “no constitutional power to earmark or segregate certain kinds of tax proceeds for certain purposes.” The Trust Fund is a political and accounting construct, not a legal obligation.

3. Unfunded Liabilities: Future Generations as Collateral

The current unfunded liability of the Social Security and Medicare systems, the gap between promised benefits and projected tax revenues—is estimated to exceed $100 trillion. This represents a staggering burden on future generations, who will be required to pay higher taxes, receive reduced benefits, or both.

The biblical principle articulated in Proverbs 17:18 warns against becoming “surety” for debt: “One who lacks sense gives a pledge and puts up security in the presence of his neighbor.” By participating in the Social Security system, American workers have become surety for the national debt. Their future labor is the collateral that backs the government’s promises to pay benefits.

President Abraham Lincoln, in his Second Inaugural Address on March 4, 1865, stated: “It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces.” This principle applies directly to the Social Security system. Current retirees are receiving benefits funded by the labor of current workers. This intergenerational transfer of wealth is a form of forced redistribution that violates the biblical command in Genesis 3:19 that each person shall earn bread “by the sweat of your face.”

The system is inherently unsustainable. As the ratio of workers to retirees declines, the burden on each worker increases. Future generations will pay more and receive less, all to honor promises made by politicians who will be long gone.

4. Congress Can Spend Social Security Taxes on Anything

Because Social Security taxes go into the general Treasury and are not earmarked, Congress has complete discretion to spend the money on any purpose it chooses. The Supreme Court in Helvering confirmed that “Congress could, in its future discretion, spend that money for whatever Congress then judged to be the general welfare of the country.”

This means that even if a worker has paid FICA taxes for 40 years, Congress could theoretically eliminate all Social Security benefits and use the tax revenue for other purposes—and the worker would have no legal recourse. The combination of the non-contractual nature of benefits (Flemming) and the non-earmarked nature of taxes (Helvering) creates a system in which participants have no legal protection whatsoever.

5. The Deception: “Sold As If It Were Insurance”

Edwin Witte, one of the principal architects of the Social Security Act, admitted in congressional testimony (Ways and Means hearings, pages 936-946) that Social Security was “sold as if it were insurance” and that this was a mistake. Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor under President Roosevelt, wrote in the forward to Witte’s book The Development of the Social Security Act: “The Government of the United States is not an insurance company and so it could not be done.”

These admissions reveal that the American people were deliberately misled about the nature of the Social Security system. It was presented as insurance—a system in which your contributions buy you a guaranteed benefit. But legally, it is nothing of the sort. It is a tax-and-welfare system in which current workers fund current retirees, with no guarantee that future workers will fund current workers when they retire.

The phrase “as if it were insurance” is telling. “As if” means it is not actually insurance. It is a simulation, a pretense, a deception. True insurance creates a contractual right to benefits. Social Security does not.

6. Conclusion on the Trust Fund Myth

The legal reality is clear: there is no Social Security trust fund in any meaningful sense. FICA taxes go directly into the general Treasury and can be spent on anything. The “Trust Fund” is an accounting fiction consisting of IOUs that the government has written to itself. Future benefits are not funded by past contributions but by future taxes on future workers. The system is a pay-as-you-go intergenerational wealth transfer, not a funded retirement program.

This is the second critical fact that the government has not adequately communicated to the American people.

C. Constitutional Questions: The Supreme Court Has Never Ruled Social Security Constitutional as Welfare

A widely held belief is that the Supreme Court has ruled the Social Security Act constitutional. This is only partially true. The Court has upheld the Act as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power, but it has never ruled on the larger constitutional question of whether the Act is valid as a welfare program. This distinction is critical and is often overlooked.

1. The Two 1937 Cases: Steward Machine and Helvering

The constitutionality of the Social Security Act was challenged in two cases that reached the Supreme Court in 1937: Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).

In Steward Machine, the Court upheld the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act. In Helvering, the Court upheld the old-age benefits provisions. However, in both cases, the Court based its decision on the narrow ground that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to tax for the general welfare under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.

The Court did not rule on whether the Act was constitutional as a welfare program or whether Congress had the power to create a mandatory national retirement system. Instead, the Court characterized the Social Security taxes as excise taxes and held that Congress has broad discretion to determine what constitutes the “general welfare.”

2. The Court’s Refusal to Decide the Larger Question

In Helvering v. Davis, Justice Cardozo explicitly acknowledged that the Court was not deciding the larger constitutional question. He wrote:

We find it unnecessary to make a choice between the arguments, and so leave the question open.

This statement appears on page 645 of the opinion. The Court was presented with arguments about whether the Social Security Act exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and violated principles of federalism and personal liberty. The Court declined to address these arguments, instead relying on the narrow ground that the taxing power is sufficient to uphold the Act.

3. The Ashwander Doctrine: Constitutional Avoidance

The Supreme Court’s approach in the Social Security cases is consistent with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance articulated in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). Justice Brandeis, in a famous concurring opinion, set forth seven rules that the Court follows when deciding constitutional questions. Rule 7 states:

When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

This is precisely what the Court did in Steward Machine and Helvering. Rather than confronting the difficult constitutional questions about the scope of federal power to create a mandatory national welfare system, the Court found a “construction of the statute” that avoided the question: it characterized Social Security as a tax, and taxes are clearly within Congress’s constitutional authority.

The problem with this approach is that it leaves the larger constitutional question unresolved. The Court has never ruled that Congress has the power to create a mandatory national retirement system or to require all workers to participate in a federal welfare program. It has only ruled that Congress can impose taxes and spend money for the general welfare.

4. Social Security is Valid Only as a Tax, Not as a Benefit Program

The practical implication of the Court’s narrow holding is that Social Security is constitutional only to the extent that it is a tax. The taxing power is valid. But the promise of benefits—the quid pro quo that makes the system politically palatable—has no constitutional foundation.

This explains why the Court in Flemming v. Nestor held that there is no contractual right to benefits. If Social Security were a true benefit program with enforceable rights, it would raise serious constitutional questions about whether Congress has the power to create such a program. By characterizing it as a tax-and-welfare system with no enforceable rights, the Court avoids these questions.

The result is a legal fiction: the government can tax you for Social Security, but it has no obligation to pay you benefits. You are required to participate in the system (if you fall within the statutory definitions of “employee”), but you have no legal recourse if the system fails to deliver on its promises.

5. Lower Courts Had Ruled Social Security Unconstitutional

It is important to note that before the Supreme Court’s 1937 decisions, lower federal courts had ruled that the Social Security Act was unconstitutional. These courts found that the Act exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and violated the Tenth Amendment by intruding on matters reserved to the states.

The Supreme Court reversed these lower court rulings, but it did so on narrow grounds without fully addressing the constitutional concerns that the lower courts had raised. The larger questions about federalism, personal liberty, and the limits of congressional power remain unresolved.

6. The Continuing Constitutional Debate

Legal scholars continue to debate whether the Social Security system, as it currently operates, is constitutional. Some argue that the system exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers and violates principles of federalism and personal liberty. Others argue that the taxing and spending powers are broad enough to encompass the Social Security system.

What is clear is that the Supreme Court has never definitively resolved these questions. The Court has upheld Social Security as a tax, but it has not ruled that Congress has the power to create a mandatory national retirement system with enforceable benefit rights. Indeed, the Court in Flemming made clear that there are no enforceable benefit rights, which suggests that any such system would be constitutionally problematic.

7. Conclusion on Constitutional Questions

The Supreme Court has never ruled that the Social Security Act is constitutional as a welfare program. It has only upheld the Act as a valid exercise of the taxing power. This is a critical distinction that is rarely understood or acknowledged. The larger constitutional questions about the scope of federal power and the rights of people remain open.

This is the third important fact that the government has not adequately communicated to the American people.

D. Jurisdictional Limits: Who is an “Employee” Under the Internal Revenue Code?

The authority of the federal government to impose FICA taxes and require Social Security participation is not unlimited. It is derived from specific statutory definitions found in the Internal Revenue Code. A careful analysis of these definitions reveals that they do not apply universally to all American workers. The definitions focus primarily on government employees and corporate officers, suggesting that private citizens engaged in private-sector work may not fall within the mandatory scope of the Social Security system.

1. The Definition of “Employee” in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)

26 U.S.C. § 3121 contains the definitions applicable to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA). Subsection (d) defines “employee” for purposes of Social Security taxes. The full text of the definition is lengthy and complex, but several key provisions are noteworthy.

The statute states that the term “employee” means:

(1) any officer of a corporation; or
(2) any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee; or
(3) any individual (other than an individual who is an employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who performs services for remuneration for any person as a [home worker, traveling salesman, agent-driver, commission-driver, full-time life insurance salesman, etc.].

The critical word in this definition is “includes.” In statutory construction, the word “includes” can be either expansive (meaning “includes but is not limited to”) or restrictive (meaning “includes only the following”). The context and structure of § 3121(d) suggest a restrictive meaning.

The definition specifically enumerates certain categories of workers: corporate officers, common law employees, and specific types of service providers. The fact that Congress felt it necessary to list these specific categories suggests that not all workers are automatically “employees” for FICA purposes.

Most significantly, the definition emphasizes officers of corporations as the first category. This is not accidental. The federal government has clear constitutional authority to regulate corporations, which are artificial entities created by state law and engaged in interstate commerce. By focusing on corporate officers, the statute establishes federal jurisdiction based on the corporate form of organization.

2. The Definition of “Employee” in 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c)

26 U.S.C. § 3401 contains the definitions applicable to income tax withholding. Subsection (c) defines “employee” for purposes of withholding. The definition states:

For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.

This definition is even more revealing than the FICA definition. It explicitly states that “employee” includes:

1. Officers, employees, and elected officials of the United States (federal government)

2. Officers, employees, and elected officials of a State

3. Officers, employees, and elected officials of any political subdivision (counties, cities, etc.)

4. Officers, employees, and elected officials of the District of Columbia

5. Officers, employees, and elected officials of any agency or instrumentality of the foregoing

6. Officers of a corporation

The focus on government employees and corporate officers is unmistakable. The statute does not say “all workers” or “all individuals who perform services for compensation.” It specifically enumerates government employees and corporate officers.

The legal argument that flows from this definition is straightforward: if you are not a government employee and you are not a corporate officer, then you are not an “employee” as defined in § 3401(c), and therefore income tax withholding does not apply to you. By extension, if you are not an “employee” under the related FICA provisions, then Social Security taxes do not apply to you.

3. The Significance of “Includes” in Statutory Construction

The word “includes” appears in both § 3121(d) and § 3401(c). Understanding how this word functions in statutory construction is critical to interpreting the scope of these definitions.

In general usage, “includes” is often understood to mean “includes but is not limited to,” suggesting an expansive, non-exhaustive list. However, in legal and statutory contexts, “includes” can also mean “includes only” or “means,” creating a restrictive, exhaustive list.

The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in various contexts. The interpretive principle is that when a statute uses “includes” followed by a specific list of items, the list is presumed to be restrictive unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. This is known as the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing excludes others.

Applied to §§ 3121 and 3401, the principle suggests that by specifically listing government employees and corporate officers, Congress intended to limit the definition of “employee” to these categories (and those who fall within the common law employee relationship). Private citizens who work for private, non-corporate employers, and who do not have an employer-employee relationship under common law, are not included.

4. The Common Law Employee Test

Both § 3121(d) and the broader tax code reference the “common law” definition of employee. Under common law, an employee is someone who is subject to the control and direction of an employer in the manner and means of performing work. The key factors include:

• The employer’s right to control how the work is performed

• The employer’s provision of tools and workplace

• The employer’s right to terminate the relationship

• Regular payment of wages or salary

• The work being part of the employer’s regular business

An independent contractor, by contrast, is someone who controls their own work methods, provides their own tools, works for multiple clients, and is paid per project rather than by salary or hourly wage.

The critical point is that the common law employee test is a factual determination, not a universal status. Not everyone who performs work for compensation is a common law employee. Many workers are independent contractors, sole proprietors, or engaged in private exchanges of labor that do not create an employer-employee relationship.

If someone is not a common law employee, and is not a government employee or corporate officer, then they do not fall within the statutory definition of “employee” in §§ 3121 or 3401.

5. The Distinction Between “United States” and “several States”

Another critical aspect of the jurisdictional analysis is the definition of “United States” in the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(9) defines “United States” as:

The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

This definition is circular and requires further analysis. What are “the States” referred to in this definition? Are they the 50 states of the Union (the “several States” mentioned in the Constitution), or are they federal territories and possessions?

Legal researchers have noted that in many contexts, the term “State” in federal statutes refers to federal territories (such as Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands) rather than the sovereign states of the Union. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the definition includes “the District of Columbia,” which is federal territory, not a state of the Union.

If “United States” in the tax code refers only to federal territories and the District of Columbia, then the jurisdiction of the IRS and the Social Security Administration is limited to those areas. Inhabitants of the 50 states of the Union, who are not federal employees or corporate officers, would not be subject to federal income tax or FICA taxes.

This interpretation is controversial and has been rejected by federal courts in tax prosecution cases. However, it remains a plausible reading of the statutory language and is consistent with the principle that federal jurisdiction is limited to areas where the federal government has territorial sovereignty or where people have voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction.

6. Voluntary Participation Through the W-4 Form

A related argument is that private-sector workers become subject to income tax withholding and FICA taxes only by voluntarily completing a W-4 form. The W-4 form is titled “Employee’s Withholding Certificate,” and it requires the worker to certify that they are an “employee” and to provide their Social Security Number.

The Privacy Act Statement on the W-4 form states that the form is authorized by Section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code, and that the definitions for this section are found in Section 3401. As discussed above, § 3401(c) defines “employee” as including government employees and corporate officers.

The argument is that by completing a W-4 form, a private-sector worker is making a false certification that they are an “employee” as defined in § 3401(c). If the worker is not actually a government employee or corporate officer, then the W-4 form is based on a false premise, and the withholding is not legally authorized.

Furthermore, the act of completing the W-4 form and providing an SSN can be characterized as a voluntary submission to federal jurisdiction—a form of tacit procuration (discussed in Section K below). The worker is not required by law to complete the form; they do so voluntarily, often without understanding the legal implications.

7. Conclusion on Jurisdictional Limits

The statutory definitions of “employee” in the Internal Revenue Code are not universal. They focus specifically on government employees and corporate officers, with a residual category for common law employees and certain enumerated service providers. Private citizens who do not fall within these categories have a plausible legal argument that they are not subject to mandatory FICA taxes or Social Security enrollment.

This jurisdictional analysis is supported by the principle that federal power is limited and that people are not subject to federal jurisdiction unless they fall within a specific constitutional or statutory grant of authority. The burden is on the government to demonstrate that a particular people falls within the definition of “employee,” not on the man to prove that they do not.

This is the fourth critical fact that the government has not adequately communicated to the American people: the Social Security system does not apply universally to all workers, but only to those who fall within specific statutory definitions.

E. State Inhabitants vs. Federal Citizens: The Dual Citizenship Doctrine

Closely related to the question of who is an “employee” is the question of citizenship and jurisdiction. American law recognizes a distinction between state citizenship and federal citizenship, and between inhabitants of the several states and residents of federal territories. This distinction has significant implications for the application of federal programs like Social Security.

1. The Concept of Dual Citizenship

The concept of dual citizenship—that an American can be simultaneously a citizen of a state and a citizen of the United States—has deep historical roots. Before the Fourteenth Amendment (1868), citizenship was primarily a matter of state law. People were citizens of their respective states, and national citizenship was derivative of state citizenship.

The Fourteenth Amendment changed this by creating a federal definition of citizenship: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” This created two distinct forms of citizenship: United States citizenship and state citizenship.

The Supreme Court has recognized this dual citizenship in numerous cases. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), the Court stated:

We have in our political system a Government of the United States and a government of each of the several States. Each one of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own.

The Court further explained:

The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will be different from those he has under the other.

This distinction is critical. A citizen of a state has rights under state law and the state constitution. A citizen of the United States has rights under federal law and the U.S. Constitution. But these are not identical sets of rights, and the two forms of citizenship do not impose identical obligations.

2. Kitchens v. Steele and Dual Sovereignty

The case of Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1953), addressed the concept of dual citizenship and dual sovereignty. The court stated:

A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the federal government and a citizen of a State is a citizen of the State in which he resides. There is a difference between a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State.

The court further explained that when one becomes a citizen of the United States (as opposed to merely a citizen of a state), they “owe allegiance to two sovereignties, and are liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either.”

This concept of dual allegiance is significant for Social Security purposes. If one is only a citizen of a state, and has not voluntarily become a “citizen of the United States” in the federal sense, then they may not be subject to federal programs that apply only to federal citizens.

The question then becomes: how does one become a “citizen of the United States” as distinct from a citizen of a state? The answer may lie in voluntary acts such as registering to vote in federal elections, obtaining a Social Security Number, or accepting federal benefits. These acts can be characterized as a voluntary submission to federal jurisdiction and an acceptance of the obligations that come with federal citizenship.

3. Elk v. Wilkins: Jurisdiction as a Prerequisite to Citizenship

The Supreme Court’s decision in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), provides important insights into the relationship between jurisdiction and citizenship. The case involved a Native American who was born on a reservation but later moved to a city and attempted to register to vote. The question was whether he was a citizen of the United States.

The Court held that he was not a citizen because he was not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States at birth. The Court explained that the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the Fourteenth Amendment means complete political jurisdiction, not merely geographic presence.

The Court stated:

The evident meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance.

This holding suggests that jurisdiction is not automatic or universal. It requires a specific relationship of allegiance and subjection. Applied to the Social Security context, the argument is that one who has not voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction (by obtaining an SSN, registering for federal benefits, etc.) is not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the federal government for purposes of mandatory participation in federal programs.

4. The Buck Act and Federal Enclaves

The Buck Act, codified at 4 U.S.C. §§ 104-113, addresses the jurisdictional relationship between the federal government and the states. The Act authorizes states to tax federal employees and federal property in certain limited circumstances, but it also implicitly recognizes the distinction between federal enclaves (areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction) and the territory of the several states.

4 U.S.C. § 104 provides:

No person shall be relieved from liability for any income tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, by reason of his residing within a Federal area or receiving income from transactions occurring or services performed in such area.

This provision recognizes that “Federal areas” are distinct from state territory and that different jurisdictional rules apply. The Act creates a limited exception to the general rule that states cannot tax federal property or federal employees within federal enclaves.

The implication is that there are two distinct jurisdictions: federal enclaves (where the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction) and state territory (where the state government has primary jurisdiction). People who have a home in state territory and are not federal employees may not be subject to federal jurisdiction for purposes of programs like Social Security.

5. State Inhabitants Are Exempt

The argument flowing from the dual citizenship doctrine and the Buck Act is that “state inhabitants”—people who domicile in one of the 50 states, who are not federal employees or corporate officers, and who have not voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction—are exempt from mandatory participation in the Social Security system.

This argument is based on the principle that the federal government is a government of limited, enumerated powers. It has jurisdiction over federal territories, federal employees, and individuals engaged in activities that fall within its constitutional authority (such as interstate commerce). But it does not have general police power or plenary authority over all people within the geographic boundaries of the United States.

The Social Security Act, as a federal statute, can only apply to those who are subject to federal jurisdiction. If a man or woman is a state inhabitant who has not voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction, then the Act does not apply to them.

6. Voluntary Submission to Federal Jurisdiction

The counterargument, of course, is that most Americans have voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction by obtaining a Social Security Number, registering to vote in federal elections, accepting federal benefits, or engaging in federally regulated activities. Once someone has voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction, they become subject to federal laws and programs.

This is where the concept of tacit procuration (discussed in Section K) becomes relevant. By applying for an SSN, one may be making a voluntary election to become a “federal citizen” subject to federal jurisdiction. The application is not mandatory, but once made, it creates a legal relationship with the federal government.

The key point is that this submission is voluntary, not mandatory. No one is required by law to obtain an SSN or to participate in the Social Security system unless they fall within the specific statutory definitions of “employee.” The widespread participation in the system is the result of social pressure, employer requirements, and government encouragement—not legal compulsion.

7. Conclusion on State Inhabitants vs. Federal Citizens

The legal distinction between state citizenship and federal citizenship, and between state inhabitants and federal residents, is well-established in American law. This distinction has significant implications for the application of federal programs like Social Security. People who are state inhabitants, who are not federal employees or corporate officers, and who have not voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction, have a plausible legal argument that they are not subject to mandatory participation in the Social Security system.

This is the fifth critical fact that the government has not adequately communicated to the American people: participation in Social Security may be limited to those who have voluntarily submitted to federal jurisdiction, and state inhabitants may be exempt.

F. The Voluntary Nature of Social Security Number Disclosure

Perhaps the most shocking admission by the federal government regarding the Social Security system is that obtaining and disclosing a Social Security Number is voluntary. This fact is stated explicitly in official Social Security Administration publications, yet it is almost universally unknown to the American public. The widespread belief that an SSN is mandatory is false and is contradicted by the government’s own documents.

1. SSA Publication No. 05-10002: The Explicit Admission

SSA Publication No. 05-10002, titled “Your Social Security Number and Card,” is an official publication of the Social Security Administration. The publication is available on the SSA’s website and is distributed to the public as an informational resource.

On the topic of SSN disclosure, the publication states:

This statement is clear, unambiguous, and dispositive. The Social Security Administration, the federal agency responsible for administering the Social Security system, admits that providing your Social Security Number is voluntary—even when someone asks you for it directly.

This admission contradicts the common practice of employers, banks, schools, government agencies, and countless other entities that treat SSN disclosure as mandatory. When an employer demands an SSN as a condition of employment, or a bank demands an SSN as a condition of opening an account, they are acting contrary to the SSA’s own admission that disclosure is voluntary.

The publication continues:

This clarification reveals the coercive nature of the system. While disclosure is technically voluntary, the practical consequences of non-disclosure are severe. This creates a system of de facto compulsion: you are not legally required to provide your SSN, but you will be denied employment, banking services, and other essential services if you refuse.

This is a classic example of what legal scholars call “unconstitutional conditions”—the government cannot directly compel you to waive your rights, but it can create conditions that make it practically impossible to exercise those rights.

2. SSA Publication No. 05-10023: Voluntary SSNs for Children

The voluntary nature of SSN enrollment is even more explicit in the context of children. SSA Publication No. 05-10023, titled “Social Security Numbers for Children,” states on page 4:

The original version of this brochure emphasized the word “voluntary” in bold letters, making it impossible to miss. The SSA wanted parents to know that they are not required to obtain an SSN for their newborn child.

Despite this clear statement, hospitals routinely provide SSN application forms to new parents and strongly encourage them to apply for an SSN for their baby before leaving the hospital. Many parents believe this is mandatory and comply without question. It is entirely voluntary.

The pressure to obtain SSNs for children comes primarily from the tax code. The Internal Revenue Code requires taxpayers who claim a dependent child on their tax return to provide the child’s SSN. However, this requirement applies only if the parent is claiming the child as a dependent for tax purposes. If the parent does not claim the child as a dependent, there is no requirement to obtain an SSN for the child.

Furthermore, even this tax code requirement is subject to the larger question of whether the parent is subject to federal income tax in the first place. If the parent is not a “taxpayer” as defined in the Internal Revenue Code, then the requirement to provide a dependent’s SSN does not apply.

3. The Privacy Act of 1974: Section 7

The voluntary nature of SSN disclosure is further supported by federal statute. The Privacy Act of 1974, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a, contains a specific provision addressing SSN disclosure. Section 7 of the Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a note, states:

(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account number.

This is a clear statutory prohibition. Government agencies cannot deny rights, benefits, or privileges based on refusal to disclose an SSN—unless an exception applies.

The statute provides two exceptions:

(2) the disclosure of such number is required by Federal statute, or
(3) the disclosure of such number to such agency was required under statute or regulation adopted prior to January 1, 1975, to verify the identity of an individual.

These exceptions are narrow. The government agency must point to a specific federal statute that requires SSN disclosure, or a pre-1975 regulation. General requests for SSNs, without a specific statutory basis, are prohibited.

Furthermore, Section 7 requires that when a government agency requests an SSN, it must inform the individual:

(A) whether that disclosure is mandatory or voluntary,
(B) by what statutory or other authority such number is solicited, and
(C) what uses will be made of it.

This is known as a “Privacy Act Notice.” Any government form that requests an SSN must include this notice. If the notice is absent, or if it falsely states that disclosure is mandatory when it is actually voluntary, the request is unlawful.

In practice, many government forms include Privacy Act Notices that cite vague or inapplicable statutory authorities, or that fail to clearly state whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntary. People have a legal right to challenge these deficient notices and to refuse to provide their SSN if the agency cannot demonstrate a specific statutory requirement.

4. No Federal Statute Requires Universal SSN Enrollment

Despite the widespread belief that everyone must have a Social Security Number, there is no federal statute that imposes such a requirement. The Social Security Act itself does not require people to apply for an SSN. The Internal Revenue Code does not require people to have an SSN unless they are engaged in activities that trigger tax obligations (such as being an “employee” as defined in the Code).

The closest thing to a universal SSN requirement is found in the tax code provisions requiring SSNs for:

• Individuals filing federal income tax returns (26 U.S.C. § 6109)

• Dependents claimed on tax returns (26 U.S.C. § 151)

• Recipients of certain government benefits

But all of these requirements are conditional. They apply only if one is engaged in the activity that triggers the requirement (filing a tax return, claiming a dependent, receiving benefits). If someone is not engaged in these activities, there is no requirement to have an SSN.

The argument, therefore, is that SSN enrollment is voluntary for people who are not federal employees, not corporate officers, not engaged in federally regulated activities, and not receiving federal benefits. Such people have no legal obligation to obtain or disclose an SSN.

5. The Coercive Reality vs. the Legal Voluntariness

The tension between the legal voluntariness of SSN disclosure and the practical compulsion to disclose creates a significant problem. On paper, SSN disclosure is voluntary. In practice, it is nearly impossible to function in modern American society without an SSN.

Employers demand SSNs as a condition of employment, citing the requirement to report wages to the IRS. Banks demand SSNs as a condition of opening accounts, citing federal anti-money-laundering regulations. Schools demand SSNs for student records. Government agencies demand SSNs for driver’s licenses, professional licenses, and countless other purposes.

In each case, the demanding entity can point to some federal or state regulation that requires or authorizes the collection of SSNs. But the underlying question remains: are these regulations lawful? Do they violate the Privacy Act’s prohibition on denying rights or benefits based on refusal to disclose an SSN?

The answer depends on whether the regulation is based on a specific federal statute that requires SSN disclosure. If it is, then the Privacy Act exception applies, and the disclosure can be required. If it is not, then the demand for an SSN is unlawful, and man or woman has a right to refuse.

The problem is that most people are not aware of their rights under the Privacy Act, and most entities that demand SSNs are not aware of (or choose to ignore) the limitations on their authority to require disclosure. The result is a system of widespread unlawful compulsion masquerading as legal requirement.

6. Conclusion on the Voluntary Nature of SSN Disclosure

The Social Security Administration’s own publications admit that SSN disclosure is voluntary. The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits government agencies from denying rights or benefits based on refusal to disclose an SSN, except where specifically authorized by federal statute. There is no federal statute that requires universal SSN enrollment.

Despite these legal facts, the practical reality is that SSN disclosure is treated as mandatory by employers, banks, schools, and government agencies. This creates a system of de facto compulsion that violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the law.

This is the sixth critical fact that the government has not adequately communicated to the American people: obtaining and disclosing a Social Security Number is voluntary, not mandatory.

G. Religious Freedom Protections and the Landmark Jordan v. Blinken (aka Rubio) Decision

For people with sincere religious objections to participation in the Social Security system or to the use of government-issued identification numbers, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) provides powerful legal protection. The 2025 federal court decision in Jordan v. Rubio demonstrates that these protections are not merely theoretical but can be successfully invoked to obtain essential government documents without a Social Security Number.

1. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was enacted by Congress in 1993 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which had weakened protections for religious exercise. RFRA was designed to restore the compelling interest test that had previously governed religious freedom cases.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 provides:

(a) In general Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).

(b) Exception: Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

This statute establishes a two-part test. First, if a government action substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion, the burden is presumptively unlawful. Second, the government can overcome this presumption only by demonstrating both (1) a compelling governmental interest and (2) that it is using the least restrictive means to further that interest.

This is the highest level of scrutiny in constitutional law, known as “strict scrutiny.” Very few government actions can survive strict scrutiny. The government must show not just that it has an important reason for its action, but that the reason is “compelling” (of the highest order of importance), and that there is no less burdensome way to achieve the same goal.

2. What Constitutes a “Substantial Burden” on Religious Exercise?

RFRA does not define what constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise. Courts have interpreted this phrase to mean a government action that:

• Requires someone to engage in conduct that violates their religious beliefs, or

• Prevents someone from engaging in conduct required by their religious beliefs, or

• Pressures someone to modify their religious behavior or expression.

The burden must be more than a mere inconvenience. It must meaningfully constrain religious practice or force a choice between following religious beliefs and forfeiting government benefits or rights.

In the context of Social Security Numbers, a substantial burden could include:

• Being required to obtain an SSN in violation of religious beliefs about government identification or the “mark of the beast” (Revelation 13:16-17)

• Being denied a passport, state ID, or other essential document because of refusal to provide an SSN on religious grounds

• Being unable to work or engage in commerce without an SSN, in violation of religious convictions

The key is that the burden must be substantial and must be based on sincere religious beliefs. The government cannot question the truth or validity of the religious beliefs, but it can inquire into whether the beliefs are sincerely held.

3. Jordan v. Rubio (2025): A Landmark Victory

Jordan v. Rubio, Case No. 1:24-cv-01844 (D.D.C. 2025), is a groundbreaking case that demonstrates the power of RFRA to protect people with religious objections to Social Security Numbers.

Facts of the Case:

The plaintiff, Jordan, is a U.S. citizen who has lived her entire life without a Social Security Number. Her refusal to obtain an SSN is based on deeply held religious convictions rooted in her interpretation of biblical passages, particularly Revelation 13:16-17, which describes a mark that people will be required to receive on their right hand or forehead in order to buy or sell. Jordan believes that the Social Security Number is a precursor to or form of this mark, and that obtaining one would violate her religious duty to avoid participation in such a system.

Jordan applied for a U.S. passport, which is necessary for international travel and serves as a primary form of identification for U.S. citizens. The State Department’s passport application requires applicants to provide their Social Security Number. When Jordan refused to provide an SSN on religious grounds, the State Department denied her passport application.

Jordan also did not have a birth certificate. She was born at home, and her birth was never officially registered with the state. When she requested a birth certificate from the state, she was issued a “Letter of No Record,” which is an official document stating that the state has no record of her birth. Jordan submitted this Letter of No Record with her passport application as an alternative form of proof of citizenship.

The State Department rejected both the lack of SSN and the Letter of No Record, stating that a birth certificate and SSN are required for passport issuance.

Legal Claims:

Jordan filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting two primary claims:

1 That the State Department’s requirement of an SSN for passport issuance violated her rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.

2 That the State Department’s rejection of her Letter of No Record as proof of citizenship was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

The Court’s Decision:

The district court ruled in favor of Jordan on both claims.

On the RFRA claim, the court found that:

1 Jordan’s religious beliefs were sincere. The court noted that Jordan had lived her entire life in accordance with these beliefs, never obtaining an SSN despite the significant practical difficulties this created. This demonstrated the sincerity of her convictions.

2 The SSN requirement substantially burdened Jordan’s religious exercise. By denying him a passport based on her refusal to provide an SSN, the State Department was forcing her to choose between her religious beliefs and her right to international travel and identification as a national of the United States or a U.S. citizen.

3 The government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest. The State Department argued that SSNs are necessary for tracking citizens and preventing fraud. The court found this interest to be important but not compelling in Jordan’s specific case, where she had provided extensive alternative documentation of her identity and citizenship.

4 The government failed to use the least restrictive means. Even if the government’s interest were compelling, the court found that requiring an SSN was not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. Jordan had offered alternative forms of identification and documentation, and the government had not explained why these alternatives were insufficient.

On the APA claim, the court found that the State Department’s rejection of the Letter of No Record was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the State Department’s own regulations recognize Letters of No Record as acceptable proof of citizenship in certain circumstances, and the Department had failed to explain why Jordan’s Letter was insufficient.

The court ordered the State Department to issue Jordan a passport without requiring an SSN or a birth certificate.

4. Implications of Jordan v. Rubio

The Jordan v. Rubio decision has far-reaching implications for people with religious objections to Social Security Numbers:

Passports Without SSNs: The decision establishes that U.S. citizens or citizens of a state can obtain passports without providing Social Security Numbers if they have sincere religious objections and can provide alternative documentation of identity and citizenship.

Birth Certificates Not Required: The decision also establishes that birth certificates are not absolutely required for passport issuance. A Letter of No Record, combined with other evidence of citizenship, can be sufficient.

RFRA as a Shield: The decision demonstrates that RFRA provides real, enforceable protection against government requirements that burden religious exercise. It is not merely a symbolic statute but a powerful tool for protecting religious freedom.

Burden on Government: The decision places the burden on the government to demonstrate a compelling interest and the use of least restrictive means. This is a heavy burden that the government will often be unable to meet, especially when someone has provided alternative means of achieving the government’s stated goals.

Precedent for Other Contexts: While Jordan involved passports, the reasoning applies to other contexts where SSNs are demanded. If someone has sincere religious objections to providing an SSN for a driver’s license, professional license, bank account, or employment, they can invoke RFRA and cite Jordan as precedent.

5. Distinguishing U.S. v. Lee

It is important to distinguish the Jordan decision from the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), which is sometimes cited as authority for the proposition that religious objections do not excuse participation in the Social Security system.

In Lee, an Amish employer refused to pay Social Security taxes for his Amish employees, arguing that both he and his employees had religious objections to receiving Social Security benefits and therefore should not be required to pay into the system. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the government’s interest in maintaining the Social Security system outweighed the employer’s religious objections.

However, Lee is distinguishable from Jordan in several critical respects:

1. Lee was decided before RFRA was enacted. The case applied the pre-RFRA standard for religious freedom claims, which was less protective than the RFRA standard.

2. Lee involved an employer’s refusal to pay taxes, not refusal to obtain an SSN. The government’s interest in collecting taxes is generally considered more compelling than its interest in universal SSN enrollment.

3. Lee involved a claim for exemption from a generally applicable tax law, which courts have traditionally been reluctant to grant. Jordan, by contrast, involved a request for accommodation in the form of alternative documentation, which is less disruptive to the government’s interests.

4. Most importantly, Lee was decided under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, not under RFRA. RFRA was enacted specifically to provide greater protection than the Free Exercise Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.

For these reasons, Lee does not undermine the holding in Jordan. The two cases address different issues under different legal standards.

6. Biblical Basis for Religious Objections to SSNs

Many people who object to Social Security Numbers on religious grounds base their objections on biblical passages, particularly:

While Social Security Numbers are not literally marks on the hand or forehead, many Christians interpret this passage as a warning against any government-mandated identification system that is required for economic participation. The SSN functions as such a system: without it, one cannot legally work, open a bank account, or engage in most forms of commerce.

Mark 7:13 (Corban): Jesus condemned the Corban system, a Roman system of forced welfare contributions that nullified family obligations. Jesus said, “thus making void the word of God by your tradition that you have handed down.” The Social Security system, which forces people to contribute to government welfare rather than caring for their own families, can be seen as a modern form of Corban.

Exodus 23:2: “You shall not fall in with the many to do evil.” This passage warns against following the majority when the majority is engaged in wrongdoing. The widespread participation in the Social Security system does not make it morally or religiously acceptable.

These and other biblical passages provide a sincere religious basis for objecting to participation in the Social Security system and to obtaining a Social Security Number.

7. Conclusion on Religious Freedom Protections

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act provides powerful protection for people with sincere religious objections to Social Security Numbers. The 2025 decision in Jordan v. Rubio demonstrates that these protections are enforceable and can be successfully invoked to obtain essential government documents without an SSN. This decision is a landmark victory for religious freedom and provides a roadmap for others who wish to exercise their religious convictions in this area.

This is the seventh critical fact that the government has not adequately communicated to the American people: religious objections to Social Security Numbers are legally cognizable and can be successfully asserted under RFRA.

H. International Dimensions: GATT, Uruguay Round, and the Global Tracking Network

The Social Security system is not merely a domestic program but is part of a global network of social “insurance” systems coordinated through international agreements and organizations. Understanding this international dimension is important for comprehending the full scope and purpose of the SSN system.

1. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act and GATT

The requirement for parents to obtain Social Security Numbers for newborn children was significantly strengthened by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law 103-465 (originally H.R. 5110), which implemented the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the United States.

The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, enacted in 1994, included provisions requiring taxpayers to provide SSNs for all dependents claimed on tax returns, regardless of the dependent’s age. This effectively created pressure for parents to obtain SSNs for newborns, since most parents claim their children as dependents for tax purposes.

The connection to GATT is significant because it reveals that the SSN requirement for children is not purely a domestic policy decision but is part of an international framework for tracking people across national borders. GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), are international organizations that coordinate economic policy among member nations. The inclusion of SSN requirements in the Uruguay Round Agreements suggests that SSNs are viewed as part of the infrastructure for global economic coordination.

However, as noted in Section F above, SSA Publication No. 05-10023 states that “Getting a Social Security number for your baby is strictly voluntary.” This creates a contradiction: the tax code creates pressure to obtain SSNs for children, but the SSA admits that obtaining an SSN is voluntary. The resolution of this contradiction is that the tax code requirement applies only if the parent is claiming the child as a dependent, which itself is voluntary.

2. The International Social Security Association (ISSA)

The International Social Security Association (ISSA) is a global organization that coordinates social security systems across more than 150 countries. The ISSA facilitates the exchange of information and best practices among national social security agencies and works to harmonize social security policies internationally.

The United States Social Security Administration is a member of the ISSA and participates in its activities. This membership reveals that the U.S. Social Security system is not an isolated national program but is part of a global network of social insurance systems.

The ISSA’s stated goals include “extending social security coverage to all people” and “promoting the development of social security systems worldwide.” This global agenda raises questions about national sovereignty and personal liberty. If social security systems are being coordinated internationally, then domestic policy decisions about Social Security are influenced by international organizations and agreements, not solely by the republican form of government and democratic processes within the United States.

3. Conclusion on International Dimensions

The Social Security system is part of a global network of social insurance systems coordinated through international agreements (such as GATT/Uruguay Round) and international organizations (such as the ISSA). The requirement for newborns to have SSNs is linked to these international frameworks. However, the SSA’s admission that SSN enrollment is voluntary remains in effect, creating a tension between international policy goals and domestic legal rights.

I. The Federal Reserve System: A Private Corporation, Not a Federal Agency

Understanding the legal status of the Federal Reserve System is crucial to understanding the financial underpinnings of the Social Security system and the nature of the U.S. dollar. Contrary to popular belief, the Federal Reserve is not a federal government agency but a network of privately owned corporations.

1. Lewis v. United States: Federal Reserve Banks Are Private Corporations

The legal status of the Federal Reserve was definitively addressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982). The case involved a lawsuit against the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which allows suits against federal agencies for torts committed by their employees.

The question before the court was whether the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was a “federal agency” for purposes of the FTCA. The court held that it was not.

The court stated:

Examining the organization and function of the Federal Reserve Banks, and applying the relevant factors, we conclude that the Reserve Banks are not federal instrumentalities for purposes of the FTCA, but are independent, privately owned and locally controlled corporations.

The court explained the structure of the Federal Reserve System:

• Each Federal Reserve Bank is a separate corporation owned by the commercial banks in its region that are members of the Federal Reserve System.

• The stockholding commercial banks elect two-thirds of each Reserve Bank’s nine-member board of directors.

• The Reserve Banks are empowered to sue and be sued in their own name.

• The Reserve Banks carry their own liability insurance.

• Reserve Bank employees are not civil service employees.

Based on these factors, the court concluded that Federal Reserve Banks are private corporations, not federal agencies.

2. Implications for the Monetary System

The holding in Lewis v. United States has profound implications for understanding the American monetary system. If the central bank is a private corporation, then:

• The U.S. dollar is issued by a private entity, not by the government.

• The national debt is owed to private banks, not to a government agency.

• Monetary policy is controlled by private interests, not by elected officials accountable to the people.

This raises fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the monetary system and the constitutionality of delegating the money creation power to a private corporation. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof.” The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 delegated this power to the Federal Reserve System, which Lewis confirms is a network of private corporations.

3. Connection to Social Security

The connection between the Federal Reserve and Social Security lies in the fact that Social Security taxes are paid in Federal Reserve Notes (U.S. dollars), which are the liability of the Federal Reserve Banks, not of the United States government. When a worker pays FICA taxes, they are paying in currency issued by a private corporation.

Furthermore, the Social Security system was created in 1935, during a period when the national debt was expanding rapidly and the Federal Reserve was tightening the money supply. The system served (and continues to serve) as a mechanism for bringing the future labor of American citizens into the federal revenue stream, thereby providing collateral for the national debt owed to the Federal Reserve and other creditors.

4. Conclusion on the Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve System is a network of privately owned corporations, not a federal agency. This fact, established by the Ninth Circuit in Lewis v. United States, has significant implications for understanding the financial structure of the Social Security system and the nature of the U.S. monetary system.

J. Citizens as Collateral for the National Debt

One of the most disturbing aspects of the Social Security system is the argument that American citizens, through their participation in the system, have become collateral for the national debt. This argument is based on the historical context of the system’s creation and the financial structure of the federal government.

1. The Debt Crisis of the 1930s

The Social Security Act was enacted in 1935, during the Great Depression. Between 1930 and 1934, the national debt skyrocketed during peacetime—an unusual and alarming development. The Federal Reserve, established in 1913, was tightening the money supply even as the debt expanded, creating a financial crisis.

The federal government needed a mechanism to guarantee payment of interest on the burgeoning national debt. The solution was to bring the future labor of American citizens into the federal revenue system through mandatory payroll taxes. By requiring workers to pay FICA taxes, the government created a reliable, perpetual revenue stream that could be used to service the debt.

2. Future Labor as Collateral

The essence of the argument is that when people participate in the Social Security system, their future labor becomes part of the collateral base for the national debt. The government can borrow money from the Federal Reserve and other creditors with the assurance that it will have a steady stream of tax revenue from workers to service the debt.

This is consistent with the biblical warning in Proverbs 17:18: “One who lacks sense gives a pledge and puts up security in the presence of his neighbor.” By participating in Social Security, American workers have become “surety” for the national debt—they have pledged their future labor as security for the government’s borrowing.

3. The Moral Dimension

President Abraham Lincoln, in his Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1865), stated: “It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces.” This principle applies directly to the Social Security system, which forces current workers to fund current retirees, and which will force future workers to fund current workers when they retire.

The system violates the biblical command in Genesis 3:19 that each person shall earn bread “by the sweat of your face”—not by the sweat of someone else’s face. It is a system of forced intergenerational wealth transfer that is morally equivalent to slavery, as Lincoln suggested.

4. Conclusion on Citizens as Collateral

The Social Security system serves, in part, to transform American citizens into collateral for the national debt by bringing their future labor into the federal revenue system. This is a fundamental purpose of the system that is rarely acknowledged or understood.

K. Tacit Procuration, Adhesion Contracts, and Voluntary Submission to Jurisdiction

“Tacit procuration” provides an explanation for how people become subject to federal jurisdiction and federal programs like Social Security through voluntary acts, even when there is no explicit legal requirement to participate.

1. What is Tacit Procuration?

Tacit procuration is derived from the Latin procuratio (agency or management). It refers to a situation where someone, through their actions, implicitly grants another the authority to act on their behalf, even without an explicit written agreement.

In the context of Social Security, the argument is that by voluntarily applying for a Social Security Number, one is engaging in tacit procuration—they are implicitly granting the federal government authority to act as their agent or manager in certain matters, particularly financial and tax matters.

The legal maxim associated with this concept is: “An ungrateful freeman is reduced to slavery.” This maxim, found in various formulations in legal literature, expresses the principle that a free man who voluntarily accepts benefits from a benefactor becomes obligated to that benefactor and loses a degree of freedom.

2. The SSN Application as an Adhesion Contract

An adhesion contract is a standardized contract offered on a “take it or leave it” basis, with no opportunity for negotiation. The party offering the contract has superior bargaining power, and the other party must either accept the terms as written or forgo the transaction entirely.

The Social Security Number application is structured as an adhesion contract. The applicant has no ability to negotiate the terms. The application requires the one completing it to provide personal information, to certify that the information is accurate, and to acknowledge that the SSN will be used for various government purposes. The applicant must accept these terms or not receive an SSN.

By signing the application, man is entering into a contractual relationship with the federal government. The terms of this contract include:

• The man consents to the use of the SSN for tax purposes, benefit administration, and other government functions.

• The man acknowledges that they are subject to federal jurisdiction for purposes of the programs associated with the SSN.

• The man waives certain privacy rights by agreeing to allow the SSN to be used as a universal identifier.

3. Voluntary Submission to Federal Jurisdiction

The combination of tacit procuration and adhesion contract leads to the conclusion that obtaining an SSN is a voluntary submission to federal jurisdiction. The man is not required by law to obtain an SSN (as discussed in Section F), but by choosing to do so, they voluntarily enter into a legal relationship with the federal government that subjects them to federal programs and regulations.

This is consistent with the dual citizenship doctrine discussed in Section E. By obtaining an SSN, a state inhabitant may be transforming themselves into a “federal citizen” subject to federal jurisdiction. The SSN becomes the mechanism by which someone opts into the federal system.

The case of Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440 (Pa. 1925), addressed the concept of voluntary submission to jurisdiction. While the case dealt with different facts, the principle is applicable: someone who voluntarily accepts benefits or enters into a relationship with a government entity becomes subject to that entity’s jurisdiction.

4. The Waiver of Rights

By obtaining an SSN and participating in the Social Security system, a man may be waiving certain fundamental rights, including:

• The right to earn wages without taxation (since “wages” as defined in the tax code apply primarily to “employees,” and obtaining an SSN may constitute an admission that one is an “employee”).

• The right to privacy in financial matters (since the SSN is used to track all financial transactions).

• The right to religious freedom (if the man has religious objections to government identification numbers but obtains an SSN anyway under pressure).

The legal principle is that rights can be waived voluntarily, but the waiver must be knowing and intelligent. If someone obtains an SSN without understanding the legal implications—without knowing that it is voluntary, without knowing that it subjects them to federal jurisdiction, without knowing that it waives certain rights—then the waiver may not be valid.

This is why the government’s failure to adequately inform the public about the voluntary nature of SSNs and the legal consequences of obtaining one is so problematic. It suggests that millions of Americans have unknowingly waived their rights through tacit procuration and adhesion contracts.

5. Conclusion on Tacit Procuration

The theory of tacit procuration and adhesion contracts provides a framework for understanding how people become subject to the Social Security system through voluntary acts. By obtaining an SSN, people may be engaging in tacit procuration, entering into an adhesion contract, and voluntarily submitting to federal jurisdiction—even though there is no explicit legal requirement to do so.

L. FICA Taxes: Gift and Estate Tax, Not Income Tax

A critical but little-known fact about FICA taxes is that they are not classified as income taxes. Instead, they are classified as employment taxes, which fall under a different category in the Internal Revenue Code. Understanding this distinction is important for comprehending the legal nature of the Social Security system.

1. IRS Tax Classifications

The Internal Revenue Service classifies taxes into different categories for administrative and legal purposes. The two relevant categories are:

• Tax Class 2: Income taxes

• Tax Class 5: Gift and estate taxes (also called excise taxes)

FICA taxes are classified as Tax Class 5, not Tax Class 2. This means that FICA is legally a gift and estate tax (or excise tax), not an income tax.

2. The Significance of the Classification

The classification of FICA as a gift/estate tax rather than an income tax has several important implications:

• Taxation of Privileges, Not Rights: Excise taxes are taxes on privileges or specific activities, not on the general right to earn compensation. The privilege being taxed by FICA is the privilege of “employment” as defined in the Internal Revenue Code—specifically, employment by the federal government or by a corporation.

• No Right to Earn Wages: If FICA were an income tax, it would be a tax on the right to earn income, which raises constitutional questions (since rights generally cannot be taxed). By classifying FICA as an excise tax on the privilege of employment, the government avoids this constitutional problem.

• Voluntary Nature: Excise taxes apply only to those who engage in the taxable activity. If “employment” is a privilege that one can choose to engage in or not, then FICA taxes are voluntary for those who choose not to engage in “employment” as defined in the Code.

3. The W-4 Form and Voluntary Withholding

The W-4 form, titled “Employee’s Withholding Certificate,” is the mechanism by which workers authorize their employers to withhold income taxes and FICA taxes from their paychecks. The Privacy Act Statement on the W-4 form states that the form is authorized by Section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code, and that the definitions for this section are found in Section 3401.

As discussed in Section D, Section 3401(c) defines “employee” as including government employees and corporate officers. If a worker is not an “employee” as defined in Section 3401(c), then the W-4 form is based on a false premise, and the withholding is not legally authorized.

The argument is that by completing a W-4 form, a private-sector worker who is not actually an “employee” under the statutory definition is voluntarily waiving their right to earn wages without taxation. This waiver makes their wages “taxable,” even though they would not otherwise be subject to withholding.

4. Citizens Are Exempt from Withholding

There is a legal argument, based on the statutory definitions and the classification of FICA as an excise tax, that citizens (as opposed to federal employees or corporate officers) are exempt from withholding. The argument is that withholding applies only to “employees” as defined in the Code, and that private citizens engaged in private-sector work are not “employees.”

This argument is supported by the principle that federal jurisdiction is limited and that people are not subject to federal taxation unless they fall within a specific statutory category. If someone is not an “employee,” then withholding does not apply, and they are entitled to claim exemption on their W-4 form.

5. Conclusion on FICA Tax Classification

FICA taxes are classified as gift and estate taxes (Tax Class 5), not income taxes (Tax Class 2). This classification reveals that FICA is a tax on the privilege of “employment,” not a tax on the right to earn income. The tax applies only to those who are “employees” as defined in the Internal Revenue Code, and private citizens who are not employees may be exempt from withholding.

M. Practical Remedies and Procedures for Non-Participation

For people who wish to limit or terminate their participation in the Social Security system, several practical legal remedies and procedures are available. These remedies are based on the legal principles discussed in the preceding sections of this memorandum.

1. Refusing to Apply for an SSN

The most straightforward remedy is to refuse to apply for a Social Security Number in the first place. As discussed in Section F, the Social Security Administration’s own publications admit that obtaining an SSN is voluntary. There is no federal statute that requires all people to have an SSN.

For people who have never obtained an SSN, the key is to assert their rights under the Privacy Act of 1974 and to provide alternative forms of identification when necessary. The Jordan v. Rubio decision demonstrates that it is possible to obtain a U.S. passport without an SSN, using alternative documentation.

For newborns, parents should be aware that SSA Publication No. 05-10023 states that “Getting a Social Security number for your baby is strictly voluntary.” Parents can refuse the hospital’s offer to apply for an SSN and can raise their children without SSNs, provided they are willing to forgo claiming the children as dependents on their tax returns (or are not filing tax returns).

2. Asserting Religious Objections Under RFRA

For people with sincere religious objections to SSNs, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) provides powerful protection. The procedure is:

1. Document your religious beliefs: Write a clear statement of your religious beliefs and how they relate to your objection to SSNs. Reference biblical passages or religious texts that support your position.

2. Assert your RFRA rights: When asked for an SSN by a government agency, provide a written statement asserting your rights under RFRA and explaining your religious objection.

3. Offer alternative documentation: Provide alternative forms of identification and documentation that achieve the government’s stated purpose without requiring an SSN.

4. Cite Jordan v. Rubio: Reference the Jordan v. Rubio decision as precedent for your claim.

5. Be prepared to litigate: If the agency denies your request, be prepared to file a lawsuit asserting your RFRA rights. The Jordan decision provides a strong legal foundation for such a lawsuit.

3. Challenging the “Employee” Classification

For people who are currently participating in the Social Security system but believe they do not fall within the statutory definition of “employee,” the procedure is:

1. Analyze your employment status: Determine whether you are a government employee, a corporate officer, or a common law employee. If you are none of these, you may not be an “employee” under 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121 or 3401.

2. File a corrected W-4V: Complete a new W-4V form claiming exemption from withholding, based on your determination that you are not an “employee” as defined in the Code.

3. Provide notice to your employer: Inform your employer in writing of your position and your legal basis for claiming exemption.

4. Be prepared for resistance: Your employer may refuse to honor your W-4V exemption claim, citing IRS regulations. You may need to seek legal counsel or file a lawsuit to enforce your rights.

5. Document everything: Keep detailed records of all communications with your employer and the IRS, and be prepared to defend your position if challenged.

4. Privacy Act Notices

Whenever a government agency requests your SSN, you have the right to demand a Privacy Act Notice pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a note, Section 7. The notice must inform you:

• Whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntary

• By what statutory authority the SSN is solicited

• What uses will be made of the SSN

If the agency cannot provide a specific federal statute that requires SSN disclosure, or if the notice falsely states that disclosure is mandatory when it is actually voluntary, you have the right to refuse to provide your SSN and to challenge any denial of rights or benefits based on your refusal.

5. State Law Protections

Some states have enacted laws that provide additional protections against mandatory SSN disclosure. People should research the laws of their state to determine what protections are available.

6. Conclusion on Practical Remedies

Several practical legal remedies are available to people who wish to limit or terminate their participation in the Social Security system. These include refusing to apply for an SSN, asserting religious objections under RFRA, challenging the “employee” classification, demanding Privacy Act Notices, and invoking state law protections. The key is to be informed about your rights, to assert them clearly and consistently, and to be prepared to defend them if challenged.

V. CONCLUSION

The Social Security system, as it has been presented to the American people, is fundamentally different from the legal reality of the system. The government has failed to adequately communicate critical facts about the nature, scope, and legal requirements of the system. This memorandum has identified and analyzed these facts based on Supreme Court decisions, federal statutes, administrative publications, and recent case law.

Summary of Critical Facts

1. There is no contractual or property right to Social Security benefits. The Supreme Court in Flemming v. Nestor definitively held that Social Security is a welfare program, not a contractual retirement plan, and that Congress can modify or eliminate benefits at any time. This is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1304, which reserves to Congress the right to “alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the Social Security Act.

2. Social Security taxes do not go into a trust fund. The Supreme Court in Helvering v. Davis held that FICA tax proceeds “are to be paid into the Treasury like other internal revenue taxes generally, and are not earmarked in any way.” The so-called “trust fund” is an accounting fiction. The money goes into the general Treasury and can be spent on anything Congress chooses.

3. The Supreme Court has never ruled that Social Security is constitutional as a welfare program. The Court has upheld the Act only as a valid exercise of the taxing power. The larger constitutional questions about the scope of federal power to create mandatory national welfare programs remain unresolved.

4. The statutory definitions of “employee” do not create universal mandatory participation. The definitions in 26 U.S.C. §§ 3121 and 3401 focus specifically on government employees and corporate officers. Private citizens who do not fall within these categories have a plausible legal argument that mandatory FICA taxes do not apply to them.

5. There is a legal distinction between state inhabitants (nationals) and federal citizens. This distinction, recognized in cases such as Cruikshank, Kitchens v. Steele, and Elk v. Wilkins, may affect someone’s obligation to participate in federal programs like Social Security.

6. Obtaining and disclosing a Social Security Number is voluntary. The Social Security Administration’s own Publication No. 05-10002 explicitly states: “Giving your number is voluntary even when you’re asked for the number directly.” The Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits government agencies from denying rights or benefits based on refusal to disclose an SSN, except where specifically authorized by federal statute.

7. Religious objections to SSNs are legally cognizable and enforceable. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) provides powerful protection for people with sincere religious objections. The 2025 decision in Jordan v. Rubio demonstrates that these protections can be successfully invoked to obtain a U.S. passport without an SSN.

8. The Social Security system is part of a global network. International agreements such as GATT and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, and international organizations such as the International Social Security Association, reveal that the U.S. Social Security system is coordinated with social insurance systems worldwide.

9. The Federal Reserve is a network of privately owned corporations, not a federal agency. The Ninth Circuit in Lewis v. United States held that Federal Reserve Banks are “independent, privately owned and locally controlled corporations.” This has significant implications for understanding the financial structure of the Social Security system.

10. American citizens serve as collateral for the national debt. The Social Security system brings the future labor of American citizens into the federal revenue system, effectively making their productive capacity part of the collateral base for the national debt.

11. Obtaining an SSN may constitute tacit procuration and voluntary submission to federal jurisdiction. By applying for an SSN, people may be entering into an adhesion contract and implicitly granting the federal government authority to act on their behalf in financial and tax matters.

12. FICA taxes are classified as gift and estate taxes (Tax Class 5), not income taxes (Tax Class 2). This classification reveals that FICA is a tax on the privilege of “employment,” not a tax on the right to earn income.

13. Practical legal remedies exist for limiting participation in the Social Security system. These include refusing to apply for an SSN, asserting religious objections under RFRA, challenging the “employee” classification, demanding Privacy Act Notices, and invoking state law protections.

The Path Forward

For people who wish to exercise their legal rights and limit their participation in the Social Security system, this memorandum provides a comprehensive legal framework. The key principles are:

• Know your rights. The government will not inform you of your rights. You must educate yourself about the legal framework governing Social Security and SSN disclosure.

• Assert your rights clearly and consistently. When asked for an SSN, assert your rights under the Privacy Act, RFRA, or other applicable law. Provide written notice of your position and your legal basis.

• Offer alternatives. When possible, offer alternative forms of identification or documentation that achieve the government’s stated purpose without requiring an SSN.

• Document everything. Keep detailed records of all communications, requests, and denials. This documentation will be essential if you need to litigate.

• Be prepared to defend your position. The government and private entities will resist your assertion of rights. You may need to seek lawful assistance, file administrative appeals, or file lawsuits to enforce your rights.

• Stand on principle. The decision to limit participation in the Social Security system is not merely a legal or financial decision but a moral and spiritual one. It requires courage to stand against the tide of social conformity and government pressure. But as Exodus 23:2 warns: “You shall not fall in with the many to do evil.”

Final Thoughts

The Social Security system is one of the most pervasive and consequential government programs in American history. It affects virtually every American and shapes the relationship between citizens and the federal government. Yet the legal reality of the system is vastly different from the public perception.

This memorandum has sought to provide a complete and accurate account of the framework governing Social Security, based on verified authorities and rigorous analysis. The facts presented here are not widely known, and the government has not adequately communicated them to the American people.

Everyone has the right to make informed decisions about their participation in government programs. This memorandum provides the information necessary to make such decisions regarding the Social Security system. What each man chooses to do with this information is a matter of personal conscience, religious conviction, and legal judgment.

As the Supreme Court stated in Cruikshank: “The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.” This memorandum is offered in that spirit—as a contribution to informed public discourse about the nature and limits of government power.

VI. ENDNOTES

1. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (Aug. 14, 1935).

2. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/363/603/

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 - Reservation of right to amend or repeal. [Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1304

4. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/301/619/

5. Frances Perkins, Forward to Edwin E. Witte, The Development of the Social Security Act (1962), page 7.

6. Edwin E. Witte, Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means, pages 936-946 (1935).

7. Social Security Administration, Publication No. 05-10002, Your Social Security Number and Card (January 2024). [Online]. Available: https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10002.pdf

8. Social Security Administration, Publication No. 05-10023, Social Security Numbers for Children (2024). [Online]. Available: https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10023.pdf

9. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. [Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a

10. Jordan v. Rubio, Case No. 1:24-cv-01844 (D.D.C. 2025). [Court filing provided by user]

11. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. [Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000bb-1

12. 26 U.S.C. § 3121 - Definitions (FICA). [Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/3121

13. 26 U.S.C. § 3401 - Definitions (Income Tax Withholding). [Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/3401

14. 26 U.S.C. § 7701 - Definitions (General). [Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/7701

15. 42 U.S.C. § 1301 - Definitions (Social Security Act). [Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1301

16. 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i) - Use of Social Security account number. [Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/405

17. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/301/548/

18. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/297/288/

19. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/92/542/

20. Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1953). [Online]. Available: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/112/383/1749268/

21. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/112/94/

22. 4 U.S.C. § 104 - Buck Act. [Online]. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/4/104

23. Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982). [Online]. Available: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/680/1239/200393/

24. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (Dec. 8, 1994).

25. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.

26. International Social Security Association (ISSA). [Online]. Available: https://www.issa.int/

27. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (Dec. 23, 1913).

28. Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 128 A. 80 (Pa. 1925).

29. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/455/252/

30. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/494/872/

31. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/314/160/

32. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/317/111/

33. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). [Online]. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/71/2/

34. The Holy Bible, Revelation 13:16-17 (English Standard Version).

35. The Holy Bible, Romans 11:9 (English Standard Version).

36. The Holy Bible, Proverbs 23:1-3 (English Standard Version).

37. The Holy Bible, Genesis 14:23 (English Standard Version).

38. The Holy Bible, Mark 7:13 (English Standard Version).

39. The Holy Bible, Proverbs 17:18 (English Standard Version).

40. The Holy Bible, Genesis 3:19 (English Standard Version).

41. The Holy Bible, Leviticus 19:13 (English Standard Version).

42. The Holy Bible, Deuteronomy 24:14-15 (English Standard Version).

43. The Holy Bible, Exodus 23:2 (English Standard Version).

44. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1865). [Online]. Available: https://www.loc.gov/item/mal.4233400/

45. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.

46. U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1.

47. U.S. Constitution, Amendment X.

48. U.S. Constitution, Amendment I.

49. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2 (Supremacy Clause).

50. U.S. Constitution, Article V (Amendment Process).

APPENDIX: KEY STATUTORY PROVISIONS

42 U.S.C. § 1304 - Reservation of Right to Amend or Repeal

The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter is hereby reserved to the Congress.

26 U.S.C. § 3121(d) - Definition of Employee (FICA)

For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” means—
(1) any officer of a corporation; or
(2) any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee; or
(3) any individual (other than an individual who is an employee under paragraph (1) or (2)) who performs services for remuneration for any person—
(A) as an agent-driver or commission-driver engaged in distributing meat products, vegetable products, fruit products, bakery products, beverages (other than milk), or laundry or dry-cleaning services, for his principal;
(B) as a full-time life insurance salesman;
(C) as a home worker performing work, according to specifications furnished by the person for whom the services are performed, on materials or goods furnished by such person which are required to be returned to such person or a person designated by him; or
(D) as a traveling or city salesman, other than as an agent-driver or commission-driver, engaged upon a full-time basis in the solicitation on behalf of, and the transmission to, his principal (except for side-line sales activities on behalf of some other person) of orders from wholesalers, retailers, contractors, or operators of hotels, restaurants, or other similar establishments for merchandise for resale or supplies for use in their business operations.

26 U.S.C. § 3401(c) - Definition of Employee (Withholding)

For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 - Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(a) In general Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).

(b) ExceptionGovernment may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

(c) Judicial relief A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.

Privacy Act of 1974, Section 7 (5 U.S.C. § 552a note)

(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual’s refusal to disclose his social security account number.

(2) the disclosure of such number is required by Federal statute, or

(3) the disclosure of such number to such agency was required under statute or regulation adopted prior to January 1, 1975, to verify the identity of an individual.

Any Federal, State, or local government agency which requests an individual to disclose his social security account number shall inform that individual whether that disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or other authority such number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it.

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Facts in Support of the Right of Locomotion and Private Travel

This article is presented in honor and good faith, for the educational purposes, to address presumptions of commercial engagement or statutory subjection, and that the right of a man to travel upon the public highways of [pick your state and do the research, this one has South Carolina as an example], in the ordinary course of life and business, is secured under the Constitution and common law.

Note: Respectfully giving credit to Steven (D) Miller for his work and research.

The definitions and case law references as well as statutory construction rules speak for themselves.

Do your own research!

I. Driver

Definition and Original Intent

Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856):

“DRIVER. One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals.

2. Frequent accidents occur in consequence of the neglect or want of skill of drivers of public stage coaches, for which the employers are responsible.

3. The law requires that a driver should possess reasonable skill and be of good habits for the journey; if, therefore, he is not acquainted with the road he undertakes to drive; 3 Bingh. Rep. 314, 321; drives with reins so loose that he cannot govern his horses; 2 Esp. R. 533; does not give notice of any serious danger on the road; 1 Camp. R. 67; takes the wrong side of the road; 4 Esp. R. 273; incautiously comes in collision with another carriage; 1 Stark. R. 423; 1 Campb. R. 167; or does not exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in travelling on the road, to avoid dangers and difficulties, and any accident happens by which any passenger is injured, both the driver and his employers will be responsible. 2 Stark. R. 37; 3 Engl. C. L. Rep. 233; 2 Esp. R. 533; 11. Mass. 57; 6 T. R. 659; 1 East, R. 106; 4 B. & A. 590; 6 Eng. C. L. R. 528; 2 Mc Lean, R. 157. Vide Common carriers Negligence; Quasi Offence.”

This definition clearly establishes that a “driver” is one employed in commerce—conducting a coach or carriage for hire, not a private man traveling of his own right. The term “employed” denotes a commercial relationship and an agency of service for another, not a natural act of liberty.

A private man conducting his own conveyance is not a “driver” under law, but a traveler exercising his right of locomotion.

Courts and legislatures of that era recognized this distinction. Only later statutory constructions began to reframe the meaning of “driver” to encompass private travelers. This is an unlawful redefinition contrary to the rules of statutory construction:

Verba debent intelligi cum effectu ut res magis valeat quam pereat — Words ought to be understood with effect, that a thing may rather be preserved than destroyed.

This is especially true if there are no “express words of nullity” to prove the law has changed to original intent. This means that express nullity must encompass a wholesale change to the meaning in common language and be known to the people. A trick is not a law.

Thus, to preserve the integrity of the law, the term “driver” must retain its original commercial meaning. A man merely operating his own conveyance in private use is not “driving” in the legal sense.

II. Motor Vehicle

Federal Definition and Limitation to Commerce

18 U.S.C. § 31(6) & (10):

“(6) Motor vehicle – The term ‘motor vehicle’ means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways…”
“(10) ‘Used for commercial purposes’ means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge, or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.”

This federal definition confirms that “motor vehicle” is commercial by nature and use. The statutory element of “commercial purposes” is essential; without it, there is no “motor vehicle” under federal law.

Ex parte Hoffert, 148 N.W. 20 (N.D. 1914), further clarified:

“Self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled.”

U.S. Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, at page 448

“Power given to Congress to regulate interstate commerce does not carry with it authority to destroy or impair those fundamental guarantees of personal rights that are recognized by the Constitution as inhering in the freedom of the citizen.”

U.S. Supreme Court in Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 144 (1924):

“If the state determines that the use of streets for private purposes in the usual and ordinary manner shall be preferred over their use by common carriers for hire, there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent. The streets belong to the public, and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and, generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper.”

Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 22, 337 Ill 200:

“Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience. Where one undertakes, however, to make a greater use of the public highways for his own private gain, … the State may not only regulate the use of the vehicles on the highway but may prohibit it.”

Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516:

“…For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested right to use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or a license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its discretion.”

Also in Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516, we learn that the State can prohibit the use of the streets for private business gain:

“…Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has the plenary control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its police power, may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business for gain. They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary Right of the Citizen to use the streets in the usual way and the use of the streets as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business for private gain. The former is a common Right, the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the former, the legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter, it is plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the use of the streets by a common carrier in the prosecution of its business as such is not a right but a mere license of privilege.”

Washington State vs. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864:

“The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus.”

Willis v. Buck, 263 P. 982, 281 Mont.472, (1928):

“On that point the opinion is not controlling here, as no person has a vested right to use the public highways for a commercial purpose, and a denial of the mere license to do so takes from him no property or property right.”

Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82, or 93 Mont. 115:

“Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain.”

Wynehamer v. NY, 13 N.Y. 378, 481:

“The right of traffic or the transmission of property, as an absolute inalienable right, is one which has never existed since governments were instituted, and never can exist under government.”

Therefore, the lawful classification of a conveyance depends not on its mechanical nature, but on whether it is employed in commerce. Thus, the classification turns upon use, not mechanical design. It can only be regulated, prohibited, or conditioned for purposes of gain. This must be proven.

III. Locomotion vs. Transportation, Traffic, and Personal Liberty

A. The Right of Locomotion

Blackstone’s Commentaries and Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1914):

“Personal liberty consists of the power of locomotion, of changing situations, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of law.”

Am. Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, §329, p.1135:

“Personal liberty largely consists of the right of locomotion—to go where and when one pleases… The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon… is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common right which he has under his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

B. Constitutional Anchors

Fourth Amendment (Bill of Rights):

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…”

This is a possessive reference; “persons” are something the people possess, not something they are. The man possesses his “person” as property—a legal capacity. His liberty to move and to control his property is thereby constitutionally protected.

“in common usage, the term “person“ does not include the Sovereign, statutes employing the word person are ordinarily construed to exclude the Sovereign.” Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U. S. 653, 667 (1979) (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604 (1941)). See also United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275 (1947).

C. Judicial Recognition of the Right of Locomotion

• Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 (1930):

“The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right… It is not a mere privilege… It is a fundamental principle of our system of government that the rights of men are to be determined by the law itself, and not by the let or leave of administrative officers.”

• House v. Cramer, 134 Iowa 374 (1907):

“The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel along the highways of the state is no longer an open question… The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses…”

• Teche Lines v. Danforth, 12 So.2d 784 (Miss. 1943):

“The rights aforesaid, being fundamental, are constitutional rights.”

• Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964):

“Freedom of movement… is the very essence of our free society… ticketing of people and use of identification papers are routine matters under totalitarian regimes, yet abhorrent in the United States.”

These authorities reaffirm that locomotion is inherent to liberty, and that regulation can apply only to extraordinary, dangerous, or commercial uses of public ways—not to ordinary travel by right.

IV. Licensing

A. Purpose and Scope

The purpose of licensing is to regulate commercial use of the public ways, not private liberty.
Courts have uniformly held that no license is required for the exercise of a right.
Licensing applies to activities that would otherwise be unlawful but are permitted under conditions of public oversight, such as the operation of for-hire carriage or public transport.

• Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 516 (1917):

“A citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon… That right does not extend to the use of the highways as a place for private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested right to use the highways… but it is a privilege or a license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its discretion.”

and…

“…Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has the plenary control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its police power, may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business for gain. They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary Right of the Citizen to use the streets in the usual way and the use of the streets as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business for private gain. The former is a common Right, the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the former, the legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter, it is plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the use of the streets by a common carrier in the prosecution of its business as such is not a right but a mere license of privilege.”

• Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 N.E. 22, 337 Ill. 200 (1929):

“Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property… but where one undertakes to make a greater use of the public highways for his own private gain, the State may not only regulate… but may prohibit it.”

• Definition by the Supreme Court: U.S. Supreme Court in GLOUCESTER FERRY CO. v. COM. OF PENNSYLVANIA, 114 U.S. 196 (1885) at 203:

“Transportation implies the taking up of persons or property at some point and putting them down at another. A tax, therefore, upon such receiving and landing of passengers and freight is a tax upon their transportation; that is, upon the commerce between the two states involved in such transportation..”

Thus, licensing exists solely for commercial enterprises.
When a man accepts a driver’s license, registration, or title, he enters into a commercial contract with the State, subjecting himself to the statutes that regulate commerce. This is voluntary and contractual, not mandatory by right.

B. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000)

“Driver’s license information… is an article of commerce… The DPPA regulates the disclosure and resale of personal information contained in the records of state DMVs… because drivers’ personal, identifying information is, in this context, an article of commerce.”

The Supreme Court explicitly affirmed that licensing is a commercial act and that the personal information attached to it is a commodity in commerce.

This reinforces the principle: the license is a commercial instrument, and entry into that system waives certain privacy and liberty protections by contract.

C. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856):

LICENSE, contracts. A right given by some competent authority to do an act, which without such authority would be illegal. The instrument or writing which secures this right, is also called a license. Vide Ayl. Parerg, 353; 15 Vin. Ab. 92; Ang. Wat. Co. 61, 85.

2. A license is express or implied. An express license is one which in direct terms authorizes the performance of a certain act; as a license to keep a tavern given by public authority.

3. An implied license is one which though not expressly given, may be presumed from the acts of the party having a right to give it. The following are examples of such licenses: 1. When a man knocks at another’s door, and it is opened, the act of opening the door licenses the former to enter the house for any lawful purpose. See Hob. 62. A servant is, in consequence of his employment, licensed to admit to the house, those who come on his master’s business, but only such persons. Selw. N. P. 999; Cro. Eliz. 246. It may, however, be inferred from circumstances that the servant has authority to invite whom he pleases to the house, for lawful purposes. See 2 Greenl. Ev. §427; Entry.

4. A Iicense is either a bare authority, without interest, or it is coupled with an interest. 1. A bare license must be executed by the party to whom it is given in person, and cannot be made over or assigned by him to another; and, being without consideration, may be revoked at pleasure, as long as it remains executory; 39 Hen. VI. M. 12, page 7; but when carried into effect, either partially or altogether, it can only be rescinded, if in its nature it will admit of revocation, by placing the other side in the same situation in which he stood before he entered on its execution. 8 East, R. 308; Palm. 71; S. C. Poph. 151; S. C. 2 Roll. Rep. 143, 152.

5. - 2. When the license is coupled with an interest the authority conferred is not properly a mere permission, but amounts to a grant, which cannot be revoked, and it may then be assigned to a third person. 5 Hen. V., M. 1, page 1; 2 Mod. 317; 7 Bing. 693; 8 East, 309; 5 B. & C. 221; 7 D. & R. 783; Crabb on R. P. §521 to 525; 14 S. & R 267; 4 S. & R. 241; 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 522. When the license is coupled with an interest, the formalities essential to confer such interest should be observed. Say. R. 3; 6 East, R. 602; 8 East, R. 310, note. See 14 S. & R. 267; 4 S. & R. 241; 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 522; 11 Ad. & El. 34, 39; S. C. 39 Eng, C. L. R. 19.

LICENSE, International law. An authority given by one of two belligerent parties, to the citizens or subjects of the other, to carry on a specified trade.

2. The effects of the license are to suspend or relax the rules of war to the extent of the authority given. It is the assumption of a state of peace to the extent of the license. In the country which grants them, licenses to carry on a pacific commerce are stricti juris, as being exceptions to the general rule; though they are not to be construed with pedantic accuracy, nor will every small deviation be held to vitiate the fair effect of them. 4 Rob. Rep. 8; Chitty, Law of Nat. 1 to 5, and 260; 1 Kent, Com. 164, 85.

LlCENSE, pleading. The name of a plea of justification to an action of trespass. A license must be specially pleaded, and cannot, like liberum tenementum, be given in evidence under the general issue. 2. T. R. 166, 108

LICENSEE. One to whom a license has been given. 1 M. Q. & S. 699 n.

A license, as defined in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), is:

“A right given by some competent authority to do an act, which without such authority would be illegal.”

This definition is unambiguous — it presumes that the underlying act would otherwise be unlawful. A license merely legalizes that which is prohibited. Thus, when applied to any natural or constitutional right, a license becomes a contradiction in terms: it presumes the State’s authority to prohibit what it was created to protect.

The act of locomotion — the right to travel and move freely upon the land — predates any form of statute or regulation. It is a right in memorial, secured by both natural law and constitutional guarantee, and affirmed repeatedly by the U.S. Supreme Court and the foundational legal authorities of Anglo-American law:

· Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book 1, Chapter 1, “Of the Rights of Persons,” recognizes liberty of movement as an inherent incident of the absolute rights of individuals.

· The Law of Nations (Vattel, Bk. I, Ch. XIX) describes locomotion and free ingress/egress as essential to personal liberty.

· Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), Kent’s Commentaries, and numerous treatises on Constitutional Law affirm that liberty is inseparable from the right to travel.

Therefore, to assert that a man must obtain a license to exercise his natural liberty to move from place to place is to convert a right into a privilege—an act without lawful foundation and in direct conflict with the very concept of liberty.

D. Rights vs. Privileges: The Legal Paradox

1. A license may only apply to that which is unlawful.
   By its very nature, licensing presupposes prohibition. For instance, tavern-keeping or public transport “for hire” are licensable because they involve commerce and public interest.

2. A right cannot be prohibited; therefore, it cannot be licensed.
   A right is lawful in itself and requires no permission. To license a right is to redefine it as an offense unless permitted — thereby nullifying its status as a right.

3. A fundamental liberty cannot be converted into a regulated act.
   The Supreme Court and common law authorities consistently affirm that personal liberty — including the right to travel, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness — cannot be abrogated under the guise of administrative regulation.

   • Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va 367 (1930): “The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways … is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty.”

   • Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964): “Freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society.”

   • Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969): “Persons faced with an unconstitutional licensing law … may ignore the law and engage with impunity in the exercise of such right.”

These authorities collectively show that liberty of locomotion is not created by government — it is recognized by it.

E. Regulation for Gain vs. Regulation of Liberty

The State’s regulatory power extends legitimately to activities for gain or for hire — the realm of commerce — where participants enter the sphere of public interest. Such regulation is consistent with the police power recognized in Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924), concerning public carriage for hire.

However, no case in American jurisprudence has ever held that ordinary, non-commercial travel — the act of going from place to place as a man or woman — may be made a licensable or illegal act. The extension of licensing beyond commercial use is without constitutional basis, without declaration of nullity to support it, and in defiance of first principles.

F. Conclusion

If a fundamental right must be licensed, it has ceased to be a right.
The lawful exercise of locomotion — whether on foot, by horse, carriage, or automobile — cannot logically or lawfully be reclassified as an illegal act absent a license. Such an inversion of principle would subvert every foundation of liberty in the common law, the Law of Nations, and the Constitution itself.

Therefore, the licensing of the act of travel is void ab initio as a presumption against right, standing contrary to the rule of law, and wholly unsupported by any declaration of nullity or constitutional amendment to the contrary.

V. Commercial Limitation of Regulation

The commerce clause authorizes only the regulation of commercial activity.
Absent such activity, there is no lawful jurisdiction to require licensing or registration.

Every regulatory authority asserted by government derives from its power to regulate commerce under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution.

Absent commercial nexus, no jurisdiction exists to impose licensing, registration, or statutory restrictions on personal travel.

• Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924):

“The use of streets for gain is special and extraordinary… and, generally at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper.”

• Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 314 (1925):

“A citizen may have, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to travel… But he has no right to make the highways his place of business… Such use is a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the state in its discretion…”

· Hendrick v. Maryland, U.S. Supreme Court 1915:

“The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public…” and on page 624 referring to an Alabama case: “In view of the many decisions of this court there can be no serious doubt that where a State at its own expense furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefore. The amount of the charges and the method of collection are primarily for determination by the State itself; and so long as they are reasonable and are fixed according to some uniform, fair and practical standard they constitute no burden on interstate commerce.”

This case is far too often misquoted or used to mislead the courts on what was actually determined that the use of the automobile can only be regulated for commerce.

Thus, the commercial element is the foundation of any lawful regulation.
A man who travels privately, not for hire or profit, remains outside the scope of legislative control in this context.

VI. Bill of Rights, Constitution and the Limit of the Fourteenth Amendment

The right to travel is so fundamental that it is not mentioned in the Constitution.

· The U.S. Supreme Court commented in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 -758 (1966):

”. . . [T]he right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is [394 U.S. 618, 631] that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.”

“Personal Liberty is the power of unrestrained locomotion. The right to exercise it springs from the fundamental laws of our being. The ever-recurring wants of the body, requiring continual labor for their provision, and the necessity of exercise to the healthy action of all its vital processes, render locomotion indispensable to animal existence. Man shares these wants with inferior animals, and, were he their equal only, should share their freedom also. But he has other wants no less imperious than those of the body: knowledge, the aliment of the soul; and happiness, the object of its unceasing aspiration. To supply these varied wants, he is constrained to employ his powers with unremitting care. Acting upon that enlightened sense of independence, which a knowledge of his nature and destiny alone can inspire, he pursues happiness in whatever paths it invites him;…” A Treatise of the Right to Personal Liberty, Second Edition, Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 1. Rollin C. Hurd, 1876, W.C. Little Co., Albany, NY – 1876 law textbook – unrestrained locomotion and part of the pursuit of happiness.

The received law-of-the-land, as guaranteed by the Constitution for the united States of America, and that existed when the original States wrote their constitutions continues as the common law until it is canceled by the legislature with “express words of nullity.” It is restated in almost all State constitutions that the Supreme Law of the Land is in fact the organic Constitution. But because the government was created to secure the blessings of liberty, no legislature has ever had the authority to cancel personal liberty.

There are three rights of mankind, “the rights of all mankind” (“the residuum of natural liberty”) that can not be surrendered to government.

· The right to personal liberty – as noted the clear right to unrestrained locomotion

· The right to self defense

· The right to own property

These are common law rights residual to natural liberty which can never be “required by laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience…” - the introduction of the law textbook Tucker’s Blackstone printed in 1803 Virginia, updating an earlier law textbook Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law, Book 4.

“Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the “Robber Barons” and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized. If, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one by more or less rapid encroachment.”

— Dissenting Opinion in Robertson v. Department of Public Works 180 Wash 133, 39 P2d 596 (1934)

The Bill of Rights, particularly the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, secure rights that precede government and cannot be converted into privileges.

The Fourteenth Amendment, however, creates a separate class—citizens of the United States—who are subject to federal jurisdiction.

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), state:

“The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and citizens of the States are distinct from one another.”

Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment pertains to federal citizens—those domiciled within federal territory—not to state nationals or those of the several states. The rights of state citizens remain under the original Constitution and Bill of Rights, not as privileges granted by the Fourteenth Amendment, but as natural rights inherent in mankind.

VII. Unlawful Ticketing and Credential Demands (Void ab initio)

A. Freedom of movement cannot be converted into a ticketable offense

The Supreme Court recognizes freedom of movement as foundational:

• Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964):

“Free movement by the citizen is of course as dangerous to a tyrant as free expression of ideas or the right of assembly and it is therefore controlled in most countries in the interests of security. … That is why the ticketing of people and the use of identification papers are routine matters under totalitarian regimes, yet abhorrent in the United States…
Freedom of movement, at home and abroad, is important for job and business opportunities – for cultural, [378 U.S. 500, 520] political, and social activities – for all the commingling which gregarious man enjoys. Those with the right of free movement use it at times for mischievous purposes. But that is true of many liberties we enjoy. We nevertheless place our faith in them, and against restraint, knowing that the risk of abusing liberty so as to give rise to punishable conduct is part of the price we pay for this free society. ..
Freedom of movement is kin to the right of assembly and to the right of association. These rights may not be abridged, …”
… Absent war, I see no way to keep a citizen from traveling within or without the country, unless there is power to detain him. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 . And no authority to detain exists except under extreme conditions, e. g., unless he has been convicted of a crime or unless there is probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest by standards of the Fourth Amendment. This freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society, setting us apart. Like the right of assembly and the right of association, it often makes all other rights meaningful – knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and even thinking. Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer, ….”

This squarely cautions against presuming that ordinary, non-commercial locomotion is a regulatory offense.

B. No commercial nexus = no subject-matter jurisdiction

Under Article I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause), government may regulate commerce; it may not criminalize the exercise of a right. The federal statutory definition confirms the commercial line:

• 18 U.S.C. § 31(6), (10) (“motor vehicle” = used for commercial purposes; “commercial purposes” = for fare/fee/consideration or in connection with business/profit).

If an officer’s sworn statement (the charging instrument) omits any allegation of commercial use (for hire, for fee, or in connection with business), it omits the essential element that would place the accused within the regulable class. An accusation lacking an essential element is jurisdictionally defective and void ab initio; all actions flowing from the defect (stop, detention, search, impound, fine, license points, administrative suspensions) are likewise void for want of authority.

This tracks the repeated judicial distinction:

• Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 144 (1924) (ordinary use vs. use for gain; only the latter may be prohibited or conditioned).

• Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 314 (1925) (no right to use highways as a business; but the right to travel with one’s property exists).

• Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 (1930) (private use is a common right; permits may regulate, not arbitrarily deny).

C. Credentials demands cannot be used to manufacture jurisdiction

Because licensing/registration are commercial instruments (see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (DMV data treated as articles of commerce)), demanding credentials from a man not in commerce attempts to compel joinder to a commercial scheme he has not entered. Absent articulable suspicion of a commercial offense, a credentials demand functions as an unreasonable seizure of papers/effects and violates the Fourth Amendment protections (“secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects”).

Rule: An enforcement action (ticket, infraction, administrative charge) that fails to allege the commercial element is void ab initio. “Words ought to be understood with effect, that a thing may rather be preserved than destroyed” (Verba debent intelligi cum effectu ut res magis valeat quam pereat). The court must preserve the right and cannot presume a privilege.

VIII. Unlawful Seizure and Conversion of Property

A. Conversion and trespass to chattels

At common law, conversion is the intentional exercise of dominion over the personal property of another that seriously interferes with the owner’s rights and requires the actor to pay the property’s full value. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A. Trespass to chattels lies where there is an intermeddling or dispossession that causes harm or deprivation of use.

Seizing, towing, impounding, imposing storage/auction fees, or otherwise withholding a man’s automobile absent lawful jurisdiction (i.e., absent commercial nexus or other valid cause) satisfies the elements of both trespass to chattels and conversion. If impoundment springs from a void ticket, the seizure is likewise void, and the subsequent monetary exactions constitute unlawful conversion.

B. Constitutional overlay

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures; the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit deprivations of property without due process of law. When a non-commercial traveler’s conveyance is taken based on a void charging instrument (no commercial allegation), the seizure lacks probable cause and due process, and is an ultra vires act—color of law rather than law.

C. The commercial-limitation rule controls

Authorities uniformly confine plenary licensing/forbiddance to commercial use:

• Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 516 (1917) (no vested right to use highways as a place of business; permits/prohibitions apply to business use).

• Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 N.E. 22, 337 Ill. 200 (1929) (ordinary travel is a right; business use may be regulated or prohibited).

Rule: Where a man is not in commerce, the taking, holding, feeing, or auctioning of his automobile constitutes trespass and conversion. All proceeds derived from such taking are ill-gotten and subject to return, damages, and any other lawful remedy available at common law.

IX. Names, Proper Nouns, and Misnomer (Rebuttal to ALL-CAPS Designation)

A. Names, knowledge, and legal capacity

Maxims of law underscore the significance of names:

• Ad recte docendum oportet primum inquirere nomina, quia rerum cognitio a nominibus rerum dependet.
  (To comprehend rightly, inquire first into the names, for the right knowledge of things depends upon their names.)

• Fatuus praesumitur qui in proprio nomine errat.
  (One who errs in his own name is presumed incompetent.)

Thus, not knowing or understanding the ownership of ones name and its proper noun status, can lead to a presumption of incompetence and the same man can be assigned representation due to said incompetence.

Latin maxims; Oxford English Dictionary entries on Christian name; rhetorical figure antonomasia show the historic expectation that a proper noun denotes the personal, Christian, or given name, and that titles, offices, or epithets are not the same thing as a proper name.

· Antonomasia (Oxford, 1933): “The substitution of an epithet or name of office for a person’s proper name.”

B. Historic authorities on misnomer (abatement at common law)

• Bacon’s Abridgment (various editions, 18th–19th c.), Of Misnomer, and Want of Addition:

“Misnomer is a good plea in abatement … since names are the only marks … if the name be omitted or mistaken, there is a complaint against nobody. And … if the defendant has been arrested by a wrong name, the court will set aside the proceedings … and discharge him if in custody.”

• Discussions in later abridgments/materials further note that a wholly mistaken Christian name was “regularly fatal” to legal instruments at common law.

These authorities show that identity matters; the law historically requires correct, proper-name identification of the man summoned or bound, and a misnomer defeats process.

C. “All-caps name” as designation of an artificial entity

Supported by dictionary usage notes, style manuals, and historical practice—is that an ALL-CAPS name is not a proper noun, and functions as a designation for a separate, artificial, commercial/legal entity (a “person” in the statutory sense). It is a title or epithet.

• Black’s Law Dictionary (older editions) distinguished Christian name (given/baptismal) and surname (family name). “Christian name: the baptismal name as distinct from the surname…”

• Style authorities and government manuals historically capitalize initial letters of proper names, not every letter; wholesale ALL-CAPS has been used for styles, captions, docketing, or identifiers, not for the man’s proper name in ordinary usage.

• The rhetorical figure antonomasia describes substituting a title or office for a proper name — paralleling the objection that state-created designations (citizen/person/resident/national) function as offices or statuses, not as the man’s name.

• Black’s Law Dictionary – 4th Edition TITLE. “The radical meaning of this word appears to be that of a mark, style, or designation; a distinctive appellation; the name by which anything is known. Thus, in the law of persons, a title is an appellation of dignity or distinction, a name denoting the social rank of the person bearing it; as “duke” or “count.” — thus it is not the man’s Christian Name and a misnomer and misaddress of the man and a fatal flaw.

Objection preserved: When a charging instrument, license, or judgment proceeds solely against the ALL-CAPS designation without clear joinder by the man, the man may object that the instrument is directed to a different legal subject, creating a misnomer and a failure of proper party identification. Under historic misnomer doctrine, that defect goes to the sufficiency of the process.

Note on modern practice: Many modern codes allow amendment of misnomer defects. The objection stands that amendment cannot cure an identity fiction that seeks to merge the man with a separately administered commercial entity without knowing, voluntary consent. The court of record must resolve identity and capacity on the record, not by presumption.

D. Credentials and the ALL-CAPS joinder problem

As shown in Reno v. Condon (2000), driver-licensing data are treated as articles of commerce. Credentials issued solely in an ALL-CAPS designation evidence participation in that commercial registry. Where a man expressly declines commercial engagement and preserves his proper name in ordinary usage, the mere presence of an ALL-CAPS identifier on government paperwork cannot lawfully conscript him into a different legal persona or public office by presumption.

Rule: A man retains the right to appear, be known, and be held to account in his proper name. He may object to proceedings or instruments directed to an ALL-CAPS designation as misnomer or as an attempted joinder to a commercial persona he does not accept, and he may insist that any adjudication proceed upon the proper party, with the limits of that party’s non-commercial capacity preserved.

In principle, this is the legal-philosophical bridge by which the “man” is converted, by presumption, into an “entity.” Based on Bacon’s Abridgment and the Principle of Misnomer: Bacon’s Abridgment (originally by Matthew Bacon, 1736 ff.) states under “Misnomer” that if a name is wrongly given, “the process is against nobody.”

The logic is ontological: the name is the legal signifier by which an entity is known in court; misnaming severs that identity. If the law proceeds under a wrong name, it proceeds without a subject; thus void. This makes the name the juridical vessel of identity.

When the State writes a name in a different form (e.g., in full capitals, as in JOHN DOE), it is creating a distinct juridical person—a corporate or civil identity detached from the man of flesh and blood.

The Conversion of Man to Entity: In effect, this is the conversion process. By altering the name’s grammatical form, the living man, who possesses inherent, unalienable rights, is treated as a construct of law: a “person,” “resident,” or “defendant.”

This is the subtle transmutation from natural being to legal fiction, achieved not by physical act but by linguistic artifice. The Romans understood this well: in Roman civil law, the capitis diminutio maxima meant loss of status by name alteration, extinguishing natural liberty and converting one into property of another.

E. Classical and Literary Parallels:

Plato, Cratylus (on the correctness of names):

“The giving of names is no small matter; it requires a great deal of wisdom.”

Plato recognized that names define essence; to rename is to re-define being.

Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II:

“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose / By any other name would smell as sweet.”

Juliet’s lament acknowledges that political or familial designations change perception and consequence, though not essence. Yet in law, perception is consequence, so the “name” binds or frees.

Socrates, in Theaetetus, argues that ignorance mistaken for knowledge is the gravest bondage:

“He who is mistaken in what he is, is the most deceived of all.”

When a man accepts the legal fiction as himself, he enters the cave’s shadow once more.

Francis Bacon himself wrote elsewhere (De Augmentis Scientiarum):

“The Idols of the Marketplace are those formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other.”

Meaning: language itself corrupts understanding when words are misused. The “marketplace” (forum, court) is precisely where such idols - false names (titles, mark, appellation), gain power.

F. Summary

The misnomer becomes the vehicle of conversion. Through linguistic substitution, the man is presumed to have consented to stand as a corporate abstraction, subject to statutory control.

Or as the poets might put it:

“When the tongue betrays the soul, the word (in the court reality, the name) becomes the chain.”

X. Public Roads, Their Unalienable Nature, and Statutory Clarifications in South Carolina

A. Public Roads as Unalienable Trusts

1. Doctrine of Unalienability
   As expressed in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856, 1914, 1959):

“Things which are not in commerce, as public roads, are in their nature unalienable.”
“The natural rights of life and liberty are unalienable.”

This doctrine holds that public roads are not commodities to be alienated; they are held in trust for the people’s use. Any statute that purports to convert ordinary public roads into alienable property or to restrict non-commercial use without consent is inconsistent with that foundational principle.

2. Constitutional and Historical Context
   The Constitution gives Congress power to “establish Post Offices and post roads” — but that is not the same as creating all roads. Many public ways preexisted and were used by common people; the post‐roads clause does not overwrite or vest absolute proprietary title in the government to all roads. The existence of a way open to travel is often ancestral and common, not statutory.

The use of public roads by the people is consistent with the Declaration of Independence’s recognition of unalienable rights (life, liberty, property)—the roads being instrumental to liberty of movement cannot lawfully be turned into a privilege by statute except under a valid consent or contract.

3. Dedication and Public Use
   Although many roads are dedicated (by landowners or local authorities) to public use, dedication is a grant of an interest (easement or servitude) permanently to the public, not a sale of the underlying fee. Once accepted, dedication becomes irrevocable, placing the road into public use trust. The public’s right to use the way cannot be abrogated by private acts or contradictory statutes unless due process and compensation are provided.

B. South Carolina Statutes Recognizing Public Road Use

Historical and Common-Law Foundation

The public right of locomotion—of travel from place to place in pursuit of one’s affairs without license or interference—extends to every lawful man or woman and predates statutory enactments. In every state formed under the original compact, roads and highways were held in trust for the people, and were never alienated into commerce.

South Carolina, like Virginia and West Virginia, retains this doctrine implicitly within its statutory language, acknowledging that roads are maintained for the public’s use and not as a privilege to be licensed except in matters of commerce and gain.

The South Carolina Code of Laws, though modernized in form, continues to reflect this foundational intent.

C. Statutory Recognition of Public Road Use

Definitions and Scope

South Carolina Code § 56-5-430 defines the terms “street” or “highway” as follows:

“The entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.”

This definition makes no reference to license, permit, or commercial activity. It recognizes the use of the public as the defining characteristic of the road’s nature. Thus, “publicly maintained” ways are by definition held for public service, not commerce.

Likewise, S.C. Code Reg. § 63-342, defining “highway” for regulatory purposes, affirms:

“All roads, streets and other ways open, or intended to be opened, to the use of the public for travel by motor vehicles.”

And S.C. Code § 57-17-10, concerning county supervision of “public roads, highways, bridges, and ferries,” places maintenance and oversight under the counties, ensuring that such roads remain in public stewardship.

These statutes collectively affirm the enduring principle that the existence and maintenance of public roads serve the people, not the state’s commercial enterprise. The state holds only the duty to maintain and regulate safety in public use—not ownership of the people’s liberty to travel.

D. Dedication, Maintenance, and Stewardship

Under Title 57 (Highways and Public Transportation), South Carolina distinguishes between state highways and public roads but treats both as public in character. The Department of Transportation maintains such roads “in a safe and serviceable condition,” and when roads are abandoned or relocated, jurisdiction reverts to local public authorities—never to private or commercial ownership.

This continuous chain of public stewardship reflects the common-law trust: that public roads are unalienable, meaning they cannot be sold or placed in commerce. The definitions and duties across Title 57 mirror Bouvier’s long-standing definition:

(paraphrase) - “Things which are not in commerce, as public roads, are in their nature unalienable.”
(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1856, 1914, 1959 editions).

E. Regulation for Gain vs. Regulation of Rights

It has long been established that activity “for gain” or “for hire”; that is, use of public ways in pursuit of profit, is subject to regulation under the state’s police power and commerce authority. The U.S. Supreme Court in Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924), and Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868), affirmed that government may regulate carriage for hire, as it is a commercial use of the roads.

However, travel and locomotion undertaken by a man or woman in their private capacity is not commerce. The lawful use of public roads for personal passage is a right of liberty secured under the natural and common law, reiterated in the Declaration of Independence as an unalienable right.

There exists no declaration of nullity or lawful repeal of this principle in any South Carolina statute or federal law (or any law of any state of the Union of States). The presumption that all use of public roads is commercial or licensable is without foundation in original meaning and stands contrary to constitutional construction.

F. Construction and Legislative Intent

Statutory construction requires that all statutes be read in harmony with the Bill of Rights, the South Carolina Constitution (or any other lawful state of the Union), and the Declaration of Independence, all of which preserve the rights of the people as antecedent to government.
Under these principles:

1. The state cannot convert a right into a privilege without express consent or contract.

2. Regulation may exist only to the extent of safety or commerce—never to destroy or diminish inherent rights.

3. The people retain the right to locomotion as part of liberty, and such use cannot be presumed as commercial absent clear evidence of gain.

G. Conclusion

Public roads in South Carolina, as in every lawful state of the Union, remain unalienable and held in trust for the people. The statutes defining highways, streets, and roads confirm that these ways exist “open to the use of the public.”

The lawful right to travel thereon cannot be lawfully licensed or taxed unless done for hire or gain. All other regulation is a presumption beyond the limits of original intent, unsupported by any declaration of nullity or constitutional amendment to the contrary.

XI. Residency, Ownership, and the Misapplication of Legal Status

A. Definition and Misuse of “Resident”

Black’s Law Dictionary (1st Ed., 1891) defines:

Resident – “A tenant who was obliged to reside on his lord’s land and not depart from the same; a resident may not be entitled to all the privileges or subject to all the duties of an inhabitant. 9 Wend. 11”.

Emer de Vattel’s Law of Nations, Bk I, Ch. 19, § 213:

“Residents, as distinguished from citizens, are aliens who are permitted to take up a permanent abode in the country. Being bound to the society by reason of their dwelling in it, they are subject to its laws so long as they remain there, and, being protected by it, they must defend it, although they do not enjoy all the rights of citizens. They have only certain privileges which the law, or custom, gives them. Permanent residents are those who have been given the right of perpetual residence. They are a sort of citizens of a less privileged character, and are subject to the society without enjoying all its advantages. Their children succeed to their status; for the right of perpetual residence given them by the State passes to their children.”

Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 1856:

Resident – “international law. A minister, according to diplomatic language, of a third order, less in dignity than an ambassador, or an envoy. This term formerly related only to the continuance of the minister’s stay, but now it is confined to ministers of this class.”

Resident, persons. “A person [divided into categories depending on station, position, standing, etc… however, “In law, man and person are not exactly-synonymous terms”… “A person is a man considered according to the rank he holds in society, with all the rights to which the place he holds entitles him, and the duties which it imposes”]… coming into a place with intention to establish his domicil or permanent residence, and who in consequence actually remains there. Time is not so essential as the intent, executed by making or beginning an actual establishment, though it be abandoned in a longer, or shorter period.”

Thus, a resident is not an equal to the people of the state, but a foreign alien temporarily allowed to remain under license or privilege. By confessing “residency” on government forms, a man unwittingly waives his political and territorial independence and enters a foreign administrative jurisdiction. Such confession constitutes joinder to privilege and waiver of unalienable right.

No man is lawfully compelled to confess residency, for to do so is to exchange one’s inherent sovereignty for subjection under the feudal model—a tenant upon another’s land. A lawful person and a man are not synonymous as a man can have a lawful person title, yet not be of said station in the daily private life. Statutory redefinitions cannot alter that historic meaning, for the rules of statutory construction require preservation of original intent (verba cum effectu).

B. Oaths and Jurisdiction

· Oaths create vertical jurisdiction—they are acknowledgments of subordination to a superior.

· Christ’s command, “Swear not at all” (Matthew 5:34-37), reflects the ancient maxim that equality among men is lost when an oath of fealty is sworn.

· In America (as is actually true throughout the world), all men are created equal; therefore, no man is required to swear to another’s authority to exercise a right (the ability to do anything you want as long as it causes no harm to another of mankind; which is the act of rights ending where another man’s rights begin and of said other man’s rights end where yours begin).

· An oath is given to [provided to] another [public servant] by a superior [the people]; as in the oath of office and oath of fidelity given to the public servants acting in the explicit role to protect rights unalienable and inviolate to take.

· A perjury-oath signature on government forms is a contractual confession of subordination and jurisdictional consent.

· A compelled autograph under threat of loss, penalty, or prosecution is void, for it is given without free will—consensus tollit errorem; coacta voluntas non est voluntas.

C. Legal Title vs. Equitable Ownership

Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed.):

Legal Title –

“One cognizable or enforceable in a court of law… but which carries no beneficial interest in the property, another person being equitably entitled thereto.”

Legal Owner –

“The legal owner has title to the property, although the title may carry no rights to the property other than a lien.”

· Accordingly, the certificate of title to an automobile does not convey full ownership; it merely evidences participation in a public registry and that the equitable title exists somewhere.

· The true, equitable title resides with the State once the Manufacturer’s Certificate of Origin is surrendered (almost always under coercion, or lack of knowledge).

· By registering the automobile, the man converts private property into commercial property held in public trust—a voluntary alienation.

· Thus, the government becomes the equitable owner, and the registrant holds only conditional use subject to regulation.

This is by coercion and fear. As such this invalidates the agreement as no man would sign away his right to the thing he has full invested interest and the government has none.

D. Personal Liberty and Ownership

1 Bl. Comm. 134 defines personal liberty as:

“The power of locomotion, of changing situation, of removing one’s person to whatever place one’s inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law.”

· To force licensing, registration, or fealty oaths as conditions to move freely upon public roads is an infringement upon this liberty.

· By compelling the man to assume the status of resident or legal owner, government converts unalienable liberty into revocable privilege—contrary to both common-law maxims and the Declaration of Independence, which proclaims such rights as “unalienable.”

E. [State Name] Application and Standing

· [State’s Name] statutes use “resident” chiefly for taxation and administrative classification.

· They do not, nor could they, redefine the lawful status of a man born upon the land.

· The [State Name] Constitution and Code contain no grant of authority empowering government to compel men to declare residency or surrender property title as a prerequisite for exercising liberty.

· To impose such requirements exceeds delegated power and constitutes constructive fraud upon the people of the [Commonwealth or State].

F. Lawful Distinction and Remedy

1. A man of the land is not a “resident”; he is domiciled upon [State Name] or any physical state of the Union of states by right of birth and soil or by naturalization, not by privilege or permission.

2. A man’s automobile, held in private capacity, is not a motor vehicle in commerce; compulsory registration is void absent informed consent.

3. Any oath or signature obtained under threat or necessity is void ab initio, being involuntary.

4. Government may not redefine terms of art—resident, license, ownership, person, driver, motor vehicle—to usurp unalienable rights.

5. Rights of liberty, locomotion, and property ownership remain under the protection of the Bill of Rights and are beyond legislative reach.

G. Conclusion

i, a man; [First-Middle: Family Name], affirm that i am not a resident, not an alien, and not the legal owner of any property held in commercial registry.
i, retain full equitable interest in my property and full liberty of movement upon the public roads of [State Name].
All presumptions of residency, oaths of subordination, or statutory titles in my name are rebutted and void.
Government may not, by redefinition or coercion, divest me of my unalienable rights secured by divine law, the Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, and the Constitution.

XII. The Inconsistency of Licensing a Fundamental Right: Locomotion Cannot Be Made Illegal

A. The Contradiction Between Right and License

A license, as defined in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), is:

“A right given by some competent authority to do an act, which without such authority would be illegal.”

This definition is unambiguous — it presumes that the underlying act would otherwise be unlawful. A license merely legalizes that which is prohibited. Thus, when applied to any natural or constitutional right, a license becomes a contradiction in terms: it presumes the State’s authority to prohibit what it was created to protect.

The act of locomotion — the right to travel and move freely upon the land — predates any form of statute or regulation. It is a right in memorial, secured by both natural law and constitutional guarantee, and affirmed repeatedly by the U.S. Supreme Court and the foundational legal authorities of Anglo-American law:

• Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book 1, Chapter 1, “Of the Rights of Persons,” recognizes liberty of movement as an inherent incident of the absolute rights of individuals.

• The Law of Nations (Vattel, Bk. I, Ch. XIX) describes locomotion and free ingress/egress as essential to personal liberty.

• Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), Kent’s Commentaries, and numerous treatises on Constitutional Law affirm that liberty is inseparable from the right to travel.

Therefore, to assert that a man must obtain a license to exercise his natural liberty to move from place to place is to convert a right into a privilege—an act without lawful foundation and in direct conflict with the very concept of liberty.

B. Rights vs. Privileges: The Legal Paradox

1. A license may only apply to that which is unlawful.
   By its very nature, licensing presupposes prohibition. For instance, tavern-keeping or public transport “for hire” are licensable because they involve commerce and public interest.

2. A right cannot be prohibited; therefore, it cannot be licensed.
   A right is lawful in itself and requires no permission. To license a right is to redefine it as an offense unless permitted — thereby nullifying its status as a right.

3. A fundamental liberty cannot be converted into a regulated act.
   The Supreme Court and common law authorities consistently affirm that personal liberty — including the right to travel, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness — cannot be abrogated under the guise of administrative regulation.

   • Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va 367 (1930): “The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways … is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty.”

   • Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964): “Freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society.”

   • Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969): “Persons faced with an unconstitutional licensing law … may ignore the law and engage with impunity in the exercise of such right.”

These authorities collectively show that liberty of locomotion is not created by government — it is recognized by it.

C. Regulation for Gain vs. Regulation of Liberty

The State’s regulatory power extends legitimately to activities for gain or for hire — the realm of commerce — where participants enter the sphere of public interest. Such regulation is consistent with the police power recognized in Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924), concerning public carriage for hire.

However, no case in American jurisprudence has ever held that ordinary, non-commercial travel — the act of going from place to place as a man or woman — may be made a licensable or illegal act. The extension of licensing beyond commercial use is without constitutional basis, without declaration of nullity to support it, and in defiance of first principles.

D. Conclusion

If a fundamental right must be licensed, it has ceased to be a right.
The lawful exercise of locomotion — whether on foot, by horse, carriage, or automobile — cannot logically or lawfully be reclassified as an illegal act absent a license. Such an inversion of principle would subvert every foundation of liberty in the common law, the Law of Nations, and the Constitution itself.

Therefore, the licensing of the act of travel is void ab initio as a presumption against right, standing contrary to the rule of law, and wholly unsupported by any declaration of nullity or constitutional amendment to the contrary.

XIII. Regulation, Licensing, and Competence: Distinct Legal Principles Often Misapplied

A. Regulation and Licensing Are Not Synonymous

The terms regulation and license have been intentionally blurred in modern jurisprudence, yet historically, linguistically, and lawfully, they are distinct in meaning, purpose, and jurisdictional effect.

• Regulation derives from the Latin regula, meaning “rule” or “to bring into order.” Its lawful function is to maintain order, ensure safety, and provide standards within a lawful domain. It presupposes that the underlying activity is lawful and that the State merely provides parameters for its orderly exercise.

• License, conversely, derives from the Latin licere, meaning “to be permitted.” It denotes a formal authorization to do what would otherwise be illegal.

  • Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856) defines license as:

“A right given by some competent authority to do an act, which without such authority would be illegal.”

• Thus, licensing presupposes prohibition. It transforms what was once lawful by right into an act prohibited except by permission.

The fundamental distinction is therefore simple and immutable:

Regulation governs the lawful; licensing permits the unlawful.

Where regulation organizes, licensing restricts. Where regulation recognizes the preexistence of a right, licensing converts that right into a conditional privilege.

B. Competence Aligns with Regulation, Not Licensing

The concept of competence—as historically used in law and in education—refers to fitness, capacity, or ability to perform a task safely and effectively.
Its etymology (from competens, “to come together, to be fitting”) aligns naturally with regulation, as both are concerned with ensuring order and sufficiency, not subjugation or prohibition.

To assess competence (for example, ensuring that a man operating a machine understands its functions or can navigate safely) falls within a regulatory role. It affirms ability, not authority. It measures skill, not submission.

Licensing, however, is the inverse. It does not measure competence; it creates dependency. It presumes the act to be illegal unless authorized, transforming self-governance into administrative compliance. In the lawful sense, competence validates a man’s inherent capacity; licensing invalidates it until granted by another.

C. The Jurisdictional Consequences of Licensing

When a man applies for and accepts a license, he consents, often unknowingly, to a jurisdictional shift. He admits that his action (travel, trade, work, etc.) would be unlawful without the State’s permission, thereby placing himself under the authority that issues and enforces that permission.

By contrast, regulation, in its original lawful sense, does not create such a relationship of dependency. It provides general standards applicable to all, whether licensed or not, and operates within the scope of public safety, not commerce.

Under the rules of construction, courts must give words their plain and ordinary meaning as understood when the law was adopted. No rule of interpretation allows “regulation” to mean “prohibition” or “license” to mean “competence.” The two are mutually exclusive in both origin and function.

D. The Constitutional and Logical Contradiction

The contradiction arises when the judiciary and bar equate licensing with regulating competence. Doing so:

1. Destroys the distinction between right and privilege;

2. Converts liberty into an act subject to permission;

3. Reverses the burden of proof—the man must now prove he is allowed to do what was once presumed lawful by right.

If a right must be licensed, it is no longer a right. And if the act being “licensed” was never unlawful to begin with, then the license is void, and any enforcement thereof is a trespass upon liberty.

Judges and attorneys, who by oath are bound to the Constitution and to uphold the separation between public rights and administrative privileges, cannot lawfully claim ignorance of this distinction. To call a right a privilege is a usurpation; to enforce it as such is tyranny.

E. Regulation for Safety vs. Licensing for Control

The lawful purpose of government regulation is limited to ensuring peace, order, and the general welfare—never to restrict liberty itself.

• Regulating how one drives (e.g., speed, signal, right of way) maintains safety for all.

• Licensing whether one may drive transforms liberty into a commodity.

One exists within the police power—the power to prevent harm; the other within commercial jurisdiction—the power to grant or revoke privileges.

When the act being regulated is an exercise of personal liberty (travel, trade, speech, worship, or labor), licensing of that act is void ab initio. It presumes an unlawful power not delegated by the people and contradicts the very purpose of the Bill of Rights—to restrict government from infringing on natural liberty.

F. Conclusion

Regulation, competence, and licensing are not interchangeable.

• Regulation provides order among rights.

• Competence ensures ability within that order.

• Licensing destroys both, converting liberty into privilege.

As demonstrated throughout this article, licensing belongs exclusively to commerce—to the governance of that which is offered “for hire” or “for gain.” It has no lawful relation to personal liberty or locomotion, and any presumption to the contrary is without foundation in law, reason, or history.

A right cannot be licensed. A man cannot be permitted to do what is already lawful.
Any law or regulation purporting to require a license for the exercise of liberty is repugnant to the Constitution and void at inception.

XIV. The False Equivalence Between Regulation and Prohibition

A. The Original and Proper Meaning of “Regulate”

The verb regulate originates from the Latin regula — a “rule,” “straight line,” or “standard.”
The earliest English usages (17th–18th centuries) defined regulate as to bring into conformity with a rule or order; to make regular or orderly; to adjust to a proper state or condition.

There is no historical or linguistic foundation for construing “regulate” as “prohibit.”

Etymology (Oxford English Dictionary):
Regulate (v.) — 1610s: to control by rule, system, or law; to make regular or orderly; from Medieval Latin regulatus (“made regular”).
Regulation (n.) — 1670s: act of regulating; state of being reduced to order; rule prescribed by authority (1715).

Thus, the concept of regulation has always presupposed the lawful existence of the activity being regulated. It cannot logically extend to the prohibition of that which is rightfully done. It operates within the sphere of order, not the realm of denial.

B. The Lawful Boundaries of Regulation

In both common law and constitutional structure, regulation is a limited governmental function tied to the police power: the preservation of peace, safety, and order, but it may never abrogate or convert a right.

Chief Justice Marshall stated in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824):

“To regulate … is to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.”

Even here, regulate does not mean prohibit. The Court emphasized that the term involves the establishment of rules of conduct, not the destruction or conversion of the subject matter being governed. The power to regulate commerce was thus distinguished from a power to suppress or abolish commerce.

By analogy, the power to “regulate travel” (if it exists at all) could mean setting forth general rules of safety or uniform standards of conduct, but never to prohibit or condition the exercise of the right itself. Regulation ensures harmony; prohibition extinguishes liberty.

In the same opinion Marshall notes:

“But it does not extend to a commerce which is completely internal.”

Clearly separating the commerce clause from internal exchange and movement within a state. Hence, internal state commerce and travel is not within the jurisdiction of federal law.

“State inspection laws, health laws, and laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c. are not within the power granted to Congress.”

Again, all about licensing commerce, be it federal or state. Licensing is NOT about free locomotion of people.

C. The Modern Judicial Distortion

The judiciary and bar, through decades of statutory construction divorced from original meaning, have begun to treat “regulate” as synonymous with “control through permission.”

This shift occurred primarily after the incorporation of administrative law doctrines and the Commerce Clause expansions of the early 20th century (notably Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)), where the meaning of “regulate” was silently expanded to include control over private, non-commercial conduct that “affects” commerce.

This reinterpretation, an administrative invention, and not a constitutional amendment, has caused a categorical error:

• It transferred the concept of commercial regulation (a legitimate function) into the realm of personal liberty (where it has no place).

• It allowed licensing and enforcement regimes originally meant for common carriers, ferries, taverns, and trades to be applied to ordinary men and women exercising private rights.

The result is a semantic inversion: “regulation” now functions as a disguised synonym for prohibition-with-exceptions, i.e., licensing.

D. The Logical and Legal Contradiction

From a logical standpoint, the conflation is self-defeating:

1. If “to regulate” means “to prohibit unless permitted,” then all regulation becomes a system of licensing.

2. If a right must be licensed, it is no longer a right but a privilege.

3. If a right can be prohibited, it was never a right.

Hence, judicial and administrative practices that treat regulation as permission destroy the very legal distinction upon which constitutional order depends.

Under the rules of statutory construction, such an interpretation is void:

• The courts must presume that words are used in their ordinary sense (Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993));

• They may not interpret statutes in ways that produce absurd or unconstitutional results;

• Nor may they presume legislative intent to violate foundational rights (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).

Therefore, the current presumption by judges and attorneys that “to regulate” includes the authority to license or prohibit is without textual, historical, or lawful basis. It arises solely from administrative convenience and commercial interest, not from constitutional principle.

E. The Constitutional Test

The test is simple and irrefutable:

• If the act in question, such as locomotion, was lawful before the statute,

• And if the statute does not explicitly declare it unlawful, (within constitutional limitations and unalienable rights within natural law)

• Then the government has no authority to demand permission, issue a license, or impose conditions upon its exercise.

Absent an express constitutional and lawful declaration of nullity, the right remains intact and self-executing.
Thus, to construe regulation as prohibition is to act ultra vires—beyond the delegated power of government—and every enforcement arising therefrom is void ab initio.

F. Conclusion

The word regulate never meant prohibit.
The word license never meant competence.
The judiciary’s and bar’s substitution of these meanings amounts to a linguistic fraud upon the people—transforming rights into permissions and liberty into servitude.

Original meaning, lawful grammar, and the maxims of common law make the matter plain:

That which is lawful by right cannot be made unlawful by regulation, nor lawful only by license.

XV. Summary of Principles and Lawful Conclusions

1. The right of locomotion is an unalienable right secured by common law, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.

2. Driver and motor vehicle are commercial designations, applicable only to those operating for hire or gain.

3. Licensing and registration are commercial contracts; participation is voluntary.

4. Ticketing without commercial allegation is void ab initio and confers no jurisdiction.

5. Seizure and monetization of private property for non-commercial use is theft and conversion.

6. ALL-CAPS names are legal fictions; a man retains the right to visit in his proper name.

7. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to federal citizens, not to men of the several states.

8. Public Roads are held in trust for the people to use as an unalienable right.

9. Residency, Beneficial Ownership through coercive registering and titles, and the Misapplication of Legal Status do not convert unalienable rights to government controlled privileges.
   

10. Additional Principles and Lawful Conclusions